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Partm.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

As a practicing attorney, undersigned long believed that many incidents of trials,
including transcripts, could reveal a great deal of relevant information when keyed to an
appropriate historical inquiry. The value ofsuch testimony derives from its being under oat~
subject to cross examination and penalties of perjury, and immediately recorded by a court
reporter. Although opinions of appellate courts are frequently noted in history texts, they
cover only the issues appealed. A great deal more about the era in which the trial occurred
can sometimes be learned from actual testimony, covering subjects of great interest to historians, even though not examined by the appellate courts.
The Francisco trial analyzed in Chapter 8 herein met the above criteria, when
analyzed in conjunction with Virginia's Sunday closing law history. Briefing in appealed
cases can also provide clues as to who did, or did not, propose arguments appellate court
adopted, as occurred here. Such considerations were in addition to the more conventional
library research and examination of original documents also undertaken for this project.
As to citation of legal materials in this thesis, The Bluebook: A Uniform System of

Citation (18th ed., 2005), developed by the major law reviews, was the standard followed.
It generally requires that state ourt case citations be only to ''the regional reporter for the

region in which the court sits," Blue Pages portion, B5.1.3(v), page 9, ibid. These "regional
reporters" were begun by the West Publishing Company (now part of the Thompson-West
concern). All Virginia appellate opinions since 1887, for instance, are in the "South Eastern" Reporter (Bluebook, supra, Table 1, p. 237), abbreviated "S.E.," followed by a second
111

series of more recent opinions to date, abbreviated "S.E. 2d." There are similar abbreviations for other regional reporters throughout the nation, as provided in the Bluebook.
This thesis attempts, as fully as possible, to follow the Bluebook. However, being a
historical study, rather than a legal one only, it was deemed appropriate to also include the
so-called "official" reports of each state appellate court cited, along with the regional
reporter. This was because, for historical purposes, it may be important to study the "official"
state court reports, rather than the national reporter system (an example is in thesis Chapter

7, n. 72 herein).
Many court opinions discussed herein were published before the national reporter
system, so they can only be found in the official reports. This is also why official reports are
cited for every thesis case, since many could only be located that way in any event. Case
quotations are cited to relevant pages of the official report, ifapplicable, in either the United
States Supreme Court Reports or Virginia cases. In non-Virginia state cases, quotations are
cited to the official report if only that is available or to the regional reporter system only, if
that is available. Consistent with the Bluebook, the terms "page," ''p.," or similar references
for pages are not used, except where needed to avoid confusion because of other reference
numbers also identifying the document. The highest Virginia court, the "Virginia Supreme
Court," was once called the "Virginia"Supreme Court of Appeals." For reasons explained in
this thesis, Chapter 2, footnote IO, that court is described herein as the "Virginia Supreme
Court," except where th,e older name is quoted. Following the Bluebook, when the first
letters pf~urt" or "Supreme Court" are capitalized, that reference is always to the United
iv

States Supreme Court.
A work of this type cannot be accomplished without assistance from others.

The

only difficulty with naming some is the concern that names of others, equally helpful, have
been inadvertently omitted. Subject to that qualification, the following are especially remembered: Joseph D. Kyle, Ph.D., Coordinator of Education Service and Grants for the
Hanover Tavern Foundation, was extremely helpful in suggesting those in the Hanover area

familiar with the 1941 Francisco trial. Through his suggestions Mr. Sumpter Priddy, son of
the late, identically-named Sheriff, in office during the Francisco trial, was located. The
younger Priddy supplied an informative letter attached to the thesis as Exhibit "H," and
many keen observations about the thesis subject matter, all extremely appreciated. The
unparalleled assistance of Hanover County Deputy Clerk Thomas Carlson, head of the
County Clerk's Office criminal division, is highly appreciated as well as the personal approval
for that assistance by the Honorable Frank D. Hargrove, Jr., Hanover County Clerk, further
detailed in Chapter 8, n. 2. Invaluable help also was supplied by the Library of Virginia.
At the University of Richmond, diligent help was rendered in locating documents,
books, periodicals, and interlibrary loans. Mr. Keith Weimer, the highly competent government information specialist at the University's Boatwright Memorial Library, searched for
obscure documents with an intensity making it seem his life depended on it, which was more
than appreciated. Mr. James E. Gwin, Collection Librarian at Boatwright, offered encourage~ent and excellent

advice. Assistant History Professor A.H. ("Woody") Holtt'>ll, a very

quick study, supplied consistently insightful suggestions of pertinent courses of action in this

v

thesis. His laser-like analysis of the text improved its professionalism immeasurably. The
value of his contributions were beyond price. Formal approvals being obtained for thesis
materials from the Virginia Historical Society and the Historical Society of Western Virginia
in Roanoke are also much appreciated.
From the inception of entry into the graduate program in history at the University of
Richmond, undersigned has appreciated the consistent support, insight and academic
inspiration provided by faculty advisor John D. Treadway, Professor ofHistory. He has been
unfailing in encouraging academic initiative well-grounded in underlying scholarship and
generates academic enthusiasm among those attending his classes and seminars. Undersigned's progression in the program has benefitted greatly from his encouragement.
At home, undersigned's spouse, Keitha VanderKloot, when we arrived in Richmond
in 1999, opined that after talking about history for over twenty years it was high time to begin
a formal study ofit. It was at her suggestion and withher encouragement that undersigned's
graduate study was undertaken. Love and appreciation for her encouragement of this very
worthwhile experience is here expressed as well. For these reasons, this thesis, also subjected to her legal-secretarial proof-reading exactitude, is dedicated to her as well.
Respectfully submitted,

William R. V anderKloot
Dated: July 1, 2005
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THE TROUBLED INTERSECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF CHRIST
AND COMMERCE: APPELLATE-COURT REVIEW OF vmGINIA SUNDAY
CLOSING LAWS IN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW THROUGH 1942.
Chapter 1:

INTRODUCTION

Thomas Jefferson reckoned his drafting of Virginia's Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom ("Jefferson's Statute") among his three most outstanding achievements. 1 Virginia
has continuously reenacted it in subsequent recodifications of its law. 2
This study was initially undertaken to trace the impact of Jefferson's Statute on the
history of Virginia appellate litigation. Review ofthe first hundred years of Virginia appellate
opinions, however, revealed no reference to it, except Perry v. Commonwealth. 3

Jefferson's self-written epitaph: "Here was buried Thomas Jefferson, author of the
Declaration of American Independence of the Statute of Virginia for religious freedom &
father of the University of Virginia." Quoted in Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and
the New Nation: A Biography (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), 988, with a photograph, the third of four between 912-913, ibid, of Jefferson's handwritten instructions,
directing it contain "not a word more ... because by these, as testimonials that I have lived,
I wish most to be remembered." Ibid. See also Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515
U.S. 819, 822 (1995) (Jefferson viewed University of Virginia's founding ''together with
authorship of the Declaration of Independence and of the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, Va Code Ann §57-1 (1950), as one of his proudest achievements ....").
2

Current statute: Va. Code Ann. (1950), §57-1 (1995 Repl. Vol.).

3

44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 602 (1846). A convicted defendant objected to the trial court's
admitting testimony of a prosecution witness who denied God punished perjury after death
but, instead, did so, the witness said, during one's life. Defendant claimed the witness thereby
expressed "religious opinions [that] disqualified him" from testifying. Ibid, 603-604.
Virginia's highest court disagreed, observing: "[Formerly] ... one who did not believe in the
Christian religion could not be a witness. . . . In Virginia, [this] ... was wholly abrogated
by our Bill of Rights, and the act for securing religious freedom, .... [providing:] 'That
religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be
(continued... )
1

2
After Perry, Virginia appeals gave little consideration to Jefferson's Statute until litigation later arose concerning Virginia Sunday closing laws (i.e., proscribing Sunday labor
or commerce) such as Pirkey Bros. v. Commonwealth in 1922, 4 which declared:

"[The

Sunday closing law][5] ... , cannot be enforced as a religious observance, as that is forbidden by our laws on the subject ofreligious freedom." 6 Pirkey's discussion of the interplay
between Virginia's closing laws and its religious freedom laws was incorporated by Virginia's high court into later closing law opinions in 19427 and 1961. 8 Thus the issues embodied
in Jefferson's Statute first arose in a practical way in appellate review of Sunday closing laws
and, accordingly, attention was redirected to this narrower topic.

3

( ••• continued)

directed only by reason ... , and not by force and violence' .... It was said that one who
holds the proscribed opinions [here, denying that God punished perjury after death] has not
the 'capacity' to testify .... But the [Virginia] Constitution says that religious opinion shall
not lessen 'civil capacities' .... The only error ... was in allowing the witness to be
questioned . . . touching his religious principles. This being an error in favor of the
[defendant] prisoner, the judgment must be affirmed." Ibid, 610-613. Thus, Perry held that
Jefferson's statute prohibited inquiry into religious opinions of a prospective witness, when
determining the competency of that witness to testify.
4

134 Va. 713, 114 S.E. 769 (1922).

5

Then-cod~ed

6

Pirkey Bros., 134 Va. at 717 (emphasis added).

7

Francisco v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 371, 376-377, 23 S.E 2d 234 (1942).

8

in Virginia Code Ann. (1919) § 4570.

"[A] Sunday law ena~ted under the police power of the State for ... a day ofrest
... , to prevent ... debasement ... from ... labor, does not infringe upon the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom." Mandell v. Haddon, 202 Va. 979, 988, 121 S.E.2d 516
(1961), citing Pirkey Bros, discussed further, infra., at nn. 23 through 70, Chapter 7, infra,
and accompanying text.

Chapter 2:

FRANCISCO v. COMMONWEALTH APPELLATE OPINION STUDIED, TO FRAME CLOSING-LAW ANALYSIS IN THIS THESIS

This thesis begins, and ultimately concludes, studying Virginia Sunday closing laws,
their dynamics, development, and indications of their eventual quiescence; by examining the
1942 Francisco v. Commonwealth 1 opinion by Virginia's highest tribunal, the then-entitled
Supreme Court of Appeals. 2 No claim is made for Francisco as pivotal, but it can be termed
representative, both as an analytical starting point and as a means to examine social conduct,
both unifying and divisive, embodied in the operation of Virginia's closing laws as revealed
in appellate decisions through 1942, when this thesis concludes.
This Chapter 2 examination of Francisco is confined to the December 7, 1942, text
of the Virginia high-court's opinion (the "opinion" or "Francisco"). With that backdrop,
succeeding Chapters 3 through 7, offer a more detailed study of Virginia Sunday closing
laws, from their prehistory antecedents through 1942. References are also made to relevant
developments outside Virginia, some much earlier than its colonial founding. With this
detailed review in hand, the thesis returns to a more detailed examination of Francisco itself,
in Chapter 8, considering matters not apparent from this Chapter 2 review of the high-court

180 Va. 371, 23 S.E. 2d 234 (1942).
2

Virginia's highest court, formerly the "Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals," now
the "Virginia Supreme Court," retained its predecessors records. For consistency, "Virginia
Supreme Court" is used herein to identify Virginia's highest court, except in quotations
containing the other name. It is also used to avoid confusion, because there is now (circa
2005) a "Virginia Court of Appeals," an intermediate appellate court, unconnected with the
old "Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals."

3

4
opinion alone. Finally, general conclusions about Virginia closing laws through 1942 are
offered in Chapter 9.
Reading Francisco propels the imagination back to the early 1940s in Virginia's
then-almost wholly bucolic Hanover County, just north of Richmond, the state capital. Major arterial highways interlaced the area, encouraging a substantial tourist business, supporting restaurants, gas stations and convenience stores. Their sales were of gasoline, drinks,
including beer, and other goods, a significant portion of which occurred on Sunday,3 though
ostensibly prohibited, at least in part, by the Virginia Sunday closing laws.
The defendant, M. G. Francisco, described as a "country merchant," operated a
Hanover County general store. He sought to profit :(I-om the tourist traffic by selling on
Sundays, among other things, beer for off-premises consumption, as did eighty percent of
Hanover County businesses holding, as he did, a state license to sell beer. 4 He was cited for
violating Virginia's closing law, virtually unchanged since originally adopted by the first postrevolutionary war Virginia legislature in 1786,5 providing in pertinent part:
If a person on a Sunday be found laboring at any trade or calling, or
employ his apprentices or servants in labor or other business except in
household or other work of necessity or charity, he shall be deemed guilty of

3

Ibid, 373-374. The facts of Francisco here-stated are only those found in the December 7, 1942, Virginia Supreme Court opinion at 180 Va. 371. Other facts not in that
opinion, are discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis.
4

Francisco, ibid, at 373-374. ''No complaint was lodged against him [Francisco]
for the sale of articles other than beer." Ibid, at 374.

5

The original 1786 statute is quoted in text preceding n. 20, Chapter 5, infra.

5
a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than five
dollars for each offense....6
Hanover County Circuit Judge Leon M. Bazile presided at the Francisco trial. 7 His
"written opinion, made part of the record" in that trial, ruled that what was a Sunday ''work
ofnecessity," exempted from prosecution, was a question of law for the court, not one offact
for the jury. He further held that the defendant's alleged Sunday sale of beer could not, as a
matter oflaw~ be deemed a statutorily exempted "necessity. " 8 He therefore "instructed the
jury that if they believed . . . beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant ... maintained
a business for the sale of beer and sold beer on the Sunday in question, they should find him
guilty."9 Since Mr. Francisco never contested these matters, the result was, said the Francisco opinion, given the judge's jury instruction, "a verdict of guilty necessarily followed." 10
That is, the judge's instruction effectively compelled the jury to find Mr. Francisco guilty
merely because the sale occurred on Sunday. He barred the jury from considering whether
there was an exculpatory "necessity" for the sale, precluding conviction.

6

7

Va. Code Ann. (1919) § 4570, quoted in Francisco, 180 Va. at 375.
Francisco, 180 Va. at 373.

8

Ibid, 180 Va. at 375. The Virginia Supreme Court here summarized, rather than
quoted, the trial court's ruling. The Supreme Court described the precise charge against
defendant, as being his unlawful "laboring at his trade and calling by remaining open and
maintaining a business for the sale of beer and by selling beer on Sunday." Ibid at 373.
9

Ibid at 374.

10

Ibid.

6
Mr. Francisco's sentence was a five dollar fine, the statutory minimum. 11 His conviction, however, was overturned by the Virginia Supreme Court's December 7, 1942,

Francisco opinion, 12 which assigned two reasons for its reversal:
First, the trial court erred in concluding ''the sale of beer on Sunday, ... was, as a
matter oflaw, not a necessity...." It was, said the Supreme Court, "for the jury and not the
court to say whether such Sunday sale was or was not reasonably essential to the economic,
social or moral welfare of the community [i.e., a 'necessity']." 13
Second, said the high court, the trial judge erred in "excluding from the jury evidence
that the [Hanover County] board of supervisors had considered and failed to enact an ordinance prohibiting the sale of beer on

Sunday."~

was "pertinent and material on whe-

ther the work of selling beer on Sundays was reasonably essential to the economic, social or
moral welfare of the community [i.e., an exculpatory 'necessity,' precluding conviction]."14

11

Ibid at 373. For the five dollar minimum fine imposed, refer to the last line of the
statute as quoted in thesis text preceding n. 6, this Chapter, supra.
12

Francisco, 180 Va. at 383. Three of the court's five judges joined in the Francisco opinion. The fourth concurred in result only and filed a short opinion. The fifth dissented but filed no dissenting opinion.
13

Francisco, 180 Va. at 380 (emphasis and bracketed words added).That is, the Supreme Court ruled, the jury could find, in its discretion, as a matter offact (not law), that in
this particular circumstance, a sale of beer was, or was not, a "necessity." Trial Judge Bazile, the high court effectively concluded, could not take that decision away from the jury.
14

Ibid at 381-382.

7
Thus ended Francisco's appellate record. ts This did not necessarily mean the lowercourt retrial which Francisco also ordered did not occur, since a retrial, if not appealed,
would not appear in any appellate record. However, given the defendant's appeal ofhis first
conviction, he seemed unlikely to be any less inclined to appeal a later one. Conversely, given
the prosecution's zeal, it also seemed unlikely to simply abandon what it had so vigorously
pursued, even had there been an acquittal. t6 Lack of further appellate proceedings was,
therefore, puzzling.
Equally puzzling was why the County was prosecuting, given the high court's finding
that "at least eighty percent of those licensed to sell beer [in the county] ... sold it openly on
Sundays."t 7 Paradoxically, local authorities were I?-Ot prosecuting Sunday closing law
violations by "eighty percent ofthose licensed to sell beer" who "sold it openly on Sundays,"
while relentlessly pursing this one, seemingly minor, offender. ts
t5

1 Shepard's Virginia Citations (1995), 703, reveals no further appellate activity.

t6
A jury acquittal of defendant would prevent his retrial for the same offense, on
double-jeopardy grounds; e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 2. The prosecution, however, might
have appealed alleged errors of law, even after acquittal, solely to establish favorable
precedent, as suggested in a parenthetical phrase in thbe following quotation in Commonwealth v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, 811, 97 S.E. 820 (1919) (dictum): "When the purpose of
an appeal in a criminal case is to procure on behalf of the State a reversal of the judgment
and a new trial ofthe accused (as distinguished from a mere review and decision of the legal
question involved for use as a precedent in future cases) the rule against a second jeopardy
for the same offense ... destroy[s] the right of appeal." Alternatively, a subsequent Sunday
sale by this defendant could have been prosecuted.
17

Francisco at 374.

18

America's eminent entry into World War II also, arguably, should have redirected
(continued ... )

8
Thus, the Francisco opinion, as outlined above, raised questions not answered by the
facts and circumstances contained within the confines of its text. It was difficult to locate
additional credible evidence for answers, as will be shown. Although, perhaps not enough
was learned to reach unassailable conclusions, what was uncovered allowed some wellinformed suppositions about why cases like Francisco arose under the Sunday closing laws,
not only in Virginia, but elsewhere as well. To better understand what was learned, however, it is necessary first to examine the origins and development of Sunday closing laws,
both in Virginia and elsewhere where relevant, from their earliest indications in JudeoChristian history through the year-end-1942 conclusion date of this thesis.

18

( ••• continued)
Virginia law enforcement attention, in general, towards matters like espionage, sabotage,
treason and subversion, rather than the prosecution of (in 1941 ), and contesting the appeal
of (in 1942) this relatively minor state Sunday closing law misdemeanor.

Chapter 3:

(a)

OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPING A SEVEN-DAY "WEEK,"
INCLUDING CHANGING THE CHRISTIAN SABBATH TO THE
FIRST DAY OF THAT WEEK.
Development of the Seven-Day Week.

An analysis of laws prohibiting labor on a day-certain (Sunday) within the seven-day
week, is necessarily incomplete without first considering how the seven day week itselfarose.
This is because the closing law's presumed impact partly depends on its undeviating
recurrence within the week's seven-day cycle. This Chapter 3, accordingly, also considers
whether connections can be found between Sabbath requirements of rest and religious
reflection and the origins of the seven-day week.
One scholar found the seven-day week's origins a "mystery" whose roots "lie deep,
too deep to fully understand." 1 Another asserted, that "[w]hile various seven-day patterns
were present in ancient Near Eastern texts, no [non-biblical] sabbath day or seven-day week
or seven-day creation account has been discovered."2 Still others noted, however, that
Babylonians, "rested on the fifteenth day of the month, the time of a full moon, [which] they
called shabuttu, meaning 'cease' or 'rest."' Each "rest"day was called a "sabbath," when
work stopped for worship and celebration. 3

Witold Rybczynski, Waiting/or the Weekend (New York: Viking Penguin, 1991),
49, citing numerous authorities for this conclusion in ''Notes on Sources," 238-239, ibid.
2

Terence E. Fretheim "Commentary, Genesis 1: 1-2:3, The Creation," New lnterpreter 's Bible (Nashville: Abington Press, 1994), 1:340-347, 346.
3

Hiley H. Ward, Space Age Sunday (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 55-56, citing
Wilhelm P .F.F. Lotz, "Sabbath," New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia ofReligious Knowledge,
9

IO

The Babylonians ultimately observed not merely one, but four rest days each month.
Work ceased, ''probably the first, eighth, fifteenth and twenty-second of the month." Astrology convinced the Babylonians these days were ill-omened, except the mid-month full moon
date, when they prayed to be saved from divine wrath on the other three.
Weekly "sabbaths" which were "ill-omened," except at mid-month, seem the opposite of the uniformly exalted holy sabbath-day of biblical tradition. Israelites, exiled to BabyIon when conquered by that Empire around 600 B.C.E., presumably learned there of such
Babylonian "sabbaths." Perhaps they concluded that whatever their Babylonian enemy feared,
they should embrace,4 and thus saw these non-midmonth "sabbaths" as days of gladness and
rest for Israe~ not of penance or dread, as they were for the Babylonians. 5

Samuel Macauley Jackson, ed., (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1911), 10:135-136.
4

This somewhat parallels the reputedly middle-eastern saying, "The enemy of my
enemy is my friend," as explained in Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs, 4th ed., Jennifer
Speake, ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003), 90. Ward, 56, ibid, explained: "The
sabbath of the Babylonians was for penance; while to the early Hebrews it was a day of
gladness and rest."
5

Ward, n. 3 (this Chapter), supra, at 56, supplied quotations and assertions in the
text paragraph supported by this footnote and the paragraph immediately preceding; and
insightfully noted bible texts attributing, presumably due to Babylonian influence, special
significance to "new moon" and "Sabbath": (1) A husband rebukes his wife (despondent
over a son's death) for consulting the prophet Elisha: "Why will you go to him today? It is
neither new moon, nor sabbath." 2 Kings 4:23; (2) The prophet Amos disdainfully
"quotes" hypothetical greedy merchants: "When will the new moon be over, that we may
sell grain; and the sabbath, that we may offer wheat for sale?" Amos 8:5 (NRSV). J. A.
Soggin stated: "A connection [of "sabbath"]with the Akkadian [North Babylonian]
sablpattu, ... should probably be rejected, as they are unpropitious days, the opposite of
what the Sabbath seems to be. Nevertheless, the former connection is so obvious
etymologically that one should ask whether the abstention from work on such a day does

11
While the foregoing possibly offers an archeological-historical explanation oflsrael's
adopting a seven-day week, the Judeo-Christian Bible attributed the week's origin to the
Israelite deity's creative powers. In Old Testament-Genesis, God's acts ofcreation consumed
six days and then, it was said, "God blessed the seventh day and hallowed it, because on it
God rested from all the work that he had done in creation.''6 Humankind, however, was not
clearly instructed to hallow this seventh day until, we are told, God later said to Moses:
Six days shall work be done, but the seventh day is a sabbath of solemn rest,
holy to the Lord; . . . . Therefore the Israelites shall keep the sabbath ... as
a perpetual covenant. It is a sign forever between me and the people oflsrael
that in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day he
rested, and was refreshed. 7
Hiley Ward, asserted that ''periods of fifty day~, or 'pentecontads,' originated at the
time of Moses [within which] ... were seven weeks of forty-nine days, including seven
sabbaths, with one extra [holy day]." Then "'at a much later date, during the Babylonian
captivity, ... the pentecontad plan with its special 50th day was abandoned and a regular

invariable seventh-day sabbath was introduced .... "'8

not lead ... to the Israelite concept ofrest." Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan, ed.,
The Oxford Guide to Ideas & Issues of the Bible (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001),
s.v., "Sabbath," 444.
6

Genesis 2:3, NRSV. The arguably incorrect "Old Testament" is used here, because
its meaning is more widely understood in the vernacular, rather than the historically more
correct but less-well-understood "Hebrew Bible.''
7

8

Exodus 31:15-17, NRSV.

Ward, Space Age Sunday, 58 (emphasis in original), quoting from Elizabeth Achelis, Of Time and Calendar (New York: Thomas Nelson, 1955), 87, 88.

12
Still another origin for a "sabbath" or "rest" day was offered in the Old Testament
Book of Deuteronomy, saying Moses told the people oflsrael:
Six days you shall labor and do all your work. But the seventh day is a sabbath
to the Lord your God; you shall not do any work . . . . Remember that you
were a slave in the land of Egypt, and the Lord your God brought you out
from there ... , therefore the Lord your God commanded you to keep the
sabbath day. 9
One commentator claimed this passage "subordinated" creation ''to that of the exodus." In

contrast, another found ''the fundamental sanction of the Sabbath in both statements is
creation-in Exodus, of the world; in Deuteronomy, of a people. " 10
The Old Testament thus required scrupulous observance of a weekly Sabbath. The
Israelites believed this covenant with their God was "~o important that penalties for disobedience were severe [death]," and that "desolation awaits the land that pollutes the Sabbath. " 11 The meaning ofthis theological imperative was clouded, however, by confusion over
what was being ·observed. The "Sabbath," as derived from Babylonian tradition was, somehow, transmogrified from a day, in the main, to be dreaded, into, in Israelite belief, one to be
honored. Further, the biblical texts quoted also confused whether that observance honored
God's resting after six days of creation (Genesis/Exodus) or Israel's escape from Egyptian

9

Deuteronomy 5:12-15, NRSV.

10

Walter Brueggemann, "Commentary, Exodus 20:8-11," New Interpreters Bible,
supra, n. 26, supra, 1:845, first quotation in the footnoted paragraph. The last quotation,
comparing Exodus and Deuteronomy passages, was from Winton U. Solberg, Redeem the
Time: The Puritan Sabbath in Early America (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977), 9.
II

Ward, Space Age Sunday, 57. Solberg, 9, n. 9, and accompanying text.

13
slavery (Deuteronomy). These confusions seemed to carry over to its contemporary purposes
and observances, as just discussed in Chapter 2 herein, concerning Francisco.

(b)

Christians Move Sabbath Worship to the First Day of the Week.

Since Sunday was celebrated as ''the day of the [Christ's] resurrection," Christians
found it "invested ... with special character as a symbol ofredemption in Christ," inducing
their shifting its celebration to Sunday. 12 This, however, does not explain how the practice
became standard in the Roman Empire, where the Israelites and their seventh-day Sabbath
were a comparatively minor presence. Christians, with a weekly first-day Sabbath, were
initially a smaller offshoot of these relatively (to the Romans) insignificant Israelites.
Also impeding the seven-day week's development was the absence of any similar
measure of days in other cultures the Romans knew. The Egyptians provided for three tenday divisions in their thirty-day months. The Greeks had an analogous practice, roughly
corresponding to the moon's waxing, full-moon, and waning. The Romans divided their
months into three segments, but of unequal lengths, not similar to seven-day weeks. 13
Scholars studying the seven-day week admit their explanations of its origins are
speculative. That being said, Witold Rybczynski, for example, theorized that the week's seven days may reflect ancient preoccupations with supposed powers of the numeral seven,

12

Ward, Space Age Sunday, 74; Solberg, Redeem the Time, 11. The quotations in
the paragraph's text preceding this footnote are from these sources, ibid, consecutively.
13

Rybczynski, Waiting for the Weekend, 25-26, cites sources calling the religious
day shabqttu, instead of shabyftu (Ward's sources, n. 3, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text, or sab/pattu, used by Soggin's sources, n. 5, this Chapter, supra.

14
preserved in such expressions as the Seven Pillars of Wisdom, the Seven Labors of Hercules,
or the Seven Wonders of the World. The ancients also supposedly discerned seven heavenly
bodies with apparent motion: Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, Sun, and Moon. As trologers claimed each such ''planet" was supposedly influenced by the god whose name it
bore. 14 Assigning a different planet god-name to each of seven successive days, now comprising a ''week," purportedly ceded influence over each such day to that god as well. However, "historians have been unable to fully unravel the relationship between the planetary
week and the Jewish week," though they are "obviously connected." 15
Finally, Jewish communities in the Roman Empire, though small and disdained were,
nevertheless, heavily involved in trade. This made it convenient, said some scholars, for other
merchants to conform to the Jewish seven-day week with Saturday-Sabbath work-abstention, since when Jews were not doing business, it was harder for others to do any either. 16
Other faCtors favored Sunday, not Saturday, as a weekly rest day, such as its religious observance also by sun-worshiping pagan religions like Mithraism, competing with
Christianity for dominance in the Empire. 17 Also, there was a Roman tradition of"market
days," every eighth or ninth day. These increasingly recurred within the now-developing
14

The sun and moon, at that time, were considered "planets." "Tuesday'' through
"Friday'' were renamed by Northern Europeans for Norse gods whose mythological functions paralleled their Greco-Roman pagan-deity counterparts. Ibid, 30.
15

Ibid, 34. Previous discussion in this paragraph is drawn from ibid, 22-33.

16

Ibid.

17

Ibid, 36-37.

15
seven-day week, often on Christian Sundays, which commenced with worshipers celebrating Christian Eucharist, but otherwise was "an ordinary working day." 18
Presumably due to such pressures towards a Sunday cessation from labor, the Roman
Emperor Constantine, in 321 C.E., issued a Sunday observance edict, providing in part:
On the venerable day of the sun, let the magistrates and people residing in
cities rest, and let all workshops be closed. In the country, however, persons
engaged in the work of cultivation may freely and lawfully continue their
pursuits; because it often happens that another day is not so suitable for grainsowing or vine-planting; lest by neglecting the proper moment ... the bounty
of heaven should be lost. 19
Constantine also, significantly, ordered his soldiers to pray, in part: "We acknowledge thee
the only God: we own thee as our King .... Together we pray to thee, and beseech thee long

18

Rybczynski, Waiting for the Weekend, 66-61. This ''market day" influence may
have confused whether Sunday was to be a day for rest and worship or for worship and
shopping as implied, for example, in Francisco. See Chapters 2 and 8 herein.
19

Solberg, Redeem the Time, 12, quoting the edict, at n.11, from James A. Hessey,
Sunday: Its Origin, History, and Present Obligation, 3d ed. (London: 1866.), 58. Ward,
Space Age Sunday, 11 and n.18, has a slightly different translation, varying little substantively. Constantine's edict was noted in Richardson v. Goddard, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 28,
41 (1859)("The observance of Sunday as a Sabbath or day of ceremonial rest was first
enjoined by the Emperor Constantine as a civil regulation, in conformity with the practice of
the Christian church."). In McGowan v. Maryland, 360 U.S. 459 (1962) (concurring
opinion), however, Justice Frankfurter declared: "Constantine's edict proscribing labor on
the venerable day of the Sun ... [should be] passed over," and Sunday closing law analysis
confined to "modem England, the American Colonies, and the States ... ," Ibid, at 470.
However, the Jewish sabbath's confusing origins (Chapter 3(a), ibid), and confusion
concerning Constantine's Sunday edict, (Chapter 3(b), herein), perhaps augured later
confusion about what closing laws restricted in Virginia case law in Chapters 6 through 8,
herein, for example. Justice Frankfurter may have unduly discounted this earlier history.

16
to preserve to us, safe and triumphant, our Emperor Constantine and his pious sons. " 20
Hiley Ward found it unclear if Constantine was a practicing Christian, but saw his
quoted edict and prayer as political, no matter his religious sincerity.21 Since the Emperor
was protected by an army of diverse faiths, with Christianity not yet dominant over pagan
creeds, the prayer was prudently ambiguous, it could be argued, about what religion was
being followed. It did not mention Christ nor the Fourth Commandment's Sabbath mandate,
making it congenial to either Christianity or Mithraism. In the Emperor's above-quoted nowork-on-Sunday edict, only his urban subjects (whom he, presumably, more easily controlled), were ordered to cease work. Those in the country had broader exemptions from
ceasing labor in part, arguably because, being more

r~mote,

they were less subject to the

emperor's control. 22 By this explanation, the edict became a face-saving way to excuse its
nonenforcement in rural areas, probably beyond his power in any event. Furthermore, the
text of the Emperor's prayer appears more devoted to his glorification, rather than any hen-

20

Hiley H. Ward, Space Age Sunday, 77, citing and quoting, at nn. 62, 67 and 68
therein, Eusebius, "The Life of the Blessed Emperor Constantine," quoted from Philip
Schaff and Henry Ware, ed., A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
of the Christian Church (New York: Christian Literature Co, 1890), 1:545.
21

Ibid. Emperor Constantine's devotion to and understanding of Christianity is a
complex matter of study, summarized as favorable, but incremental, adjustments towards
that faith. He was not baptized until on his deathbed in 337 C.E. See Marcel Le Glay, et al.,
A History of Rome, 2d ed. (Malden, Mass./Oxford: Blackwell, 2001 ), 411-412.
22

This arguably was so despite the edict's elaborate justification for not ordering
rural cessation of labor (to the effect that nature does not allow delay of farm tasks)
which, by its very intricacy suggested, perhaps, a different underlying explanation.

17
efit to his soldiers, subjects, or homage to the deity to whom, ostensibly, it was addressed.
Thus, Constantine's "prayer" and edict perhaps, were not to be explained solely by religious
motivation; their religious attributes being to some degree a facade concealing his actual
purpose of sustaining his political dominance. They could be, instead, an early but by no
means unique example of allegedly religious government activity also intended to augment
power of those controlling the government. As will be seen, such suggestions of self-serving
motivations offer plausible explanations about how later confusions could arise about the
purpose of statutorily-required Sunday rest, as occurred in the Francisco case. 23
Thus, paralleling the confusion about the original sabbath's meaning in the Old Testament, Christian views about what was appropriate conduct on the new Christian Sunday
"sabbath" were. similarly conflicted. This continued into the Middle Ages:
Although the medieval Church formulated a demanding theory of
Christian Sabbatarianism, it failed to secure general compliance with its
expressed ideal. Many laymen ... took their morning sleep on the Lord's
Day and spent the remainder of Sunday in various innocent or vicious
pastimes.... Mother Church indulgently winked at these lapses as long as
offenders did not question her precepts. 24
So at the very beginning ofgovernmental "Sunday rest" edicts, there was a lack of consensus
similar to those much later arising, as in Francisco, over what was permitted on Sunday,
arguably derived from the initial ambiguity over what the Sabbath was observing.

23

The initial review of Francisco was in Chapter 2 herein, supra. The discussion of
possible concealed motivations in Francisco will be in Chapter 8 hereinafter.
24

Solberg, Redeem the Time, 14-15.

18
In the fourth and fifth centuries, C.E., church councils began requiring strict Sunday
rest and worship attendance. "Civil officials proscribed the payment of debts and legal proceedings, and in 386 Emperor Theodosius ... forbade the transaction of business on Sunday." Nevertheless, recreation was not banned, and ''necessary" duties could be performed,

ifnot interfering with worship. In the next thousand years, however, the Church declared ''the
new Christian ceremonies to be the legitimate successors of the old Jewish ceremonies ...
rel[ying] on the Fourth Commandment ... [as] a moral law binding all mankind rather than
a ceremonial law only binding Jews." Increasingly "bishops and princes enjoined ... [Sunday]
labor and commercial activities and ... travel and recreation." After the Norman conquest,
Sunday laws in England were enforced with increasing ~trictness. 25 In continuing the topic of
this thesis, however, the next significant event that principally affected what would become
Virginia's Sunday closing laws was Henry VIII's takeover ofthe Catholic church in England.

It is to this event, its closing law consequences, and the relation of both to Virginia's
colonization, that we now turn.

25

Ibid, 13-14 (all quoted passages in this paragraph are from this source).

Chapter4:

(a)

IMPACT OF THE ENGLISH REFORMATION ON SUNDAY
LAWS, BOTH IN ENGLAND AND IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA.
The Henrician Church Confiscation and its Closing Law Impacts.

Henry VIII broke with Rome in 1533, appropriating to himself that part of the
Catholic Church in his relm; renamed the "Church of England," which he headed. 1 He was
cautious in reforming Sunday observance. His reconstituted Church initially followed Catholic
doctrine that the Fourth Commandment was not "literally binding" on Christians, in contrast
to what were seen as the other commandments' moral imperatives. Therefore, Sunday labor

was expressly allowed "if necessary ... to save ... corn or cattle; indeed, failure to do so for
scruple of conscience offended God." Henry's Church thereby "denounced idleness ... [yet]
offered no sanction for Sunday amusements or recreations. " 2
After a more radical Protestantism under Henry's successor, his boy-king son Edward VI (1547-1553), then back toward Catholicism in the yet-briefer reign of his daughter
"Bloody" Mary (1553-1558), England finally "demonstrated the Anglican spirit of compromise," as achieved by Elizabeth I. She induced Parliament to adopt (1) the Act of Supremacy,
requiring obedience to the sovereign, and (2) the Act of Uniformity which, while "allowing
wide latitude of belief' promoted ''uniformity of practice" by compulsory Sunday worship

Euan Cameron, s.v. "Henry VIII," 470-472, 471, Oxford Companion to British
History, John Cannon, ed. (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1997). Of course, Henry neither proposed nor provided compensation to Rome for his confiscations.
2

Solberg, Redeem the Time, 22-24.
19

20
under a more protestant Book of Common Prayer. 3
But the supporters of Henry's church reorganization wanted more than to merely
replace resented papal domination with a king doing the same. 4 They increasingly saw religion as a direct covenant between God and individual worshipers, without intervening human agents, like a pope and curia or a monarch and court. Central to this concept was their
view of a sacred obligation to honor the Sunday Sabbath. Solberg found four aspects to this
increasing centrality of the English Sabbath: (1) the vernacular Bible; (2) covenant theology;
(3) the so-called Protestant ''work ethic;" and ( 4) condemnation of Sunday recreation. s These
shaped the life-experience and social outlook of English subjects and influenced those who
emigrated to Virginia and the pattern oflife they adopte~ there, including Sunday closing law
observances. 6
As to Solberg's first factor, the vernacular Bible, the 1560 Geneva Bible (so-called
because translated there by Protestant English exiles during Catholic Queen Mary's reign)

3

Ibid, 25, 28.

4

The balance of this Chapter 4(a) draws on Solberg, Redeem the Time, 24-48.

s
6

Ibid, 33.

This view supported by: Perry Miller, "Religion and Society in the early Literature of Virginia,"in Errand in the Wilderness (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press,
1956), 101 (In Virginia, religion was ''the really energizing propulsion" for settlement.);
Thomas N. Page, The Old Dominion: Her Making and Her Manners (New York: Charles
Scribners & Sons, 1914), 364 ("planting of Virginia had its origin in the religious zeal ofthe
people of England."); Solberg, Redeem the Time, 86, though asserting these sources
"overstate," nevertheless allowed that ''there can be little doubt that a desire to advance the
kingdom of God as well as to accumulate earthly riches," underlaid Virginia's colonization.

21
generated tremendous interest in the scriptures, now accessible in idiomatic English. Earnest
men came to ''measure the truth ofreligion by the square ofthe Word," wrote John Stockman
in 1578.7 Increasingly they came to view all scripture as divinely inspired, to be followed and
applied in full.
The Thirty-Nine Articles, originally promulgated to resolve then-major issues offaith,
somewhat straddled the question of obedience to the Fourth Commandment. 8 However,
increasingly influential doctrinaire Puritans insisted that all Ten Commandments be part of
English jurisprudence. They saw the Fourth Commandment as requiring Sunday sabbath
observance, despite what Solberg termed ''momentous theological confusion" in equating this

7

Solberg, 33, n. 19, quoting Stockman from Michael Walzer, The Revolution of
the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press,
1965), 187.

8

Article VII of the Thirty-Nine Articles provided: "The Old Testament is not contrary to the New, ... Although the Law given from God by Moses, as touching Ceremonies
and Rites, do not bind Christian men, nor the civil precepts thereof of necessity to be received ... : yet ... no Christian ... is free from ... the Commandments which are called
Moral." Solberg, ibid, quoting E. Tyrell Green, The Thirty-Nine Articles and the Age of
Reformation (London, 1896), 53. The Articles were promulgated by Anglican bishops in
Convocation in 1563, Rosemary O'Day, Longman Companion to the Tudor Age (New
York: Longman, 1995), 60, incorporated into English law in 1628. Will and Ariel Durant,
The Story ofCivilization, The Age ofReason Begins (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961 ),
7:187. The Thirty-Nine Articles' difficulty in distinguishing between mandatory ''moral"
imperatives ofthe commandments, contrasted with those "touching Ceremonies and Rites,"
presumably including Fourth Commandment-imposed non-imperative Saturday Sabbath,
likely confused what civil law permitted (or not) on Sunday. This particularly applied to
Sunday closing laws, converting theological admonitions into legal requirements, and thus
contributing, it would seem, to legal uncertainties revealed on appeal by cases such as
Francisco (see Chapters 2 and 8 herein).

22
with the Jewish sabbath. 9
Solberg's second factor, covenant theology, was :fundamental to Puritanism. Depending on the variant professed, Puritans asserted humankind had bound itself either (1) in
exchange for God's promise of salvation, to follow the Ten Commandments (the covenant
of ''works"); or (2) to recommitted fuith in God, in return for God's promise to redeem the
fallen through a Savior (the covenant of "grace"). By either view, religious preparation was
needed. This preparation became the Sunday sabbath's central task, making it "born twins"
with Puritan theology. 10
Solberg's third sabbath-intensifying factor, the economic impact of the "protestant
ethic," he derived from Max Weber's classic, though c9ntroverted, Protestant Ethic and the

Spirit ofCapitalism . 11 In Weber's view, Solberg explained, ''the Calvinist conception of the
calling spurred the

individua~

anxious about the certainty of salvation, to prove his faith by

strenuous activity in his worldly vocation." While Calvin did not believe salvation required
good works, "Weber argued the Calvinists regarded them as indispensable signs of
election." 12 As Weber saw it, ''the work ethic became a vital part of the Puritan code of

9

Solberg, ibid, 35.

JO

Ibid, 35-40.

11

Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner's, 1958) (hereinafter: "PE").
12

Solberg, Redeem the Time, 40 (emphasis added). PE conceded the industrial revolution occurred over a century after events here-described, but claimed the process initiating that revolution originated in earlier-developing Puritanism. Solberg, 42.
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conduct ... , evidenc[ing] a proper understanding of how to realize God's true order....
Time was fleeting and precious, a supreme value, which God held men strictly accountable
to use wisely. " 13 One Puritan divine admonished the faithful to "Redeeme the Time," a variant
of an admonition by St. Paul. 14 Solberg explained the connection of the ''protestant ethic" to
Sabbatarianism15 as one which
facilitated the emergence of modem society by rationalizing time and the
productive process.... on a ... uniform schedule.... The concentration of
religious observance on one day a week admirably suited. . . new forms of
economic organization. Sabbatarianism held workers to their tasks six days
a week and ... rest on the seventh. Then, strength restored, they could start
the cycle over again. Thus, the theological convictions of English Calvinists
and the environment of an incipient capitalistic industrial society reinforced
each other. 16
13

Ibid, 44.

14

Ibid. Solberg here quotes St. Paul, admonishing the faithful to be "Redeeming the
time, because the days are evil." Eph. 5:16, King James version, of which Solberg's booktitle (Redeem the Time) is a variant.
15

"Sabbatarianism" here means "strict observance of the Sabbath," s.v. "Sabbatarian," American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed.). An alternative meaning is observing "Saturday as the Sabbath, as in Judaism." Ibid.
l6

Solberg, Redeem the Time, 46 (footnote omitted). Some further observations:

(1)
Solberg noted, ibid, 41, nn. 47 and 48, ''voluminous" literature debating (in
1977) Weber's thesis. It has increased since then. Alan Sica, "Rationalization and Culture,"
in Stephen Turner, ed, A Cambridge Companion to Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press
for German Historical Inst., 2000) ("Companion"), 49, n. 12, noted, for example, a proposed bibliography of3,000 secondary works in English on Weber, many about PE.
(2)
Typical of Weberian texts is Weber's Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence,
Contexts ("Evidence"), Hartmut Lehman and Kenneth F. Ledford, eds. (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), with PE views from avid support to outright rejection.
(continued... )

24
Weber saw Benjamin Franklin as a quintessential personification of the Protestant Ethic,
many of whose writings he translated into German to illustrate his PE thesis. Franklin, PE
notes, recalled his father teaching him, from the Book of Proverbs, "Seest thou a man dili-

16

continued)
(a)
A PE critic, Malcolm H. McKinnon, asserted in "The Longevity of
the Thesis: A Critique of the Critics," Evidence, 212-213: "[T]here is no crisis ... in
dogmatic Calvinism [requiring] ... good works ... [;] no call for devotion to a workaday
pastime .... Calvinism ... did not contribute to capitalism in the way that Weber claims."
( •••

(b)
David Zaret, however, objected to MacK.innon, as expressed in (2)
(a), ibid, arguing he "ignores most of the relevant ... evidence ... and attributes implausible
tidbits" as applicable Puritan thought, by omitting PE passages "that strongly modify or
contradict,"those he attacked, "The Use and Abuse of Textual Data," Evidence, 245, 247.
An uneasy compromise was offered by Evidence co-editor Leh(c)
mann, conceding PE 's "dated" thesis, but stressing "no one since" Weber "has had an [equal]
influence on research .... " "Preface," Evidence, viii. As Guenther Roth more perversely
stated, "the Weber thesis ... has refused to die in spite of ... exasperated efforts to be done
with it .... [For] quite a few scholars it has become counterproductive; its very longevity
appears a nuisance." "Introduction," Evidence, 4.

(d)
One might counter Roth in (c), ibid, that if a "thesis" has "refused
to die," no matter how "exasperated" some are to "be done with it," maybe that meant there
was something to it. As expressed more cautiously by Alastair Hamilton: "[I]t is just as
difficult to demolish Weber's thesis as it is to substantiate it," "Max Weber's Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism," Companion, 169; conceding, however, "there is in fact not
much in ... Weber's thesis that stands up to modern examination." Ibid, at 171.
(3)
Such scholarly conflicts might be harmonized by inferring that Weber's informed speculations about Protestantism's relation to Europe's adoption ofmarket capitalism
many scholars deem models of insight which needed, however, augmentation by current
research those such as Solberg, for example, seemed interested to undertake, to rectify
Weber's apparent disinterest in such tasks.

25
gent in his business? he shall stand before kings...." 17 This expressed, to Franklin (and
Weber), the mores of nascent capitalism united with the obligations ofJudeo-Christian:faith.
Solberg's fourth factor, the condemnation of Sunday recreation, recognized that
those "inclined to Puritanism were fundamentally hostile to sportive play" as "essentially
frivolous." Such diversions obviously interfered with Sabbath observance, "since it was the
only non-work day," when most persons could participate in them. Pursuit of pleasure, the
Puritans believed, constituted both mortal danger to the believer's soul, and also, an invitation to violate the religious observances mandated for the Sabbath. 18
Thus, in summary:
Sabbatarianism was to prove highly ~uential in Anglo-American
history.... The conviction was gaining ground ... that well-kept Sabbaths
were essential to the realiz.ation of the New Jerusalem. ... emphasiz[ing] a
way of life in which duty to God outweighed the claims of Mammon .. .It
refused to allow ... the desire for material prosperity to deny man his dignity
and humanity. Sabbatarianism made for the highest moral standards, and
nowhere would its beneficial effect on individual character and community life
be more felt than in British America. 19

(b)

Sabbath Sanctification by Law in Colonial Virginia.

The Puritan impetus for greater Sunday-Sabbath sanctity was occurring in England
at the same time Virginia's colonization significantly got under way. Virginia and the other
British colonies became, in varying degrees, laboratories for implementing Puritan social

17

Proverbs 22:29 (KJV); Weber, PE, 53 (noting Franklin's interest in passage).

18

Solberg, Redeem the Time, 48-51.

19

Ibid, 48.

26
behavior, including Sabbath observance.
The perceived need to control Virginia's social behavior was significantly influenced
by its floundering development from about 1607 to 1610. Its organizers saw this as partly due
to ''the profune and unruly persons recruited for the undertaking" and the failure of church
and state to "cooperate[] to restrain wickedness and promote righteousness," but that
''temporal affairs would prosper if the authorities established religion on a firmer basis."
Because ofthese problems, in 1610 the colony was reorganized. Its lieutenant general,
Sir Thomas Gates, promulgated severe Lawes Divine, Morall and Martial, with mandatory
Sunday worship and catechism. Guards locked settlement gates and searched dwellings after
services began, to enforce attendance. Penalties for vi<;>lations included fines, whipping and
death. 20 While ''there is no record of any person suffering the death penalty"21 for not
attending services, Gates forcefully implemented in Virginia Puritan England's Sabbatarian
views. These Vrrginia colonial "laws" were more like a military commander's field orders.
Gates treated colonists like rank and file soldiers, enforcing church attendance to improve
their behavior, to end the indiscipline impairing colonial development.
The harsh "Lawes" Gates imposed, while improving colonial discipline, also discour-

20

Gate's Lawes, published by William Strachey, colony historian and first secretary,
titled For the Colony in Virginia Brittania: Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall (London:
1612). The death penalty and whippings were rescinded in 1618 and imprisonments, up to
a year-and-a-day, substituted. Solberg, Redeem the Time, 86-87 & n. 6; 89, from which
quotations in this footnoted paragraph and the paragraph preceding it were taken.
21

Leo Pfeffer, "Sunday Closing Laws," Encylopedia of the American Constitution,
Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth Karst, ed., 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 4:1809.
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aged immigration. The Virginia Company, the colony's proprietor, sought to remedy this by,
first, offering generous land grants to those who remained for a given period. Second, it
established nominal self-government, a colonial "General Assembly'' of"two burgesses out
of every town, hundred or ... plantation, ... to be respectively chosen by the inhabitants .
. . to make ... such general laws and orders ... for ... good government, as shall ... appear
necessary or requisite...." 22
This supposedly democratic "House of Burgesses," respected historians assert, was,
nevertheless, controlled by colonists of wealth and position. Additional restraints were
imposed by the appointed colonial governor and his subordinates. 23 Nevertheless this
Assembly "set the pattern for government which withit;t two centuries led to genuine demo-

cracy." Whatever its democratic shortcomings; its provisions requiring election and adoption

22

"An Ordinance and Constitution of the Virginia Company in England for a Council
of State and General Assembly," if 4, July 24, 1621; Clarence L. Ver Steeg & Richard
Hofstadter, ed., Great Issues in American History: From Settlement to Revolution, vol. I

(New York: Vintage Bopks/Random House, 1969), 69, 72. The editors state: (a) The
Burgesses first met pursuant to the predecessor of this "Ordinance and Constitution," from
July 30 to August 4, 1619; and (b) Although ''the instructions from ... England authorizing
the [1619] meeting are missing, ... historians believe the instructions reissued in 1621 [i.e.,
those quoted in the text preceding this n. 22] were based upon the original instructions sent
in 1619." Ibid, 70.
23

"[M]en at the top in Virginia, whether councillors, burgesses, or county commissioners, .... [without] other modes of social control, ... had to keep before the rest of the
population an exalted view of their position." Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery,
American Freedom: The Ordeal ofColonial Virginia (New York: Norton, 1975, paperback
ed., 1995), 247-248. Thus, Morgan observed, while the Virginia Company "in 1618 had
inaugurated a popularly elected representative assembly, ... effective power remained in the
governor and his council," ibid, 123 (footnote omitted).

28
oflegislation by majority vote were almost revolutionary for its time.
Thus, the House of Burgesses, despite controls exercised by those of higher social
status, probably reflected popular sentiment to a degree unusual for its era. It is significant,
therefore, that among measures adopted at its first meeting in 1619 was that "all settlers were
to attend church on Sunday bringing their weapons with them."24 This underlined the
importance Virginia's earliest electorate placed on enforcing Sunday religious observance.
Colonial Virginia's further statutory regulation of Sunday can be followed in a
recompilation ofall Virginia colonial, and immediately post-colonial, legislation, authorized
in the early nineteenth century by the Virginia General Assembly and meticulously edited by
William Hening (hereinafter: "Hening"). 25 The sevente.enth century Virginia sentiment for a
sacrosanct Sunday is illustrated in this text by a 1629 reenactment of 1623 legislation:

IT is ordered that there bee an especiall care taken ... that the people
doe repaire to their churches on the Saboth day, and to see that the penalty of
one pound of tobacco for every time of absence and 50 pound for every
months absence sett downe in the act of the Generall Assembly 1623, be
levyed and the delinquents to pay the same, as alsoe to see that the Saboth day
be not be not ordinarily profaned by working in any imployments or by

24

Richard Middleton, Colonial America: A History, 1585-1776, 2d ed. (Malden,
Mass: Blackwell, 1997), 61, is the source of the quotations in the paragraph of text here
footnoted and also in the paragraph immediately preceding it.
25

William Waller Hening, ed., The Statutes at Large; being a Collection of the Laws
of Virginia, from the First Session ofthe Legislature in the Year 1619, Published Pursuant
to an Act of the General Assembly of Virginia (13 vols., various publishers, 1819 - 1823;
Facsimile Reprint, Jamestown Foundation of the Commonwealth of Virginia by Univ. Press
of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1969) (Hereinafter "Hening," followed by (roman numeral)
numbered volume and (arabic-numbered) page of the Statutes at Large). Differing publication data is footnoted for each volume when it is first referenced or Quoted.

29
iomeying from place to place. 26

This statute's asserting that the "Saboth" was not to be "ordinarily" profaned by work suggested, by negative inference, that work could be "[extra-]ordinarily" performed on the
Sabbath without ''profan[ing]" it. Such "extraordinary" circumstances were, presumably,
known to those gentlemen called upon to construe the statute. This, also presumably, rendered it, in their minds, unnecessary, to spell out what they were. 27 This ambiguity was
exacerbated by a tendency of the legislators to incorporate by reference other law or practice, usually of England, trusting to later interpretation for what was actually meant. 28

26

Hening, I:144, Act VII (New York: R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1823); from General
Assembly session commencing October 16, 1629. (Bening, in an asterisked footnote, ibid.,
advised that 1629 typographical conventions required "i" be substituted for ')" for "iourneying" [journeying] in this quotation.) In 1625, the Virginia Company lost its charter.
Virginia became a royal colony and the House of Burgesses lost its legislative authority. In
1639 Charles I granted the colonists power "with the govemour and council" to enact
legislation "as near as may be to the laws of England." Middleton, Colonial America, 61.
27

Similar thoughts were expressed in a text closer to the colonial era than the present day, Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Rules which Govern the Interpretation
and Application ofStatutory and Constitutional Law (New York: John S. Voorhies, 1857)
("Constitutional Interpretation"), 242-43:
It may ... be ... when laws were few ... [and] legislation was confined to
a small and select class, to which ... the judiciary belonged, ... [it] might .
. . really possess, a considerable personal knowledge of legislative intent, ..
. . [~But ... in this country where the judiciary is so completely separated
from the legislature, it must be untrue in fact that they [the judiciary] can have
any personal knowledge ... to instruct them as to the legislative intention; .
. . any general theory ... of this kind must be dangerous in practice."
28

Some examples are (with emphasis added):
(continued ... )

30
Roman Emperor Constantine's 321 C.E edict, earlier discussed, 29 excused agricul-

28

( ••• continued)

(1)
The Grand Assembly of March 13, 1657, enacted Act IV, "THE lawes of
England against biggamy or haveing more than one wife or husband shall be putt in execution in this countrie." Hening, 1:434. Here a complex body oflaw is casually incorporated
by reference into Virginia law, without explaining what it was. A seemingly ''understood" way
of legislating, as this illustrates, was announcing a general principle (i.e., ''the lawes of
England against biggamy ... shall be putt in execution"), leaving details for later fill-in.
Extensive initial definition was deemed unnecessary and was thereby avoided.
(2)
Enacted the same session as (1), ibid, was Hening, 1:435, Act VIII: "And
commanders of shipps respectively to take care that poor servants do not want cloathes and
bedding in the voyage [to Virginia], in which ... if any shall offend they shall be liable to
grievous censure here according to the merrit of the offence." The statute did not define
"grievous censure" or the "merrit of the offence." English gentlemen, the drafters arguably
supposed, could determine such things if an actual controversy arose. Thus, it "incorporates
by reference," general practices of English gentry, not any specific body of law.
(3)
As applied to Sunday closing legislation, the March 23, 1660, "Grand Assemblie," Act IX, Hening, II:48 (New York: R. & W. G. Bartow, 1823)(1660-1682),
provided that on Sunday "noe other thing be used or done, that may tend to the prophanation of that day," Hening, II:48, Act IX, in part (emphasis added). Thus not only what
would "prophane" the day, but also what "may tend" to do so was proscribed. As in (2),
ibid., an incorporation by reference of the community's general understanding was inserted
as its statutory standard, extended to prosecuting those who "by common fame" [i.e.,
rumor], have been "sabbath abuseing." Hening II:51-52.
(4)
This referencing, within a statute, to other, vaguely-described legal subjects,
continued in Virginia's revolutionary government. Article VII ofVirginia's June 29, 1776
Constitution provided: "That the right of suffiage in the election ofboth Houses shall remain
as exercised at present .... "Hening, 1:52. Important voting rights thus were not spelled out.
Instead, reference was made to then-current ( 1776) practice ("exercised at present"), without
specifying what it was. This no-doubt worked well when those who drafted and interpreted
such statutes were small in number and well-known to ~ach other. However, this covered
over, and later exacerbated, friction concerning, for example, what was, or was not, a
"necessity" under the Sunday closing laws. As time passed, growing numbers of statutory
enactors, on one hand, and judicial enforcers, on the other, knew progressively less about
each other and ofany common principles under which they operated, as Sedgwick explained,
n. 27, supra, this Chapter. This multiplied opportunities for misunderstanding.

31
tural estate-owners from their workers ceasing Sunday labor, otherwise required by the
remainder of that edict, when abstention could cost "the bounty of heaven." This illustrated
a recurrent and virtually unyielding tension, repeated in the Virginia colonial statute quoted
in the previous paragraph, between the perceived mandates of heaven and the actual realities
on earth: For society's good, some Sunday work, though ostensibly prohibited by God, could
not, in practice, be deferred. This vexed drafters and would-be enforcers of Sunday closing
laws as long as such statutes were in force. ''Necessity" was ultimately adopted in closing law
statutes as a shorthand description of circumstances under which otherwise proscribed
Sunday-labor was allowed. For example, legislation of the Burgesses "Grand Assemblie" of
March 2, 1642, provided:

Be it also enacted & confirmed, for the better observation of the
Sabbath that no persons shall take a voyage uppon the same, except it be to
church or for other causes of extreme necessitie upon the penaltie of the
forfeiture for such offence of twenty pounds of tobacco being justly convicted for the same. 30
There was a similar enactment in 1657. 31 Absent, however, were explanations of what con-

See the quoted text from the edict herein, preceding n. 19, Chapter 3, supra.
30

Hening, 1:261, Act XXXV, apparently the first use in Virginia Sunday legislation
of the term ''necessity." See n. 32, this Chapter, infra, concerning the fine.
31

Burgesses also used ''Necessity" in their March 13, 1657, "Grand Assembly,"
providing: "THAT the Lord's day be kept holy, and that no journeys be made except in
cases of emergent necessitie .... " Hening, 1:434, Act III.

32
stituted the "necessitie" converting illegal Sunday labor into unpunishable lawful conduct. 32

An analytically comparable problem, centuries later, confronted United States Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart, when attempting to distinguish proscribed "pornography" from
constitutionally protected artistic expression. Conceding that "perhaps" he could "never
succeed in intelligently" defining pornography, he triumphantly concluded, "But I know it
when I see it .... " 33 Similarly, in the many Sunday closing law cases arising in Virginia and
other states, as will be seen, ''necessity" became undefinable by any standards except those
so elastic as to almost defy analysis. 34 To explain how otherwise prohibited Sunday labor
could become lawful work, excepted from prosecution as a statutory "necessity," judges
writing those opinions, in effect declared, in so many ~ords, like Justice Stewart, that they
~'knew

it when they saw it." Also like him, however, they had difficulty in articulating how

32

Solberg termed the twenty-pounds-of-tobacco penalty "staggering," exceeding £7,
sterling, in 1619 English currency, Redeem the Time, 90. Will Durant valued one
seventeenth-century English pound-sterling at fifty 1960 U.S. dollars. The Story of
Civilization: The Age of Reason Begins, 7:ix (Preface), n. 19, Chapter 3, supra. Thus, a
month's unlawful absence from Sunday worship could have incurred fines equivalent to twohundred 1960 U.S. dollars. The Consumer Price Index showed a well-over four-fold cost-ofliving increase since 1960, boosting the fine to a year 2000 equivalent of almost $1,000. See,
1999 World Almanac and Book ofFacts (Mahwah, N.J.: World Almanac Books, 1999), 111
(U.S. Consumer price Indexes).
33

34

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).

"[T]he meaning of necessity had traveled a tortuous route" to become "nearly
meaningless."Alexis McCrossen, Holy Day, Holiday: The American Sunday (Ithaca, N. Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press, 2000), 109, citing the wide latitude given, 108-110, nn. 29-35.

33
they reached such conclusions.35
In 1661, the Burgesses enacted that "the canons sett downe in the liturgie of the
church of England" were to be followed. Ministers could not ''teach any other catechisme
than ... in the booke of common prayer." Church attendance was mandated and the maximum fine for absence increased to fifty pounds of tobacco. Prosecutions were upon
presentment by the church wardens and fines were contributed to parish levies.36
The Burgesses were aware, as a preamble to their 1691 enactment concerning church
attendance stated, of continuing Sabbath violations, allegedly due to lack of clarity in punishment. 37 Their remedy was to legislate that absence from church incurred a forfeiture of

35

See nn. 55-60 and 63, Chapter 7, infra, and supporting text.

36

Hening, 11:47, Acts VI & VII; ibid, 11:48, Act IX. Although the text shows only
the commencement, on March 23, 1660, of the legislative session adopting this statute; editor
Hening, in an asterisked footnote, ibid 33, concluded, from analysis of other contemporary
documents, that its enactment was in 1661, about a year after the session commenced. See
also, n 32, this Chapter, supra, concerning the substantiality of a fine of fifty pounds of
tobacco.
37

Hening, 111:71, 72 (Philadelphia: Thomas Desilver, 1823): Laws against "sabbath
abuseing" and other wrongs, "have not produced the desired effect" partly due to ''not
directing what method shall be followed to [punish offenders] ... , and for want of
sufficient penalties.... "
Requiring the "holy keeping of the Lord's day" was enacted in a Burgesses session
commencing April 16, 1691, providing, Hening, III, 72-73:
[F]orasmuch as nothing is more acceptable to God than the true and sincere
... worship ofhimaccording to his holy will, and that the holy keeping ofthe
Lords day is a principall part of the true service of God, which in very many
places of this dominion hath been ...prophained and neglected, ... Bee it
(continued... )

34
38

twenty shillings. The statute's rigors were somewhat relaxed by a 1744 amendment excusing non-attendance on proof of approved worship at another parish,39 marking the last
Sabbath-law change of substance before the Revolution.
Prerevolutionary Virginia's legislative enactments enforcing Sunday worship observance, reviewed in this Chapter 4(b), emphasized the view of those in society who saw
themselves enforcing God's dictates. They saw those dictates achieved, in part, by compelling the entire population to cease Sunday secular labor and, instead, actively worship,

37
( ••• continued)

enacted, . . . That there shall be no meetings, assemblies, or concourse of
people out of their parishes on the Lords day, and that no person ... shall
travell upon the said day, and that no other thing or matter whatsoever be
done on that day which tends to the prophanation of the same, but that the
same be kept holy in all respects upon pain that every person ... so offending
... shall ... forfeit twenty shillings. [Hening, III :72-73.]
38

Ibid, 111:73. A similar statute, prohibiting being ''wilfully absent" from "divine service at his ... parish church" for a month except permitted dissenters and "cases of necessity and charity" was enacted at the Assembly session commencing March 19, 1702. Ibid, III:
358, 360-361:
That if any person, being of. . . twenty-one years, ... shall wilfully absent
him or herself from divine service at his or her parish church, the space of one
month ... and shall not, when there, in a decent and orderly manner, continue
till the ... service is ended; and if any person shall, on that day ... make any
journey, and travel upon the road, except to and from church, (cases of
necessity and charity excepted,) or shall, ... be found working in their com
or tobacco, or any other labour of their ordinary calling, other than is
necessary for the sustenance of man and beast; every person ... being ...
convicted ... shall forfeit and pay, for every such offense, ... five shillings,
or fifty pounds of tobacco ....
39

Ibid, V:220, 226, Chap. II,, IV (Richmond: Franklin Press, 1819) (1738-1748).
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consistent with Christian doctrine promulgated by the Established Church. Solberg pointed
out, however, that this legislative portrait ofenforced Sabbath observance did not fully reflect
what was actually happening in Virginia. Instead, he asserted, "economic development
undermined the physical basis upon which proper sanctification of the Sabbath rested."
Virginia's then-main source of revenue, tobacco, destroyed the soil, compelling search for
new lands. The energy the colony's larger landowners necessarily devoted to this task
"made it difficult to attend church and supervise morality." That this was, indeed, happening,
Solberg illustrated, in part, through minutes of a "mid-[seventeenth] century ... grand jury
ofLower Norfolk County, com- plaining ofgeneral indifference of Sunday observance, [and]
charg[ing] the entire population ... with breach oftht'. day.'"'0
Thus, as the American Revolution approached, Virginia society was advocating,
through adoption and enforcement ofits closing laws, an intensely Sunday worship-centered
life. Simultaneously, however, a significant portion ofits leadership was expanding its search
for land, and profit-making through its use. This made it difficult, perhaps effectively
impossible, for them to actually practice the sanctified Sabbath that colonial legislation
sought to preserve. A paradox resulted: The Sabbath observance called for by puritan
theology, underpinning the colony's creation, ostensibly enforced by colonial legislation,
conflicted with the earthly realities of colonial Virginian life. Economic existence made it
increasingly difficult to cease laboring on the legislatively sanctified Sunday Sabbath. As will

40

Solberg, Redeem the Time, 92 (footnote omitted).

36
be seen hereinafter in this thesis, the complexities ofthis paradox were exacerbated after the
Revolution, when it became harder still for this commercial society to both achieve the
financial success such commerce sought, while at the same time obeying the requirements of
Sabbatarian legislation to cease labor one day of the week.

Chapter 5:
(a)

THE REVOLUTION AND VIRGINIA'S SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS
The Voiding of Colonial Sunday Closing Laws Immediately After the
Commencement of the American Revolution.

What follows is not focused on the American Revolution itse~ but rather its impact
on Virginia's Sunday closing laws. First, however, before newly-independent Virginia would
formulate its own closing laws, or any other legislation, its governmental connection with
England had to be severed. America's July 4, 1776, Declaration oflndependence accomplished this by declaring ''these United Colonies" to be" free and independent states" that
were "absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown," with "all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain ... totally dissolved .... " 1
Virginia had similarly resolved earlier when ''representatives of the several counties
and corporations" met at Williamsburg on June 29, 1776. They unanimously adopted
Virginia's Constitution asserting that ''the government ofthis country [Virginia], as formerly
exercised under the crown of Great Britain, is TOTALLY DISSOLVED."2 Virginia's revolutionary legislators also sought to void parliamentary religious strictures by providing:
[O]ppressive acts of parliament respecting religion have been ... enacted,
and doubts have arisen . . . whether the same are in force within this
commonwealth or not: For prevention whereof, Be it enacted . .. , That ...
every act of parliament, . . . , which renders criminal the maintaining any
opinions in matters of religion, forbearing to repair to church, or the exer-

Declaration oflndependence. The sufficiency of this unilateral assertion of the Declaration ultimately depended, obviously, not on its legal phraseology, but on the military
ability of the new government uttering it to maintain the independence it asserted.
2

"Virginia's Constitution," Article I (in part), Hening, IX:l 12, 113 (emphasis and
capitalization in original).

37
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cising any mode of worship whatsoever, or ... punishments for the same,
shall henceforth be of no validity or force .... 3
This voiding of "acts of parliament" punishing "forbearing to repair to church," by
the act's text, applied only to British parliamentary statutes, not those ofVirginia's House of
Burgesses. Left unexamined by this statute, therefore, was the validity of colonial preRevolutionary versions of such "Sunday closing" or "blue law''4 legislation.
The General Assembly enacted the just-quoted statute voiding British parliamentary
acts concerning religion, soon after its June 29, 1776, adoption of the previously-quoted
Virginia constitutional provision dissolving Virginia's governance as "formerly exercised"
by Britain. 5 This statute was enacted, its preamble stated, due to explicit "doubts" about
whether British parliamentary religious legislation

h~

been effectively voided. This was

despite the earlier-quoted state constitution provision terminating all British governmental
authority. By parity of reasoning, therefore, similar legislative "doubts" presumably existed

3

Adopted October 7, 1776, Hening, IX: 164 (emphasis in original).

4

A "blue law'' regulates or prohibits "commercial activity on Sundays," s. v. "blue
law" Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.). Its etymology was traced by Marc A Stadtmauer,
"Remember the Sabbath? The New York Blue Laws and the Future of the Establishment Clause," Cardozo Arts & Entertainment L. J., 12(1994):213, 213, n. 2: "There are
at least two theories," for its origin. The "most prominent" was that it " ... 'originated in
1781, when the Sunday laws of New Haven, Connecticut were printed on blue paper.'
.... The second [claimed] ... 'blue' is a synonym for 'puritanical' or 'strict'[citations
omitted]. "Andrew J. King, "Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century," Albany L. Rev.
64(2000):675, 676 n. 1, cites other authority favoring the "blue paper" explanation.
5

See quotation in text preceding n. 2, this Chapter, supra.
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about whether Virginia's colonial legislation also remained in force. 6

6

Early American scholarly interpretations of "contemporary construction" of constitutions and statutes ("contemporary," that is, to the constitutions or statues being interpreted), advancing rules (and limitations on those rules) congruent with this view, are:

(1) Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 3 vols.,
(Boston: Hilliard, Gray & Co., 1833)("Commentaries"), 1:390: "Contemporary construction [can] ... explain a doubtful phrase, ... .It can never abrogate the text; ... fritter away
its obvious sense; [nor] ... enlarge its true boundaries ...."Story was a Supreme Court
Justice whose Commentaries guided Alexis de Tocqueville in explaining American law.
Gerald T. Dunne, "Joseph Story," The Justices of the United States Supreme Court 17891969, Their Lives and Major Opinions, Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel, ed. (New York:
Chelsea House/RR Bowker Co., 1969), I:443.
(2) Sedgwick, Constitutional Interpretation (1857), 251-52 (see, n. 27, Cbapter4,
this thesis, supra): "In ... constru[ing] a ... doubtful statute, considerable weight is attached
to the opinions ... [of] persons learned in the law, at the time ofits passage. 'Great regard,'
says Lord Coke, 'ought ... to be paid to the construction which the sages of the law who
lived about the time . . . it was made . . . , because they were best able to judge of the
intention of the makers . . . . ' A contemporaneous is generally the best construction of a
statute. It gives the sense ... of the terms made use of by a legislature. Ifthere is ambiguity
... , the understanding . . . when the statute first comes into operation, sanctioned by long
acquiescence [by] ... legislature and judicial tribunals, is the strongest evidence that it has
been explained in practice...." Sir Edward Coke ( 1552-1634), whom Sedgwick quoted, ibid,
had been Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas. His Institutes was a much-cited legal
treatise, even after the American Revolution, on both sides ofthe Atlantic. J. A. Sharpe, s.v.,
"Sir Edward Coke," Oxford Companion to British History, 226, at n. 1, Chapter 4, this
thesis, supra Thus, the. legal doctrine here discussed was long-accepted before the
Revolution, and in full flower when the Virginia statutes discussed herein were adopted.
(3) Thomas M. Cooley, Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest upon
the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union, 5th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown,
1883) ("Constitutional Limitations"), 81-82 (emphasis added): "Contemporaneous
interpretation may indicate merely the understanding with which the people received it at the
time, or it may be accompanied by acts ... putting the instrument in operation .... In the
first case it can have very little force, because the . . . public understanding, when nothing has
been done ... , must ... be vague .... But where there has been a practical construction,
... acquiesced in for a considerable period, considerations in favor of ... this construction
sometimes present themselves to the courts with a . . . force ... not easy to resist . . . . In
(continued ... )
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It is not here-asserted that the General Assembly's above-quoted 1776 "doubts" 7

about whether British parliamentary acts on religion were void in Virginia, somehow, by
being so-stated, restored the legality of those British statutes that the Virginia Constitution
expressly invalidated. Lack of"long acquiescence" to those "doubts," as mandated by the
three commentators just-quoted,8 precluded such a conclusion. However, the presence of
such "doubts" suggested Jefferson's statute on religious freedom could have been enacted,
in part, to ( 1) Remove any "doubts" about the invalidity of such English legislation and (2)
Prevent any inference of"long acquiescence" to such "doubts" from arising due to purported
Assembly inaction. It is also plausible that early General Assembly statutes concerning

6

( ••• continued)
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee [14 U.S.] 1 Wheat. 304, 351 [(1816)], Justice Story, ... say[s]:
' .... It is an historical fact, that ... when the Judiciary Act was submitted ... [to] the First
Congress, composed, ... of men of great learning and ability ... who had acted a principal
part in framing; supporting, or opposing that Constitution . . . . This weight of
contemporaneous exposition ... , this acquiescence by enlightened State courts, and . . .
decisions of the Supreme Court through so long a period, ... place the doctrine upon a
foundation of authority which cannot be shaken.... ' The same doctrine was subsequently
supported by ChiefJustice Marshall . .. say[ing] that 'great weight has always been attached,
... to contemporaneous exposition. Cohens v. Virginia, [19 U.S.] 6 Wheat. 264, 418
[(1821))."' The "Justice Story" quoted here, also wrote the Commentaries quoted in this
n. 6, part ( 1), supra.

(4)
The application in this thesis of "contemporary construction" to construe legislation is to assert that Declaration oflndependence provisions voiding British parliamentary legislation, gave rise to Virginia constitutional provisions, declarations and statutes
voiding, in the same ("contemporary construction") manner, colonial legislation that
originated in the pre-revolutionary Virginia House of Burgesses.
7

In its statute quoted immediately preceding n. 3, this Chapter, supra.

8

See, for example, n. 6(2), this Chapter, supra.
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religion, such as Jefferson's religious-freedom statute, were adopted, among other reasons,
to also end any later argument asserting the validity of pre-Revolutionary Virginia colonial
laws on religious subjects.

(b)

Post-Revolutionary Enactment of a Virginia Closing Law.

Consistent with the principles of the just-quoted statute voiding parliamentary
religious legislation, the Virginia General Assembly, at the Revolution's commencement,
unanimously adopted, on June 12, 1776, its own "Declaration of Rights," providing:
16. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our CREATOR, and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction,
not by force or violence, and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the
mutual duty of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity,
towards each other. 9
Thus, this Article 16, contrary to Virginia colonial Sabbath laws earlier described, 10
declared a universal entitlement to ''free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience." Under its principles, "conscience," not "force or violence," instructed the
citizen in religion, suggesting a government barred from mandating church attendance. 11

9

Hening, IX:112, 113-114.

10

For example, see nn. 37-39, Chapter 4, and accompanying text, supra.

11

Asserting, however, that Jefferson's Bill Establishing Religious Freedom, ambiguously, did not "explicitly prohibit establishment" of religion, was Mark DeWolfe Howe,
The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional
History (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1965), 44; in Daniel L. Dreisbach, "Religion and
Legal Reforms in Revolutionary Virginia," Religion and Political Culture in Jefferson's
Virginia (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 189, 195.
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Similar to earlier-described incongruities in the history ofsabbath legislation, 12 however, new
logical paradoxes arose concerning Virginia's post-revolutionary Sunday closing laws and
related enactments. The first was that Virginia's Declaration ofRights, while negating ''force
or violence" to promote religious observance, still asserted a ''mutual duty" (presumably
enforceable by the state through ''force or violence") of"Christian" forbearance, love and
charity." 13 Thus, while promoting religious freedom in theory, arguably the Virginia
Declaration undid its own premise by mandating a "duty'' to obey the "Christian" religion
to achieve it. Therefore, by inference, legislation encouraging a "Christian" lifestyle, such as
a Sunday closing law (banning Sabbath work, as the Bible ordained), 14 was necessary (or so
its proponents plausibly could assert). Its presumed justification, would be to help fashion
the "Christian forbearance" the Declaration declared was needed.
The second Virginia Sunday closing law paradox was that in its 1786 enactment
year, the General Assembly had already adopted the famous "Jefferson's Statute," his
"Statute on Religious Freedom," annulling prerevolutionary laws requiring any specific

12

Earlier thesis examples included (1) the Babylonian "shabuttu" day of dread which
became, instead, the Judeo-Christian "Sabbath" day of rest, veneration and rejoicing; (2)
Sunday's biblical rest and veneration role, contrasted with a parallel tradition of Sunday
markets and sports. See nn. 3-5 and 18, and accompanying text, Chapter 3, supra.
13

"Virginia Declaration of Rights," art. 16, quoted in text preceding n. 9, supra, this
Chapter. Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 17761787 (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1977), 19, insightfully comments on this
passage:" The Revolutionary convention could accept the concept offreedom ofconscience,
but it would not sever the special relationship which bound Virginians to the church oftheir
fathers."
14

As discussed herein in text supported by n. 13, ibid.
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religious practice. It also seemingly prohibited post-revolutionary statutes on the same subject, such as Sunday closing laws. 15 Regarded by Jefferson as one of his three outstanding
accomplishments, 16 it provided in part:
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor ... suffer on account of his
religious opinions or beliefs; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by
argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, [which] ... shall
in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities. 17
This Jefferson-drafted enactment has been readopted verbatim in all Virginia statutory recodifications since its 1786 passage. 18 Its plain meaning seemingly precluded governmental
reliance on, or regulation or support of: Christianity or any religion. This contrasted with the
Virginia Declaration's reliance on "Christian forbe~ance, love and charity," to achieve
harmony. Thus, there was an apparent conflict of reasoning underlying these respective

15

But, ct: n. 11, this Chapter, supra.

16

Seen. 1, Chapter 1, and supporting text, supra.

17

Adopted January 16, 1786, Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia (Richmond, Va.: Samuel Shepherd, 1828), 143-144; January 16, 1786, Journal of the Senate . .
. of Virginia (Richmond: Thomas W. White, 1827), 92. Pirkey Bros. v. Commonwealth. 134
Va. 713, 717, 1148.E. 764(1922),incorrectlydateditsadoptiononDecemberl6, 1785,
actually the date setting its final legislative reading. See Daniel L. Dreisbach, "Thomas
Jefferson and Bills Number 82-86 of the Revision of the Laws ofVirginia, 1776-1786: New
light on the Jeffersonian Model of Church-State Relations," North Carolina L. Rev. (1990),
69:159-211, 169, n. 60.
18

Currently, Va. Code Ann. §57-1 (1950) (1995 repl. vol.) (annotating prior enactments). The statute "has been retained in its original form in every revision of the laws from
... [its 1786 original adoption] until now... ,"Pirkey Bros., 134 Va. at 717 (1922).
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enactments. 19 This seemed resolved by later adoption of Jefferson's religious freedom
statute, which discouraged legislating religious dogma into state policy. This was after and,
therefore, presumably rescinded, the Virginia Declaration's seemingly contradictory principie of expressly requiring "Christian" forbearance for religious toleration.
However, as this paradox was seemingly resolved, the Assembly enacted another
one, on November 27, 1786, the Virginia Sunday closing law, providing in part:

If any person on the sabbath day shall ... be found labouring at his own, or
any other trade or calling, or shall employ his apprentices, servants or slaves
in labour or other business, except it be in the ordinary household offices of
daily necessity, or other work of necessity or charity, he shall forfeit the sum
of ten shillings for every such offence, ....20

19

Note, however, contra analysis of some claiming Jefferson's statute permitted an
"established" church. See n. 11, this Chapter, supra.
20

"An Act for punishing disturbers of Religious Worship and Sabbath breakers,"
Hening, XII:336, 337. Dreisbach, "Religion and Legal Reforms in Revolutionary Virginia,"
198, at n. 11, this Chapter, supra, contended "Jefferson's use of. .. 'Sabbath' suggests the
measure was inspired by religious concerns, as opposed to ... promoting recreation and rest
from secular employment." However, "Sabbath" was in the Act's title which, under Virginia
law of the time, was generally not used to determine intent, unless there was ambiguity, as
Jefferson, a practicing attorney, was undoubtedly aware: Commonwealth v. Gaines, 2 Va.
Cas. 172, 180; 3 Va. Rpts. Ann. 188, 192 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1819) ( "It is true that the title is no
part ofthe law, and when plainly repugnant to the enacting clauses, has no weight, but it may
be resorted to ... remove an ambiguity" [applying a statute to 1786 conduct, the year of the
closing law's enactment].) Accordingly, the closing law's title would be irrelevant for legal
interpretation, according to case law applied to acts contemporary to its adoption. Dreisbach
further noted, supra, this footnote at n. 67: "It is noteworthy that when the Virginia
legislature enacted Bill 84 it apparently changed the fifth [sic, should be sixth?] word of this
paragraph from "Sunday" to "Sabbath day." So Jefferson used "Sabbath" only in the act's
title which, as a practicing attorney, he likely knew was not legally relevant to assess its
meaning. He originally used what Dreisbach deemed the more secular "Sunday" in its text.
Thus, Dreisbach's surmise of Jefferson's religious intent concerning the word "sabbath"
appears contradicted by the evidence his own article references.
(continued ... )
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The statute was slightly amended on December 26, 1792, remaining largely unchanged
thereafter until the 1960s.21 The Christian "day of rest" was, by its provisions, required to be
honored by Virginians, whether Christians or not, through not working. That is, the text's
underlying logic appeared to foster Christianity through enforcing biblically-inspired sabbath
work restrictions and thus, collaterally, facilitating worship on that day. As Dreisbach com-

20

( ••• continued)
Other background about this Act provides additional and needed context about it:

(1) Its adoption was wrongly given as 1779 in(a) Mandell v. Haddon, 202 Va. 979,
988, 121 S.E.2d 516 (1961) (citing no authority); and (b) Pirkey Bros. v. Common wealth,
134 Va. 713, 717, 114 S.E. 769 (1922) (citing Hening, XII:337). Hening's page heading,
however, ibid., shows a 1786 enactment, not 1779. In contrast, its printed margin notes,
ibid, state: "From Rev. Bills oft 779, Ch. LXXXIV" [i.e., Chapter 84], referring to the 1779
committee Jefferson chaired, proposing Revolution-mandated statutory revisions, of which
his religious freedom bill was No. 82, and the closing law No. 84.
(2)
The Act's 1786 adoption is detailed in Daniel L. Dreisbach's 1990 article
[seen. 17, supra, this Chapter, N. Carolina L. Rev. 69 (1990):159-211; 178-184, 190-193].
(3)
Jefferson's proposed revisions,"... faded into obscurity ... from 1776 to
1786, .... " Editorial Note, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Julian P. Boyd, ed. (31 vols. to
1800 as of2004) (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1950) ("Jefferson Papers"), 2:305. As
Jefferson explained, revising statutes was deferred to winning the Revolution: "[T]he first
assembly ... appointed a committee to revise the whole code . . . . This work has been
executed ... ; but probably will not be taken up till a restoration of peace ...." Thomas
Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Frank Shuflleton, ed. (1785) (New York: Penguin
Books, 1999) ("Notes"), 144. Thus, the Jefferson committee's statutory revisions, proposed
in 1779 (the seeming origin of the erroneous 1779 closing law adoption date in Mandell,
supra, this footnote), were not enacted until 1786.
21

Samuel Shepard, The Statutes at Large of Virginia: from October Session 1792 to
December session 1806, inclusive, in three volumes (new series), being a continuation of
Bening (Richmond, Va: 1835, reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1970), 1:193, December 26,
1792. This amendment restated the monetary forfeiture for violating the Act in dollars and
cents, instead of in shillings, as its original enactment provided.
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mented, the statute's use of "sabbath," the Judeo-Christian term for the religious day to
which it applied, was arguably a governmental support of Judeo-Christian religion. (Dreisbach further pointed out, however, that legislators substituted "Sabbath" for the "Sunday"
Jefferson had used. 22)
Nevertheless, the closing law seemingly contradicted Jefferson's religious freedom
statute that decreed ''no man shall be compelled to :frequent or support any religious worship," nor be "restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods," for so doing, but
instead "shall be free to profess ... their opinions in matters ofreligion," which "shall in no
wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities." Certainly the closing law "restrained"
citizens from ignoring Sunday as a legally mandated rC?st day. Refusing to so-recognize Sunday, after this law's passage also "diminish[ed]" one's "civil capacities," since labor on that
day exposed one to forfeitures, resulting in being ''restrained, molested or burthemed in his
body or goods" Tor so doing. 23
A third paradox about Virginia Sunday closing laws concerned Jefferson himself. His
advocacy ofvirtual state abstention on religious matters, as in his Bill on Religious Freedom,
seemed contradicted by his sponsorship and probable drafting of post-revolutionary Virginia's first Sunday closing law. A meticulous examination of original documents led Julian P.
Boyd, editing Jefferson's papers, to conclude that "Jefferson drew Bills No. [thereinafter are

22

23

See n. 20, this Chapter, supra.

Quotations in this paragraph are extracted from Jefferson's statute, as quoted more
fully herein at n. 17 and accompanying text, this Chapter, supra.
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listed 51 numbered bills, including the Sunday closing law, No. 84)."24
Daniel Dreisbach, a student of this statute, concluded:
Bill 84 and Sunday closing laws in general arguably discriminate
against individuals who choose not to preserve the ... "day of rest" observed
by most Christians. Acknowledgment of the Christian "Sabbath" ... and its
preservation by law conflicts with a strict separationist ban on state support
for organized religion .... Modern advocates of church-state separation have
criticized Sunday legislation less restrictive than Bill 84 as a breach in the
"wall of separation" .... Bill 84 also suggests that Jefferson's desire to
separate the institutions of church and state ... was merely a means of
achieving the fullest ... :freedom of religious expression. If religious hoorty
was realized in its richest sense through cooperation between the state and the
church, then Jefferson, it would seem, endorsed such a limited union. 25
Dreisbach cited only secondary sources for his conclusions. This, however, should not detract from the merit of the issue raised: Why would Je~erson either draft or ratify, as chair
of the committee charged with its drafting, a statute largely prohibiting Sunday work,
seemingly contradicting the Virginia religious :freedom act he also had drafted?
Discemirig Jefferson's intentions in pursuing these seemingly conflicting policies is
therefore pertinent in studying Virginia's 1786 adopting ofits first Sunday closing law. Jefferson and his ideas, however, did not exist in a vacuum, so that Chapter 5(c), immediately
hereinafter, offers a small sampling of the divergent views then existing.

24

Boyd, ed., Jefferson Papers, 2:318-320 (seen. 20(3), supra, this Chapter). Even
if Jefferson did not personally draft the closing law, editor Boyd's discussion, ibid, makes
clear Jefferson's extensive review of, and apparent approval of, its final form.
25

Daniel L. Dreisbach, "Religious and Legal Reforms in Revolutionary Virginia
[etc]," 198-199, (footnotes omitted), n. 11. Dreisbach's earlier study of the first postrevolutionary Virginia closing law is in a 1990 article, see n. 17, Both footnotes are in this
Chapter, supra.
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(c)

Complexity of Church/State Interrelation Attitudes in America in the
Immediate-Post-Revolutionary War Era.
The complexities of divergent American Post-Revolutionary War attitudes

about permitted relations, ifany, between church and state, are illustrated by these seemingly
conflicting viewpoints: Justice Brewer, writing for a unanimous United States Supreme Court
in 1892, but citing authority nearly a century older, declared the United States "a Christian
nation."26 In contrast, the United States Senate ratified in 1797,27 a treaty with Tripoli
asserting that "the Government of the United States of America is not, in any sense, founded
on the Christian religion. " 28 These both constitute actions taken, seemingly without dissent,
by powerful government entities, yet simultaneously pointing, metaphorically, in opposite

26

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (Brewer,
J., for unanimous Court). See also, Zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1961)
(Douglas, J., for Court): "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." (dissenting opinions filed by Black, Frankfurter and Jackson, JJ.)
27

The United States Senate's power to ratify treaties by two-thirds of Senators present, was apparently the basis for a later congressional consensus that the ability ofthe Senate
to approve a Constitutional amendment by two-thirds vote, meant two-thirds of Senators
present, and not two-thirds of the entire body. David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts:
Amending the U.S. Constitution (Univ. Press of Kansas, 1996), 116.
28

Article 11, Treaty between the United States and Tripoli, January 3, 1797, reaching the Senate on May 26, 1797, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Documents
Legislative and Executive of the Congress ofthe United States (Washington, DC: Gales and
Seaton, 1832), 11:18-19. The Senate's undissenting treaty adoption on June 7, 1797, is in
Journal, The Executive Proceedings, The Senate, The United States ofAmerica (Washington, D.C.: DuffGreen, printed by Senate order, 1828); 1:244: "(23 affirming votes): (twothirds of the Senators present concurring therein,) Resolved, That the Senate do advise and
consent to the ratification of the treaty ofpeace and friendship between the United States of
America and the Bey and subjects of Tripoli, of Barbary."
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directions concerning religion's permitted influence upon that government.

(1)

Judicial Assertion of America as a "Christian" Nation.
The 1892 assertion of America as a "Christian nation" is in the United

States Supreme Court's Church ofthe Holy Trinity opinion, deciding ifthe defendant Church
violated a federal statute criminalizing "assist[ing]" in "importation" of an "alien." 29 This
was alleged because the Church hired as its rector a British subject and resident (therefore an
American "alien"), whose acceptance of the post for which he was hired necessarily caused
his "importation" into the United States to take the position.
The Court held the statute applied only to "cheap, unskilled [manual] labor," not
"importation" of"brain toilers" like the rector, and dis~sed the indictment. This disposed
of the case's only issue and should have ended the opinion. However, Justice Brewer had
more to say, even though, following his above-described holding, there was no need to say
it. 30 He volunteered that it was "historically true," beyond the statutory analysis and holding
just-summarized, no action against religion could be imputed to any American legislation,
state or national, because this is a "religious people" and a "Christian nation." Therefore, he
inferred, for a unanimous Court, that Congress could not have "intended to make it a
misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for the services of a Christian minister

29

30

143 U.S. at 458.

The American common law defines such a statement as "obiter dictum," meaning
'judicial comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, ... unnecessary
to the decision ... and therefore not precedential (though it may be persuasive)," s. v.
"obiter dictum," Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th ed.
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residing in another nation."31 His dictum.32 implied Christianity possessed an inchoate priorclaim over American law. It suggested, in effect, that Christianity was intended by America's
predominantly-Christian legislators as inherent in their statutory output, though not expressly
stated in any given statute nor, indeed, in the Constitution itse1£

In so-concluding, the Court quoted Vidal v. Girard's Executors, that "the Christian
religion is a part of the common law of Pennsylvania;"33 the 1811 opinion by New York's
famed Chancellor Kent in People v. Ruggles on Christianity's legal primacy,34 and the
31

143 U.S. 457, 471. The thesis sentence supported by this footnote asserts that
the Court "inferred" the rejection of the quoted conclusion, because it was rendered in the
opinion as a question, which was then answered with prolixity in the negative.
32

See n. 30, supra, this Chapter.

33

43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 198 (1844); quoted in Holy Trinity at 471.

34

Holy Trinity at 471. Chancellor Kent wrote in People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290,
294, 295 (N. Y., 1811 ): "The people ofthis State, in common with the ... country, profess
the general doctrines of Christianity as the rule of their faith and practice, and to scandalize
the Author of these doctrines is not only, in a religious point of view, extremely impious,
but, even, in respect to the obligations due to society, is a gross violation of decency and
good order." Kent's biographer, however, John Theodore Horton, James Kent: A Study in
Conservatism, 1763-1847 (New York: D. Appleton-Century for the American Historical
Ass'n, 1939; Reprint, De Capo Press for The American Scene, Comments and Commentators, Wallace D. Farnham, gen. ed., 1969), 192, wrote that Kent "in the privacy ofhis club,
had spoken of Christianity itself as a vulgar superstition from which cultivated men were
free." Horton's source was, ibid at 115, an acquaintance of Kent's: "The playwright and
painter, William Dunlop, recorded in his diary: 'Kent remarked that men of information were
now nearly as free from vulgar superstition or Christian religion as they were in ye [sic] time
of Cicero from pagan superstition-all, says he, except literary men among the clergy
[bracketed insertion by Horton],"' Diary I, 151, September 30, 1797, identified in Horton's
bibliography, ibid, 330, as: "Printed Sources other than Newspapers and Law Journals, ...
The Diary of William Dunlop, 1766-1829, Collections of the New York Historical Society,
N.Y., 1930." Horton thus-reconciled Kent's public praising and private disparaging of
(continued...)
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court's admonition that "general Christianity, is and always has been,
a part of the Common law of Pennsylvania; ... not Christianity with an established church,
and tithes, and spiritual courts, but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men."35
While Holy Trinity's "Christian nation" dictum was hailed by many Christian religious groups,36 appellate trends concerning it were in the opposite direction. Andrew J King
surveyed nineteenth century Sunday closing law appellate cases, analyzing rationales for them
given by then-contemporary legal commentators. He concluded, quoting former Michigan
Supreme Court Justice Thomas Cooley, a noted legal scholar of the time, that as the nineteenth century progressed, "laws against the desecration of the Christian Sabbath by labor or
sports" were ''not so readily defensible...." 37 Consistent with this analysis, courts relying
on a "Christian nation" rationale to uphold enactments like closing laws, King noted,

34

continued)
Christianity: "lfhe [Kent] held that opinion, then his comments on religion from the bench
were sincere only as they expressed an aristocratic conviction that religious faith is useful as
a buttress of the social order. To that theory of the case, his hatred of Jefferson and his
constant fear of Jacobinical commotion lend support." James Kent, 192-193.
35

( •••

Holy Trinity at 471, quoting Updegraf v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394,

400 (Pa. 1824).
36

Articles praising Holy Trinity's "Christian nation" dictum collected in William
A. Blakely, Compiler and Annotator, American State Papers Bearing on Sunday Legislation, rev. ed., Willard A. Colcord, ed. (Washington, D.C.: General Conference Corporation of Seventh-Day Adventists, 1911; New York; reprint, De Capo Press, 1970), 508, n. 1.
37

Quoted from Cooley, Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations (6th ed. 1890),
584, in Andrew J. King, "Sunday Blue Laws," Albany L. Rev. 64 (2000):675, 677-678, for
the receding of religion as a basis for decisions supporting Sunday closing laws. Justice
Cooley is quoted in n. 20 part (3), supra, this Chapter, in another context.
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markedly declined as the century progressed. Instead, they were sustained as health and
welfure measures. "Christian nation" rationales usually, he found, were obiter dictum
afterthoughts, not dispositive of the cases. 38

(2)

Tripoli Treaty: America Not "Founded on the Christian Religion."

Article 11 of the 1797 United States-Tripoli Treaty provides, in part:
~UiIJ~ctltlmaEntn;1}'SI~mkIRUBnl~6tllEntmDdDa:trolfilt1Y

against the laws, religion, or tranquillity, ofMussulmen; ... no pretext, arising from religious
opinions, shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two
countries. 39
The first line and a half of the above-quoted Treaty provision suggested a total divorce
between Christianity and the federal government.

~

was contrary to the tenor of Justice

Brewer's Holy Trinity "Christian nation" dictum40 and the authority he cited to support it
(roughly contemporaneous with, though slightly later than, the Treaty's 1797 rati:fication). 41
In the late 1920s, however, this Treaty was subjected to a State Department-com38

Ibid, n. 37. For "obiter dictum," in this footnoted sentence, see n. 30, supra, this
Chapter.

39

May 26, 1797, American State Papers, Foreign, Relations, Documents Legislative
and Executive ofthe Congress, 11:18-19, n. 119, supra, this text. Thetreatywasrepublished
in Appendix, Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, containing
Important State Papers and Public Documents and all the Laws of a Public Nature, 5rh
Congress (May 15, 1797 to March 3, 1799) (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1851 )("State
Papers"), 3:3095.
40

41

See text preceding n. 26, supra, this Chapter.

The treaty was adopted on June 7, 1797, by the Fifth Congress, whose term was
from May 15, 1797, through March 3, 1799. See, title page, State Papers; n. 28, supra,
this Chapter.
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missioned review, as part of a comprehensive retranslation and study of original texts and
supporting documents of all treaties since the nation's founding. This included the Tripoli
Treaty's original arabic, retranslated by specialists. The study concluded this Treaty's original
eighteenth-century translation to English, directed by Joel Barlow, the United States Counsel
General at Algiers during its negotiation, had "defects throughout ... obvious and glaring."
In particular, it concluded, the above-quoted Article 11 (asserting America as ''not founded"
on the "Christian religion"), "does not exist at all. There is no Article 11."
Implausibly but truly, the Barlow translation, no matter its defects, including its bogus
Article 11, was the treaty-version presented to the Senate for its constitutionally-required
ratification in 1797, remaining the official English t~xt therea:fter. 42 That text, including

42

This Tripoli treaty review is in United States Department of State, Treaties and
other International Acts of the United States of America, 5 vols, Hunter Miller, ed.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931), 2:384, from which quotations
and details in text this footnote supports were taken Here is a fuller quotation (emphasized "the" in line 2 is in the original):
[T]he Barlow translation ... submitted to the Senate ... and . . . the Statutes
at Large ... always been deemed the [English] text... is at best a poor ...
summary of ... the Arabic; ... [with] defects ... obvious and glaring. Most
extraordinary (and wholly unexplained) is ... that Article 11 ... , with its
famous phrase, ''the government of the United States ... is not in any sense
founded on the Christian Religion" does not exist at all. . . . The Arabic text
... between Articles 10 and 12 is ... a letter, crude and flamboyant and ...
quite unimportant, from the Dey of Algiers to the Pasha of Tripoli. How that
. . . came . . . to be regarded . . . as Article 11 . . . , is a mystery . . . .
Nothing in the diplomatic correspondence throws any light ... on the point.
['-J A further ... mystery is ... that ... the Barlow translation has been .
. . accepted as ... equivalent of the Arabic....
(continued... )
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concededly bogus Article 11,43 the Senators, the referenced State Department's 1931 study.

42

( ••• continued)
This account, ibid, was praised for "important corrections in [the treaty's] translations ..
. [with] most enlightening notes ... of great value." Samuel Flagg Bemis and Grace Gardner Griffin, Guide to the Diplomatic History ofthe United States, 1775-1921 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 1935; reprint, Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963), 159 (Bemis was Yale University's Farnam Professor of
Diplomatic History on the Guide's 1935 publication date).
43

The State Department report termed bogus Article 11 "a mystery [about which]
[n]othing in the diplomatic correspondence throws any light ... ,"n. 42, ibid.

(1)
Arguably, Joel Barlow, America's then-counsel-general in Algiers, added bogus Article 11, but supporting evidence is lacking. Barlow's 1797 "skillful negotiations" released American sailors the Barbary Pirates enslaved. Thomas A. Bailey, The Diplomatic History of the American People, 10th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1980), 1004 (Appendix, sources and commentary on Chapter V). He was condemned,
however, by his Yale classmate, Noah Webster, among others, for "atheism and licentious[ness]," Arthur L. Ford, Joel Barlow(NewYork: Twayne, 1971), 36, and for Jeffersonian
deistic, political and social views, ibid. Barlow wrote his wife during Treaty negotiations
that if he, ''through intoxication or some other accident" entered a mosque whereupon,
on pain of death, Tripolitan law supposedly required conversion to Islam, he would become
"a Mohammedan on the spot, for I have not enough religion of any kind to make me a
martyr," quoted by James Woodress, A Yankee's Odyssey: The Life ofJoel Barlow (New
York: Greenwood, 1958), 164 (emphasis added).
(2)
Joe Barlow's views on the connection between religion and freedom are also
expressed in: Advice to the Privileged Orders in the Several States ofEurope. Resulting
from the Necessity and Propriety of a General Resolution in the Principle of Government
(1792) (Reprint, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1956), 23: "The existence of any kind of
liberty is not compatible with any kind of church. By liberty I mean the enjoyment of equal
rights and by church I mean any mode ofworship declared to be national or declared to have
any preference in the eyes ofthe law." Quoted in Mark Douglas McGarvie, One Nation
Under Law: America's Early National Struggles to Separate Church and State (DeKalb,
Ill: Northern Ill. Univ. Press, 2004), 127, n. 85.
(3)
These quotations show Barlow lacked fixed religious views and, while far
from proof he inserted bogus Article XI, are enough to fairly characterize him as a suspect.
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concluded,44 relied upon as correct in ratifying it. 45
One can speculate that, even though not agreeing with the treaty's Article 11, the
Senators may have ratified it to speedily end Barbary commerce raiding and retrieve enslaved
American crews. Alternatively, they could have viewed Article 11 as unimportant, compromising no American rights worth the delay to negotiate its change.46 All things considered,
however, it is reasonable to conclude that the Senators approved Article 11 without dissent
because they genuinely agreed with what it said: There was no foundational relationship
between the United States government and the Christian religion.
A review of the Senate leaders ratifying the 1797 Tripoli treaty renders it difficult to
believe they would casually consent to Article 11

if it did not reflect their views of core

American political values. Four Senators in the Fifth Congress ratifying the Treaty had been
Senators in the First Congress (March 1, 1789 to March 3, 1791 ), where what became the

44

Seen. 42, and accompanying text, supra, this Chapter, where the study is

quoted.
45

There were sixteen states at the 1797 treaty ratification, with two Senators per
State. Thus, 32 Senators comprised the Senate. Biographical Directory of the American
Congress, 1774-1996, Joel D. Treese, ed. (Alexandria, Va.: CQ StafIDirectories, Inc.,
1997) ("Biographical Directory of Congress"), 50. Thus the treaty's 23 ratifying votes
exceeded two-thirds ofthe members, satisfying U.S. Const., art. II,§ 2, cl. 2, that "two-thirds
of the Senators present concur."
46

A powerful incentive for Senate ratification was the cost of maintaining the
navy, greatly expanded to fight the Barbary piracy. There was anticipation that the Treaty,
by ending the piracy, would allow reduction of this expense. See the discussion in Ray W.
Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations ofthe United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. ofN. Carolina Press, 1931), 79-80.
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Constitution's first ten amendments ("Bill of Rights") were proposed in 1789, including thenow First Amendment's prohibition against governmental "establishment of religion," or
limitation of its ''free exercise. ''47 This arguably gave them a clear understanding ofthe nature
ofchurch/state separation that Amendment intended. Ofthese four "Fifth Congress" Senators
who also were "First Congress" Senators, two voted for the Tripoli treaty. 48
One of these two Senators was New Hampshire's John Langdon, a signatory of the
1787 federal constitution, and a company commander at the Battle of Concord. Langdon
was also first president pro tern of the United States Senate, and administered the first presidential oath to George Washington. He was a member ofhis state's constitutional ratifying
convention and, after his Senate service, a five-term N:ew Hampshire govemor. 49 The other
Tripoli treaty-ratifier who was a First Congress Senator, was Rhode Island's Theodore
Foster, a lawyer and later trustee of his alma mater, Brown University. 50

47

David E. Kyving, Explicit & Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution,
1776-1995 (Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1996), 105, n.68. The members of the
U.S. Senate and House of Representatives in each Congress are set out, by state, with
biographies, in the Biographical Directory of Congress, supra, n. 45, this Chapter, supra,
most importantly for this paper, the First Congress, ibid, 41, when the Bill of Rights was
proposed, and the Fifth Congress, ibid, 50, when the Tripoli treaty was ratified.
48

Philip John Schuyler, third of the four" Fifth Congress" Senators who also served
in the "First Congress" Senate, resigned due to ill health January 3, 1798, dying thereafter.
Biographical Directory of Congress, 1790 (n. 45, supra, this Chapter). Senate voting
records near the Tripoli treaty's ratification reveal his continuing absence. His failure to vote
on the treaty, therefore, suggests absence due to illness, not disapproval of its terms.
49

Biographical Directory of Congress, 1363, at n. 45, supra, this Chapter.
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Ibid, at 1032. Foster only became a Senator on June 25, 1790, ibid, 42, n. 24.
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Five other "Fifth Congress" Senators (Bloodworth ofNorth Carolina, Goodhue of
Massachusetts. Laurence ofNew York, Sedgwick of Massachusetts, and Vining of Delaware), served in the First-Congresses House of Representatives. Of these, all but Vining
voted for the Treaty's ratification. Two of these Senators merit additional comment: (1)
Theodore Sedgwick ofMassachusetts, a Yale graduate and attorney, was President pro-tem
of the Fifth Congress Senate, a member of the Massachusetts convention adopting the
Constitution, and served in the 1775-1776 American expedition to Canada; and (2) John
T.~nrP.ncP. C)f New York, an English immigrant and attorney, was a Continental officer,

appointed chief Judge Advocate by Washington. He presided at the 1780 court martial
convicting British Major John Andre' to hang as a spy, arising from the latter's go-between
role in Benedict Arnold's treason. 51
The common thread of Sedgwick's and Laurence's service is of practical men risking their lives for patriotic ideals. The Canadian expedition Sedgwick experienced and the
Andre' court martial Laurence adjudged, suggested, in separate ways, their high degrees of
intestinal fortitude. The harrowing expedition Sedgwick endured resulted in American defeat,
retreat and pursuit by an avenging enemy, causing many deaths and imprisonments. 52 Pre-
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For First Congress Representatives serving as Fifth Congress Senators, see, ibid,
41-42; and 50-51. For biographical information in footnoted paragraph concerning Senators
Laurence and Sedgwick, see Biographical Directory ofCongress, 1371, 1799, n. 45, supra,
this Chapter. Each was also, at various times of the Fifth Congress, President pro tem of
the Senate, ibid, showing the respect with which they were held by their Senate peers.
52

Arnold's November 27, 1775, thumbnail description of the march to Quebec, ne(continued... )

58
siding at the court marital hanging British commanding general Sir Henry Clinton's favorite
aide, Major John Andre', put Laurence at risk had Clinton prevailed over Washington. 53
Those like Laurence and Sedgwick apparently steeled themselves to such dangers for reasons
of conscience. While such circumstances cannot prove, with geometric precision, the intent
of the Senators ratifying the Treaty, it supplies reasons to believe they would not do so flippantly, without circumspection, on declarations of conscience like Article 11. That Article's

52

continued)
ver challenged for accuracy despite his later treason, was:
( •••

Thus ... we completed a march ... not to be paralleled in history; the men
having with the greatest fortitude ... wad[ing] almost the whole way ... over
hills ... and bogs almost impenetrable, ... [s]hort of provisions, ... ; famine
... and enemy's country and uncertainty ahead. [The] ... officers and men
inspired ... with the love of liberty and their country, pushed on with a
fortitude superior to every obstacle ....
Quoted by Kenneth Roberts, compiler and annotator, March to Quebec, Journals of the
Members ofArnold's Expedition, rev. ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1947), 98-99.
Expedition doctor Lewis Beebe observed: ''No person can conceive the distress our people
endured the winter past, nor was it much less at the time of their retreat." Lewis Beebe,
"Journal," May 12, 1776; Thomas Fleming, 1776, Year of Illusions (New York: Norton,
1975), 222, citing, at n. 9, ibid, Frederick R Kirkland, ed., "Journal of a Physician on the
Expedition against Canada, 1776," Pennsylvania Mag. ofHist. & Biog., 59 (Oct 1935):325.
53

ThP til'!noPr T.l'lnrPn~P.

fqced was revealed in this extract from an October 1, 1780
Benedict Arnold letter for Sir Henry Clinton to George Washington: "[F]orty of the
principal inhabitants of South Carolina have justly forfeited their lives" for revolutionary
activity, and Clinton could not "in justice extend his mercy to them . . . if Major Andre'
suffers, .... "Willard Sterne Randall, Benedict Arnold: Patriot and Traitor (New York: Wm.
Morrow, 1990), 567. Randall concluded, ibid: "In other words, Arnold ... threatened ...
forty-to-one retaliation on hostages ifAndre' was executed." Thus, had the British captured
Judge Advocate John Laurence (later Senator Laurt::nce when ratifying the 1797 Tripoli
treaty), he had reason to fear death for his role in the Andre' court martial.
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stark assertion was that the United States was not founded upon the Christian religion. Given
these ratifying Senators' leadership positions, it seems equally difficult to believe their support of that provision did not influence their colleagues and constituents. Accordingly, the
Senate's 1797 ratification of this Treaty is deemed significant in reflecting national views of
the time on the relation between government and religion.
While senate votes on this treaty cannot incontrovertibly prove popular inclination
toward church/state separation, it is suggested those so-voting were not doing it lightly. As
might be expected, however, the sentiments reflected in the Tripoli treaty vote cannot be
deemed the whole story. There were other viewpoints to consider, even in this necessarily
cursory treatment ultimately focused on the narrower ~unday closing law question.

(3)

Possible Reconciliation of Jefferson's Seeming Inconsistencies
Concerning Government and Religion.

Truncated examples were just given ofAmerica as a "Christian nation" in the Church

of the Holy Trinity decision and the Tripoli Treaty provision asserting, to the contrary, an
America not "founded on the Christian religion." They illustrated the existence, virtually
simultaneously, near the time of the Virginia closing law's adoption, ofpowerfu~ yet contradictory, social inclinations toward governmental attachment to, versus separation from,
organized religion.
Jefferson certainly was aware that many Virginians were allied to each of these competing trends. Supporting closer association of government and religion, for example, was
the Patrick Henry-backed proposal for tax assessments for religious education, ultimately

60
defeated, in part, by Jefferson's political colleague, James Madison's, anonymously circulated
petition. 54 Reflecting, in contrast, movement toward government-religion separation, was the
General Assembly's refusal to allow churches to incorporate. 55
Contrary to Dreisbach's assertion, 56 however, it seemed unlikely that Jefferson
thought, even tentatively, that "religious liberty was realized in its richest sense through cooperation between the state and the church,"57 or that this explained his drafting Virginia's
Sunday closing law. Such were not Jefferson's expressed views in his Notes on the State of

Virginia, whose writing and publication straddled the 1786 enactment of the Virginia Sunday closing law he drafted. 58 There he wrote:
But our rulers can have authority over such i,mtural rights only as we have
submitted to them. The rights ofconscience we never submitted, we could not
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James Madison," Memorial and Remonstrance," 1785, The Constitution and Religion, Robert W. Alley, ed. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1999), 18-19, 29-34.
55

Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., "After Disestablishment: Thomas Jefferson's Wall of
Separation in Antebellum Virginia," Journal ofSouthern History, 61(1995):445, 451-480.
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See Dreisbach's text quoted immediately before n. 25, where the phrase quoted
in the footnoted sentence appears in context. His text, however, and his article containing it,
did not consider Jefferson's views expressed in Notes on the State of Virginia (n. 59 and
accompanying text, infra), although he cited the Notes on another issue on p. 182, n. 84, in
his 1990 North Carolina Law Review article (n. 17, supra) examining Jefferson's religious
freedom statute and Sunday closing law. (All footnote references, supra, except n. 84 in the
North Carolina Law Review article, are in this Chapter.)
57

58

Dreisbach, text preceding n. 25, supra, this Chapter.

Jefferson wrote Notes on the State of Virginia principally in 1781, published, after
his revisions, in 1787. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Frank Shufileton,
ed. (New York: Penguin, 1999) ("Notes"), "Introduction," xii-xvi. Joseph L. Ellis,
American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Knopf, 1998), 85.
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submit. We are answerable for them to our God. The legitimate powers of
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me
no injury for my neighbour [sic] to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.... Constraint may ... fix him
obstinately in his errors, but will not cure them. Reason and free enquiry are
the only effectual agents against error.... [T]hey will support true religion,
by bringing every false one ... to the test of their investigation. They are the
natural enemies ... of error only.... If [free inquiry] ... be restrained now,
the present corruptions will be protected and new ones encouraged. 59
Thus, according to Jefferson, government "cooperation" to achieve religious liberty, as
Dreisbach described, was achieved by the government's staying out of the way of religions
or popular deliberations about religion. Instead he advocated allowing citizens untrammeled
freedom to decide these matters themselves. Assuming, for argument's sake, this is true,
however, then the Jefferson-drafted Sunday closing 1:aw certainly appeared contrary to the
spirit, if not substance, of his religious freedom statute.
Other Jeffersonian views, in contrast, appeared congenial to government support of
organized religfon. For example, he urged using his local courthouse as "the common ternpie, one Sunday in the month to each [denomination]." There, he continued:
Episcopalian and Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist, meet together, join in
hymning their Maker, listen with attention and devotion to each others'
preachers, and all mix in society with perfect harmony. 60
Jefferson also proposed that his prized creation, the University of Virginia, a state
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Thomas Jefferson, Notes, Frank Shuflleton, ed., 165; n. 58, ibid, and accompanying text.
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Thomas Jefferson letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper, November 2, 1822, The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson, 20 vols.; Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, ed.
(Washington, D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Ass'n, 1903), 15:404.
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institutio~ allow religious groups to establish separate on-campus religious schools. He

would have permitted "students to attend religious exercises with a professor of their particular sect," while also attending "scientific lectures of the University.•'6t Further, Jefferson
not only did not object to Sunday religious services at the United States Capitol but attended

himself: though his biographer Merrill Peterson claimed this was merely to allay "criticism of
his friendliness with [Thomas] Paine," condemned by many for atheism. 62
All this, however, left unexplained Jefferson's seemingly contradictory views simultaneously held about interrelations of church and state. Joseph Ellis wrote of Jefferson's
tendency "to invent and then embrace" what Ellis called "seductive fictions," and "play fast
and loose with historical evidence on behalf of a great~r cause."63
Although evidence remained murky for this thesis as it was also for past investigations, the "greater cause" in this instance seemed to have been achieving greater societal
religious freedom through creating, in part through a Sunday closing law, an improved ethi-

Thomas Jefferso~ "Freedom of Religion at the University of Virginia," October 7,
1822, Saul K. Padover, The Complete Jefferson (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1943),
957.
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Thomas Jefferson, 713, n. 1, Chapter 1, supra, this thesis.

Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York:
Knopf, 1998), 33. Jefferson was less charitably described in sources Bernard Bailyn collected, To Begin the World Anew : the Genius and Ambiguities of the American Founders
(New York: Knopf, distributed by Random House, 2003), 38 (footnotes omitted): "John
Quincy Adams ... conceded that Jefferson had an 'ardent passion for liberty and the rights
of man' but denounced him for infidelity, 'pliability of principle,' and double dealing....
Hamilton ... [,] Jefferson's chiefenemy[,] ... feared what he called the Virginian's fanaticism
and believed he was 'crafty' and a 'contemptible hypocrite."'
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cal climate. Analysis supporting such a view was offered by A. James Reichley:
Some of the positions on ... religion in public life taken by Jefferson
at different times were simply inconsistent, as he himselfwould probably have
acknowledged, attnbuting the inconsistencies to changes of mind or to
pressing political needs of the moment. His overall view, however, though
based on two sets of values in natural tension, was not necessarily
inconsistent. Jefferson firmly believed that government should be barred from
acting ... as arbiter of religion; but ... that a free society... uphold[ing]
personal freedom . . . requires moral sustenance from a religious culture.
These beliefs ... can exist together within a consistent social philosophy,
though they may pull against each other in ways that require difficult
constitutional adjustments. 64
Thus, one explanation for Jefferson's apparently inconsistent views on church-state
relations, is as an amalgam of his beliefs in (1) some kind of divine providence; (2) freedom
of inquiry (even to the extent ofrejecting most of (1) .if one chose to do so); (3) the attempted accommodation of vastly differing philosophical views for political expediency; and (4)
society's need for ''moral sustenance" from a "religious culture."
To simply say, however, that Jefferson advocated a ''religious culture," does not
adequately convey what he meant. His humanist views about ''free enquiry," sharply contrasted with earlier English Puritan ideas about the centrality of the Judaic-Christian scriptures to society's sound operation. 65 Further, though Jefferson's interest in religion was intense, his religious views were anything but conventional for either his time or for most
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A. James Reichley, Religion in American Public Life (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), 96.
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Concerning "free enquiry," see portion of Jefferson's text from Notes on the State
of Virginia; quoted preceding n. 59, supra, this Chapter.

64
practicing Christians today. He created, for example, a bible of his own editorial desi~
omitting Christ's resurrection or New Testament miracles, concepts Jefferson rejected. 66
Jefferson was unable to exert any in-person influence for the 1786 adoption of his
Bill for Religious Freedom and the Sunday closing law, having been serving as American
Minister to France in Paris since 1784.67 For enactment of statutory revisions proposed by
the 1779 committee of''revisors" he chaired, he relied on James Madison, his "faithful lieutenant," with a "keener sense of realities," and "more patience with the drudgeries of politics" than Jefferson. Madison's was also considered more adept than Jefferson at "political
maneuvering [that] was an integral part of Virginia's political process."68
Among Madison's strengths in obtaining enactµient of many of the proposals of the
"revisors"' committee Jefferson chaired was his "idealism" which, nonetheless, "did not allow him to ignore the realities of politics." The two opposed a conservative-inspired assessment bill to support religion with taxes, provoking conservative opposition to the 118

66

"To Jefferson ... , miracles violated God's laws of nature, something [he was]
... sure God would never do .... To ... rationalists, Jesus' virgin birth and other miracles
... did not prove him to be the Son of God, but ... an 'illegitimate imposter' [which he
rejected] .... It was sinful men, not God, who killed Jesus....Jefferson [believed] ... Jesus
was not a divine being but the greatest man that ever lived, for he omits the New Testament
accounts of Jesus resurrection, subsequent appearances, and ascension." Charles B.
Sanford, "The Religious Beliefs ofThomas Jefferson," 64-65, Religion and Popular Culture
in Jefferson's Virginia, Garrett Ward Sheldon & Daniel L. Dreisbach, ed. (Lanham, Md.:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) (this author an ordained minister), ibid, 236.
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Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation, 286; n. 1, Chapter 1, supra.
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Ibid, 266.
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bills Jefferson and his revisors proposed. As explained by Madison's editors:
[Madison] presented 118 bills in the Revised Code early in the session in the
hope of completing the long-unfinished business. The legislature [in 1785]
slowly progressed through the bills until conservative, pragmatic Virginians
balked at Jefferson's bill on crimes . . . . With little time left, [Madison]
decided to postpone the majority of the bills in favor of trying to pass the
most important, among them the bill for religious freedom. 69
Among these "most important" bills that Madison presented for passage was the Sunday
closing law or, as titled in an October 31, 1785, printed copy prepared for the House of
Delegates, "A bill 'for punishing disturbers of religious worship and sabbath breakers. "'70 As
earlier discussed herein, it was ultimately adopted by the legislature, through Madison's
efforts, on November 27, 1786.71
Madison's just-described proclivities for ''political maneuvering" (i.e., compromise)
as "an integral part of Virginia's political process" and his declining "to ignore the realities
of politics" suggests another reason that could have induced him to offer Jefferson's Sunday
closing law for legislative adoption and worked for its passage. Such a law could have been
a means to counter conservative Virginians' concerns about Jefferson's and Madison's (a)
sponsorship ofthe religious freedom bill, and (b) opposing conservative religious assessment

Robert A. Rutland and William M. E. Racha~ ed., Papers of James Madison,
17 vols(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1973) ("Madison Papers") "Editorial Note," 8:
390 (10 March 1784 - 28 March 1786) (includes quotations in text paragraph
immediately preceding footnoted paragraph).
69
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Madison Papers, 8:394.
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See nn. 17 and 20 parts (1) through (3) and accompanying text, supra, this Chap-

ter.
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proposals. Introducing a Sunday closing law affording ordinary citizens a day of rest their
employers could not countennand, because it had the force of law; which also addressed
religious concerns of Virginia's conservatives through penalizing sabbath work, could have
been Jefferson's motivation.
While no documentary proof can be presented that such motives of political compromise underlay Madison's proposal of Virginia's Sunday closing law, it certainly offered
possible political solutions for the Jeffersonians. Despite requiring general abstention from
Sunday work, Jefferson's closing law, unlike Virginia's colonial versions, contained no
parallel requirement for mandatory religious observances. 72 Thus, for followers of the Enlightenment, like Jefferson and Madison, it could be S"4pported as a public welfare measure
to achieve one day per week of mandatory rest, paralleling other public welfare statutes
Jefferson's "revisors" drafted for Assembly consideration.73 On the other hand, for conservatives such as war-time Governor Patrick Henry, a supporter of the religious assessment
bill, it legally sanctioned punishing businesses, entertainments and other activities interfering
with Sunday worship. Even though it did not require such worship, it at least potentially
mitigated Sunday secular diversions that distracted citizens from worship. Thus the Sunday
closing law, in part, could have been calculated to achieve compromise and, chameleon-like,
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See, for example, nn. 37-39 and accompanying text, Chapter 4, supra.

Among the subjects of these bills: "support of the poor;" "preventing infection of
the homed cattle," ''preservation of deer," and "preventing frauds by the dealers in flour,
beef, pork, tar, pitch and turpentine;" from a House of Delegates October 31, 1785, printed list of them. Madison Papers, 8:394-395.
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mean different things to those of differing political views.
In summary, some or all of the reasons discussed above probably explain Jefferson's
seeming inconsistency in his simultaneous support of both his religious freedom statute and
the Sunday closing law at the time of their eighteenth century Virginia adoption.

Chapter 6:

SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

The national dynamic concerning Sunday closing laws in the nineteenth century was
crisply summarized by law professor Andrew J. King:
During the nineteenth century American courts reluctantly gave up
strict enforcement of Sunday observance. The American theories ofreligious
liberty-separation of church and state and noncoercion-made it increasingly difficult for courts to give Sunday restrictions a sectarian justification.
To avoid state constitutional questions, the courts adopted a police power
justification that relied on the theme of Sunday as a "day ofrest."1
To apply the trends summarized above to Virginia's nineteenth century Sunday closing laws,
national developments are here considered with relevance to the Virginia experience. The
principles derived are applied to Virginia closing-law situations.

(a)

Sunday Closing Law's Nineteenth Century Impact on Liability Arising
from Sunday Contracts or Negligence.
(1)

Representative State Courts Outside Virginia Denying Liability
Due to Sunday Closing Law.

Nineteenth century non-: Virginia appellate cases with Virginia relevance concerned
Sunday closing law applications to [a] contracts made or performed on Sunday; or [b] negligence injuring claimants on Sunday. In McGrath v. Merwin, the Massachusetts closing law
prohibited "any manner of [Sunday] labor, business or work, except ... necessity or charity."
The plaintiff McGrath, injured by defendants' "carelessness," worked for them on Sunday
(termed the "Lord's day" by the court) because "it was more convenient and profitable" for

Andrew J. King, "Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century," Albany L. Rev. 64
(1990):675, 771-772. When the article was published, its author was an associate professor oflaw at the University of Maryland School of Law, ibid, 675.

68

69
the defendants that he do so than "any secular day." The court held the plaintiff's "illegal"
Sunday work repairing paper mill machinery ''was inseparably connected with the cause of
action and contributed to his injury," denying recovery solely for that reason. 2

McGrath was relied upon by the defendant in Bucher v. Cheshire R.R. before the United States Supreme Court, an appeal from a Massachusetts federal trial court, which denied
Bucher's injury claim against the defendant railroad, although the latter's negligence caused
the injury. This denial was because, the lower court held, (1) plaintiffBucher's Sunday travel
violated the state closing law; and (2) the travel was not a ''necessity," thus not exempted
from closing law prosecution.
The Supreme Court affirmed, due to the pop~ly-termed federal "Rules ofDecision" Act,

3

requiring substantive state law to control in this federal trial. The Court deter-

mined (1) the applicable Massachusetts law, and (2) that it was required by the "Rules of
Decision" Act to apply that law in Bucher, even though it preferred not to do so:
[T]he Supreme Court of Massachusetts... holding[s] that a person engaged
in travel on the Sabbath day, contrary to the statute of the State, ... shall not

2

3

McGrath v. Merwin, 112 Mass. 467, 468-469 (1873).

Bucher v. Cheshire R.R., 125 U.S. 555, 582 (1884). The "Rules of Decision Act"
(see s.v. "Rules of Decision Act" Black's Law Dictionary [ri1 ed]), currently 28 U.S.C. §
1652, originally §34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, c.20, 1 Stat. 73,
provided ''the laws ofthe several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes
of the United States shall otherwise require ... , shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at common law in the Courts of the United States, ...." Its current text is the same
except "civil actions" replaced ''trials at common law" to conform to ''terminology of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." See Historical Note in "Official" (2000) edition, United
States Code, following 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (Washington: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 2000).
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recover against a corporation upon whose road he travels for the negligence
of its servants, thereby establish . . . a local law . . . of sufficiently long
standing to establish the rule, ... though giving an effect to it which may not
meet the approval of this court .... 4
Thus, in Bucher, the Court found itselfconstrained by federal statute to follow Massachusetts
closing law rules denying the plaintiff recovery, despite its disapproval of those rules.
Other nineteenth century American courts, mostly in New England, applied Sunday
closing laws similarly to Massachusetts. In Maine's Parker v. Latner, the defendant leased a
horse and carriage on a Sunday, allegedly damaged due to his negligent driving. The plaintiff
lost solely because the contract was made, and the alleged negligence occurred, on a Sunday,
rendering the contract illegal under Maine's Sunday closing law:
If the contract had been a valid contract, the defendant would have
been liable upon the implied promise to use ordinary and common care of the
property bailed, which the case finds he did not. Being a contract illegal and
void, his liability upon the contract is at an end. 5
Similarly, in Rhode Island, a defendant leased a horse and buggy on Sunday from the
plaintll: but did not return them at the place promised, resulting in alleged damages. Because the contract was made on Sunday, however, the plaintiff was denied relief:
That agreement, ... violat[es] ... a statute which prolnbits the
plaintiff from so contracting on Sunday. . . . [T]he contract was thereby
rendered illegal. ... [N]o court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause
... upon an ... illegal act... ; and though the objection, said Lord Mans-
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Bucher,125 U.S. at 584. McGrath (seen. 2, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text) was cited by defendant railroad in Bucher, ibid at 576, as reflecting Massassachusetts law.
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field, ... sound [sic] ill in the mouth of the defendant, it is allowed, not for
... sake of the defendant, but because the court will not lend its aid to such
a plainti:ff. 6
In accord, Vermont held that a traveler without a "necessity" or "charity'' exemption for
Sunday travel could not recover from a negligent defendant who injured him that day. 7
Andrew King concluded that application of closing laws to deny recovery to injured
travelers or workers largely ceased by the end ofthe nineteenthcentury. 8 Vestiges, however,
remained. In Mississippi, as late as 1925 for example, a plaintiff's recovery for damages due
to drinking the defendant bottler's contaminated beverage was reversed because plaintiff
bought and consumed the drink on Sunday, violating, the court held, the closing law:
Before the manufacturer ... was liable .... for a breach ofits warranty
of
. . . fitness . . . , the party injured thereby must have . . . rightful
possession of the drink. The implied warranty runs with the sale and passes
with the title, and where the sale ... is made void by [the Sunday closing.
law] statute, and where he is a participant in the sale, he cannot recover,
although this statute makes the crime, apparently, apply to the seller alone.
His [plamtifI's] ... purchase is illegal ... and the courts will not give him
relief for injuries ... brought about by ... an illegal act in which he is a joint
participant voluntarily. 9

6

Whelden v. Chappel, 8 RI. 230, 233 (1865). Lord Mansfield was the "greatest
judge" of eighteenth century England; Richard A. Smith s.v. "Mansfield, William Murray
... " Oxford Companion to British History, John Cannon, ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press 1997), 616.
7

Johnson v. Town oflrasburgh, 42 Vt. 23 (1874). (If plaintiff's Sunday travel to
preserve fish was ''necessary''? held: jury fact-question, not subject to appellate review.)
8

See n. I, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. (Nineteenth and twentieth
century Virginia closing laws did not bar Sunday travel, only certain Sunday labor.)
9

Grapico Bottling Co. v. Ennis, 140 Miss. 502, 106 So. 97, 98-99 (1925).
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The above-quoted majority opinion generated a biting dissent:
The [majority] rule ... means that an innocent person, who purchases a
bottled drink on Sunday ... poisoned ... with filthy flies ... caus[ing] him
great ... suffering[,] ... has no remedy .... The purchase and drinking ..
. on Sunday is merely incidental to the breach of the warranty by the
manufacturer, . . . on a previous day when he bottled the poisoned drink ..
. . The ... majority opinion will ... free ... every vendor of drinks ... sold
on Sunday [from liability], regardless of the ... damage. 10

This dissent well-summarized views of other courts increasingly rejecting older
common law barring claimants from recovery due to negligence or contract breaches, solely
because plaintiffs were, at the time of their injury, violating Sunday closing laws.

(2)

Representative State Courts Outside Virginia Retreating from
Denying Liability Due to Sunday Closing Laws.

Other late-nineteenth century cases rejected closing laws as a reason to escape from
liability due to Sunday negligence. An example was Carroll v. Staten Island R.R., 11 which
found a plaintiff passenger's Sunday injury was caused by the railroad's negligently maintaining a ferryboat boiler. The resulting explosion injured the passenger. Carroll indignantly
denied New York's closing law could free the defendant from liability:

It is certainly a startling proposition, that the thousands ... who travel ... on
Sunday, ... are at the mercy of ... careless engineers ... , for ... their
negligence . . . . The plaintiff's unlawful act [i.e., Sunday travel] did not ...
contribute to the explosion.... To hold the carrier exempt from liability,
because the plaintiff was violating the Sunday statute, would ... shield a

to

Holden, J, dissenting, in Grapico Bottling, ibid, 106 So. at 99;joined by Cook, J.

II

Carroll v. Staten Island R.R., 58 N.Y. 126 (1874).
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wrongdoer from a just responsibility for his wrongful act. 12

Ca"ol/ thus rejected earlier Sunday closing law cases supposedly promoting Sunday rest
through discouraging Sabbath travel and work. These cases led, however, to reprieving
defendants from their own wanton negligence for no reason except that the harm occurred
on Sunday. The persuasiveness of Ca"oll 's view caused other states to follow it in denying
that closing laws should preclude recovery for Sunday injuries. 13
Implicit in these decisions was technology's social impact as the nineteenth century
progressed, undoing simpler generalizations of earlier ages facing fewer complications due
to ceasing secular activities on Sunday. An earlier-nineteenth century discussion of the
Sunday closing-lawproblemactually couched in such te~ was an 1829 Report by Kentucky
Senator Richard M. Johnson, chair of the United States Senate Committee on Post Offices
and Postal Roads. After hearings on demands by some religious groups that the federal
government, as

a "Christian nation"

suspend Sunday transport of mails, 14 the Senator

12

Ibid at 135-136 (Vainly cited by plaintiff in Bucher, nn. 3-4, this Chapter, supra,
and supporting text; [125 U.S. at 569-570]).
13

Carroll followed, for example, in Opsahl v. Judd, 30 Minn. 126, 14 N.W. 575,

576 (1883) ("[Deceased's] presence [on Sunday] did not ... cause the accident; and ...
wrongdoers [due to Sunday travel,] though answerable to the state[,] ... are entitled to the
protection [from] ... negligence of others."; and in Van Auken v. Chicago & Western
Mich. R.R., 69 Mich. 307, 55 N.W. 971, 974 (1893) ("In nearly all the states it has been
held under quite similar [Sunday closing] statutes that a party traveling ... who is injured .
. . , is not barred from recovery ... [because] the injury occurred on Sunday.")
14

Senator Johnson commented on these demands: "The transportation of the mail
on the first day of the week [i.e., Sunday], . . . does not interfere with the rights of
(continued... )
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disagreed:
The various departments of government require, frequently in peace, always
in war, the speediest intercourse with the remotest parts of the country; and
one important object of the mail establishment is to furnish the greatest and
most economical facilities for such intercourse. The delay of the mails one
whole day in seven would require the employment of special expresses, at
great expense, and sometimes with great uncertainty.
The commercial, manufacturing, and agricultural interests of our
country are so intimately connected as to require a constant and the most
expeditious correspondence between all our seaports, and between them and
the most interior settlements. 15
After thus describing difficulties expected from ending Sunday mail transport, Senator Johnson concluded that continuing Sunday mail best honored the Constitution, despite
religious objections. 16 His report influenced the 1858 ~alifornia Supreme Court in Ex parte

14

( ••• continued)

conscience. The petitioners for its discontinuance appear to be actuated from a religious zeal,
which may be commendable ifconfined to its proper sphere; but they assume a position better
suited to an ecclesiastical than to a civil institution." Senator Richard M. Johnson, Chair,
Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, Report [on Sunday Observance and Delivery of
Mail], January 19, 1829, 20th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Report No. 74, The Debates and
Proceedings in the Congress of the United States with an Appendix Containing Important
State Papers and Public Documents and All the Laws ofa Public Nature; ... Index, 42 vols.
(Washington, D.C.: 1834-1856); Reprinted in Annals ofAmerica, Mortimer J. Adler, ed.
(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1976), 5:284, 285. (Hereinafter, "Johnson, Annals")
15

16

Johnson, Annals, ibid, 286-287.

"What other nations call religious toleration, we call religious rights. . . . Let the
national legislature once perform an act which involves the decision of a religious controversy and it will have passed its legitimate bounds.... Our Constitution recognizes no other
power than that of persuasion for enforcing religious observances." Ibid, 287.
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Newman, 17 to declare unconstitutional its state Sunday closing law; a position from which it
subsequently retreated. 18 Nevertheless, practicality, as shown in Johnson's Report, 19 rather
than constitutionality, seemed more influential in the Sunday closing laws' demise. 20

(b)

An Unsuccessful Attempt to Escape Sunday Liability Through the Virginia Sunday Closing Law.

Many ofthe principles already discussed in this Chapter 6 became relevant in Virginia
due to the United States Supreme Court's applying them in Powhatan Steamboat Co. v.
17

Ex Parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 506, 507 (1858), referring to "Mr. Johnson," and
his "celebrated Sunday-mail report," correctly quoted, but without further citation details.
18

Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 679, 684 (1861) ("The Act ... requires no man to profess or support any ... religious faith, or even to have any religion at all. It simply requires
him to refrain from keeping open his place of business on Sunday.")(Adopting dissent of
Justice Field in Newman, n. 17, ibid, as part of the Andrews opinion.)
19

See quotation in text preceding n. 15, this Chapter, supra.

20

The ubiquitous Tocqueville, in 1831, shortly after Senator Johnson's 1829 report,
ibid, colorfully described the totality of a Sunday-law closedown in an urban setting:
There is, notably, a great American town in which, from Saturday evening on,
social movement is almost suspended. You go through it at the hour that
seems to invite the mature to business and youth to pleasures, and you find
yourself in profound solitude. . . . One hears neither the movement of
industry nor the accents ofjoy, not even the confused murmur that continually
rises from within a great city.
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, translated
and edited by Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, 2000), 683 (Notes to Vol I., Part I,
p. 39). Tocqueville was describing New York City, based on his June 29, 1831, letter written just after his five week stay there, as set forth in George Wilson Pierson, Tocqueville in
America (New York: Oxford, 1938; Reprint, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1996
[paperback]), 153-154, whose text substantially paralleled the above-quoted Democracy in
America passage. Tocqueville claimed in the letter that "public opinion, much stronger than
the law," ibid, enforced the Sunday absence of activity.
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Appomattox R.R. 21 in analyzing the Virginia closing law's impact on the defendant railroad's
liability for Sunday negligence and contract beach. The steamboat company sought damages
for goods its ship carried from Baltimore, Maryland, to City Point, Virginia. 22 Reaching City
Point on Sunday, its crew unloaded the goods into the defendant railroad's wharfside
warehouse, with the defendant merely unlocking and relocking the warehouse door before
and after delivery. The railroad ran no Sunday trains and planned to reload the goods on its
Monday Petersburg (Virginia) freight. 23 On the same Sunday the goods reached the warehouse, however, a fire there destroyed them due to, the trial court found, the defendant's
negligence. This was a finding not challenged on appeal. 24
Virginia's Sunday closing law was essentially upchanged in 185325 from its original
enactment. 26 Amendments exempted from prosecution (a) Sunday transport of "mail, or
passengers and their baggage," (b) anyone ''who conscientiously believes the seventh day of

21

Powhatan Steamboat Co. v. Appomattox RR, 65 U.S. [24 How.] 247 (1860).

22

City Point was "on James River," ibid at 250, twenty miles south of Richmond,
West Point Atlas of American Wars, 1689-1900, vol. I, Vincent Esposito, ed., (New
York: Praeger, 1959; reprint: Henry Holt, 1995) (unpaginated), Map 43 (a),"... 31 May
1862 ... [,] Battle of Fair Oaks .... ").

23

Defendant stored the goods "at the risk of the plaintiffs," 65 U.S. at 251, held: not
to excuse defendant's "subsequent negligence and carelessness," ibid at 256, in that loss.
24

Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 250-251 & 256.

25

The Court decided Powhatan in 1860, but the fire-loss of plaintiff's goods, litigated in the case, occurred on June 26, 1853. Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 251.
26

See text preceding n. 20, Chapter 5, supra, for the statute's text.
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the week [is the] ... Sabbath [Saturday], and actually refrains" from labor that day, 27 and (c)
passengers and baggage on Sunday mail-stages. 28 These added exemptions could well have
been derived from the previously-discussed 1829 Post Office Committee Report objecting to
suspending Sunday mail transport, which favored them. 29
The Supreme Court summarized the result of the federal trial court proceedings:
the jury were substantially told by the presiding justice ... , that ... if they
found . . . the goods were delivered on a Sunday, under a contract between
the parties, . . . and were destroyed by fire on th[at] day . . . their verdict
should be for the defendants. 30
Thus, the lower court attempted to use Virginia's Sunday closing law to generate a

27

Va. Code, Ch. 196, § 17 (Patton & Robinson rev., 1849), quoted in Powhatan at
247 & 252. A Saturday worshiper, by the amendment's literal text, was not excused from
the Sunday ban on labor if not "conscientiously believ[ing]" in the Saturday sabbath, an
obligation not similarly imposed on a Sunday worshiper.
28

Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 252 (quoting statute).

29

See nn. 14-16, and accompanying text, this Chapter, supra. See also Johnson,
Annals, 286, n. 15, this Chapter, supra: "Passengers in the mail stages, if ... not permitted
to proceed on Sunday, will . . . spend that day . . . under circumstances not friendly to
devotion, and at an expense which many [cannot] ... encounter." Ibid at 285-286: "[A]
variety of sentiment exists ... on ... the Sabbath day; and our government is designed for
the protection of one [sentiment] as much for another. The Jews, who in this country are.
. . entitled to the same protection from the laws, derive their obligation to keep the Sabbath
from the Fourth Commandment, and ... pay religious homage to the seventh day of the
week, which we call Saturday." The Virginia amendment, as in Senator Johnson's Report,
describes Saturday as the "seventh day ofthe week," ibid, rather than by name. This suggests
Virginia's legislators may have based the amendments previously discussed herein on the
Report's language.
30

Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 251-252.
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jury _"instruction/' like the jury "instruction" in Francisco, 31 effectively removing the decision from the jurors. This was because it was undisputed that the "goods were delivered"
and "destroyed by fire" on Sunday. This trial ruling, if not reversed, effectively meant that
the defendant railroad escaped liability as a matter of law, due to the Sunday closing law.
Also, like Francisco, however, this reliance on the closing law did not survive the appeal.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower Virginia federal trial court.32
What Powhatan accomplished, without citing authority beyond the Virginia Sunday
closing law itself,33 is given context by legal scholar Norman Cantor:
The common law is sometimes hailed as a kind of fixed heavenly
firmament, its . . . principles shining down like beautiful and remote stars,
infinitely set apart from the anxieties . . . and. passions of particular human
lives. That is not what legal history teaches. On the contrary, contingency,
relativity, malleability, institutional change in response to modification in context and ambiance-this is what the history of the common law teaches....
Reading a case for historical purposes broadens the implications of
the legal text and joins it with social, political, and cultural trends. This may
not be what the lawyer always wants; it is what the historian always needs to
explain judicial change or to use law cases for social history. 34
The analysis by Powhatan of the Virginia closing law exemplified the Court's con31

See n. 10, Chapter 2, supra, and accompanying text.

32

Powhatan at 255-256.

33

Powhatan's lack of cited authority was not due to a lack of briefing. Instead, the
Court observed: "The arguments upon both sides contained... cases ... [concerning] ...
Sunday laws; but [since] ... this case does not come within the scope of the Virginia code,
the insertion of these arguments is not considered necessary." 65 U.S. at 249.
34

Norman F. Cantor, Imagining the Law: Common Law and the Foundations of the
American Legal System (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 375-376.
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sideration of"institutional change in response to context and ambiance" as Cantor described.

Powhatan delineated, without characterizing them as such, complexities that could arise due
to Virginia's closing law; analogous to the difficulties noted by the dissent in the 1925 Mississippi tainted soda-pop opinion. 35 For example, said Powhatan, ifplaintiff steamboat company
had sued for compensation for its Sunday "labor of landing and depositing the goods" at
defendant railroad's warehouse, or if defendant had refused "to open and close the warehouse" on Sunday, or if the defendant had refused on Sunday "to allow the goods to be
deposited" at the warehouse, then the Sunday closing law "would apply," to deny plaintiff
recovery it might have asserted, under those assumed, but non-existent, facts. 36
Such Court-posed hypotheticals seemed calculated to illustrate to the business community, through this opinion in the Court's much-read Reports, 37 how commerce could be
impeded by Virginia's Sunday closing law. This surmise is strengthened by the Court's first

35

See nn. 9 and 10, supra, this Chapter, and supporting text.

36

Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 255-256.

37

Roy M. Mersky, s.v. "Publishing Law," Oxford Companion to American Law,
Kermit L. Hall, chief ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), 679-681: "The reporting
of decisions of the Supreme Court deserves special mention .... Because of the importance
of these decisions, the Court's holdings were reported almost from the beginning .... The
Supreme Court endorsed the principle [in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834), says
Mersky] that no copyright should exist in the laws governing the nation [such as its own
opinions], since their wide dissemination is [sic] essential," 680, ibid (Note: The Justices in
Wheaton were "unanimously of opinion that no reporter has nor can have any copyright
in the written opinions [of] ... this court ... ," ibid. at 668. Thatthe Justices did so because
wide dissemination of their opinions was "essential," was Professor's Mersky's inference; no
doubt well-merited, but not expressly stated in Wheaton.)
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offering, as just described, a variety of hypothetical circumstances where the Virginia Sunday closing law would apply to deny plaintiff relief for commercial losses. The Court then,
miraculously-or so it might seem-extracted from the case other facts mandating that the
Sunday closing law should not apply in Powhatan. This meant plaintiff steamboat company
could recover, according to the Supreme Court, thus reversing the trial court.
The legal-reasoning mechanism Powhatan applied to deny the closing law's application was one of several typically used by common-law courts construing statutes not to
their liking, which they cannot, or prefer not, to overrule. "[I]nstitutional change in response
to modification in context and ambiance," as Norman Cantor described, 38 is implemented by
such courts "discovering," as it were, a previously ~iculated underlying principle which
they assert is, nevertheless, applicable. "Obviously," or words to that effect (according to
such a court), the principle is one the legislature could not have intended to be impaired by
the statute it drafted. Powhatan accomplished this by declaring that the issue before it
was one to which the Sunday laws of Virginia have no application whatever.
. . . [T]he real claim is grounded on the obligations ... imposed on the
defendants safely and securely to keep, convey, and deliver the goods, and
upon their subsequent negligence ... , whereby the goods were lost. 39
Powhatan thus asserted there were underlying "obligations ... imposed on the defendants
safely and securely to keep ... the goods," independent of any contract with plaintiff steamboat company. These obligations, the Court reasoned, could not cease on Sunday, any more

38

See n. 34, this Chapter, supra, and supporting text.

39

Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 253, 255-256 (emphasis added).
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than a bank was relieved on Sunday from protecting depositors' funds in its vaults. The logic
here was similar to the later holding in Carrol/. 40 The Powhatan Court declared that ifit had
ruled that defendant railroad's gaining Sunday possession ofthe goods, excused defendant's
later negligence in destroying them due to the Sunday fire, this would
amount to a forfeiture of the goods, ... allow[ing] the carrier ... voluntarily
to destroy ... or to appropriate them to his own use. [ii] [T]he obligations of
the defendants, ... were not varied [because] ... the goods were deposited
in their warehouse by their consent on 'a Sabbath day.' Great injustice would
result from any different rule, and although the precise question has seldom
or never been presented for decision, yet we think the analogies of the law
fully sustain the rule here laid down. For these reasons ... the instruction
given to the jury was erroneous. 41

Powhatan expressly generated new, judge-made law, by applying "analogies" (as
stated in the above quotation), rather than relying on precedent. However, it was not content
to let its ruling rest exclusively on the defendant's duty to protect bailed goods, independent
of the closing law. It also asserted a statutory "necessity" for labor on Sunday (stretching

40

Seen. 12, this Chapter, supra, and supporting text quoting Carroll. Powhatan's
technique of asserting an underlying principle of safekeeping people and property, to negate
the Sunday closing law's seeming imperative of not working or traveling on that day, was
also applied in Carroll, 58 N.Y. 126, 133-134, 137: "The graveman of the action is, the
breach of the duty imposed by law upon the carrier . . . to carry safely . . . persons . . .
exist[ing] independently of contract, .... The plaintiff went upon [defendant's steamer] ..
. in ... an unlawful purpose, [i.e., Sunday travel] .... [but since] [t]he action was not
founded upon contract; ... the principle that courts will not ... to enforce the performance
of illegal contracts has no application..... [T]hat the plaintiff was... traveling contrary to
the [Sunday closing] statute, is no defense ... " (Emphasis added.)
41

Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added). Virginia overturned Powhatan within
its borders by statute, 1889-90 Acts of General Assembly, c. 49 ( "[N]o steamboat company
shall ... load or unload on a Sunday any steamship ... at any port or landings ... of this
state....")(Adopted February 7, 1890).

82
back to the earlier-discussed edict of Emperor Constantine)42 by alternatively holding:
To take care of the goods on "a Sabbath day," and safely and securely keep
them, after the goods were received, was a work of necessity, and therefore
was not unlawful, even on the theory assumed by the defendants [i.e., reliance
on the Sunday closing law and its ''necessity'' exception], and the defendants
were not expected to convey or deliver the goods until the following day. 43
Powhatan thus limited Virginia's Sunday closing laws by first denying they applied
to so-called ''noncontractual" duties of protecting goods or passengers. Second, it afforded
more scope to the courts to define a given Sunday activity as a "necessity," exempted by the
closing law from prosecution. These themes reappear in Virginia decisions to dilute closinglaw effectiveness.44

42

Emperor Constantine's edict discussed at nn. 19-23, Chapter 3, and accompanying text, supra.

43

44

Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 256.

Contra to the trend suggested here was Norfolk & Western R.R. v. Commonwealth,93 Va. 749, 24 S.E. 837 (1896), holding a Virginia statute denying the right to
"load, unload, run or transport ... on a Sunday, any car, train ... or locomotive," did not
violate U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, (interstate commerce clause), since the coal cars in
question, being empty, lacked "commerce" to regulate. Ibid. at 753. It alternately held: (1)
this legislation might "affect" commerce, but not unconstitutionally "regulate" it, when
intended to protect "health and morals" by shielding "persons from the physical and moral
debasement ... from uninterrupted labor," ibid., at 757, 762, 763; and (2) the lack of
necessity for Sunday coal-car travel: "[The statute's] only effect upon such commerce
would be to delay it a few hours .... There is nothing in ... coal ...that requires that the
laws ... for the preservation of the health and morals ... should be struck down ... [for]
a more rapid movement." Ibid. at 763. The court's acceptance of delay for "only ... a few
hours," ibid., ... recalls Justice Holmes' wry comment that ''property rights may be taken
... without pay if you do not take too much." Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418,
446 (1927) (Holmes, J, dissenting).

Chapter 7:

(a)

VIRGINIA'S CLOSING LAW ENTERS THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.1
Closing Law Appeals Through the Conclusion of the First World
War.

Virginia's twentieth-century Sunday closing law appellate litigation began with

Hortenstein v. Virginia Carolina R.R. 2

The plaintiff, executor of an estate of a decedent

fatally injured by the defendant railroad, urged the mirror-image opposite ofrailroads in other
states who, as earlier discussed,3 urged they should not be liable when those they injured
were traveling or working contrary to a closing law. The plaintiff here insisted that the
defendant railroad was liable to his deceased's estate for the same reason: illegal operation
on a Sunday of the locomotive injuring deceased. Had it not been so operating contrary to
the Sunday closing law, the executor argued, the deceased could not have been fatally injured.
Virginia's high court was unimpressed. It found plaintiff failed to show the railroad
"did not come within the exceptions contained in the [Sunday] statute.',.. Second, it held
that merely alleging the railroad violated the Sunday law was insufficient. To prevail, ''the

In this thesis, not every Virginia Sunday closing law appellate decision has been
cited but it is believed, in good faith, that all major trends are covered.
2

102 Va. 914, 47 S.E. 996 (1904). Although this appeal was decided in 1904, the
events litigated occurred in 1901, ibid at 915.

3

See nn.2 through 4 and accompanying text, Chapter 6, supra.

4

Ibid. Those exceptions allowed Sunday operations to transport "live stock, ...
articles of such perishable nature as would be necessarily impaired in value by one day's
delay," and "ordinary goods ... ''to make a whole train-load." Va. Code,§ 3801.
83
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same facts ... [as] if the ... negligence" had not occurred on Sunday must be proved. 5
Procedural nuances of a sort irritating to nearly everyone except lawyers dominated
Virginia's next twentieth-century Sunday closing law appeal,

Wells v. Commonwealth. 6

The defendant argued he could not be fined for closing law violations, due to a 1904 closing-law amendment providing in part: "From any judgment rendered under this section, the
right of appeal shall lie ... as appeals in misdemeanor cases."7
The Virginia Supreme Court agreed, reversing defendant's conviction, first, because
the closing law did not describe itself as a misdemeanor. Second, the court found that the
1904 amendment's requiring closing law appeals to proceed like misdemeanor appeals "indicates a conscious knowledge ... of the legislature that the accused already has a right of
appeal" for misdemeanors. Therefore, the court held, the Sunday closing law was not a
criminal statute, so criminal law provisions for collecting fines did not apply. The State could

collect forfeitures at bar, the court held, only through a separate civil suit.

5

Hortenstein, 102 Va. at 924, 926.

6

107 Va. 834, 57 S.E. 588 (1907).

8

Va. Code Ann., §3799 (1887). Amendment in 1904 Acts of Assembly at 79.
The statute's legislative history was traced in 107 Va at 841 (Buchanan, J., disi:;enting).
7

8

107 Va. at 835-836, 838. Parsing the amendment's language, Wells found its reference to an appeal from any 'judgment," not any "conviction," also suggested a civil
rather than criminal proceeding, id. Two judges dissented, swayed by the closing law's
placement in the misdemeanor portion of the state code; and dictum calling it a misdemeanor, ibid at 840-842. See further discussion inn. 15, this Chapter, and accompanying text,

infra
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Following Wells, 9 Hanger v. Commonwealth 10 affirmed a trial-court termination of
what the appellate court saw as a blatant closing law evasion, commencing shortly after the
City of Portsmouth threatened to prosecute Hanger

for his drugstore's closing law

violations. In response, Hanger incorporated the "Crawford Social Club" where, its charter
declared,"... questions of the day may be discussed .... and furnishing [occurs], at .. .

all times, to its members, for pay, ... [of] refreshments ... and ... other articles .... "
As Club president, Hanger arranged its "meetings" in his drugstore's back room. The Club
"rented" the room from the drugstore for ninety percent of the Club's receipts from sales to
Club members of drugstore merchandise.
The Club opened Friday, May 11, 1906. Club. ''members" paid no dues but, instead,
signed applications for immediate admission as Club customers of the drugstore. Club sales
were in full swing at the drugstore, which members reached through the Club's ''rented"
back-room, on May 13, the second Sunday after Hanger was warned of future closing law
prosecu- tions. 11 He was convicted of violating that law by operating his Club. The supreme
court reversed his conviction, however, holding its recent Wells decision barred criminal
prosecu-tion for closing-law violations. It then awarded the City a seeming consolation prize
by affirming the trial court's voiding of the Club's charter because

9

Footnotes 6-8, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra.

10

107 Va. 872, 60 S.E. 67 (1908).

11

Hanger, 107 Va. at 876-878.
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the charter ... and the pretended organization of a social club thereunder
was for the fraudulent purpose of ... selling tobacco, cigars, cigarettes, sodawater, and other soft drinks on Sunday-a privilege which an individual
could not exercise without incurring the forfeiture prescribed in [the closing
law].12

Hanger voided the charter, holding the social-club incorporation "clearly never intended to confer upon the organization authority to conduct a business which, if conducted
by an individual, would be in violation ofthe law. " 13 By so ruling, however, the Hanger court
avoided the uncomfortable issue of its own role in producing a result it now saw as
unfavorable. After all, it was the court's then-recent Wells decision, barring criminal fines for
Sunday closing law violators, 14 not Hanger's incorporating his drugstore, that barred his
criminal prosecution. The state supreme court argua~ly scapegoated the Social Club and its
incorporation, when the real culprit the judges could more readily find by collectively looking
in a mirror. 15
12

Hanger, 107 Va. at 878-879 (emphasis in original). The referenced Wells decision
is discussed at nn. 6 - 8, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra.
13

14

Ibid at 875.
See n. 8, this Chapter, and supporting text, supra.

15

Wells's interpretation of the 1904 amendment governing closing law appeals (see
n. 8, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra) as applied in Hanger, was not compelling:
(1) That the statute did not say it was a misdemeanor, the dissent noted, was not decisive,
because "[m]any statutes whose violations are admittedly misdemeanors, do not in terms so
declare." Ibid at 841. (2) That the 1904 amendment allowed closing law appeals like "appeals
in misdemeanor cases," ibid at 836, the dissent said, merely provided an alternate appeal
procedure; not a negation of the statute's misdemeanor status. (3) Further, the closing law
statute in Wells, 107 Va. at 835, described its violation as an "offence," suggesting a criminal statute. See Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary: Complete Text
(continued ... )
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In both Wells and Hanger, the legislative modification of closing law appeal
procedures led to confusion about what it meant and who it was intended to reach. Hanger
. also illustrated the incipient boldness of Virginia businesses in challenging that law, including
bearing the expense ofa supreme court appeal, in a case with all the earmarks of a test-case
appeal.
In 1908, the legislature amended the closing law, providing a violator. "shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor," 16 statutorily overturning just-discussed Wells and Hanger. The first
appeal governed by this amendment, Ellis v. Covington, 11 construed a municipal "ordinance
... substantially in [amendment's] language," in considering whether the defendant could sell
soft drinks, like Coca-Cola, on Sunday. The court held ~hat defendant's municipal license for
Sunday meal sales did not include Sunday soft drink sales, since the ordinance required
separate licenses for each. Ellis then expressed a view whose significance would resurface,
as will be seen, iil Francisco: That the defendant "plainly could not, though licensed, ply his
calling of selling such drinks on the Sabbath day in any way so as to escape liability under the

15

( ••• continued)

Reproduced Micrographically (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 1971) ("OED Micrograph")
1:1978, defining "offence" [no. 7], in a criminal context ("breach of the law").(4) It thus
seems Wells more nearly revealed high-court dissatisfactions with the closing law itself, rather than compelled by facts or precedent.
16

See legislative history in Pirkey v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 713, 729, 114 S.E.
769 (1922). Wells and Hanger are discussed, supra, nn. 6 - 15, this Chapter, and accompanying text.
17

122 Va. 821, 822-823, 94 SE 154 (1917), quoting Va Acts 1916, c. 751.
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[Sunday closing law] ordinance." 18 Ellis also quoted other provisions of that amendment
which statutorily defined delivery of"ice cream manufactured on ... other than the Sabbath,"
as a "necessity," exempt from prosecution. 19 This reflected an acceler-ating trend of
businesses obtaining legislative dispensation redefining their activities as closing-law
"necessities," exempt from prosecution

(b)

Virginia Closing Law Appeals After World War I Until July 1942.

Ellis was decided on November 18, 1917. World War I hostilities ended almost
exactly one year later (less one week), on what came to be called Armistice Day, November
11, 1918. The war's end saw significant changes in American mores, highlighted by social
commentator Frederick Lewis Allen:
During the three or four years that followed ... there came a subtle change
.... People felt it was about time to relax; to look after themselves, [not] .
. . the world in general; and to have a good time. . . . [A] contagion of
delighted concern over things that were exciting but didn't matter
profoundly-was dominant.... [T]here was a very general desire ... to shake
off the restraints of puritanism, to upset the long-standing conventions of
decorum. 20
The changes Allen described were mirrored in Virginia closing law appeals between the
World War I Armistice through the pre-World War II nineteen-forties. Closing law concerns about work and labor earlier discussed shifted to cases dominated by that law's appli-

18

19

20

Ellis at 825, discussed further, infra, nn. 109-113, Chapter 8 and supporting text.
Ellis at 823.
Frederick L. Allen, The Big Change (New York, Harper & Bros, 1952), 131-133.
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cation in the context of "hav[ing] a good time," through amusement or recreation, in the
interwar period. The desire to "shake off ... puritanism," that Allen described, can be seen
in these appeals, suggesting popular dissatisfaction with the Sunday closing-law which, as
earlier discussed in the thesis was, as Allen put it, one of the "restraints of puritanism."21

(1)

Religious Herald Discussion of Rest on Sunday.

Some Virginians, immediately after World War I, wanted work to generally cease on
Sunday for religious reasons, but hesitated about achieving this through secular law. In
Richmond, the weekly Religious Herald newspaper, speaking for Virginia Baptists, through
the paper's editor Dr. D. H. Pitt, on December 16, 1920, urged the "necessity of adopting

some guiding principles for [Sunday closing]

legisla~ion,"

to prevent "great confusion,"

through ''unwonted activity of several Sabbath Observance Associations in favor ofsome sort
of national legislation covering this question." He further declared:
Wholly apart ... from the Sabbath of the decalogue and the Lord's
Day of the New Testament, is ... a legal day, a civil day, ofrest. This ...
must be justified not by an ancient law given to the Jewish people, nor by the
relaxation ... of this law in the New Testament, but by the experience of
mankind, showing . . . [it] is in the interest of society .... When we come .
. . to the practical question of providing by law for such a day, it falls in with
the convenience ... of a great majority of our people to choose the first day
of the week. ... [W]e are not to legislate on the day as a religious institution
at all.... [I]t is the duty ofChristian[s] ... to follow the .... early Christian
example of giving the first day of the week, . . . to worship .... [T]o carry
out this purpose ... they should refrain from ... unnecessary labor.... As
to the part which the State shall play[,] let it make no law concerning its civil
rest day which interferes ... with the ... liberty of the soul in the religious

21

Ibid.
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sphere. 22
Dr. Pitt's was not the only view about closing laws among those of Sabbatarian views. As
his editorial noted, there were "several Sabbath Observance Associations" seeking ''national

legislation" enforcing Sunday closings. In the next weekly Religious Herald, however, he
noted the daily Richmond News-Leader, "copies in full" his closing law editorial, and "in a
pleasant editorial commends the tone and temper of that utterance." He further deplored
"laxity in the observance" of Sunday as a "day ofrest" among "Christian people" and " ...
inconsistent and unreasonable ... legislation" arising without "guiding principles."23
H. R. Pollard, of the Richmond City Attorney's office then weighed in with a letter
the Herald published on January 6, 1921, commend~g Dr. Pitt for stating "clearly, ... the

22

R. H. Pitt, Editorial, "The State and the Sabbath," Religious Herald, 10, 11 (Richmond, Va., December 16, 1920)(Emphasis added).

23

Ibid, 10-11 (December 23, 1920). Such non-enforcement had been long noted. A
speaker at the American Bar Association's 1880 annual meeting declared: "The laws for the
observance of Sunday, though on the statute books ... , have fallen into such disuse that
they seldom come to the attention even of our profession, except when used as a shorthand
way of getting rid of some nuisance on Sunday which is not otherwise prohibited; or when
pleaded by some corporation as a defense to some action for neglect of duty." Quoted in
Sr. Candida Lund, "The Sunday Closing Cases," The Third Branch ofGovernment: 8 Cases
in Constitutional Politics, a Harcourt Casebook in Political Science, C. Herman Pritchett
and Alan F. Westin, ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963 ), 277. Rigorous closing
law enforcement appeared confined to communities organized for strict religious observance,
such as Ocean Grove and Asbury Park, New Jersey, though even there, "after the turn of the
[twentieth] century, [Christian] reform fervor [including for the Sunday closing law] was lost,
but a comfortable family-oriented resort remained." Glenn Uminowicz, "Recreation in a
Christian America: Ocean Grove and Asbury Park, New Jersey, 1869-1914," Hard at Play:
Leisure in America, 1840-1940, Kathryn Grover, ed. (Amherst, Mass: Univ. ofMassachusetts Press; and Rochester, N.Y.: The Strong Museum; 1992), 8, 35.
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principles involved." Pollard declared, like Dr. Pitt, that many Sunday closing law problems
arose from a "misguided view that ... political authority . . . might ... enforce the Jewish
Sabbath." Sunday, the "Lord's Day," he said, and the Jewish "Sabbath Day," were ''not even
as near ... as first cousins."24 Pollard saw the legislating of Sunday observance as ignoring
that this (quoting Jefferson) "destroys all religious liberty, because the civil magistrate will
make his opinions the rule ofjudgment, and approve ... the sentiments of others only as they
shall square with ... his own." Pollard agreed with Dr. Pitt that government's proper role
was to stay out of the way, to not interfere with religious observances. He quoted the
doctor's editorial in concluding the state should "make no law concerning its civil rest day
which interferes ... with the freest and most unrestricted exercise of the liberty of the soul"
in religion. 25

(2)

Pirkey Brothers v. Commonwealth: Cave Viewing on Sunday?

No documentation discovered suggests the Virginia Supreme Court considered the
views of H.R. Pollard of the Richmond City Attorney's office, or Dr. Pitt, the Religious

Herald's editor, as discussed above. Remarkably, however, their views mirrored the ap-

24

Pollard also noted: "If the strictures of the Sabbath day law (Mosaic law) is to be
observed, a large majority of the Christian people could not attend Christian worship on the
'Lord's Day' by reason ofthe inhibition against 'making journeys' on the Sabbath Day." Ibid.

25

H.R. Pollard, "Sound Doctrine," Religious Herald (January 6, 1921), 5, variously
quoted in this footnoted paragraph. Pollard quoted Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," as enacted in 1786. For full text, with legislative variants from Jefferson's
draft see The Constitution and Religion: Leading Supreme Court Cases on Church and
State, Robert S. Alley, ed. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1999), 34, 35.
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proach that court ultimately took in Pirkey Bros. v. Commonwealth, 26 more closely than any
of the litigants' appellate briefs. Pirkey's congruence with Pitt's and Pollard's observations
perhaps reflected increasing harmony of outlook by would-be Virginia opinion-makers. 27
Pirkey also revealed the court's increasing inclination to interpret closing laws in ways

which, in practical terms, weakened their enforceability.
Defendant Pirkeys owned "Weyer's Cave, or Grottoes ofthe Shenandoah," a tourist
attraction for which they charged admission. Heavy Sunday attendance led to church demands that it close that day. When the defendants refused, prosecution ensued. The jury
convicted them, and the stipulated issue on appeal was ''the simple question [of] whether the
keeping open of these caverns and admission to

the~

of visitors on Sunday, constitute a

violation of the statute commonly known as the 'Sunday observance law."'28
Defendant cave-owners contended they did not "labor" on Sunday, as the statute

26

134 Va. 713, 114 S.E. 764 (1922). In 1919, a new state code designated the
Sunday closing law as Va. Code Ann. §4570 (1919) at 2:1871, Code of Virginia (1919)
(2 vols, ann.)(Richmond: David Bottom, Spt. of Public Printing, 1919)(Day ofthe week for
closing amended from "Sabbath" to "Sunday"). Donald L. Dreisbach, at n. 20, Chapter,
5, supra, theorized that ''Sabbath" in its eighteenth-century text reflected a more religious
orientation than Jefferson's original "Sunday." However, the 1919 Code "Revisors' Notes"
for the closing law, Code vol. 2 at 1871, stated "Sunday and Sabbath day are synonymous
terms," ibid, citing out-of-state authority, which conflicts with Dreisbach's opinion.
27

Reflected by, for example, Dr. Pitt's recounting the Richmond News-Leader's
adoption of his editorial, as just-described at n. 23, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text.
28

134 Va. at 715-716, from the trial court "certificate offacts"in Defendants' "Petition" for Appeal, Pirkey Brothers v. Commonwealth of Virginia, File No. 1616 [renumbered 6516](Richmond: Virginia Supreme Court [n. d. ]), 7.
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proscribed, but merely allowed Sunday entry to their caves for a fee (presumably dropped into
an unattended lockbox, since they also claimed no Sunday employees). 29 Conceding no
"absolute necessity for opening their caverns on Sunday," they insisted doing so was, nevertheless, "reasonably ... necessary'' for wholesome, family diversion.

30

Pirkey 's reliance on this ground alone reduced the likelihood of appellate success.

The daunting task in Pirkey was supplying grounds sufficiently compelling for a reviewing
court to overturn that virtually sacrosanct creation of the common-law, ajuryverdict.31 The
defendants' appeal, however, contested no jury instructions, asserted no constitutional nor
closing-law infirmity, cited no legal authority nor legal error, except vaguely asserting it was
''reasonably necessary" for defendants' business to

op~n

on Sunday. Such minimal briefing

29

Pirkey Brothers v. Commonwealth,"[Defendants'] Reply Brief," File No. 6516
(Richmond: Virginia Supreme Court [no date]), 2: "The defendants permit [tourists] to enter
the caverns upon payment of an admission fee . [The warrant does not charge they] ... did
any work [or] . . . employed any servants ... on the Sabbath ...."
30

Petition of Defendants (''plaintiff in error"] for Appeal, 2; supra n. 28, this Chap-

ter.
31

Chesapeake & Ohio RR v. Williams, 108 Va. 689, 690, 62 S.E. 796 (1908)
("When a case has been fairly submitted to a jury, ... it ought not to be interfered with by
the court, unless ... the verdict is clearly not warranted by the facts proved."). Hill v.
Commonwealth, 43 Va (2 Gratt.) 595, 603 (1845) ("[W]herethejuryandjudge ... concur
in the weight ... [of] the evidence, it is an abuse of the appellate power ... to set aside a
verdict . . . , because the judges of this court, from the evidence . . . , would not have
concurred . . . .") Accord, Michie 's Jurisprudence of Virginia and West Virginia
(Charlottsville, Va: Michie, 1996), vol. 1B, "Appeal & Error" §267, 480, 482 ("Where the
case has been fairly submitted to a jury, their verdict will not be disturbed ... because the
court ... would have given a different verdict.") (Pre-Pirkey cases cited).
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usually merits scant appellate review. 32 Thus, it was remarkable the reviewing court even
considered the Pirkey appeal, given its poor preservation of appellate issues.
Assisting in the Commonwealth's briefing in Pirkey was "Leon M. Bazile, Second
Assistant Attorney-General," later the trial judge in Francisco, with which this thesis began
and to which it will return. 33 The issues he dealt with in Pirkey, as will be seen, anticipated
questions he faced nineteen years later in Francisco. 34
The Commonwealth's brief first noted that appellants ''failed to [cite] any authority
in support of the contentions made," but did not urge rejecting the appeal on that ground. 35
Instead, consistent with the parties' stipulation,36 it discussed decisions in other states, af-

32

This rule was first applied two years later in Morris & Co. v. Alvis, 138 Va. 149,
164-165, 121 S.E. 145 (1924), where appellant's "statement is made without ... discussion, or citation of authority .... (W]e have no disposition to enter the field ... [when]
counsel ... offer no reason or authority in support of their statement"). Four of the five
concurring judges in Morris & Co. decided Pirkey. Nothing indicates their 1924 views in
Morris & Co. were different in 1922, when they decided Pirkey. The rule is currently stated
in Novak v. Commonwealth,
20 Va.App. 373, 389, 457 S.E.2d 402, 410 (1995)
("Statements unsupported by argument, authority, or citations to the record do not merit
appellate consideration.")
33

Pirkey, 134 Va. at 715. Prior discussion of Francisco and Judge Bazile is in
Chapter 2, supra. Subsequent discussion of both occurs in Chapter 8, infra.

34

See nn 93-95, and accompanying text, Chapter 8, infra.

35

"Brief on Behalf of the Commonwealth," Pirkey Brothers v. Commonwealth, File
No. 1616 [renumbered 6516] (Richmond: Virginia Supreme Court [n. d.]), 4. Appellate
court rejection of an issue due to appellant's failure to cite authority, per n. 32, this Chapter,
and accompanying text, supra, the Commonwealth presumably did not urge, because there
was not, as of the Pirkey appeal, any Virginia appellate opinion expressly so holding.
36

See n. 28, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra.

95
firming convictions of Sunday theater operators under statutes resembling Virginia's,
providing ground, the Commonwealth urged, to affirm the Pirkeys' convictions. 37
The parties thus briefed on appea4 as stipulated, ''whether the keeping open of these
caverns and admission to them of visitors on Sunday'' violated Virginia's closing law.38 The
high court, however, had different view of the issue, revealed by its initial legal analysis:
The constitutional validity of the statute has not been called in question, and we do not doubt that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the
State. Its provisions, however, cannot be enforced as a religious observance.39
Thus the supreme court, though acknowledging the statute's constitutionality "had not been
called into question," concentrated on that subject,40 even though not briefed by the litigants,
for the rest ofits opinion (except less than a page in which it disposed of the appeal).
Pirkey 's constitutional analysis then threaded the needle between recognizing the
Christian religious preference of most Virginians while still acknowledging the force of Jefferson' s religious freedom statute, by asserting that society must be "at all times according

37

"Brief on Behalf of the Commonwealth," 4, n. 35, this Chapter, supra: "Under
statutes similar to [Virginia's], the courts of other states have held that the sale ... [of]
tickets ... to a show ... on Sunday [violates] ... statute[s] prohibiting laboring on Sunday
[citing cases]."
38

See n. 28, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra.

39

Pirkey, 134 Va 713, 717 (emphasis added).

40

If a reviewing court discerns an unexamined, determinative, constitutional issue on
appea4 arguably it might pursue that issue. In Pirkey, however, this was not so, since the
court conceded the statute was constitutional thus, presumably, not requiring analysis. For
unarticulated reasons, however, it set forth its own constitutional interpretation in Pirkey.
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freedom of conscience to all men."41 It quoted Perry v. Commonwealth,42 asserting Jefferson's statute purged the common law "of its [religiously] intolerant spirit;" by declaring
(quoting the statute), that "all men shall be free to profess, and by argument maintain, their
opinions in matters ofreligion; and the same shall in no wise affect, diminish, or enlarge their
civil capacities."43
The religious-freedom statute further provided, Pirkey noted, that in Virginia, religious discussion "shall be as free as the air [citizens] breathe; that the law is of no sect in
religion; has no high priest but justice. •'44 While thus acknowledging citizen entitlement to the
"fullest :freedom of conscience," the court noted that the Virginia Constitution urged,
specifically, "Christian forbearance,"45 thus emphasizing the "Christian" context of the
religious :freedom espoused.
So Pirkey, metaphorically, carried water on both shoulders, by asserting ''there was
a fixed purpose to sever church and State, and to give the fullest freedom of conscience," and
also, in contrast, ''that we are a Christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply

41

Pirkey, supra, at 717. Jefferson's statute is cited in Pirkey, immediately following
this quotation. Ibid. Note how this passage in Pirkey parallels the views of Dr. Pitt's
editorial in the Religious Herald, quoted in the text accompanying nn. 20-25, this Chapter,
supra.
42

Discussed at n. 3, Chapter 1, supra.

43

Pirkey, 134 Va at 718, quoting Perry, 44 Va. at 611 (emphasis in both opinions).

44

Jefferson's statute, quoted in Pirkey, 134 Va. at 719.

45

Ibid at 719 (emphasis by the Court). See Fr. Buckley's comments, n.13, Chapter
5, supra.
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engrafted upon Christianity.',..6

Pirkey extracted from Justice Brewer's Holy Trinity Supreme Court decision,47
events demonstrating, to its satisfaction, Virginia's and the nation's Christian underpinning,
thereby justifying Sunday closing laws. 48 It declared that while the Sunday closing law "cannot be enforced as a religious observance, the great moral force that is back of it will make
itself felt in its enforcement in conformity with the views of that force. " 49 Statutorily requiring public rest" on Sunday (i.e., abstention from ordinary labor), the court found, was
constitutionally justifiable, when not coupled with a statutory obligation to worship.

Pirkey thus provided elaborate judicial support for the closing law, harmonized to
existing religious preferences of Virginia's public. Titjs was a preface, however, for some
metaphorical bombshells Pirkey then tossed, impairing future closing law prosecutions. Before reviewing these, however, attention is directed to Pirkey's remarkable assertion that
"We cannot, however, agree with the few courts that hold that the word 'necessity' must be
46

134 Va. at 720. The last quotation before the footnote was from from People
v. Ruggles, 8 John. 290, 295, 5 Am. Dec. 335 (N.Y., 1811) (Kent, Chancelior).Pirkey also
cited Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892), for its "Christian
nation" dictum, previously discussed at nn. 29-35, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying
text.
47

Discussed herein at nn. 26 - 36, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text.

48

Including: (I) Virginia's 1606 colonial charter, partly granted for "propagating of
Christian religion;" (2) the 1776 revolutionary Virginia declaration of "Christian forbearance;" (3) testimonial oath "to the Almighty"; (4) opening "sessions of all deliberative bodies" with prayer; (5) Sunday closing of courts and government offices; and (6) many
churches promulgating Christian doctrine. Pirkey, 134 Va. at 720-721.
49

Pirkey, 134 Va. at 720-722.
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construed to mean the same thing now as it did when the original act was passed in 1779."

It explained this by asserting:
Many things that were deemed luxuries then [in the eighteenth century when
the statute was adopted], or had no existence of all, are now deemed necessaries. For example, street railways, telegraphs and telephones. The word
is elastic and relative and must be construed with reference to the conditions
under which we live, and yet the elasticity must not be extended so far as to
cover that which is not needful but simply desirable, and thereby defeat the
manifest purpose of the statute to set apart Sunday as a day of rest from
ordinary labor. 50
Here the 1922 Virginia Supreme Court condoned in Pirkey what is today considered politically conservative legislation, prohibiting many forms of Sunday labor, being thereby supportive ofa particular (Christian) religious belief. It nevertheless, surprisingly, took a position
contrary to "original intent" analysis currently fashionable (circa 2005) among conservative
constitutional interpreters, who typically assert
that in order to understand the Bill of Rights today, it is necessary to attempt
to understand the original meaning of the amendments; to understand the Bill
of Rights the way those who wrote the amendments understood them. ... 51

50

Pirkey, 134 Va. at 722-723, also covering the short passages from Pirkey in the
in the immediately preceding text paragraph. As explained at n. 20(1), Chapter 5, supra,
Virginia enacted the closing law in 1786, not 1779 as quotation here footnoted states.

51

Eugene W. Hickock, Jr., ed., The Bill of Rights: Original Meaning and Current
Understanding (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1991 ), "Introduction," 6 (emphasis added). Though discussing the "Bill of Rights" here, the analysis, by force of its
own logic, applies to other writings, such as other constitutional provisions and statutes
as well. Some commentators, such as James Madison, argued intent of those ratifying
the text, not "those who wrote" it, ibid., determined its "original" meaning. He stated:
"[W]hatever veneration might be entertained for the ... men who formed our Constitution,
the sense of that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the
(continued... )
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In contrast to such "original intent" analysis Pirkey, in a distinctly different approach,
denied that ''necessity's" eighteenth century meaning, when the closing law was enacted,
should continue to define its meaning thereafter. Instead, Pirkey posited that ''necessity's"
meaning "changes, not only through time, but within different geographic locations in the
jurisdiction at the same time. " 52 This method ofinterpreting the meaning of "necessity" made
the assessment of its contemporary definition much more difficult for prosecutors.

Pirkey limited this expansive interpretation ofthe closing law's "necessity" exemption
by cautioning against "defeat[ing] the manifest purpose of the statute to set apart Sunday as
a day ofrest from ordinary labor." The General Assembly, however, arguably contributed to
just such a "defeat," in practical result, by amending t~e closing law to provide, as quoted in

Pirkey: "This section shall not apply to :furnaces, kilns, plants and other businesses of like

51

( ••• continued)
Constitution. As the instrument came from them it was nothing more than a dead letter, until
[ratified] ... by the ... people, speaking through the several State Conventions. Ifwe were
to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond [its] face ... , we must look
... not in the General Convention ... , but in the State Conventions, which ... ratified [it]
...." James Madison, Annals of Congress, 4th Cong. 1st sess., V, April 6, 1796. Quoted
in Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framer's Constitution (New York, Macmillan,

1988), 14.
52

As Pirkey put it: ''No :fixed and unvarying definition of 'necessity' as used in the
statute can be given What may be a necessity in one place may not be in another. A Sunday excursion to the seaside . . . in the hot summer months may be a necessity for the
crowded population in the tenement houses of a large city, when it would not be for the
inhabitants of a small town. Every case must stand on its own peculiar facts and circumstances." 134 Va. at 723.
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kind that may be necessary to be conducted on Sunday. "s3 The businesses entitled to this new
exemption (''furnaces, kilns, plants and other businesses of like kind") though vaguely
described, appeared to be larger manufacturers, employing larger numbers of workers.
This new exemption, more importantly, made it easier for these (apparently) larger
businesses to escape the closing Jaw: only that it "may be necessary" to do Sunday business
was required. This contrasted with the old, actual ''necessity" standard with no qualifying
"may'' about it, still applying to those (presumably smaller) businesses not granted this new
exemption. Like the short-lived "ice cream" exemption,s4 this new exemption illustrated how
some businesses gained special provisions excluding them from closing Jaw prosecution,
while others were still burdened with the older, more tjgorous, standard.
Thus, Pirkey described or imposed measures having the practical effect of diluting
the effectiveness of the Virginia Sunday closing laws, summarized as follows:
[1]

The legislature effectively removed what today is termed "heavy industry" from the

closing Jaw prohibitions, quoted in the opinion. ss
[2]

The "necessity'' permitting labor on Sunday was not limited to that word's eighteenth

s3

"[D]efeat[ing] the manifest purpose of the statute," Pirkey, ibid, at 723; ''furnaces,
kilns, plants and other businesses of like kind" amendment, ibid, at 717.

S4

Seen. 19, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra.

ss
This was a legislative (statutory), not judicial, act. The closing law, however, was
quoted in full in Pirkey, seen. 53, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text, rendering
it useful to include its newly amended features that effectively weakened the closing law
here, where Pirkey 's similar impacts are discussed.
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century meaning, nor to the same meaning throughout the state.

[3]

The ''necessity" exemption was broadened to be "not a physical and absolute neces

cessity, but a moral fitness of the ... labor done under the circumstances of each particular
case."56
[4]

"Issues of fact arising under the statute will ... be decided by juries ... reflect[ing]

the community opinion of moral fitness and propriety."57 What constituted ''moral fitness"
sufficient to meet the closing law's ''necessity" exemption from prosecution, was also
"generally a question of fact for the jury and not one of law for the court. " 58 This, Pirkey
conceded, "leaves the question unsettled, with nothing for future guidance," because
"different juries may reach different results on the s~e evidence."59 Thus, a prosecutor's
determining whether given activity was a ''necessity," exempt from

prosecution, was

complicated by depending upon what the court frankly conceded would be, due to its
holding: changillg, and even contradictory, opinions of successive jury panels, not the more
uniform results presumably obtainable from appellate precedent. 60

56

Pirkey, 134 Va. at 723. The court listed ten states following this rule.

57

Pirkey, 134 Va. at 722.

58

134 Va. at 726.

59

Ibid at 726-727.

60

Pirkey qualified the jury's ability to decide the result by directing how the court
should rule, in place of the jury, ifthere was either overly sufficient or insufficient evidence:
"[I]fthe labor is so clearly a work ofnecessity that no reasonable minds would differ ... ; the
court may treat it as a matter of law" as necessity, or "if the proof is so clear that no two
(continued ... )
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[5]

Finally, the ''work" or "labor" the closing law was intended to prohibit, Pirkey sug-

gested, was only of those who could '"be found'-indicating a public display [of work],"
"laboring, -suggesting manual labor, rather than intellectual ... employment; at 'any trade
or calling'- ... seeming to exclude isolated transactions, and ... pursuits higher than manual
occupations ...." 61 Thus, certain types of employment, including those characteristically
performed by judges and lawyers ["pursuits higher than manual occupations"], were exempt
from closing law prosecutions, Pirkey suggested It would be a foolhardy prosecutor who
ignored the unanimous "suggestions" of the judges in Pirkey on this point, that such
activities were not covered by the closing law, despite the court's further assertion that, being
dicta, these "suggestions" were not controlling. 62
After this lengthy analysis, the Pirkey court disposed of the appeal in less than one
paragraph of the seventeen-printed-page opinion, stating that the conviction of the Pirkeys:
is not [based on] ... doubtful evidence, or conflicting testimony, but the verdict of a jury, ... [R]easonably fair-minded men might draw different conclu-

60

continued)
reasonable minds could differ ... that no possible element of necessity ... entered into the
... labor performed, then the court may, as a matter of law, treat the matter ... not within
the exception." Ibid at 727, i.e., not exempt from closing law prosecution as a "necsssity."
( •••

61

Pirkey at 728. Note that suggesting closing-law exemptions for "higher than manual occupations" arguably stigmatizes manual labor and, impliedly, those performing it.
62

After the statement here-quoted, the court then said: "But that question is not
fore us, and we do not wish to be understood as expressing any opinion upon it." Ibid. Of
course, the court had "express[ed]" its "opinion," whose force it now sought to deny. It
would be difficult for a prosecutor to conclude the court meant other than what it had just
said, and govern future prosecutions (or, more likely, non-prosecutions), accordingly.
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sions as to the ultimate fact to be ascertained, to-wit, was the work done one
of necessity in view of modem conditions of life. Under these circumstances
we do not feel warranted in interfering with the verdict of the jury. 63
Virginia precedent compelling this result was previously discussed herein. 64 The Pirkeys,
based on those precedents, failed to present to the reviewing court an arguably sustainable
theory to support overturning the jury's decision. However, Pirkey 's above-quoted assertion
that it did ''not feel warranted in interfering with the verdict ofthe jury" borders on the ironic.
The supreme court, indeed, let the verdict stand, as compelled by Virginia precedent. The
legal underpinnings for many future closing law prosecutions, however, were effectively shot
asunder by Pirkey's five-part limitation on them, asjust-discussed. 65
The supreme court did all this, as seen by the re~ew ofPirkey appellate briefing, with
no input from the litigants, supposedly a hallmark of the common law system. 66 This,
presumably, was because their appellate stipulation assumed constitutionality would not be
controverted, and therefore was not briefed. Accordingly, the litigants addressed none of

63

Pirkey at 730-731. Note that the court, almost surreptitiously, here broadened the
"necessity" exemption by adding it must be considered "in vew of modem conditions of
life," an expanded meaning certainly not self-evident from the closing law's text.
64

Seen. 31, supra, this Chapter, and accompanying text.

65

See nn. 55-62, supra, this Chapter, and accompanying text.

See appellate briefing, attached Ex "C" & "D." The court could have raised constitutional issues at oral argument. However, Pirkey states "the constitutional validity of
the statute has not been called into question," 134 Va. at 717, suggesting that if the court
did so, neither party challenged the constitutionality of the closing laws. This would be
as expected, given the parties' stipulation. Seen. 28, supra, this Chapter, and accompanying text.
66

104
court's conclusions on what it deemed the central issue in the case.
The court's methodology in its resolution of Pirkey uncannily resembles aspects of
United States Supreme Court ChiefJustice John Marshall's approach in his famous Marbury

v. Madison opinion. 67 In Marbury, Marshall seemingly deferred to the executive branch ofthe
federal government, but in such away as to reserve to his Court the important power of
declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional. Both the Virginia high court in Pirkey, and the
United States Supreme Court in Marbury, ruled, ostensibly, for the government. In Pirkey,
this meant affirming a closing law conviction. In Marbury, it meant negating a minor judicial
appointment of the outgoing Federalists (Marshall's own party).
Marshall's method of denying the appointme11:t, however, was to rule that the statute
Congress enacted to enforce it, unconstitutionally gave "original" (trial) jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court. This, said Marshall, violated the Constitution's Article III which, he held,
restricted the Supreme Court to appellate proceedings only (with minor exceptions not here
applicable). Marshall, therefore, declared the statute unconstitutional, rendering it
unenforceable to validate the Marbury judicial appointment.
Marshall's new analytical technique, it was quickly realized, could block other legislation as also supposedly "infirm." These new "infirmities" would be present, Marshall could
contend, because this other legislation also was allegedly "inconsistent" in some way with the

67

5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Text comments that follow consider Marbury not
only as a judicial opinion, but also as crafted for a specific political result. Pirkey also
appears to have had the political purpose of impeding closing-law prosecutions.
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Constitution whose interpretation he had, by his adroit opinion, arrogated to his Federalistcontrolled Supreme Court. Similarly, closing-law prosecution restrictions in the Virginia highcourt's affinnance in Pirkey could not but impede future prosecutions under that law, given
their common-sense consequences, as just described. 68 With the undoubted familiarity of the
Virginia high-court judges with Virginia-native Chief Justice Marshall's landmark Marbury
decision, the similarities in dispositional techniques of the two cases seem more than
coincidence.
Through Marshall's opinions, commencing in Marbury, the United States Supreme
Court-the last national bastion ofthe Federalist party-established itself as the final arbiter
ofthe constitutionality oflegis1ation proposed by the n~w Democratic-Republican Jefferson
administration. In Marbury, that administration could not dispute his decision, since it was
the prevailing party:
Because the opinion denied relief to William Marbury [the Federalist judicial
minor-court appointee], there was no order to be enforced against the wishes
ofthe executive branch ofgovernment. Hence the Jeffersonians were refused
the opportunity to actively oppose the opinion . . . . At the same time,
however, [the Marbury opinion] ... thoroughly entrenched judicial review .
. . and undermined Jeffersonian insistence upon legislative supremacy. Marbury v. Madison stands as one of the most artful utiliz.ations ofjudicial power in the history of the Supreme Court.69

68

Those restrictions are discussed in the text supported by nn. 55-62, this Chapter,

supra.
69

Herbert Alan Johnson, "John Marshall," The Justices of the United States Supreme Court 1789-1969: Their Lives and Opinions, Leo Friedman & Fred L. Israel, ed.
(New York: Chelsea House & RR Bowker, 1969), 1:285, 292 (emphasis added).
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Similarly, in Pirkey, the Virginia Supreme Court imposed limitations on future closing law
prosecutions the Commonwealth could not challenge, because, like the Jeffersonians in
Marbury, it prevailed on appeal. Thus, Pirkey and Marbury each allowed the respective
government appearing before each to win the appeal, but in a way auguring ultimate loss by
each government of the respective political war each was fighting. 70
(3)

Lakeside Inn Corp. v Commonwealth: Swimming on Sunday?

On November 16, 1922, the day the Virginia Supreme Court decided Pirkey Bros. v.

70

To counter denials that Pirkey intended to. weaken closing law prosecutions,
Abraham Lincoln's masterful Cooper Union response to those objecting to his similar
assertion that [Dred] Scott v Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), was politically
motivated through a conspiracy, is a persuasive answer:
But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we
know have been gotten out at different times and places and by different
workmen--[Senator] Stephan [Douglas], Franklin [Pierce] and James [Buchanan] and [Chief Justice] Rodger [Taney] for instance-and when we see
these timbers joined together, and see they exactly [are] ... adapted to their
respective places ... we find it impossible to not believe that Stephen and
Franklin and Roger and James all understood one another from the beginning,
and all worked upon a common plan or draft ....
The Collected Works ofAbraham Lincoln, Roy P. Basler, ed, 8 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953), 2:465-66 (emphasis in original).
As will be seen, another case analyzed herein at nn. 71-87, this Chapter, and accompanying
text, infra, (Lakeside Inn, Corp. v. Commonwealth) was published immediately after Pirkey
on the same day, with Pirkey's rulings incorporated into it. The new closing law
procedural restrictions in Pirkey were applied in Lakeside. Publishing these two cases on the
same subject (closing laws) on the same day suggests judicial preplanning for a specific result,
just as Lincoln described in his Cooper Union speech, supra, this footnote.
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Commonwealth, 71 it also released a second Sunday closing law opinion, Lakeside Inn Corp.
v. Commonwealth ("Lakeside"). 72 Lakeside held that in a jury trial, the trial judge could not
decide whether the Inn's operating a Sunday fee-for-use swimming pool, supposedly thereby
reducing county-wide nude bathing, was a closing-law "necessity," exempting it from
prosecution. Instead, that was a fact question reserved for the jury. As to exactly how nudebathing reduction could conceivably become a closing law ''necessity," the reader can only
be asked to read on.
Lakeside Inn was convicted of violating the closing law by keeping "open on Sunday
a public resort, ... for ... bathing, [with] ... employees ... selling admission tickets to the
pool, ... [and] furnishing bathing suits ... :m Unlike ~irkey, Lakeside alleged two trial-court

71

See nn 26 through 70, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text.

72

Lakeside Inn Corp. v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 696, 114 S.E. 769 (1922). Lakeside was the "second" closing law opinion that day, even though (1) earlier (p. 696) in the
volume than Pirkey (p. 713), and (2) earlier-appealed (January 9, 1922) than Pirkey (May
20, 1922). (See Lakeside, 134 Va. at 699; and Defendant-Appellants' "Petition" to the
Virgitlla Supreme Court, 3, at n. 74, infra, this Chapter.) Lakeside confirms this, 134 Va.
at 700: "Sunday observance under the [closing law] is discussed ... in Pirkey Bros. ... ,
decided today, and much that is there said has an important bearing on the questions
hereinafter discussed." It appears Pirkey was issued not so much on its own merits, but to
underpin the court's Lakeside opinion, hereinafter discussed in this Chapter 7(b)(3).
73

Lakeside, at 696 and 699. Peter Wallenstein, ''Never on Sunday: Blue Laws
and Roanoke, Virginia," Virginia Cavalcade, 43(1994):132-143, 133, reports Lakeside's
prosecution began shortly after "a delegation from a local church arrived on a Sunday [at the
Inn], bought tickets, looked around, and then complained that they bad been al- lowed to
do so." Thus, the Inn's prosecution was apparently sparked by a local church, similar to
Pirkey, as set forth inn. 28, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text.
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legal errors, for which proper lower-court foundational objections had been laid 74
The supreme court, before discussing Lakeside 's facts, explained the rule of law
whose application theoretically could justify reversing the jury's guilty verdict:
It is the function of the court to interpret the statute, but ... the function of
the jury, as representative ofthe morality ofthe community, to determine ''the
moral fitness or propriety of the work" in question. But the jury cannot
discharge its function, unless it is permitted to hear all the pertinent and
relevant testimony on the subject.75
The "pertinent and relevant testimony'' the court found improperly withheld from the
jury, was from witnesses "examined before the judge, in the absence ofthe jury, so that there
is no doubt or uncertainty as to what the testimony would have been. " 76 That testimony, from
the county sheriff and one of his deputies, s~d by the court, was that
prior to the opening of Lakeside swimming poo4 the persons ... along ...
streams [near] ... Roanoke city and ... roads ... near those streams, had
been shocked ... by the great number of nude men ... and partially nude
women who could be seen on Sundays bathing ... and undressing ....77

74

Also favoring the appellant was that, unlike Pirkey, in Lakeside a shorthand reporter recorded all testimony, allowing appellants to present precisely on appeal the excluded
evidence and rulings for which they sought reversal. See, Lakeside Inn Corp. v. Commonwealth, "Petition for Writ ofError, No. 6453 (Richmond: Virginia Supreme Court [n.d.]),
13, naming the shorthand reporter.
15

Lakeside, 134 Va. at 701 (emphasis added).

76

Ibid, at 701-702. In this way, testimony excluded at trial from the jury was preserved. If the party offering it lost at trial and appealed its exclusion as error, the appellate
court could review the excluded testimony. If disagreeing with the exclusion and deeming
its exclusion significant, the appellate court could set aside the verdict for a new trial. The
testimony then could be admitted into evidence on retrial.
77

Ibid at 702.
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Before the pool's opening, they testified, complaints were :frequent, with "thirty some" indecent exposure arrests on one Sunday alone. After the pool opened, however, this problem
was "greatly relieved," with indecent exposure complaints "practically eliminated," reducing
"disorder in the community." The court held: "This testimony had an important bearing on
the moral fitness and propriety ofthe work in question [i.e., Lakeside's pool operation], and
it was error [for the trial judge] to exclude it."78
The testimonial exclusion the supreme court found to be the first error, led directly
to its second determination of error, the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury as follows, as
the defendant, Lakeside, had unsuccessfully requested:
[I]f ... the opening of Lakeside swimming po<;>l on Sunday ... tends to prevent disorder or indecent exposure ... along the streams in Roanoke county,
... and the work ... was morally fit ... [for] Sunday, then ... [the jury]
may find that the work [at the pool] ... is a necessity within the meaning of
the [Sunday closing ] statute and they should find the defendant not guilty. 79
The supreme coUrt held "the [trial] court erred" in refusing this instruction80 and had erroneously instructed the jury that the evidence presented " ... no element of necessity either

78

Lakeside at 703-704.

79

Ibid at 705. Defendant proposed four additional instructions, which the trial court
also rejected, which the supreme court also reversed , for the same rationale given above.
80

Ibid. Unlike Pirkey, Lakeside "laid the foundation" as lawyers put it, for appellate review of this alleged error, by asking the trial judge that this testimony be heard by the
jury with a proper instruction. The judge refused both, thus providing the basis for the
appeal of both the evidence excluded and the jury instruction refused.
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physical or moral within ... the Virginia statute for the protection of Sunday,"81 The Supreme Court concluded that: ''Under the testimony actually admitted, and the instructions
given, the jury could not have found any other verdict than the [guilty] one found" 82 and,
accordingly, reversed the instruction as well.
The future, however, for Virginia closing law prosecutions, given the holdings in

Pirkey and Lakeside, was decidedly cloudy: Pirkey affirmed ajury verdict that Sunday (forfee) cave-viewing, was not a "necessity," thus not exempted from closing law prosecution.
In seeming contradiction, that court, the same day, reversed a conviction in Lakeside, be-

cause the trial court barred the jury from deciding if the Inn's fee-paid bathing was a ''necessity," exempting it from prosecution. To add to

~he

sense of contradiction, the Inn, in

Lakeside, whose conviction was reversed, had employees working on Sunday, while the
convicted cave-owners in Pirkey, did not. Thus, the supreme court was prepared to accept,
for instance, a defense victory in Lakeside 's retrial, based on the supposed "necessity" for
the Inn's Sunday pool operation to alleviate nude bathing, simultaneously with ajury conviction in Pirkey criminalizing fee-paid viewing of defendants' caves. The court conceded
that this left closing law questions the jury would decide "unsettled, with nothing for future

81

82

Ibid at 706.

Ibid at 701. Another seeming error, not addressed by the reviewing court, was the
trial judge's assertion in the quoted instruction that the closing law was intended to ''protect Sunday," ibid at 706, instruction no. I. It would be more accurate to say that its constitutionally sanctioned object was to protect people, by allowing them to rest on Sunday.
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guidance," because "different juries may reach different results on the same evidence. " 83 Thus,
jury verdicts could contradict each other from an ordinary person's common-sense
viewpoint and still be legally sustainable, according to Pirkey and Lakeside.
The Virginia Supreme Court accomplished this result completely on its own initiative.
There was no briefing ofany substance by either party in Lakeside on this issue. 84 Lakeside 's

final paradox, therefore, was that the Virginia high court, citing no authority, had utterly
changed the nature of the "necessity" exempting defendants from closing law prosecution.
The statute prohibited being, on Sunday, "found laboring at any trade or calling ... in labor
or other business, except in household or other work of necessity or charity."85 This had
previously been thought to mean that only the defen~t' s own ''necessity," or that ofanother

83

Quoting from Pirkey, at n. 59, supra, this Chapter, and accompanying text. Recall that Lakeside expressly stated that Pirkey was applicable to Lakeside 's holdings, see
n. 72, supra, and accompanying text. (Footnote references are to this Chapter.)
84

The Commonwealth's brief treated this issue in only two sentences: "The Company [Lakeside Inn], ... undertook to bring the business conducted by it within the
exception of the statute . by . . . show[ing] that men and women had before . . . this
swimming pool gone in swimming in sight of the public road. We do not see how this ...
ha[d] any bearing upon ... the necessity of conducting ... business ... on Sundays."
Lakeside Inn Corp v Commonwealth, "Brief on Behalf of the Commonwealth ... ,"
Docket No. 6453 (Richmond: Virginia Supreme Court [n.d.]), 11. The Defendant's "Petition for Writ of Error," ibid, 7, was even terser, saying only: "[T]his Court will recognize
... , as a matter or [sic, "of'?] public policy, it is to the best interest of our state... that
persons . . . confined closely to hard labor, during week days... have such places as those
conducted by the company where on Sundays they can relax." Whether such Sunday bathing
was in "the best interest of our state," however, appears irrelevant, when the question
impliedly presented was how such Sunday commerce constituted a "necessity" for Lakeside,
which was not directly, however, either asked or answered.
85

Pirkey, 134 Va at 717 (emphasis added).

112
in immediate peril the defendant assisted, excused prosecution. This was suggested by the
appellate court when it gave, as an example, a case that was ''plainly one of necessity, as
where the owner lifts his ox out of the ditch."86
Virginia's high-court ultimately did not so-interpret the statute, however. In Lakeside, the "necessity'' was the protecting of the sensibilities of others in the community
ostensibly "shocked" by nude bathing, not any "necessity'' of the defendant itself, nor of
anyone else in peril defendant was attempting to assist. Further, though nude-bathing
complaints to the sheriff supposedly abated after Lakeside's pool opened, that did not
necessarily mean former nude bathers were now using Lakeside's pool on Sunday. Those
bathing along roadways arguably did so because they could not afford Lakeside's Sunday
pool charges. Thus, they would not be benefitted, nor the supposed "necessity'' of curtailing
nude bathing expedited, by defendant's pool. Although this was arguably contradicted by the
sheriff's testimoriy of indecent exposure arrests sharply declining after the pool opened, that
also could be explained by a vigorous arrest policy that his testimony appeared to reveal.
Regardless of whether Lakeside's pool-opening reduced nude bathing, beyond ques-
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Pirkey Bros., 134 Va. at 726 (emphasis added), paraphrasing Jesus's rebuke to
"lawyers and Pharisees" in Lk. 14:3-7 (KN) for stopping sabbath work: "Which ofyou shall
have an ass or ox fallen into a pit, and will not straightway pull him out on the sabbath
day?" which they "could not answer." The court's paraphrase capsulized the problems of
trying to place the closing law's secular and religious aspects in their ostensibly separate
spheres. In the quoted passage Jesus rebukes enforcing Sabbath "rest" in an inflexible,
legalistic, way. Some argued that was exactly what state closing laws misguidedly
attempted. This was also inferred by Jesus's chiding ofhis pharisee and lawyer hosts, v. 3,
ibid, about whether it was "lawful to cure people [from disease] on the sabbath, or not?" in
response to which they, in apparent discomfort, ''were silent."
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tion Virginia's high court introduced, in Lakeside and Pirkey, new "necessity" analysis in
Virginia closing law litigation, whose practical effect was to make closing law enforcement
more difficult. It also was congenial to, if not caused by, popular disinclination to continue
following puritan strictures, generally identified as a significant post-World-War-I viewpoint
shift, of which declining obedience to Sunday closing laws would be a prime example. 87

(4)

Crook v. Commonwealth: "Play Ball" on Sunday?

An indication of the growth of recreation in the form of spectator-viewed of

professional sports was the increasing interwar hold of big-league baseball on the national
psyche. 88 As a result, whether professional baseball on Sunday violated the closing laws was
litigated in several states. In Virginia, this occurred in Crook v Commonwealth. 89
In Crook, the entire starting teams fielded for the Richmond and Portsmouth minor-
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See n. 20, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text.

88

The intensity of interest is evident in The Greatest Sports Stories from the New
York Times, A. Danzig & P. Brandwein, eds. (New York: A.S. Barnes & Co., 1951),"The
Golden Age of Sport, 1920-1930," 139-355. Two of the baseball "greatest sports stories"
in this collection were Sunday games, ibid at 147 (World Series, Cleveland v Brooklyn, Oct
10, 1920) and ibid. at 169 (World Series, Giants v Yankees, Oct 8, 1922) (Sunday dates
confirmed by"PerpetualCalendar," WorldAlmanac-1999, 320-321). The pressureofmajorleague Sunday games on minor-leagues for Sunday play, like the Richmond/Portsmouth
game in Crook, was probably significant.
89

147 Va. 593, 136 S.E. 565, 50 A.L.R. 1043 (1927), citing opinions from three
other states, ibid. at 598-599, illustrating the frequency of litigation on the topic. To put
Crook in context, the 1950 version of the closing law, Va. Code Ann. §18-329 (1950)
(identically worded to the earlier code versions studied in this thesis), was amended in 1960,
beyond the 1942 termination date of this thesis, to exempt "sports" and" athletic events"
from its provisions. Va. Acts 1960, c. 267 and c. 358.
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league baseball clubs, and the umpires,90 were all arrested at a Sunday exhibition game. The
circumstances suggest this, perhaps, was a ''test case," that is, a "lawsuit brought to establish
an important legal principle ... ,"91 of whether Sunday professional baseball was subject to
closing law prosecution. These circumstances included: completing the first inning before the
arrests so that nine defendants from each team were in play and, presumably, subject to the
statute; the clubs' not charging admission;92 the ballplayers' contract-terms resulting in the
game being played at the "request" of the Portsmouth club president, purportedly not by
express contract; and sentencing on conviction confined to the five-dollar-per-defendant
statutory minimum. Thus, fines for all players and umpires totaled one hundred dollars,
relatively nominal for the twenty defendants, even allowing for the dollar's greater 1927
purchasing power compared to today. Yet the case was tried twice, and appealed. 93
The Crook defendants claimed immunity because they were not "laboring at a trade
or calling" on Sunday as the closing law prohibited,94 which the court's majority brushed
aside, easily concluding professional baseball was a ''trade or calling," based on defendant
players receiving monthly wages for full-time play. The majority also refused to dismiss due

90

One of these umpires, T. A. Crook, was the first-named defendant in the case caption, giving the opinion its citation-name, 147 Va. at 595.

91

S.V. ''test case," Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.).

92

Crook, ibid, at 596; although the norm was to charge admission, ibid at 599.

93

Ibid at 595 Gustice court, circuit court, and appeal to supreme court).

94

Quoting the statute set forth, ibid at 596.
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to lack of admission charges since "[t ]he Sunday game being more largely patronized, tended
to stimulate the interest of the public ... and thereby increase the gate receipts ... on week
days,"95 establishing a commercial purpose for this no-charge exhibition game. 96
The court in Crook also shelved its earlier suggestion, in Pirkey, of a "physicaV
mental work" distinction, so that only "manual labor rather than mental," was within the
closing-law's prohibition. 97 Crook, to the contrary, concluded one "can be 'found laboring'
at his desk, in violation of the statute, just as surely as another can be 'found laboring' upon

his farm. " 98 This ''physical/mental work" distinction, however, appeared irrelevant in Crook,
since professional baseball has both elements, rendering this analysis dictum only.99
Out-of-state decisions reviewed in Crook hel4 professional baseball players exempt
from Sunday closing laws because those laws were enacted long before "professional baseball
clubs were first organized," and "could not, ... , have [been] intended to apply to a game not
then in existence." These other state courts, said Crook, also gave weight to legislative

95

Ibid at 599.

96

The dissenters, however, concluded the ballplayers were playing ''without compulsion and without remuneration," and were not "under contract to play exhibition games for
their club at all," and thus were not subject to prosecution. Ibid at 606.
97

See nn. 61 and 62, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text.

98

Crook, 147 Va. at 598.

99

Seen. 30, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text for definition of"dictum."

116

failures to expressly prohibit ''the playing ofbaseball on Sunday." 100 Virginia's experience was
different, said Crook, because its closing law was never designated a misdemeanor until
amended in 1908, "long after professional baseball was known and played in Virginia...." 101
Thus, the court held, the criminalizing of Sunday labor fairly could include professional
baseball, along with other types of work.
The court also noted the Virginia legislature failed to adopt a proposed closing-law
amendment that would exempt from prosecution "outdoor sports open to the general public"
after 2:00 PM Sunday, 102 finding this an "indication ofthe legislative policy ofVirginia." This
supposedly meant, by inference, that the legislature did not favor exempting Sunday baseball
from the closing law's prohibitions. It is difficult,

ho~ever,

to confirm a change in the law

by the legislature's failure to act, as opposed to its taking action 103 In Pirkey and Lakeside,
100

Crook, 147 Va at 600-601.

101

Ibid at 601. The 1908 amendment is discussed at n. 16, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. The reasoning ofthe out-of-state "baseball" cases as Crook explains them,
appeared flawed, since many occupations, such as paper-mill machinery repair (seen. 2,
Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text),· arose after those states adopted Sunday closing
laws, yet no difficulty arose in enforcing such laws against them.
102

Crook at 601.

103

Ibid.

(1)
Abraham Lincoln, in his Cooper Union speech, denied that intent could be
inferred from a legislative failure to act, when he argued the Constitution authorized "our
Federal Government to control ... slavery in our Federal Territories." He documented that
a majority of the thirty-nine signers of the original Constitution so-interpreted it when voting later in Congress for issues where such Constitutional authority was necessarily implied. Critical to this discussion was his analysis of two such founding fathers who voted
(continued... )
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103

continued)
against proposed legislation that, by its terms, implicitly presumed federal authority to
regulate slavery in the Territories. Lincoln cautioned that such votes declining to act,
unaccompanied by explanation, could not be deemed to mean that those so-voting necessarily thought congress lacked constitutional power to control slavery in the territories:
( •••

". . . . They may have . . . so [voted] because they thought a proper division
of local from federal authority, or some provision . . . of the Constitution
stood in the way; or they may . . . have voted . . . on ... grounds of
expediency. . ... It, therefore, would be unsafe to set down even the two
who voted against the prohibition, as having done so because, in their understanding, . . . anything in the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery federal territory."
Abraham Lincoln, "Address at Cooper Institute, February 27, 1860," The Collected Works
ofAbraham Lincoln, Roy B. Basler, ed, 8 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press,
1953), 3: 522, 523, 530-531 (emphasis added).
(2)
Similarly, in Crook, though the legislature rejected an amendment broadening closing law exemptions, why it did so was unstated. Its reasons, paralleling Lincoln's
argument above, could have been unrelated to excluding professional baseball from the
closing law exemption. Thus, legislative failure to adopt the measure should not be, by
itself, "an indication of the legislative policy in Virginia" as the Crook opinion stated.
(a)
Paradoxically, the balance of Crook proves the above argument:
If legislative failure to act changed legislative policy on ''necessity'' then, by parity of
reasoning, the jury in Crook should have been barred from deciding ifthis ball game was
a closing law "necessity" or "charity'' exemption. This would have been because the
Legislature's failure to adopt a "baseball" exemption supposedly showed, according to the
Crook opinion, a contrary ''policy."
(b)
Crook, however, held the jury still should decide if this Sunday ball
game was a closing law "necessity," and therefore free from prosecution. This meant the
court found by implication that legislative failure to amend did not change state policy on
"necessity." This shows the difference between inferences that can be drawn from adopting
legislation, contrasted with inferences that cannot be drawn from failing to adopt
legislation. Thus Crook contradicted itself, on the one hand treating legislative non-action
as a "policy" change, while still allowing the jury to decide the issue that the legislature's
(continued... )
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as previously described 104 (reaffirmed and quoted in Crook), the Court effectively broadened
exemptions to the Sunday closing law, and procedural changes that made closing law
cases more difficult to prosecute.
The Crook jury instructions scrupulously followed Pirkey and Lakeside Inn, directing
that whether this Sunday professional baseball game was "a work of necessity within the
meaning of the statute, is a question for the jury.... " 105 Thus, despite everything previously
discussed, Crook boiled down to whether the jurors thought this particular Sunday professional baseball game was a "necessity" exempting it from prosecution. 106 Pirkey recognized
this meant that "different juries may reach different re~ults on the same evidence," 107 yet that
was what the supreme court approved. In short, in Crook the Virginia Supreme Court,

103

continued)
declining to act supposedly settled.
( •••

(3) In the Francisco trial, Chapter 8, infra, the Commonwealth's attorney also made
the same argument as that Abraham Lincoln's quoted in part (1 ), and applied in part (2)this
footnote. See n. 120, Chapter 8, infra, and accompanying text. This shows it was not an
interpretive rule that favored one "side" or the other in a closing law case.
104

Supra at 26-87, this Chapter, and accompanying text.

105

Crook, 147 Va. at 602, ibid at 604: "[C]areful consideration of these instructions
fails to disclose any error."
106

Crook exempted amateur ballplayers from the closing law: "Unlike the professional
player, whether he plays on Sunday or a week day, the amateur engages in the game as
a sport and not for ... procuring a livelihood." Ibid at 599.
107

Pirkey, 134 Va. at 726-727.
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without overruling prior holdings, accommodated the objects ofthe Sunday closing law, while
still allowing itself maneuver room to later change its thrust, if it chose to do so.

(5)

Williams v Commonwealth: Movies on Sunday?

The problems posed by Sunday closing laws for profit-based motion picture film
exhibitors were first considered on appeal in Virginia in Williams v Commonwealth. 108 Before reviewing Williams, however, it is useful to consider Professor Wallenstein's historical
study ofthe closing law's impact, among other things, on Roanoke 1930s film exhibitions. 109
A copy of a 1935 announcement illustrated in the above-referenced Roanoke study,

'°

publicizing a Sunday film exhibition is attached." 1 declaring: ''NEW PRICES effective
tomorrow SUNDAY," listing the ticket prices, fo]).owed by the statement: "Starting
Tomorrow Sunday[,] Jean Harlow and William Powell in 'RECKLESS'." In its smallest
type, is written: "SUNDAY PERFORMANCES by and for the benefit of Chapter 3 ofUnited
Spanish War Veterans and Auxiliary."

111

This "announcement" in Exhibit "A" of a Sunday movie brings to mind the court's
discussion in Crook (though Crook's Sunday game was admission-free) that Sunday
108

179 Va. 741; 20 S.E.2d 493 (1942). To put Crook in context, the 1950 version of
the closing law, Va Code Ann. §18-329 (1950) (identically worded to the earlier codeversions studied in this thesis), was amended in 1954, after the 1942 termination date of this
thesis, to exempt "operation of motion picture theatres," from its provisions. Va. Acts 1954,
c. 131, pp. 127-128.
109

Wallenstein, "Never on Sunday," see n. 73, this Chapter, supra.

110

Ibid at 138. See copy in Appendix, Exhibit "A."

Ill

Ibid.
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attendance ''tended to stimulate the interest ofthe public in professional baseball and thereby
increase the gate receipts ... on week days." 112 Replacing ''professional baseball" in this
quotation with "motion pictures," could describe Exhibit "A's" purpose as well. That is,
Sunday attendance, Crook suggested, as a matter of practical business, promoted more
revenue the rest of the week.
In this context, on Sunday, March 24, 1935, Professor Wallenstein recounted
Roanoke's American Theatre manager, S. G. Richardson, was arrested for selling tickets and
presenting films that day, and "(a]ccused of violating a local ordinance against Sunday
movies[.] [H]e was convicted in the Roanoke Civil and Police Court ... , [and] paid a fine
of two dollars. . . ." 113 For seven weeks this scenario recurred, so that by ''mid-May,
Richardson had

been convicted ... seven different times for violating Sunday closing

laws," all of which he appealed on the ground that "each one of the Sunday performances
had been advertised as a benefit for "Chapter 3 of the United States Spanish War Veterans

Auxiliary. " 114 While awaiting dispositions ofhis appeals, Richardson continued to sell tickets,
and exhibit Sunday films. Professor Peter Wallenstein asserted that, in 1935, "Richardson
could have been required to post a substantial bond. But the judge decided that he had no
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Crook at 599. Earlier quoted, n. 95, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra.
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Wallenstein, ''Never on Sunday ... ," 136-138, n. 73, this Chapter, supra.
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authority to do so while the cases were under appeal. " 115
Seeming inaction followed these convictions because the judge to whom they were
appealed "was

ilL

and his replacement declined ... to become embroiled in potentially

volatile Sunday-closing cases." The Roanoke Times observed that
[T]he unedifying spectacle [continues] of Sunday movies ruled illegal... for
six or seven consecutive weeks, an appeal noted to a higher court, and a ...
theatre [sic] continuing to open ... Sunday after Sunday, with no disposition
... to press the issue and get the thing settled definitely 116
The deadlock was broken by a May 1935 appointment of another out-of-town judge
for a a retrial deciding if Richardson should be acquitted under the Sunday law's "necessity''
or "charity" exclusions. At the retrial, ''the five-man jury could not agree . . . . Three
members voted to convict; two disagreed. At a second trial in July, however, Richardson
finally won acquittal." 117
On 19July1935, the [local newspaper] editor remarked that the issue seemed
settled,[:] "[T]heatres of ... [Roanoke] can throw open their doors on
Sunday ... without hindrance by the authorities." Not even the pretense of
a charitable purpose would be required .... "Sunday movies," he added, "are
not a necessity, in the strictest sense ... , but neither are they objectionable."
[I]fthere is ... sentiment ... in favor of them, we can see no objection ...
Certainly the trend generally seems to be in that direction .... "' 118
These 1935 experiences of a Roanoke theater manager in the local police court and
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appeals therefrom, as extracted from Professor Wallenstein's study, 119 suggested Sunday film
exhibitors had possible, though not iron-clad, chances of escaping the somewhat indifferent
local closing law prosecutions. Williams, in 1942, improved such defendants' odds by maleing Sunday "charitable" exemptions not only easier to claim but also, as will be seen,
effectively reducing operational costs to businesses benefitted by them. 120

Williams, in its essence, was a jury instruction battle. The trial judge approved
instruction "V," concerning defendant theater manager, providing that:
"[W]ork of charity" ... means ...that if the defendant was working at his
usual trade or calling which . . . is not charitable, and was receiving
consideration for such work even though the net proceeds ... ofhis labor are
given to charity, he has violated the statute .... 121
How the Sunday charity film exhibitions operated in Williams was explained as follows:
[T]he [theater] owners ... arrange[d] ... with the Junior Woman's Club [to].
. . operate[] on Sundays, and the net proceeds above actual operating
expense would be turned over to the Junior Woman's Club for ... charitable
work .. ~ [to a $1,000 total, estimated to take four to six months]. 122
Thus, in Williams, the theater-owner's charitable contribution was carried out by its agree-
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Supra, nn. 110 through 118, this Chapter, and accompanying text.
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Williams quoted, without discussion, new closing law exemptions, 179 Va. at
740:"This section shall not apply . . . to the sale of gasoline , or any motor vehicle fuel, or
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121

Williams, 179 Va. at 748-749. The supreme court ultimately rejected this instruction, seen. 124, this Chapter, infra, and accompanying test.
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ment to donate to a bona fide charity the Sunday profits of the theater from film receipts (less
operating expenses) up to $1,000. The Williams trial court jury instruction, however, provided
that even with all those elements in place, the defendant theater manager could not avail
himself of the "charity''exemption from prosecution for Sunday work, unless he received no
pay for his regular work ofmanaging the theater on that Sunday. Defendant Williams objected
to the trial-court instruction "V" quoted above, and unsuccessfully insisted at trial that, instead,
the court should have given his following proposed instruction "A":
[I]f ... [the jury] believe ... that the [theater] exhibitor[s] ... received no
compensation from the proceeds of the Sunday ... motion pictures ... and
. . . proceeds above actual operating expenses are . . . used for charitable
purposes, then you should find the defendant not guilty. . . . [T]he payment
out of gross receipts of the actual expenses .. : in operating the theatres on
Sunday [is not] ... compensation to the exhibitor. 123
The Virginia Supreme Court held "it was reversible error for the [trial] court to give
instruction 'V' ..."Instead, the court ruled," instruction 'A', which the trial court refused[,]
properly gave the true ... application ofthe statute to ... this case."124 The high court favored
defendant's proposed instruction "A" over the instruction "V" the trial court gave, because:
We do not think that the test as to whether the particular work of [defendant] Williams was to be found solely in his actual work itself to the exclusion
of a consideration of the primary purpose of the exhibition; to-wit, that the
profits will be devoted to charity....
[T]he record shows a plan to dedicate to charity a substantial sum . . . . Yet
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instruction "V" told the jury that they could not consider this fact whic~
according to our view, was the principal element . . . . The actual work of
Williams [defendant manager] was purely incidental if the exhibitions were
solely for charitable purposes, and here this has been conclusively shown 125

Williams made a significant difference in the commercial feasability of using the "charitable"
closing law exemption, contrasted with previously-quoted instruction ''V"which the trial court
was reversed for using. Instruction ''V" denied defendant Williams the charitable exemption
at trial because he was paid for supervising the theaters' Sunday "charitable" film exhibition.
Virginia's high court, in contrast, deemed his salary "purely incidental" to the film exhibition's "charitable purposes" which the court held to have been "conclusively shown."
In Williams, the supreme court effectively stood the closing law on its head. The law's
eighteenth century purpose was providing Sunday rest by barring Sunday employment. In
contrast, the theater employees in Williams, including the defendant manager, were working
on Sunday, not resting. Further, the supreme court approved using charitable proceeds thereby
obtained to pay Sunday employee wages and operating expenses for the theater, thereby
encouraging, rather than discouraging, labor on Sunday.
A theater using the closing law's "charitable exemption" to avoid Sunday prosecution,
as Williams approved, potentially could make a greater profit than another theater, closed on
Sunday, but with equal non-Sunday gross revenues and expenses, all other things being equal.
Although such a "charitable exemption" theater must surrender its Sunday net profits to
charity, the Williams-approved jury instruction allowed it to satisfy its Sunday operating
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expenses from its Sunday charity receipts. This could reduce the amount of operating expenses needing to be paid from gross revenues received the other six days of the week's
business, effectively increasing its net profit. 126 Thus, through the economic incentives
provided by the closing law charity exemption as interpreted in Williams, that law could
effectively act precisely contrary to its original purpose ofreducing Sunday labor. Further, the
increase of net profits in this way probably assured increases in Sunday employment.

(c)

Conclusions About Twentieth-Century Virginia Closing Law
Appeals Before Francisco.

Frederick Lewis Allen pinpointed World War I's aftermath as the beginning of a
"subtle change" to "shake offthe restraints ofpuritanism."127 Popular disaffection with closing
laws would be an example of such "change." 128 Virginia anti-closing-law sentiment arose
slightly earlier. Appellant-plaintiff in Hartenstein v. Virginia Carolina RR, the first twentiethcentury Virginia closing law appeal, however, did not reflect this trend; unsuccessfully

126

Paying Sunday contingent operating expenses from charitable proceeds, like
wages, would not necessarily increase net profits, since these expenses would generally
increase as revenue increased. Paying Sunday fixed operating expenses from Sunday
charitable proceeds, however, (apportioned to meet the Sunday portion only [1/7 of the
week] ofthose expenses), such as the lease (or mortgage), insurance, and property taxes,
reduced what must otherwise be paid for those expenses from receipts of the remaining six
days of the week (other than Sunday). In this way, net profits from overall theater
operations were increased through partial satisfaction of theater fixed expenses from charitable proceeds (revenue which would not have been realized had the theater not operated
on Sunday).
127
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The relation between puritanism and Sunday closing laws is discussed at nn. 4 18, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text.

126
attempting to apply closing laws to liability arising from Sunday personal injuries. 129 The
remaining two pre-World War I-Armistice twentieth-century appeals, however, arose in an
entertainment or leisure context. The first, Hanger v. Commonwealth ( 1908), held the closing
law could not be avoided through an incorporated "social club" from which ''members"
purchased Sunday cigarettes, soft drinks and sundries. 130 The second, Ellis v. Covington
(1917), seemed to state, in non-binding dictum, that a restaurant's selling Sunday meals and
soft drinks, even with a municipal license, unconditionally violated the closing law, 131 further
discussed hereinafter. 132
Both Hanger and Ellis could hardly have arisen without a market-demand from
consumers with sufficient leisure and disposable inco,ne to significantly support the controverted Sunday sales, which authorities sought to interdict by closing law prosecutions. It
appears that growth of such retail consumer markets significantly influenced closing-law
interwar Virginia Supreme Court appeals. That court's closing-law decisions, with minor
exceptions, reflected a greater sympathy for Sunday commerce, than providing a Sunday "day
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of rest" to ordinary workers, the supposed object of the closing law.
From the World War I Armistice through the 1942 conclusion of this thesis, the
appealed closing law cases unfolded much in accord with Frederick Lewis Allen's observations. Subtly underlying the reported decisions can be seen, from their fact statements and
documentation supplied in the thesis outside of the case-law, manifestations of public
disaffection with puritan strictures, such as closing laws. This was reflected in part by a public insistence, as a practical matter, divorced from ideology, on access to entertainment and
dining on Sunday, carried out by paid employees on that day, like any other day, contrary to
the closing law's ostensible intent.
As a prelude to this apparent interwar relaxatio~ ofclosing law enforcement, one legal
hiccup remained. The conviction-failures in Wells and Hanger, 133 ostensibly resulted from the
statutory text not expressly describing the statute as criminal. An explicit criminal sanction was
inserted in the closing law by a 1908 amendment effectively overruling Wells and Hanger. 134
Virginia's high-court, however, with fair consistency, construed the statute so as to favor
Sunday business, as opposed to concerns for worker-rest on Sundays, the closing law's
supposed purpose. 135 The court would not countenance crude, head-on charges against the
closing law, like the bogus "social club"druggist S. T. Hanger clumsily and unsuccessfully
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attempted. 136 It tended to acquiesce, however, to more subtle arguments undermining closing
laws, reducing their effectiveness in a context which, with reasonable consistency, favored
business efficiency and profitability. The result was a mimicing, in closing law litigation, of
what British military historian B. H. Liddell-Hart described as the "indirect approach" in
warfare: "Avoid a frontal attack on a long established position; instead, seek to turn it by flank
movement, so that a more penetrable side is exposed . . . ." 137 It was to such "indirect
approach" 138 attacks on closing laws that the Virginia Supreme Court favorably responded.
These supported what Virginia's appellate judges appeared to perceive, namely that Virginia
citizens after World War I, even though their conduct exhibited dissatisfaction with the Sunday
closing law, did not seek its outright repeal, so long ~judicial interpretations allowed them
to remain relatively unaffected by its ostensible labor-reduction purposes. This accorded with
what happened in Commonwealth v. Pirkey, including (1) a legislative broadening of closing
law exemptions for manufacturers; (2) expanding the "necessity'' exemption to include matters
that were perceived to have become necessities "in view of modem circumstances of life," 139
but may not have been "necessities" at the closing law's eighteenth-century enactment; (3)
allowing a closing law "necessity" that need not be "physical" or "absolute;" (4) requiring
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jury-decisions for virtually all major closing law issues, rather than judicial rulings. 140
To confirm the complete extent and all the reasons for the apparent decline in
enforcement of the closing law during the circa 1920-1940 interwar years would require an
examination of appellate cases, the appellate judges who presided over them and the personalities who participated in them. This would need to be undertaken with an intensity and
scope comparable to, or exceeding, the review that will later be undertaken of the Francisco
trial in Chapter 8 of this thesiS.
Such an investigation should attempt to confirm or refute, the effect of the following
as potential causes of declining closing law enforcement: First, greater self-transportation due
to greater auto ownership. This logically led to more restaurants, sporting events and other
Sunday activities such travel attracted, which the public wanted on Sunday, in nominal
violation of the closing laws. Second, national prohibition's repeal in the early 1930s also
increased the attractiveness of such roadside sales, dining and entertainment, by including sale
of alcoholic beverages. Third, particularly in the 1930s, a desire to shake off the throes of the
great depression, by encouraging additional employment, including on Sundays. Fourth, the
increase ofdefense work, with its emphasis on twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week
plant operation would erode, as a practical matter, strictures against Sunday work.

Fifth,

many seeking appointments as Virginia appellate judges could well have been products of
successful business backgrounds and law firms with ingrained preferences against govern-
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ment policies encouraging expansion of business and industry and for less government regulation. Such lawyers, when elevated to the bench, while not necessarily dismissive of the
closing law, perhaps tended to interpret its ambiguities in ways favoring business expansion,
on Sunday or any other day. Some combination ofthe above factors likely accounted for the
consistently permissive attitude of the public and the appellate court, concerning "necessity"
or "charity" exceptions to Sunday closing law enforcement.
Two other dynamic interwar closing law changes achieved by the Virginia Supreme
Court were (I) judicial expansion of closing-law "necessity" further exempting Sunday labor
from closing-law prosecution in Lakeside Inn Corp. v. Commonwealth; and (2) expansion of
the "charity" prosecution-exemption of the same Iaw_in Williams v. Commonwealth.

Lakeside permitted the exemption to apply not only to the "necessity" of the defendant or those with whom defendant dealt directly, but also to the defendant's actions arguably
affecting the world at large, whether defendant intended any "necessity'' benefit from them
or not. This led to the Virginia high-court's remarkable ruling that the defendant Inn was
entitled to a "necessity'' closing law exemption should the jury find, on retrial, that opening
the Inn's pool reduced Sunday nude bathing in drainage ditches adjourning public road- ways
in the rest of the county where the pool was located.
In evaluating the Lakeside "necessity" issue, it is instructive to examine the Exhibit

"B" (Appendix) photo ofthe Inn's pool from the Wallenstein article about Roanoke, Virginia,
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closing law enforcement. 141 In particular, the ambiance of the formally dressed patrons at the
pool area (being serenaded by a dance orchestra, according to the Exhibit "B" picture
caption), renders it difficult to believe the Inn's pool was planned or financed with any
expectation of reducing Sunday nude bathing. The well-coi:Jfured Inn patrons pictured,
furthermore, do not resemble those the Sheriff described at the Lakeside trial as arrested for
nude swimming in drainage ditches adjoining public highways (such arrests supposedly being
"greatly relieved" due to, the pool's opening). 142 The apparently high-society individuals in the
photo, Exhibit "B," seemed unlikely to be those who changed their aquatic habits from
roadside ditches to Lakeside's pool to escape indecent exposure arrests. Nevertheless, the
high Court concluded the alleged reduction in nude Qathing created a ''necessity'' jury issue
on whether the decrease justified operating the Inn pool on Sunday. 143
During the interwar era Virginia's high court, as Lakeside exemplified, tended to
interpret closing-law statutory ambiguities in ways benefiting increases in Sunday commerce.
The practical result was to diminish the closing law's intended ameliorative, Sunday laborreducing, purpose. This was true even though in some cases, such as Crook v. Common-
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wealth, the appellate court affirmed a trial court verdict rejecting a "necessity'' exemption for
Sunday professional baseball. The Virginia high court made clear in Crook that its a:ffirmance
was because the question was entirely one of fact for the jury to decide. Under Pirkey and

Lakeside, the Crook opinion continued, later juries could reach the opposite conclusion on the
same facts.
The supreme court's inclination to encourage Sunday commercial activities, thereby
limiting the rest from labor sought by the Sunday closing law, reached something of an apogee in Commonwealth v. Williams (1942). 144 There the court approved a "charity" closing law
exemption for a Sunday motion picture where the net profit ofthat showing, after subtracting
operating expenses from gross receipts, was contributed to a bona fide charity. 145 Williams
further found the theater-manager-defendant was not subject to closing law prosecution
merely because his salary for Sunday management of the theater was part of those expenses.

If the ''primary purpose of the [film] exhibition" was "that the profits will be devoted to
charity," held the court; then the manager's Sunday "actual work" and resulting salary was
"purely incidental," for which he could not be prosecuted under the closing law. 146

Williams offered businesses using the closing law charitable exemption an opportun
ity for increased profits by so doing. This was because the court approved the a theater's
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subtracting its Sunday operating expenses from its Sunday charitable gross receipts. This
appeared to include satisfying fixed operating expenses (such as rent [or mortgage], insurance
and property taxes), pro rata from Sunday charitable revenues, reducing the amount of such
expenses needing satisfaction from revenues of the rest of the week. The prospective result
was greater net profits, overall, for businesses taking advantage of the charitable exemption
under the Sunday closing law, than if they did not operate on Sunday. The further result was
that the Sunday closing law, instead of achieving rest for from labor on Sunday, accomplished
the opposite, encouraging more Sunday labor on a charitable exemption basis, with potentially
greater profits for the business taking advantage of the exemption. 147
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Chapter 8:
(a)

REVISITING FRANCISCO v. COMMONWEALTH-THE TRIAL.
Introduction.

The Virginia Supreme Court's 1942 Francisco v. Commonwealth opinion was already reviewed. 1

That discussion concluded by asking: (1) Why was Mr. Francisco

prosecuted for Sunday beer sales when eighty percent of licensed county merchants also
doing so were not? (2) Did the supreme court-ordered new trial ever occur?
To answer these questions, Chapters 3 through 7 reviewed the development of
Sunday closing laws. What was learned allowed clearer answers to the above questions and
better understanding of such laws in general. This Chapter 8, besides offering answers to the
questions posed above, also examines details of the Francisco trial not contained in the
appellate opinion discussion in Chapter 2, and reveals how the trial re-echos major themes
concerning Virginia closing law history.

(b)

Dramatis Personae and SimilarMatters in Francisco.

It is useful, in analyzing the Francisco trial, to first consider the following significant
personalities and other matters related to it.

(1)

Transcript and Court Record.

Locating Francisco's trial-transcript was a problem. Inquiry at the Hanover County
Circuit Court revealed a bare cupboard. Prodigious searches by the Clerk's office, disclosed
only a few Francisco-related documents. The transcript and virtually all trial-papers could

See, Chapter 2, herein, supra.
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not be found. 2 Fortunately, the Virginia Supreme Court retained Defendant's Petition for

Writ ofError ("Petition") in Francisco, with transcript, brief, rulings and other papers from
the 1941 trial and the 1942 appeal, attached to the Appendix herein as Exhibit "C,"3 along
with the Commonwealth's responsive brief, also attached as Exhibit "D."4

(2)

The Prosecutor: Attorney Edward F. Simpkins, Jr.

The current Hanover County Commonwealth Attorney's office explained its records
only commenced with its professionalization after World War II. Before then, it explained,
Hanover County Commonwealth Attorneys were in private practice, representing the Commonwealth along with other clients, and kept their prosecutorial files when their terms ended
like any other client files. In any event, neither former. Commonwealth Attorney Edward P.
Simpkins, Jr., nor his files, could be found.

(3)

The Defendant: M. G. Francisco.

Defendant M. G. Francisco was deceased, but telephone listings with his surname led
to his son T. Waddy Francisco, whose bitter explanation for the trial was "Joe Johnson, the

2

No fault for this, if any there be, falls on today's Hanover County Clerk's Office.
Deputy Clerk Thomas Carlson, criminal division head, exhaustively searched and provided every assistance, including accessing documents, photocopy facilities and work space.
Thanks are extended to him and to the Hon. Frank D. Hargrove, Jr., County Clerk.
3

Exhibit "C," Appendix: M. G. Francisco v. Commonwealth, [Defendant's] Petition for Writ of Error[ "Petition"] No. 2633, filed September 16, 1942 (Richmond: Virginia Supreme Court). (Page references are to the Petition page numbering itself, NOT
the page numbering of internal documents within the Petition.)
4

Exhibit "D," Appendix: M. G. Francisco v. Commonwealth, Brief on Behalf of
the Commonwealth, Record No. 2633, filed October 8, 1942 (Richmond: Va. Sp. Ct.).
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County Supervisor, didn't like my old man." Johnson, he said, attended the trial, reminding
the Judge during recesses to "don't forget who made you a judge."5 His recollections of
prejudice, as he saw it, of Johnson toward his father, were not "history'' for him, but a
present, living-memory. It would be unwise scholarship, however, to solely rely on anyone's
sixty-year old memories, no matter how sincere or intense.
T. Waddy Francisco's description of County Supervisor Johnson, however, possibly
explained some testimony of witness Charlie Williams in the Francisco transcript:

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Where do you live, Mr. Williams?
I live on Mr. Johnson's place.
What Johnson?
Joseph Johnson.
Joseph Johnson?
Yes, sir. He is in the courtroom.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Where does Mr. Cauthorne live?
Mr. Cauthorne, he lives on Mr. Johnson's place.
The same Mr. Joe Johnson who is sitting in this courtroom?
Yes, sir.
He [Cauthorne] is the other [complaining] witness in this case, isn't he?
I suppose so.
Who took you up there to Mr. Francisco's [on Sunday, September 7, 1941]?
Mr. Nichols.

Q.

Well, can you explain how you and Mr. Nichols and Mr. Cauthorne all
happened to meet in Mr. Joe Johnson's house this Sunday afternoon?
Well, I couldn't tell you that. I can't answer that question. 6

A.

5

T. Waddy Francisco, telephone interview, February 22, 2002. His phone number
was obtained from his son, Peter, an executive at Lakeside Appliances, Richmond, Va.
6

Exhibit "C", Petition, 43-45 (emphasis added). The witnesses given name was
shown in the transcript as "Charlie," not "Charles," ibid at 42 and 99 (transcript index).
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This testimony seemed unconnected with the rest of the case, before the Francisco phone
interview. Comparing the two, however, suggested possible connections: Williams, one ofthe

Francisco Sunday beer purchasers, testified to living "on Mr. Johnson's place." Furthermore,
Williams' testimony recites, Johnson was at the trial when he (Williams) testified, as T.
Waddy Francisco recalled about "Supervisor Joe Johnson." The transcript did not identify this
"Joseph Johnson" as a Supervisor, as Mr. Francisco recalled. It seemed unlikely, however,
that another "Joseph Johnson" was at the trial, other than one well-enough known in this
small community, that his name alone, as the cross-examiner used, was enough for all to
know who was meant.
The above transcript extract also suggested loJ?nson' s primacy in the prosecution: ( 1)
Complaining witness Charlie Williams said he met the other two complaining witnesses at
Johnson's home for the Sunday beer-buy at Francisco's; and (2) Two of these three witnesses, he testified, were Johnson's tenants. Not con firmed, however, was Mr. Francisco's
recalling Johnson as a County Supervisor. Johnson was, indeed, a County Supervisor, but not
until December 30, 1941, over two months after the trial was over. 7 He was appointed by
none other than the Honorable Leon M. Bazile, the Francisco trial judge, as revealed in the
Court's Order Book providing in part:
It appearing to the Court that T. M. Thompson, the member of the Board of
Supervisors of Hanover County from Beaver Dam District, has departed this
life, thereby creating a vacancy in said office, IT IS ORDERED that J.Z.

7

The transcript shows all trial proceedings occurring on one day, October 17, 1941.
See Ex "C", Petition, 35 (trial commences) and 93 (verdict).
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Johnson, a qualified voter resident of Beaver Dam District, Hanover County,
be and he is hereby appointed Supervisor ... to fill the unexpired term. ...
[no signature]
Leon M. Bazile, Judge8
Thus, according to the Order Book, it was not Johnson, the Supervisor who, to paraphrase
T. Waddy Francisco, "made him [Bazile] a Judge" but rather Bazile, the Judge, who made
Johnson a Supervisor.

(4)

The Newspapers.

Given current (circa 2005) coverage of spectacular criminal trials by television, it is
hard to believe that the 1941 Francisco trial, carrying a fine-only penalty, ultimately five
dollars, was big news. Richmond's two daily papers, however, provided front-page coverage. The Judge's order prohibiting Sunday beer sales garnered a favorable Methodist
Conference resolution as well, also on the front-pages. 9

8

Common Law Order Book No. 19 (June 8, 1939-November 20, 1944), Hanover
County Cir. Ct.) (Clerk's Office, Hanover County, Virginia), December 30, 1941, p. 214
(photo-reduced and Attached as Exhibit "E") (capitals in original). Circuit judges made
such appointments pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 136 (1919). Section 5962, ibid, also
required: "The proceedings of every court shall be entered in . . . the order book." Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 679, 687; 17 S.E. 238 (1893) held that order book entries
need only be read in court in the term entered to be valid, meaning the Judge's failure to sign
the appointment he made in the Order Book, Exhibit "E", did not invalidate it.
9

Richmond News-Leader, October 18, 1941, 1: "Bazile Beer Ban Hailed by
Methodists; .•. : The Virginia Methodist Conference meeting today in Lynchburg, adopted
a resolution hailing 'with joy' Judge Bazile's decision that the sale of Beer on Sunday violated Virginia's blue law.... " Times-Dispatch, October 19: "Methodists Praise Ruling on
Beer Ban," 1, identifying resolution sponsor, J. W. Moore, as president of ''Virginia AntiSaloonLeague." News-Leader, October 18, 1941, trialcoverageonp.12:"Bazi/e Will Hear
Argument on Blue Law Beer Verdict." [All italic and bold-faced type in the originals.]
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(5)

The Judge: Honorable Leon M. Bazile.

Papers of the late Leon M. Bazile, Circuit Judge (1890-1967) ("Bazile Papers"), 10
are at the Virginia Historical Society. The Society's Guide to his Papers revealed he was a
graduateofT.C. Williams SchoolofLaw, UniversityofRichmond (1910), who after private
practice, served in the Virginia Attorney-General's Office ( 1916-1930), interrupted by World
War I Army duty in France. His prewar Assistant Attorney-General service intertwined with
his courting ofVirginia Hamilton Bowcock (1889-1970). Some ofhis letters to her he called

his "briefs," proselytizing his Baptist fiancee about his Catholic faith. None of the Papers
show either converted the other but they married, nevertheless, on January 26, 1918. 11

10

Leon Maurice [Nelson] Bazile Papers, 1826-1967, MSSl B33483 a FA2 (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, accessioned December 14, 1987) ("Bazile Papers"). The
Society's 18-page "Description and Guide" ("Guide") for the Papers, advised there were
over 10,000 items, in 27 archival boxes. The Judge's other interior name, ''Nelson,"
bracketed in this footnote, ibid, is from the Guide, as is the other information in the text.
11

Guide, 3-4, n.10, ibid. Each of the pair engaged in a seemingly complicated yet
familiar minuet danced to one of one of the world's oldest tunes. He was verbally aggressive, and she, perhaps more effectively, seemed to yield, thereby raising his intensity. Thus,
he wrote what he called a July 24, 1917, "Reply Brief' letter stating he realized she had
"determined never to marry." He "never loved anyone as I do you and I shall never love
anyone else in the same way." He described his courtship, however, in military metaphor:
"Battles have never been won by giving up. I am sure the problem can be solved if we will
but try." She responded in a way that could hardly fail to increase his ardor: "I do wish I
could help you in some way just now when you need me most, but instead of being a help to
you I am only another Problem to cause you worry and anxiety. If our Problem were only
solved I might- but I won't tell you any more until it is solved or it would be useless. Leon,
I am sure we can never find a 'common ground' unless you could accept my faith, but I
would not and could not ask you to do that unless you could truly believe in the Baptist
Doctrines and be as sincere a Christian as you are now. Try to forget all about me, I often
wonder why God brought us together, perhaps some day [I] will understand [dated July 31,
(continued... )
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After his Attorney-General service, Bazile practiced law privately for eleven years
(1930-1941) including four years in Virginia's General Assembly (1936-1940). Appointed
circuit judge in 1941, he served until illness forced a 1965 retirement, followed by his death
in 1967.12 He and his wife had one child, daughter Virginia Lee Bazile (1920-1972), who
married Dr. John Edward Miller (1944). Her Estate donated the Papers to the Society. 13
The deaths of the Judge (1967), his wife (1970) and daughter (1972), impeded location ofrelations or acquaintances. Many of his Papers were routine congratulatory letters to
or from him for achievements, promotions or the like, revealing few personal qualities of
writer or recipient. There were, however, exceptions. Between his religious "briefs" to his
future bride (1916-1918), 14 were his letters to her car~fully analyzing prohibition influences
on vote-getting. 15 This would be significant in Francisco, where the defendant was prosecuted

11

( ••• continued)

1917, by an archivist]." Bazile Papers, Box 3 (underlining in original). Despite their mutual
protestations, within six months they were married, with no evidence either had converted the
other.
12

Ibid, 4.

13

Ibid, 1, 6.

14

Already discussed, at n. 11, this Chapter, supra and accompanying text.

15

An example is, Bazile Papers, n. 10, this Chapter, supra (box 2, July 21, 1917,
letter, Leon M. Bazile to Virginia Hamilton Bowcock, his future bride, providing in part:
The leaders - not the rank and file - of the Prohibition element are for the
most part identified with the 'machine' ... giving their support to Mr. Ellyson who is the candidate of that faction. Mr. Pollard having been a more
staunch prohibitionor [sic] than Mr. Ellyson, these dry leaders have been
(continued ... )
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only for Sunday beer sales. 16 Such a beer-only prosecution in Francisco may have been the
Judge's suggestion, since testimony had him instructing a witness, before prosecution began,
on how ''to bring evidence in court." 17
Other correspondence was more fruitful in assessing personal character. For example in 1941, while a judge, Leon Bazile wrote the U. S. Attorney General (attached Exhibit

"F" 18), accusing labor leader John L. Lewis of treason and demanding his indictment.

On

15

( ••• continued)
somewhat embarrassed as to how they should proceed. For some time Dr.
Cannon has had his friends write letters to Mr. Pollard and the press suggesting that Mr. Pollard withdraw as the chance of two dry men beating one
wet candidate was not very bright.

This showed Bazile's deep interest in "dry" and ''wet" voting dynamics, presumably equally
so in 1941, when prohibition sentiments were still important in Virginia politics. This
importance was evidenced by prominent press coverage given the Methodist resolution
praising the Judge's Francisco ruling banning Sunday sales on prohibition grounds. Seen.
9, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text.
16

''No complaint was lodged against him [Francisco] for the sale of articles other
than beer." Francisco v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. at 374. So he was not prosecuted for the
"cigarettes and tobacco, soft drinks and ice cream," ibid, 373-374, he also sold on Sunday.
17

Ex "C", Petition, 38: "I was directed by the Honorable Judge and the Commonwealth's Attorney to bring evidence in Court." (Complaining witness Nichols.). The
prosecutor spoke of Nichols discussing ''with the Judge and me ... what you could do to
bring a prosecution ... ," 39, ibid.
18

Exhibit "F", Bazile Papers, November 20, 1941 (n.10, this Chapter, supra, box
10, photo-reduced, handwritten copy on 8 Yz x 14-inch, lined paper, typescript attached for
easier reading [Exhibit "F-1", immediately after Ex "F"]). David M. Kennedy wrote:
"John L. Lewis... demonstrated his continuing capacity for mischief in 1941 when he called
his United Mine Workers out on a nationwide strike.... After a long, acrimonious standoff,
amid mounting wintertime coal shortages and bitter denunciations of Lewis as a traitor and
saboteur, the miners finally went back to work --on December 7, 1941." Freedom from
(continued... )
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Exhibit F's left margin, he wrote, "This was sent to the Attorney General of the United
States ... , but he did not have the courtesy to acknowledge it."
About fifteen years after Francisco, Judge Bazile achieved a kind of celebrity due to
the Supreme Court's Loving v Virginia opinion, 19 where an interracial married couple was
charged in his court with violating Virginia's miscegenation laws. Upon their guilty plea, he
sentenced them to a year in jail, suspended for 25 years on condition they leave Virginia for
that 25-year period. Although the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed (with modifications not
here relevant), the couple obtained review by the United States Supreme Court, challenging
Virginia's miscegenation laws on equal-protection and due process grounds. In holding the
laws unconstitutional, Chief Justice Warren quoted t~e ''trial judge" as follows:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix. 20
Judge Bazile was not named by Chief Justice Warren, but was listed as the trial judge in the
Virginia Supreme Court opinion for which U.S. Supreme Court review was granted, mean-

18
( ••• continued)

Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945, vol. 9, The Oxford History
ofthe United States, C. Vann Woodward, gen. ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), 639.
Thus, without accepting or defending the Judge's 1941 view of Lewis as a traitor, his was
far from an isolated opinion at the time.
19

388 U.S. 1 (1967), reversing, sub nom, Commonwealth v. Loving, 206 Va. 924;
147 S.E. 2d 78 (1966).
20

388 U.S. at 3.
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ing he was the ''trial judge" whose opinion Justice Warren quoted in Loving v Virginia. 21
(6)

The Defense Counsel: George Haw and Andrew Ellis.

Little was discovered about defense counsel, except that one ofJudge Basile's former
Virginia legislative colleagues, Albert G. Boschen, Delegate from Richmond, wrote him a
December 28, 1941 letter stating, in part (attached Exhibit "G"):
While talking to the Governor, your name came up and I told him that he did
one big act when he appointed you as Judge. He told me that he had splendid
reports of your good work. I did not know that Geo Haw and Andrew Ellis
opposed you but I understand it now. 22
Thus "Geo Haw and Andrew Ellis" purportedly "opposed" Bazile, ambiguously meaning
either "opposed" his judicial appointment or "opposed" him in Francisco. Either interpretation suggests an antagonism between them which the trial, in some way, continued. 23

21

This is also confirmed (1) in 206 Va. at 924, listing Hon. Leon M. Bazile as trial
judge (seen. 21, ibid); and (2) in Record [on appeal], Commonwealth v. Loving, No. 6163
(Richmond: Virginia Sp. Ct., filed November 4, 1965) (Univ. of Richmond Law Library
duplicates official filings since 190 Va, including bound filings for 260 Va. pp. 899-944
[within which is Loving's Record, containing the Judge's Opinion at Record, 8-14, supra,
identifying Bazile as author, with the passage quoted in the U.S. Supreme Court Loving
Opinion, 388 U.S. at 3 [Record, 14, ibid]). Loving arose in Caroline County, not Hanover
County where Francisco was tried. However, both counties are in Virginia's Fifteenth
Circuit Court, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (2004) (Matthew Bender/ LexusNexus), 29, as presumably was true in 1965 when Loving was decided, meaning the same
judges presided in both counties.
22

Albert 0. Boschen, Delegate, Virginia House of Delegates, December 28, 1941
letter to Hon. Leon M. Basile (emphasis added). Bazile Papers, Exhibit "G".
23

Seen. 101, this Chapter, infra, and accompanying text, as an example of the antagomsm.
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(7)

The Sheriff: Sumpter Priddy

Sumpter Priddy was Hanover County Sheriff during the Francisco trial. Although he

has passed o~ his so~ identically named, though advanced in years, was very much alive and
agreed to be interviewed about what his father told him about the Francisco prosecution. The
son's answer to the first question posed about Francisco at the end of Chapter 2 (i.e., Why
Francisco was singled out for prosecution) is in Attached Exhibit "H", undersigned's April
16, 2002, letter to him, based on information he supplied and countersigned to confirm its
accuracy, providing in part:
You advised that your father had told you, ... this case was brought . . . because a County Commissioner, Joseph Johnson ... , from the Beaverdam
area . . . had a daughter who operated a store similar to the one allegedly
operated illegally by Mr. Francisco on a Sunday. The inference was ... that
Johnson hoped thereby that his daughter could gain a commercial advantage
over Francisco, due to the latter's having been prosecuted in this case for
operating his business on Sunday in violation of the ... Closing Law .... 24
Of course the younger Priddy's confirming signature on Exhibit "H" proves, at most, his
understanding, of what his father, the Sheriff, told him about Francisco. Further, Joseph
Johnson's views are

unkno~

since neither he nor his relations or acquaintances could be

located, cutting off the potentially quite different views of Francisco and his participation in
them, that might have been thereby obtained.
What favors reliance on Exhibit "H's" story is that it appears to have been the

24

Exhibit "H" (extract), in Appendix. Attached Exhibit "H" errata: Priddy's adaddress is on "Goshen" not "Ocean" Road (phonetic error due to telephone transmission);
Joseph Johnson was County "Supervisor" not "Commissioner." Finally, Mr. Priddy dated
his signature "4/16/2001" rather than the correct "4/16/2002," see Ex "H".
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Sheriff's confidential and uncompelled disclosure to his son. Further, his story suggested he
yielded to a County Supervisor's pressure. This also encourages reliance, in that a speaker's
uncorroborated admission arguably unfavorable to himself, is more credible than, in contrast,
an uncorroborated admission favorable to himself
There also were several then-contemporary, though partial and indirect, corroborations ofExhibit "H". One ofthese was on October 18, 1941, the day after trial, when the

Times-Dispatch reported that Sheriff Priddy declared a closing law moratorium: 25
While no official announcement was made, Sheriff Sumpter Priddy
said he did not plan to make any arrests for Sunder [sic, Sunday?] beer selling
until the [Francisco] case is finally decided by the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. Judge Bazile and the Commonwealth's Attorney Simpkins indicated
their approval of this procedure. 26
The Sheriff's announced intent to not enforce closing laws seems unusual. Imagine,
for instance, if he had refused to make arrests consistent with local judicial rulings on robbery or murder until an appeals court approved. Public protests would have been expected.
In any event, he cared not for this prosecution, either for reasons his son advised in undersigned's letter, Exhibit "H", or those inferred from the transcript, Exhibit "C".
Whatever the Sheriff's motives, the above-quoted Times-Dispatch October 18, 1941
article amounted to a challenge to the other officials named to oppose his abstention from

25

The second corroboration was his trial testimony; see nn. 79-80, this Chapter, infra, and accompanying text.

26

Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 18, 1941, "Hanover Verdict Bans Sale of
Sunday Beer As Blue Law Violation; Judge Bazile's Decision Based Upon 24-Year-Old
Court Ruling," 1, footnoted quotation in text is at continuation page 10.
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closing law prosecutions. The Sheri.fr was refusing to enforce the closing law as the prosecutor had urged it was written and as the Judge had ruled it meant. This constituted unusual defiance his part. Yet the article closed stating that prosecutor and judge "indicat[ed]
their approval ... ," acquiescing to his seeming defiance, also unusual.
The Times-Dispatch provocatively recycled the story the next day, October 19, 1941,
as if daring the Judge and prosecutor to contest it:
SheriffPriddy was quoted in yesterday's Times-Dispatch as saying he
did not plan to make any arrests for Sunday beer selling until the Francisco
case is finally decided by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and it was
considered probable that the sherifrs promise had been taken by the licensees as an assurance that they can remain open. No licensee will be arrested
for selling beer on Sunday unless some citizen swears out a warrant such as
was done in the Francisco case[,] the sheriff explained. 27
The Sheriff, accordingly, had slightly modified his stand: He now would arrest licensees who
were alleged closing-law violators only if a citizen "swears out a warrant."28 That is, he will
not allow closing law prosecutions based on observations by deputies during regular duty, as
he did concerning other law violations, unless Francisco is affirmed.
Thus, late Sheriff Priddy suggested to his son that he was pressured by Hanover
County Supervisor Johnson to prosecute Francisco to competitively advantage Johnson's
daughter. Of the three complaining witnesses who made the Francisco Sunday beer purchases two met at Johnson's to do so (picking up the third on the way), and two were John-

27

Times-Dispatch, October 19, 1941, "Methodists Praise Ruling on Beer Ban," 16.

28

That is, the same way the Francisco prosecution was filed.
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son's tenants. 29 These facts support viewing Johnson as Francisco 's initiator, plus his
attending the trial. Conversely, the Sheriff's reluctance to rely on Francisco, as reported by
contemporary newspaper accounts, supported his son's recollections in Exhibit "C", of his
father's lukewarm view of the Francisco prosecution.
The trial transcript (Exhibit "C"), however, also allowed an inference that the

Francisco prosecution was motivated by a variant of Exhibit "H" (undersigned's letter), as
brought out by complaining witness William Nichols' testimony: 30
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

You operate a store yourself, don't you?
We operate a grocery store.
About how far from Mr. Francisco?
About three miles, around three miles to the west.
You are a competitor, are you?
Sir?
You are a competitor?
No, sir.
Not a competitor within three miles of him?
My wife operates the store in her own name. I haven't anything to do
with it.
Well, your wife is a competitor of Mr. Francisco's?
No, sir, we don't consider it that way. That has been our home down
there for about 26 years, a long time before he [Francisco] came to
Hanover County. 31

Nichols, despite denying his wife's being Francisco's "competitor," testified to facts
showing the contrary: His wife solely owned a store only three miles from Francisco's. He

29

On this point, however, seen. 57, this Chapter, infra, and accompanying text.

30

The Francisco complaining witnesses were Charlie Williams, Conway Cauthorne
and William J. Nichols, "Indictment for Misdemeanor," Ex "C", Petition, 20.
31

Ibid, 40.
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was a County "special officer"32 overseeing Sunday beer purchases at Francisco's as a prelude
+to prosecution. 33 He was logically motivated to economically advantage his wife as a store
owner not open on Sunday by collecting evidence for this prosecution against a competing
store owner (Francisco) who was open and selling beer on Sunday. 34
The parallels, described above, of the Exhibit "C" transcript story with Sheriff
Priddy' s account in Exhibit "H", also expose differences: Both describe Francisco arising to
benefit a competing female store owner. If she was Johnson's daughter, however, as the
Sheriff said, that would have been widely known and would have dominated the trial testimony, which it did not (there was no mention of any such relation); just as Johnson's relation
to this prosecution, in contrast, did dominate earlier-quoted, cross-examination. 35
Thus, two plausible and somewhat similar stories36 emerge of Francisco's origin,
neither completely consistent with the other, and each with documentary support. Under
such circumstances, eminent constitutional historians warn: "The German historian Leopold

32

Ibid, 36.

33

Ibid, 38.

34

Ibid, 36.

35

See n. 6, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. Although Johnson was not
County Supervisor during Francisco (see n.9, this Chapter, and accompanying text), he
still may have had political influence, leading to his Francisco involvement before appointed
Supervisor. It could well be that those recalling the trial, because of Johnson's local
prominence, incorrectly remembered his being a Supervisor before Francisco.
36

The word "stories" here is not used to denigrate, nor to imply that "story" means
fiction. "Story" here-means a coherent account based on reasonably reliable information.
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von Rank.e's exhortation ... to determine 'wie es eigentlich gewesen' ('how it actually was')
is noble and human, but at times futile." 37 Attempts here to learn "how it actually was" about

Francisco's origin may not quite be "futile," but they do present difficulties, with no clear basis to prefer one story over the other.
It seems reasonable, however, to consider common threads in both stories as the

closest approximation of "how it actually was." Thus: both the transcript (Ex "C") and
Sumpter Priddy's recollections (Ex "H") described Francisco's store competing with a
female-owned store as causing the prosecution. Both stories also involved County Super visor Joseph Johnson. His involvement could be, in Priddy's version (Ex "H"),

because he

was the female store owner's father; or because, in the transcript version (Ex "C"), as an
important County political figure, he was consulted due to complaining witness Nichols, the
female store owner's husband, seeking Francisco's prosecution. 38 Both versions have common
themes of commercial competition as a prosecution motive and Johnson's importance in
bringing that motive to fruition. This is probably as close as one can come, from the record
here assembled, to the "real" reasons for the Francisco prosecution.
What is noteworthy about commercial-competition as Francisco's supposed motivation, is not its novelty, but its frequency. Two of four landmark closing-law cases col-

37

Henry J. Abraham & Barbara A. Perry, Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and
Liberties in the United States, 6th ed (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), 42.
38

Francisco does not show Nichols speaking to Johnson, but Johnson certainly
seemed involved, given the complainants were his tenants and his home was their rendezvous for the beer purchases (See nn. 6 - 7, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text).
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lectively reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in 1961, Gallagher v Crown Kosher

Super Market, Inc, 39 and Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v McGinley, 40 reflected
commercial rivalry similar to Francisco, 41 according to Sister Candida Lund's research.
In Crown Kosher Super Market, 42 she found, a grocery chain, following its stockholders' religious convictions, closed its Springfield, Massachusetts, store at sundown Friday, reopening on Sunday, thus violating the state closing law. In Crown, Springfield police
chief/plaintiff Gallagher, refused "reporters the names of those" seeking arrests of Crown's
employees. "The answer ... could be found in the small kosher butchers," who "wished to

39

366 U.S. 617 (1961).

40

366 U.S. 582 (1961).

41

The Supreme Court reviewed, besides Crown Kosher and Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, the cases Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) and McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In all four the Court held Sunday closing laws enforceable
for the secular purpose of affording workers a weekly rest day, regardless of religious
persuasion, and thus did not offend US Const, amend. XIV. Justice Frankfurter wrote an
encyclopedic concurring opinion in McGowan, 366 U.S. 420 at 459-581 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring, joined by Harlan, J.) historically reviewing Sunday closing laws in Britain and
the United States, citing Francisco as one of "the large majority" state court examples of
considering closing laws as "having either an exclusively secular function or ... accomodating both ... civil and secular needs.... ,"ibid at 497, n. 82. Justice Frankfurter also reviewed closing laws in Roman times, and in England, ibid at 470-483, and English colonial
times in Virginia, ibid at 484-486, 492-496, 549 (Part ofAppendix I of his opinion) and thencurrent Virginia closing law provisions (part of Appendix II of his opinion).
42

Sister Candida Lund, "Religion and Commerce, The Sunday Closing Cases," The
Third Branch of Government: 8 Cases in Constitutional Politics, a Harcourt Casebook
in Political Science, C. Herman Pritchett & Alan F. Westin, ed. (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1963), 277. Lund examined court records and briefs, interviewed police
and counsel, and reviewed newspaper files, supported by an American Association of
University Women fellowship, ibid. at 308, for material not in the appellate opinions.
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work a five-day week but were disturbed by the competitive advantage that Crown Market had
through . . . staying open on Sunday . . . ." She discovered they were the complainants
against their Crown co-religionists.43
The Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown closing law prosecution, Sister Lund discovered, was "[s]imilar to Crown in ... economic motivation.... "

Two Guys aggres-

sively price-competed through "low rental, ... large ... parking lot, centralized warehousing ... , computer inventory ... , volume purchasing, low advertising, spare decor, ...
almost total absence of ... service," and doing Sunday business. The Hess department store
chain threatened Sunday sales also, she said, but it became "apparent that Hess took this step
to give [the] District Attorney ... opportunity to act." When he, in response, announced he
would prosecute, Hess advertising made its sentiment clear: "Our Hats Are Off to District
Attorney Paul McGinley for his Dynamic Action Against Sunday Selling. " 44
The Connecticut Court of Common Pleas similarly discovered patterns of privatecitizen complaints initiating closing law prosecutions for commercial advantage. On this basis,
it held its state's closing law unconstitutional because, said the court, public prosecutors
became "tools of the private interest of the complainants and thus prostitute the State's law
enforcement power to the service of selfish private goals." This unfavorably and unconstitutionally contrasted, the court found, with Connecticut's enforcing the rest of the criminal

43

Ibid at 278-279.

44

Ibid at 283-285.
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code almost exclusively through police investigations and complainants. 45

(8)

Summary of "Dramatis Personae."

Closer examination ofunderlying facts provides a basis to conclude Mr. Francisco was
prosecuted for business competition reasons: A nearby competing female store-owner store
lost business to Francisco's store because he operated on Sunday while she did not. She sought
to disadvantage Francisco by having him prosecuted, with her husband, Nichols, as chief
prosecution witness, the police officer in charge.
The prosecution may have originated because the store owner was the daughter of a
politically powerful Hanover County personality, Joseph Johnson. Alternatively, it may simply be that Johnson, along with the Judge and prosecutor, all major county figures, were
involved through a business-competitor's seeking prosecution. The prosecution's use of
Johnson's tenants as complaining witnesses, his home as a rendezvous for their travel, and
his attendance at trial, all support his involvement. A limited sampling of closing law appeals

before the United States Supreme Court and in Connecticut suggests such closing law
motives were the norm, rather than the exception.
Judge Leon M. Bazile emerged as a principal Francisco figure. He had long Attorney

45

Connecticut [(State of)] v. Anonymous (1976-7), 33 Conn. Supp. 56; 364 A. 2d
244, 246 (Common Pleas, 1976 ). The quotation in the footnoted paragraph is from the
dissent in Playtogs Factory Outlet, Inc v. County of Orange, 57 App. Div. 772 ; 379 N. Y.S.
2d 859, 867 (1976), a New York closing law case, incorporated into Connecticut's
Anonymous (1976-7) as part of the court's opinion. The Connecticut Supreme Court
declared that Anonymous (1976-7), supra, forced the legislature to revise Connecticut's
closing law. Caldor's Inc v Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304; 417 A. 2d 343, 346 (1979).
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General's Office experience briefing closing law cases, some of which were pivotal in

Francisco. 46 He gained political influence by his General Assembly service, presumably aiding
in his judicial appointment. 47
The Judge's inclination to push his own strongly held views was evidenced early in
his career by his vigorous "battles" to convert his fiancee to his Catholic faith. 48 In his midlife
it was again suggested by his 1941 letter to the U.S. Attorney General demanding prosecution
of labor leader John L. Lewis. Near the end ofhis life, his strongly-held racial attitudes caused
implicit comment in a United States Supreme Court opinion. His personality, however, was
illuminated most keenly by his marginal note on his 1941 draft letter to the U.S. Attorney
General, complaining of the latter's lack of"courtesy to acknowledge it,"49 revealing a pride
of status which he strongly felt others should acknowledge.
The Judge's letters to his fiancee analyzing 1916-18 prohibition voting illustrated his
political interest. 50 He plausibly saw opportunity to enhance his status with the prohibition
movement, still powerful in 1941 Virginia, by encouraging the Francisco prosecution. His
efforts to induce filing the case were confirmed by trial testimony. High local interest in

46

See Pirkey, 134 Va. at 715; and Lakeside, 134 Va. at 699, where Leon Bazile's
service as an Assistant Attorney General in each case was noted.

47

This can be inferred from attached Ex "G", Delegate Albert 0. Boschen's letter.

48

Seen. 11, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text.

49

See n. 18, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra, following that footnote.

50

Example extracted inn. 15, this Chapter, supra.
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prohibition was evidenced by Richmond papers first-page coverage of the Methodist
Conference Resolution, commending the Judge's ruling against Sunday beer sales.
Some other persons turned out to be more important than might be expected:
•

The Francisco defense counsels were apparent political opponents of the

Judge. Comments from the Judge's former legislative colleague suggests that their prior
conflicts, at least partly, accounted for their representing Mr. Francisco;
•

Sheriff Sumpter Priddy effectively stopped the use of the Judge's Francisco

closing law ruling. Richmond papers at first were replete with breathless intimations of

Francisco's larger significance in dramatically decreasing Sunday sales. 51 The Sheriff halted
such speculation, however, by deferring such prosecutions pending Francisco's appeal. Press
coverage of his decision was written so as to challenge the Judge and Commonwealth's
attorney to oppose his prosecution moratorium, which they declined to do. Ultimately, of
course, Francisco's supposed wider enforcing of the closing law came to nothing with the
Virginia Supreme Court's reversal of the trial verdict. The high court ruled that whether

51

Examples: (1) Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 18, 1941, front-page, by Overton Jones: "Hanover Verdict Bans Sale ofSunday Beer As Blue Law Violation . .. ,"(a)
"Every ABC licensee in ... Virginia who sells beer on Sunday is guilty of violating the socalled Blue Law, according to a far-reaching verdict in a Hanover County Circuit Court case
... ;" and (b) "[T]he ruling has almost unlimited ramifications since it would appear that
hundreds of articles now sold on Sunday are sold in violation of the blue law [Emphasis in
original]." (2) Richmond News-Leader, October 18, 1941, 1, coverage of Methodist
Convention resolution commending the Judge's Francisco ruling, emphasizing the ruling's
presumed effect on the entire state, 12: "Bazile Will Hear Argument On Blue Law Beer
Verdict; •••• Questions of the legality of Sunday sales of beer and wine, ... in a case that
may be State-wide in its decision [sic], is [sic] still undecided today, while indications point
to an eventual ruling by the Virginia Court of Appeals..... [emphasis in original]."
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Francisco's beer sales were "necessary" on Sunday, and thus exempt from a closing law
prosecution, was the jury's decision, not the Judge's. 52

Prior to the Virginia Supreme

Court's year-later Francisco's decision reversing Judge Bazile's prohibition of Sunday beer
sales, however, it was Sheriff Priddy's refusal to follow the Judge's ruling, as much as
anything else, that drew from that ruling its sting of Sunday labor prohibition.

(c)

More Detailed Examination of Witness Testimony.

In this Chapter 9(c), testimony of various witnesses is further reviewed, to develop
major themes herein.

(1)

Witness William J. Nichols.

Nichols, the first prosecution witness, was a Cpunty "special officer" for closing law
prosecutions. 53 After testifying he saw Francisco selling beer to the other complaining
witnesses on Sunday, Nichols was asked "at whose direction" he went to Francisco's for
"securing evidence." He answered he ''was directed by the Honorable Judge [Bazile] and the
Commonwealth's Attorney to bring evidence in Court."54 Accordingly, the Judge, far from
being a neutral adjudicator, was important in initiating the prosecution, and telling witness

52

Seen. 13, Chapter 2, and supporting text, supra.

53

Attached Exhibit "C", Petition, 36.

54

Ibid, 38. He reconfirmed this to the prosecutor: "Q. You had discussed, Mr. Nichols, ... with the Judge and with me here what you could do to bring a prosecution,
had you not? A. Yes, Sir." Ibid.
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Nichols what evidence to obtain. 55

(2)

Other Complaining Witnesses.

Complaining witness Williams testified that Nichols, as just discussed, drove him
and Cauthorne to Francisco's store for the Sunday beer purchases. 56 Although his testimony
differed slightly from Cauthorne and Nichols,57 all

versions showed the three traveling

55

Conduct like the Judge's in Francisco is today proscribed in Virginia, Rules of
the Supreme Court of Virginia, Section III, "Cannons of Judicial Conduct [effective
1999]," 3B(7), Virginia Court Rules and Procedure - State (n.p.: Thompson-West 2005),
221: "A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications made to the
judge outside the presence of[both] ... parties concerning a pending or impending case ..
. ."(emphasis added) (With exceptions not here relevant). The Supreme Court held, concerning contempt prosecutions by state-court judges: "Fair trials are too important a part
of our free society to let prosecuting judges be trial judges of charges they prefer." In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955). Though Murchison was some years after Francisco, it cited an older cases on this point : Wisconsin ex rel Getchel v. Bradish, 95 Wis.
205, 70 N.W. 172 (1897): Liquor license revocation by town board member who hired minor to make illegal purchase from licensee; held that seriousness of alleged offense "does
not justify members of such board ... prejudicing themselves by ... procuring and abetting
[its] commission ... that they may pronounce judgment on the offender.... " Ibid. Getchel was followed by respected courts, such as in Wilcox v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 210 N.Y. 370, 104 N.E. 624, 627 (1914) (society directors who initiated vigorous
public demands for society member's expulsion, held: disqualified from conducting expulsion hearing). Thus, there was authority for the Judge's removal at the time of Francisco.
At that time, however, Virginia courts were extremely reluctant to recuse judges for such
reasons. For example, in Ewing v. Haas, 132 Va. 215, 223, 111S.E.255 (1923), the judge
supplied to one side only in a case over which he presided, legal authority and proposed
written argument for that side's appellate brief. Held, that while this was "indiscrete, unwise and injudicious" it did not warrant removing the judge from a second case between
the same parties. Therefore, it is unclear if removal could have been obtained in 1941 when
Francisco was tried. No such motion was filed, nor the issue raised on appeal.
56

Exhibit "C", 44.

57

Williams recalled meeting Nichols and Cauthorne at Johnsons, see Ex "C", Peti(continued... )
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together to Francisco's, with at least two of them meet-ing at Johnson's for that trip, with
two of them Johnson's tenants. All versions also agree that they proceeded with the third
witness (Williams) to Francisco's. These events and Johnson's attendance at trial, all
suggested his involvement in Francisco.

(3)

Other Merchant Witnesses.

Local merchant/restaurant-owners testified, for the defense, 58 that most of their
customers ordering meals also ordered beer or wine; that merchants not primarily serving
meals sold a great deal of beer and wine for off-site consumption; that Sundays were a major
sales-day, economically vital; that tourist beer-purchases were substantial, and that no one
arrested them for Sunday beer sales, even with police frequenting their businesses. 59 The

Times-Dispatch, on October 18, 1941, reported "a number of ABC licensees who had sat
through the trial began asking questions as to their right to sell beer this coming Sunday,"60
one of whom shifted from courtroom spectator to defense witness. 61

57

( ••• continued)

tion, see Ex "C", 44. Nichols and Cawthorne, however, testified only the two of them met
at Johnson's, then drove from there to pick up Williams. Ex "C", 38, 49, whereupon
all three traveled in Nichols' car to Francisco's for the beer purchases.
58

Exhibit "C", Petition, lists these witnesses as: I. Keeton, 52-59; Mrs. Mary K.
Winn, 72-75; Robert Stone, 76-79; F. R. Baker, 80-82; and Frank Bradley, 82-85.

59

Examples are in Ex "C", Petition, 76-77 (testimony of Robert Stone); 80-81, ibid,
(testimony ofF.R. Baker).
60

Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 18, 1941, 1, on continuation page 10.

61

See Exhibit "C", Petition, 75, merchant/witness, Mrs. Mary Winn: "Q. [by
(continued ... )
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Presumably these witnesses were called to persuade the jury that Francisco was unfairly singled out for prosecution. 62 Appellate opinions contemporary to Francisco made
clear, however, that supposed closing law selective prosecutions (i.e., charging some with the
offense, but not others) was not a defense. 63 Only later did some courts change this view. 64

(4)

R. K. Turner, ABC Inspector.

R K. Turner, inspector for the "Alcohol Beverage Control Board [ABC]," testified
that of his "own knowledge, approximately 80 percent of the 61 [ABC licensees] in ...
[Hanover] County are selling [beer] on Sunday."65 This was presumably why the supreme
court stated in Francisco that "at least eighty per cent of those licensed to sell beer ... sold

61

continued)
prosecutor] And you, of course, are down here ... tying to save your Sunday business?/ A.
No, sir, I didn't have any idea that I would be called as a witness .... I am operating that
business, and I came here ... as a spectator. I was asked if I would be a witness and I
consented out there.IQ. But you are interested in the outcome?/A. Of course I am interested
in the outcome."
( •••

62

Asking the Judge to rule for the defense on this ground was presumably viewed as
futile, given testimony that he helped plan the prosecution (seen. 54, Chapter 8, supra,
and accompanying text).
63

Arrigo v. Lincoln [(City of)], 154 Neb. 537; 48 N.W. 2d 643, 648 (1950) ("To establish arbitrary discrimination ... , there must be more than a showing that a law or
dinance has not been enforced against others .... Abuse in its enforcement does not affect
its validity [citations omitted].)" The Francisco's Commonwealth appellate brief, Exhibit
"D", 3, also quoted a case so holding: Gallen v. State, 156 Md. 459, 144 Atl. 350, 353
(1929) ("[G]uilt or innocence ... could not ... depend upon ... whether other parties had
been guilty of similar acts without prosecution .... ").
64

See n. 45, this Chapter, and supporting text, supra, as an example.

65

Exhibit "C", Petition, 72.
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it openly on Sundays. •'66 The inspector's unrefuted testimony also seemed intended to portray
Francisco as unfairly singled-out for prosecution. As already noted, this was insufficient
according to legal authority of the time to excuse the defendant, 67 though some later cases
saw things di:fferently. 68
(5)

The M. G. Franciscos, Husband and Wife.

The testimony of defendant M. G. Francisco and his wife about their Sunday beer
sales was essentially undisputed. 69 For ten years they had lived near their store which was
licensed to sell beer. Mr. Francisco made the Sunday beer sales to complaining witnesses
Cauthorne and Williams, he said, along with chewing tobacco and Coca-Cola. He knew that
complaining witness Nichols, a special officer, could see there was no disorder due to beer
sales. Mrs. Francisco described helping at the store from the family's nearby home where six
of their eight children also lived. 70
Unexpected trial humor arose as Mr. Francisco, while describing Sunday beer sales
interjected, "I have sold to a Judge on Sunday," whereupon Judge Bazile expostulated, on

66

Francisco v Commonwealth, 180 Va. at 374.

67

Seen. 63, this Chapter, and supporting text, supra.

68

Seen. 45, this Chapter, and supporting text, supra.

69

Their transcribed testimony is in Ex "C", Petition, the defendant's at 60-67, 69-71
and 79, ibid; his wife's at 67-69, ibid, summarized in paragraph containing this footnote.
70

Exhibit "C", Petition, 68. The oldest Francisco children were out of the home, a
22 year old son in Florida, and an 18 year old daughter in school. The only son at home was
aged 14. Ibid. This, presumably, was T. Waddy Francisco, interviewed via telephone by
undersigned in February 2002; seen. 5, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text.
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the record, "Not this one."71 This was reported in both papers, the News-Leader noting the
Judge's response was ''to the amusement of the courtroom spectators."72

(6)

C. W. Taylor, Clerk, Hanover County Board of Supervisors.

The Times-Dispatch 's Overton Jones gave the clearest account of why Francisco
defense counsel Andrew Ellis sought documentary evidence from the Board of Supervisors,
through testimony from the Board's clerk, C. W. Taylor:

Mr. Ellis sought to bring before the jury ... that on July 1 ... [1941]
the ... Board of Supervisors refused to ... ban ... Sunday sale of beer ... ,
as an additional indication that the ... people of Hanover County considered
beer selling a necessity. Mr. Simpkins [prosecutor] maintained that the
board's action had no bearing ... ; and Judge Bazile upheld that view and
refused to allow [it] . . . before the jury. However, in the absence of the
jurors, the defense inserted in the ... record a statement of the supervisor's
action .... 73
In Francisco, the defense argued that the Board of Supervisors' rejection of requests
to prohibit Sunday alcoholic beverage sales amounted to its agreeing there was an economic
"necessity" for such sales, entitling the defendant to seek jury acquittal on that ground. Judge

71

Ex "C", Petition, 70.

72

News-Leader, October 18, 1941, "Bazile Will Hear Argument in Blue Law Beer
Verdict," 12. The Times-Dispatch, October 18, 1941, 10, also reported this interchange.
The Judge was concerned to clarify that this did not refer to him. ("The Court: Just a minute.
I do not mean to reflect on Mr. Francisco at all, but I do not think I have ever been to his
place.... Q. [By Judge to Francisco] You didn't mean that this Judge [speaking of himself]
- You don't mean this Judge-? A. [by M.J. Francisco] No, I certainly did not. It was a
different Judge. But I have sold to a Circuit Judge." Ex "C", Petition, 70-71.) This shows
the Judge's concern to have nothing he regarded as improper attached to his name.
73

Richmond Times Dispatch, October 18, 1941 [day after trial], supra, 1. The footfootnoted quotation from the article is from its page 10 continuation.
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Bazile denied admission of the Board's records of its action on that subject in July 1941,
produced by its clerk under subpoena. 74 As occurred in Lakeside, however, he allowed the
Defendant to preserve evidence on a separate record apart from the jury, for appellate review

if a conviction occurred. 75 Defendants' use, in closing law cases, of such sophisticated evidence techniques, partly helped explain closing-law defense victories in Lakeside and, as will
be seen, in Francisco as well. In both cases, relatively unique "necessity" claims were advanced, and were more persuasively expounded on appeal through transcribed testimony. 76
The Judge's questions from the bench elicited from the witness, Board Clerk C.W.
Taylor (referencing Supervisors' meeting records to answer), that (1) There were about 75
spectators at the Board meeting considering banning Sunday beer-sales; (2) A majority of
those attending (apparently beer-selling merchants) opposed a sale ban; but (3) That the
written petitions the Board received contained about a thousand signatures favoring a ban. 77

74

Exhibit "C", Petition, 86. The Judge ruled immediately thereafter that the records in question were to be "put in the record," ibid, of the trial, for the appeal.
75

See nn. 75-77, Chapter 7, and accompanying text, supra, discussing use of this
technique in Lakeside (part of Chapter 7(b)(3), supra).
76

In theory, prosecutors also could do this, but not much would usually be gained,
since prosecutorial retrials mostly would be barred on double-jeopardy grounds.
77

Exhibit "C", Petition, 88. Defense counsel asserted these 1,000 signatures were
''[o Jut of twenty-five thousand," ibid, presumably meaning out of a Hanover County population of25,000. However, the 1940 federal County census was only 18,500. Virginia Statistical Abstract (2000)(Charlottesville: Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, Univ. of
Virginia, 1999), Table 16.6C, "Decennial Census Counts for Virginia's Counties and Cities:
1790 - 1990," 64 7. If half the population was under 21, those wanting to ban Sunday beer
sales impressively obtained supporting signatures of over 10% of Hanover County adults.
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The Judge's questioning suggested he was aware, in advance, ofthe answers he was eliciting.
This would be consistent, as earlier discussed, with his interest in analyzing the politics of
prohibition issues. 78

(7)

The Sheriff: Sumpter Priddy.

The Sheriff testified he saw complaining witnesses Williams and Cauthorne purchasing beer from Francisco on a Sunday, but could not recall the date, though he was at
Francisco's "on quite a number of Sundays." He was the last witness. 79
The Sheriff's testimony was unenthusiastic about the prosecution. His testifying for
for the defense was odd as a matter of form. As a law enforcement officer, a Sheriff typically
testified for the prosecution and not, as here, for the defense. This was followed by a
prosecution cross-examination of him with incredulity almost approaching disdain. 80

78

See n. 15; this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra.

79

Sheriff Priddy's testimony, Ex.

80

"C", Petition, 89-91, the quoted phrase at 89.

Extract of prosecutor's cross-examination of Sheriff: "Q. How did you happen to
be visiting Mr. Francisco on two occasions on that Sunday? A. I went ... in Louisa County,
just over the line, ... and when I came back I stopped by Mr. Francisco's. Q. You stopped
on the way up? A. I didn't stop on the way up.? Q. You said you visited him on two
occasions? A. I said I slowed up when I went by; I didn't stop. Q. You didn't stop, but you
stopped when you came back? A. I stopped when I came back. Q. You just stopped in there
as you would ... any other place? A. Yes, sir. Q. Didn't stop for any purpose other than to
buy the Coca-Cola? A. Well, I was riding around ... the County. I stop any time ... to see
if everything is quiet, and no drunks riding around. Q. Then you did stop under your duties
as Sheriff to see ifeverything was orderly? A. Well, I do most everywhere ... in line of duty.
Q Had you had any request by anyone to stop there? A. No, sir. Q. Or to observe that place
for orderliness or disorderliness on Sundays? A. No, sir. Q. Had one at all from anyone? A.
No, sir. [ending trial testimony]" Exhibit "C", Petition, 90-91 (emphasis added). This was
(continued ... )
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The Sheriff's professed non-recall of the "exact date" of the Sunday beer purchases
bordered on the disingenuous. 81 As an experienced law enforcement officer, he would know
that if he could not testify to the purchase's "exact date," he was not supporting the state's
criminal charge. This was because the indictment specified a date, Sunday, September 7,
1941, when the unlawful Sunday "labor" of beer-selling occurred. He admitted his presence
at Francisco's when the complaining witnesses purchased the beer, but did not give the date.
He easily could have refreshed his recollection before testifying merely by asking the date of
purchase from any complaining witness. Since he had observed the purchases, in this way he
also could have testified as to its date. Yet his testimony suggested (but did not expressly
state), that he could not do so.
The Sheriff's withdrawn manner and ineffectual testimony, however, were consistent
with his unwilling involvement in a prosecution initiated merely to commercially advantage
a local merchant, as can be inferred from his son's recollections in Exhibit "H". This also
agreed with the Sheriff's public stance of not relying on Francisco for other closing-law

80

( ••• continued)
not a particularly '':friendly'' prosecutorial cross examination of the Sheriff. It also showed the
Sheriff was not advised in advance on the plans for the September 7, 1941 Francisco
prosecution beer purchases. Nichols' testimony showed, to the contrary, that the prosecutor
and Judge were informed, and discussed with him what to do '"to bring a prosecution" and
"bring evidence to Court" in Francisco, ibid at 38-40.
81

The sheriff testified, answering defense counsel's questions: "Q. Did you have occasion to be in Mr. Francisco's store or filling station on Sunday, September 7, 1941? A. I
don't remember the exact date, but I was there on quite a number of Sundays. Q. Do you
recall seeing Mr. Cauthorne or Mr. Williams come in and purchase a bottle of beer on any
Sunday that you were there? A. Yes, sir." Ex "C", Petition, 90 (emphasis added).
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prosecutions unless affirmed by Virginia's high court.

(d)

The Judge's Francisco Closing Law Ruling.

This Chapter 9(d) contrasts Judge Bazile's Francisco Sunday beer-sale ruling
reported in the press, with what the trial record shows the Judge actually ordered. What is
learned is that the most newsworthy aspects of this ruling did not appear in the trial transcript. The jury, first of all, only knew of the Judge's instructions to them: 82
Note [by court reporter]: At this point the Court read
to the jury Instruction No. 1
[INSTRUCTION NO. I]

83

[The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from
the evidence ... beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
M. G. Francisco did keep open . . .on Sunday the Jib of
September in Hanover County a business for the sale of beer
and did on said Sunday sell beer, they should find him guilty
and fix his punishment at a fine of not less than five dollars.]
Note [by court reporter]: Following a discussion with counsel,
the Court addressed the jury as follows:
The Court: .... Now, if you believe ... beyond a reasonable doubt
that he [defendant M. G. Francisco] sold beer on Sunday, then you
must find him guilty, and five dollars will be a sufficient fine ..... 84

82

Although referred-to as the "Judge's" instructions, they were actually proposed by
Commonwealth's Attorney Simpkins and approved by the Judge.

83

This Instruction No. 1 [in brackets] is set forth in the text, exactly as the court reporter's ''Note," quoted above the instruction, says the jury actually heard it at trial.
84

Attached Ex "C", Petition, 92
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Mr. Francisco, the defendant, never disputed the Sunday beer sales, but claimed a
prosecution exemption due to the closing law's ''necessity" exception. The Judge's instructions, however, cut off that ''necessity" defense. Thus, as Francisco stated, "a verdict of
guilty necessarily followed, " 85 because eliminating the "necessity" issue left nothing to decide.
The jury's deliberations were, accordingly, virtually non-existent, as the court reporter
described: "After staying out five minutes the jury knocks" and announced its verdict that:
"'We, the jury, find the accused guilty ... and fix his punishment at a fine of $5.00. "'86
Following in the transcript (Ex "C") after the just-quoted instructions, were defenserequested instructions the Judge refused. 87 They all expressly or impliedly assumed a "necessity'' defense, absent from the Judge's instructions.. Nevertheless, nowhere in the transcript,

88

was there any ruling by the Judge ''that sale of beer on Sunday violates Virginia's

blue laws," as the News-Leader, for example, claimed he decided. 89

85

Francisco, 180 Va. at 174 (emphasis added).

86

Exhibit "C", Petition, 93. The Judge eliminated the fine's amount as an issue by
by instructing "$5.00 will be a sufficient fine," ibid (maximum was $500, see, 92, ibid).
87

Attached Ex "C", Petition, 94-97.

88

The Judge certified in Ex. "C", Petition, 97, that the transcript "is a true and
correct stenographic copy . . . of all the testimony and evidence ... including all of the
instructions requested, given, and refused and objections and exceptions .... [a]s well as all
questions raised,[and] rulings thereon ... in the trial .... " Ibid, 98.
Quotation in footnoted sentence is from part of the following in the October 18,
1941 News-Leader, 1: "The Virginia Methodist Conference ... adopted a resolution hailing
'with joy' Judge Bazile's decision that sale of beer on Sunday violates Virginia's blue laws."
There also was nothing in the transcript, resembling a similar first sentence in Times(continued... )
89
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The Judge's instructions to the Francisco jury earlier quoted herein, stated that in this
particular case, if the jury believed "Francisco did keep open ... on Sunday the 7th of
September in Hanover County a business for the sale ofbeer and did on said Sunday sell beer,
they should find him guilty. " 9°Further, the Judge, as already discussed, refused instructions
permitting the jurors to acquit the defendant on "necessity" grounds." 91

Thus, the jury

never heard, in the recorded trial transcript, anything concerning exempting defendant's beer
sales as a closing law "necessity." That the Judge's Francisco jury instructions lacked any
reference to the closing law "necessity" exception, however, did not also mean, under thencontrolling case law, that the "necessity" exemption, due to the Judge's ruling, was barred

in every Sunday sale in the state. This approach was expressly rejected in the Virginia
Supreme Court's 1922 Pirkey opinion.92
The Judge well knew this because, in 1922, he had been an Assistant Attorney General
briefing that court in Pirkey, and included Pirkey 's holding on this point in his Francisco

89

( ••• continued)

Dispatch, October 18, 1941, 1: "Hanover Verdict Bans Sale of Sunday Beer as Blue
Law Violation: Every ABC licensee in the State of Virginia who sells beer on Sunday is
guilty of violating the so-called Blue Law, according to a far-reaching verdict in a Hanover
County Circuit Court case yesterday."
90

See n. 83, this Chapter, and accompanying text.

91

See n. 85, this Chapter, supra.

92

See nn. 55-60 Chapter 7, supra, and supporting text, supra, discussing this point.
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"Opinion of the Court."93 Pirkey recognized alternatives could arise of either so much
evidence that no reasonable juror could doubt the "necessity," thereby excepting prosecution
under the exemption; or so little evidence that no reasonable juror could conclude "necessity" existed. Either alternative precluded submitting the issue to ajury. 94 However, if the
"necessity" evidence was between these two extremes, Pirkey held, a defendant was entitled
to a jury decision. 95
The first evidence in the appellate record ofthe trial Judge, Leon Bazile, ruling at trial
leveL to unequivocally bar Sunday liquor sales, denying defendants any recourse to the
closing law "necessity" exception, was when his "Opinion of the Court" stated in part:
[H]ow can it be said that the sale of beer on ~unday is a work of necessity
or capable of being made such? The vendor of beer cannot show that its sale
on Sunday is necessary to save himself from serious or unexpected loss or that
its sale on Sunday is necessary to save the public from unusual discomfort or
inconvenience. 96
This accords with the Judge's supposed ruling during the Francisco trial, as the Times93

Leon Bazile was listed as an Assistant Attorney General briefing in Pirkey, 134
Va. 713, 715 and Lakeside, 134 Va. 696, 699. For Judge recognizing Pirkey and Lakeside
did not hold that Sunday sales always barred by the closing law, see his "Opinion of the
Court," Exhibit "C", Petition, 28: "The decisions in Pirkey . .. [and] Lakeside . .. involved
acts about which fair-minded men might reasonably differ as to whether ... [it, sic] was a
work of necessity [emphasis added]." (Judge held Pirkey and Lakeside not controlling,
because not specifically permitting Sunday beverage sales).
Seen. 60, Chapter 7, supra, where this rule from Pirkey is quoted. The Judge also
quoted it in his later, January 19, 1942, "Opinion of the Court" in Francisco. Exhibit"C",
Petition, 24 and 28 (date of Opinion at 34, ibid).
94

95

Ibid.

96

Exhibit "C", Petition, "Opinion of the Court," 27.
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Dispatch and News-Leader both reported on the day following the trial. The "Opinion" from

which it was quoted, however, was dated January 14, 1942, almost four months later. 97
Thus, it was not available at the time of the Francisco jury verdict on October 17, 1941, nor
the day after, when the Richmond papers first-claimed the Judge so-ruled, 98 so they could
not have based their reporting on it.
Even though Francisco attorney arguments were not transcribed, all the Judge's
rulings following those arguments were in the transcript. 99 None of them declared the Virginia Sunday closing law barred Sunday beer sales without exception, as a reference to the
attached transcript (Exhibit "C") will show. The only other source of information for the
press about the judge's rulings would be statements by .lawyers or the Judge during arguments
before the court. The most lengthy ofthese arguments was over jury instructions, commencing immediately after testimony of the last witness (Sheriff Sumpter Priddy) was concluded. 100 The news reports revealed that the interchanges between defense counsels and court
at times became heated. JOI Nevertheless, it is plausible that during these arguments the Judge

97

Ibid, 34. The Opinion is at 22-34 of Petition, Exhibit "C".

98

See n. 89, this Chapter, supra.

99

Seen. 88, this Chapter, supra, quoting the Judge's certification in the appeal papers that all his rulings in Francisco were set forth in the trial transcript.
JOO
Exhibit "C", Petition, 91, shows the conclusion of Sumpter Priddy's testimony
and the court reporter's characteristic notation "Here followed extended argument on
instructions." showing the commencement of jury-instruction argument.
101

For example, the News-Leader reported defense attorney Ellis saying that when
(continued ... )
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asserted, as reported by Times-Dispatch writer Overton Jones, "that beer selling on Sunday
is a violation of Section 4570 of the Virginia Code, known as the Blue Law, ... based on a
24-year-old ruling ... in ... Ellis vs. the Town of Covington." That being said, it is critical
to reassert here that nowhere in the October 17, 1941, trial transcript did Judge Bazile unequivocally announce such a rule. This was not accomplished in the trial record until the
Judge filed his January 14, 1942 "Opinion of the Court" announcing such a rule, nearly three
months after the trial ended.
It is hard to believe that the Richmond newspaper reporters and their editors, and le-

gal counsel presumably advising them, were unaware that their October 18 and 19, 1941,
articles describing the Judge's ruling did not match the trial record. One can only speculate
that the Judge either gave the reporters private assurances of his later issuing a written
opinion, as he ultimately did; or that they were sufficiently certain, without his express
promises, that he would do so. For either reason, their articles treated his formal opinion as
completed, even though the Judge only published it months later, and even though this
conditionally-future nature of the Judge's ruling banning Sunday beer sales was not revealed
in the Richmond papers' press-reports of the Francisco trial.

101

( ••• continued)
Ellis v Covington (at n. 17, Chapter 7, supra) was decided, "Virginia was under the sway
and rule of religious fanatics and bigots, 'to which Judge Bazile volunteered, 'racketeers and
crooks as well ... ,"'News-Leader, October 18, 1941, 12 (not in trial transcript, Exhibit
"C", Petition, because it was part ofuntranscribed attorney argument).
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(e)

Judge Bazile's January 19, 1942, "Opinion of the Court" and its Treatment by the Virginia Supreme Court.

Judge Bazile's January 19, 1942, "Opinion of the Court," occupied twelve printed
pages of the appellate record. 102 Reflecting extensive research, it was the centerpiece for his
view, shared with many Virginians of prohibitionist or conservative-religious outlook, that
the Virginia closing law absolutely prohibited Sunday beer sales, including M. G. Francisco's
beer sales on Sunday, September 7, 1941. 103
The delay in the Judge's writing the opinion until almost four months after the jury
verdict appeared due to the defense motion at the end ofthe trial to set aside the jury verdict,
on which the Judge ruled argument would be held later. 104 Presumably this generated motions and arguments for some time after the trial, after which the Judge issued his January 19,
1942, "Opinion of the Court," and denying defendant's motion to set aside the jury verdict
on March 16, 1942. 105 Additional argument presumably occurred after that ruling, since the
May, 1942 "Hanover County Criminal Docket," still listed Francisco as "pending on

102

Exhibit "C", Petition, 22-34.

The intensity of prohibitionist views was suggested by accounts of the October
18, 1941 Methodist Conference, whose resolution praised the Judge's supposed (but nonexistent) "ruling" barring Sunday beer sales at the previous day's Francisco trial. One report, for instance, stated the Conference "adopted a resolution approving the decision of
Judge Leon Bazile against the sale of beer and volleyed 'amens' last night as it heard a report calling upon church people to 'make America as dry as the Sahara Desert.'" TimesDispatch, 1, October 19, 1941, "Methodist Praise Ruling on Beer Ban."
103

104

Exhibit "C", Petition, 94.

105

Ibid, 21.
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motion." 106 The last circuit court docket date was July 29, 1942. 107 The defendant's appeal
was filed on September 16, 1942. 108
The Judge's January 11, 1942 "Opinion of the Court" was the fulcrum of the opposition to defendant Francisco's appeal, buttressed by two propositions. First, as to the banning of Francisco's Sunday beer-sales, the Judge relied on Ellis v. Covington, 109 which had
declared the defendant in that case ''plainly could not, though licensed, ply his calling of selling such drinks on the Sabbath day in any way so as to escape liability .... " 110 Asserting El/is decreed unqualified opposition against Sunday sales, the Judge characterized the abovequoted Ellis ruling as "a definite holding by the highest Court of the Commonwealth that the
selling on Sunday of soft drinks pursuant to one's regular business is a violation of the
Sunday law." This meant, the Judge reasoned that, in so many words, no "necessity"
exception applied in Francisco, 111 because he considered beer sales, for purposes of the

106

"Hanover County Criminal Docket, May 1942," Hanover County Circuit Court
Clerk's Office, Commonwealth v. Francisco files. (One of the handful of documents
concerning Francisco remaining in the county clerk's office. Seen. 2, Chapter 8, supra, and
accompanying text.) Attached as Exhibit "I".
107

Exhibit "C" Petition, 19, grant of writ of error (for appeal).

108

Ibid, cover sheet (rear).

122 Va.821, 94 S.E. 154 (1917); discussed at n.17, Chapter 7, supra and accompanying text.
109

I JO

Exhibit "C", Petition, "Opinion," 25, quoting Ellis, 122 Va. at 825.

Ill

Exhibit "C", Petition, "Opinion," 25.

172
closing law, a "similar act" to the soft drink sales in Ellis. 112
The Virginia Supreme Court, however, dismissed Ellis as superficial:
[B]ecause the conduct of such a business was held, as a matter oflaw, not to
be a work of necessity ... in Ellis ... in 1917, it does not necessarily follow
that such a business is to be outlawed in every community in the State,
regardless of the ... present day mode, habits and demands of a particular
community. To adhere to that view is to shut our eyes to the known fact that
the habits, customs, demands and necessities of the people, in some if not all
the communities throughout the State, have undergone a change in the past
twenty five years. 113

Francisco's formulation here almost parallels Frederick Lewis Allen's description of postWorld War I American social change. 114 It mandated a substantial broadening of the closing
law "necessity" exception and threw on the scrapheap holdings like Ellis and Hanger, due
to what the supreme court saw as the "change in the past twenty five years" of the "habits,
customs, demands and necessities ofthe people." A prosecutor seeking to enforce the closing
law under Francisco, faced complex arguments that the Sunday labors prosecuted could be
exempted by a jury as a ''necessity" due to "change" in "some if not all the communities
throughout the state." The Supreme Court had given fair notice that it could find many activities, under this reasoning, exempt from the Sunday closing law. The first supreme court

Ibid, 26. The supreme court agreed with part of the Judge's analysis: "We agree
with the trial court that, in so far as the Sunday law is concerned, the sale of beer cannot be
distinguished in principle from the sale of soft drinks, cigarettes or tobacco." 180 Va. at 3 80.
112

113

Francisco, 180 Va. at 376 and 380.

114

Seen. 20, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text,
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flexing of its procedural muscle to do just that was Francisco itself
The second underpinning to Judge Bazile's opinion concerned the Hanover County
Board of Supervisors not barring Sunday beer sales. This, the defense unsuccessfully argued
at tria4 required a jury-determination of whether defendant should be acquitted for the
Sunday beer-sales due to the closing law's "necessity" exemption. A statute provided that
the county board of supervisors had "authority to ... prohibit ... sale of beer and wine ..
. between.. each Saturday and ... Monday," and that "no provision herein ... shall ...
alter[] ... or repeal[] Section [4570] ... of the Code ofVirginia." 115
The Judge's opinion focused on the last sentence of the above quotation: "[T]he
General Assembly must have concluded that section 4570 ... prohibited the sale ofwine and
beer on Sunday and that it was, by Chapter 129 of the Acts of 1938 merely giving to the
localities the authority, by ordinance, to parallel the existing State law .... 116 Thus, he asserted the above referenced closing law statute (Section 4570) barred Sunday labor. Beer
sales, he correspondingly claimed, could not qualify for the "necessity" exception. Further,
the Judge reasoned, the Board of Supervisors' right to control beer sales on Sunday, granted
by the 1938 enabling Act, was expressly subject to the statutory closing law. Thus, the
Judge's concluded, the Supervisors could not permit Sunday beer and wine sales, because
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Virginia Acts of 1938, p. 194, quoted in Exhibit "C", Defendant's Petition, 12,
further described in the Judge's Opinion as Chapter 129 of the Acts of 1938; ibid at 29.
116

Exhibit "D", Petition, "Opinion of the Court," 32. Section 4570 is, of course, the
Virginia Sunday closing law itself, incorporated by reference into the enabling act, the latlatter act allowing the Board of Supervisors to ban Sunday beer sales.
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that conflicted with the closing law's prohibition of doing Sunday business.
The reason the Francisco opinion reversed the Judge was most clearly explained by
"Mr. Dooley," a mythical Irish-American saloon-keeper (created by syndicated columnist
Finley Peter Dunne a century ago), who "commented on politics and society in a rich Irish
brogue." 117 As "Mr. Dooley" was described as commenting: "A law ...that might look like
look like a wall to you or me wud look like a triumphal arch to th' expeeryenced eye iv a
lawyer." 118 In "Mr. Dooley's" terms, Judge Bazile saw the statutory closing law's
incorporation into the 1938 Act enabling the Board of Supervisors to ban beer sales as a
''wall," barring such Sunday sales. To the contrary, the supreme court held, the closing law
actually contained what Mr. Dooley called the ''triun;iphal arch": its "necessity" exception,
allowing the jury to bar its enforcement. The court explained:
[T]he legislature ... did not intend that the sale of beer on Sunday should be
prohibited,[as] ... shown by ... authoriz[ing] ... localities to fix the hours
between . . . Saturday and ... Monday [when] ... beer and wine ... might
be sold [and a] ... proviso that no such local ordinance shall be construed as
... altering, amending or repealing Code, section 4570 [the closing law]. This
... indicates that the legislature was fully aware that the sale of beer on
Sunday might or might not be a violation of ... section 4570, depending on
the circumstances ... in each locality, under ... Pirkey Bros.... and later
cases. Hence, the ... enabling act was not to validate the sale of beer on
Sunday in a community or locality where it was not a work of necessity
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S.V., "Finley Peter Dunne" (1867-1936), Encyclopaedia Britannica, 4:277 (15th
ed., 1974-1994): Early syndicated columnist, creator of "Mr. Dooley," whose ''witty penetration of shams and hypocrisies" became "a force for clear thinking and tolerance.... "
118

Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, Elizabeth Knowles, ed., 5th ed. (Oxford Univ.
Press 1999), 285:14 [quoting from "Mr. Dooley and the Power of the Press," American
Magazine, 62:607, 607 (1906)].
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within the_meaning of the Sunday law. [ii] [I]f the sale of beer on Sunday was
unlawful ... , [w]hy the necessity of regulating such sale if it be prohibited?
119

Based on the above analysis, the Francisco opinion laid out a new form of jury instruction,
overturning Mr. Francisco's jury-conviction:
In view ofwhat we have said [the contested] ... instruction should be
modified to read as follows:
The court instructs the jury that if they find ... the keeping open by
the defendant of his place of business on Sunday, and the sale therein of beer
... was reasonably essential to the economic, social or moral welfare of the
community, ... then they may find that such work was necessary within the
meaning of the [closing law] statute, and if they so find, they should find the
defendant not guilty.
Thus, incorporating the closing law statute into the

19~8

enabling act, allowing counties to

bar Sunday beer sales, which Judge Bazile concluded prohibited sales on Sunday, the supreme court said showed exactly the opposite. It proved, said the high court, that the legislature allowed local communities to decide that issue themselves. They could, according
to the portion of Francisco above quoted, determine there was no "necessity" for beer sales
at certain times on Sunday, by expressly prohibiting sales at those times. In any event,
concluded the supreme court, had the legislature intended the closing law to absolutely bar
local allowance of Sunday beer sales without exception, it would not have enacted the 1938
enabling act amendment, which provided for the opposite.
It should be noted in passing that what appeared to be the most persuasive argument

Francisco, 180 Va. 371, 381, 382 (including further indented quotation from opinion later on this page).
119
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against the defense contention that the Board of Supervisors records should be considered
by the jury, was made spontaneously by the Commonwealth's Attorney at trial:
Mr. Simpkins: Now, the Commonwealth desires to object ... that the
record of the Board of Supervisors ... does not show any action at all by the
Board. It merely shows a motion and failure of a second, which could show
no action or failure to act on anything ... before the Board . . . . 120
This was precisely, as noted earlier herein when discussing the Virginia Supreme Court's

Crook case, 121 what Abraham Lincoln raised in his Cooper Union speech. Lincoln cautioned
that it is usually difficult to discern any intent from a legislative failure to act, as opposed to
legislative action Francisco's appellate briefing, however, was by the Attorney General's
office (not the local Commonwealth's Attorney), which did not reassert that argument. 122 As
a matter ofsheer logic, however, Mr. Simpkins' above-quoted argument at trial made eminent
sense. The failure ofthe Board of Supervisors to take any action or make any statement about
Sunday beer sal~s, due to lack of a seconding of a motion to do so, could well be argued to
amount to no action by the Board at all.
The Francisco supreme court opinion thus went out ofits way to refute every point
of Judge Bazile's "Opinion of the Court" as has been discussed in Chapter 2 and this

Chapter 8. The high court made it clear that an increasingly wide number of yet-undefined
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Exhibit "C", Petition, 83.
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Seen. 103, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.

Exhibit "D", "Brief on Behalf of the Commonwealth," 2, only says that the enabling Act provides "by special proviso in the Act [that it] does not alter the provision of section 4570 [the closing law]."
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circumstances potentially could constitute a "necessity," 123 entitling the defendant to seek a

jury verdict of exemption from the closing law on that ground.
(t)

Epilogue- End of the Francisco Prosecution.

The News Leader carried a December 7, 1942, page 1 article reporting the supreme
court Francisco opinion reversing, that day, defendant's conviction. 124 Upon remand to the
trial court, the Commonwealth's Attorney, after cogitating most of the ensuing year,
dismissed the case by filing a no/le prosequi motion on September 20, 1943, without
attempting the new trial Francisco authorized. 125 This answers in the negative the second
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Although decrying the inadequacy of past definitions, the court essentially retained them, despite attempting to restate the issues discussed. Thus Francisco asserts, 180
180 Va. 371, 379: "[l]t is difficult to understand how a particular work may be moral and
fit in one community and immoral and unfit in another. And yet, on the other hand, all of the
authorities agree that a particular work may be a necessity in one community and not in
another, depending upon the peculiar circumstances ofthe case." Paraphrasing Justice Potter
Stewart, seen. 33, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text, the Virginia high court justices
knew "necessity" after-the-fact "when they saw it." It was becoming evident that if nude
bathing suppression (Lakeside Inn) or beer sales (.Francisco) could constitute a Sunday
''necessity," according to the supreme court, then just about anything else could be a
''necessity" as well, rendering the term "nearly meaningless," seen. 34, Chapter 4, supra, and
accompanying text.
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News-Leader, December 7, 1942, 1: "Sunday Sale Of Beer Held Not Illegal ..•.
The State Supreme Court today held that the sale of wine and beer in Virginia on Sunday
is not unlawful and remanded the case brought against M.G. Francisco, a Hanover County
merchant, to the Hanover Circuit Court for a new trial ...."
Common Law Order Book #19, Hanover County Circuit Court, 379. Exhibit "J".
Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed), s. v. "nolle prosequi": "[A] formal entry on the record by the
prosecuting officer ... that he will not prosecute the case further. . . . It is a judicial
determination in favor of the accused and against his conviction, but it is not an acquittal, nor
is it equivalent to a pardon. [citing 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 419 at 1(1989)]."
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question first raised in Chapter 2 herein (i.e., whether a new trial was ever held). 126

(g)

Concluding Comments on Francisco.

Many ofthe paradoxes characterizing Sunday closing laws since their inception were
reprised in Francisco. In probably the earliest governmental restricting of Sunday work, the
Edict of Constantine in 321 C.E., agricultural workers, could work on Sunday "lest by
neglecting the proper moment ... the bounty of heaven should be lost." 127 This described, in
a roundabout way, ''necessity" as permitting Sunday labor, a concept still troublesome to
define in Francisco, over 1,600 years later, as its testimony revealed.
Confusion over just what was permitted on Sunday was no doubt exacerbated in Roman times because their "market days", traditionally r.ecurring in an eight to nine day-cycle,
were incorporated into the weekly Christian Sabbath. 128 This made it difficult to determine

if the Sabbath was for "rest" or ''recreation," the latter, of course, giving rise to Sunday
employments to satisfy popular recreational tastes. These were arguably in violation ofclosing
laws, whether that labor be in village fairs in the middle ages 129 or M. J. Francisco dispensing
beer at his store in Hanover County, Virginia on September 7, 1941.
Not so much the closing law itself, but its "necessity" exception, was at the crux of

Francisco. Charles E. Clark, writing of rules in procedural codes, described how "bad or
126

See Chapter 8(a), supra; and n. 16, Chapter 2, supra, and accompanying text.
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Seen. 19, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text.
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See n. 18, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text.
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See n. 25, Chapter 3, and n. 19, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text.
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harsh" decisions "drive out the good, so that in time a rule becomes entirely obscured by its
interpretive barnacles." 130 Similarly, the ostensible closing law ''rule" banning Sunday labor
became "entirely obscured" in Virginia appeals from 1922 to 1942, by its "necessity" exception. Such a "necessity" defense came to the forefront in Francisco when the defendant
learned ofpetitions to the County Board of Supervisors to ban Sunday beer sales. Thereafter,
on July 1, 1941, Super visor Thompson moved that the Board prohibit ''the sale of beer and
wine in Hanover County on Sunday, which received no second and was lost." 131
Defendant's appeal brief almost, but not quite, anticipated the Francisco appeal's
outcome. Key to the supreme court's decision was the Hanover County Board of Supervisors not banning Sunday beer sales, even though it had new authority to do so, due to a
1938 amendment to the enabling act. Francisco's lawyers explained that the significance of
the Board of Supervisors actions was as follows:
[W]hat is or is not a necessity is . . . determined by juries who reflect the
community's opinion .... [A] necessity in one place may not be in another.
Under this [Pirkey] holding ajury ... might say that the sale of beer is not a

°
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Charles E. Clark, "Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes
and Rules," Vanderbilt L. Rev., 3(1950):493, 498.

Exhibit "C", Petition, 86 (Testimony of C. W. Taylor, Clerk, Board of Supervisors, summarizing a "certified copy of the [Board] minutes" which he had been subpoenaed to produce, to which he "refer[red] in the record," and which was, by the Judge's
order, "put ... in the record [for the appeal, but] not for the jury," ibid.) It is interesting,
perhaps almost ironic, that "Supervisor Thompson" in this footnoted sentence, is probably
the same "Supervisor J.M. Thompson" whose death resulted in Judge Bazile's appointing
Joseph z. Johnson as Supervisor in his place. Johnson was extensively discussed in nn. 8 and
35-38, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. See attached Exhibit "E", in the Appendix for the full text for his appointment as a County Supervisor.
131
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. . . necessity, . . . . [or] that it is . . . , in which case the sale would not be
unlawful . . . . Then, ifthat jury did not truly reflect the community's opinion,
[it] ... could be reflected by adoption of a local ordinance by the Board of
Supervisors, making the sale unlawful, regardless of ... the jury.
[Thus] . . . , each locality is now given two opportunities to express the
community's opinion of the ... propriety of selling beer on Sunday, one
though its juries and the other through its duly elected representatives,
whereas it had only one prior to the ... [enabling] Act of 1938. 132
Comparing this portion of defendant's brief with the Francisco holding quoted earlier, 133 the
supreme court went defendant Francisco one better by concluding
the trial court erred in excluding from the jury evidence that the board of
supervisors ... had considered and failed to enact an ordinance prohibiting
the sale of beer on Sunday [which was] ... pertinent and material on whether
the work ofselling beer on Sundays was reasonably essential to the economic,
social or moral welfare of the community. 134
That is, the court went beyond merely holding that the jury could decide if beer sales qualified as a Sunday "necessity." It additionally ruled that in so deciding, the jury could also
infer, at its option, that the Board of Supervisors' not banning Sunday beer sales was evidence the community viewed such sales as a closing law "necessity," exempt from prosecution. In so doing the court engaged in verbal sleight-of-hand, by describing "necessity" in
the immediately preceding quotation135 as "reasonably essential to the economic, social or
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Exhibit "C". Petition, 13 (Defendant's brief to the Supreme Court).

See n. 119, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text, quoting the relevant portion of the Virginia Supreme Court's "necessity" instructions.
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Francisco, 180 Va. 371, 381-382.
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As the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in the portion of its Francisco opinion
(continued ... )
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moral welfare of the community." This gave a far broader meaning to "necessity'' than Judge
Bazile contemplated in his January 19, 1941 "Opinion of the Court":
[H]ow can it be said that the sale of beer on Sunday is a work of necessity or
capable of being made such? The vendor of beer cannot show that its sale on
Sunday is necessary to save himself from serious or unexpected loss or that
its sale on Sunday is necessary to save the public from unusual discomfort or
inconvenience. 136
The practical result of this broader "necessity'' definition was that many more circumstances, based on Francisco, jurors could decide was a closing law "necessity," exempting a defendant from prosecution. Virginia thus conformed to a national trend to more
broadly define closing-law "necessity", so that it became, in the opinion of at least one
scholar, ''virtually meaningless." 137 Indeed, judges in Virginia and elsewhere in the United
States essentially defined "necessity" by paraphrasing, in so many words, Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart: they "knew it when they saw it," 138 but without reasoned analysis.
In plain fact, in Francisco, Hanover County's Board of Supervisors took no action
concerning Sunday beer sales. A motion was made to ban such sales, which died for want of
a second. There was no evidence at trial of any further Board consideration of the issue.
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continued)
quoted at n.119 and accompanying text, this Chapter 8, supra.
( •••

Exhibit "C", Petition, "Opinion of the Court," 27 (Bazile, circuit judge). The
high court's definition of"necessity" was also broader than standard dictionary definitions,
seen. 68, Chapter 9, infra.
136
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See n. 34, Chapter 4, supra.
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Seen. 33, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text.
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Although the supreme court, as already quoted, said the jury could take into account that the
Board "had considered and failed to enact the ordinance" prohibiting Sunday beer sales, that
premise appears mistaken. The Board could not have "considered" a resolution not seconded, because it was never brought before the meeting, an elementary and widely-recognized
parliamentary procedure rule for conducting meetings of businesses and elective bodies. 139
As significant as the problems confronting closing law defendants was the issue of
how someone became such a defendant. Clearly M. G. Francisco was not prosecuted because of Hanover County's abstract desire to prevent Sunday labor. Instead, that prosecution was due to a competing business, closed on Sunday, seeking to advantage itself over
Francisco, who was open on Sunday. Examples were_given from other jurisdictions of closing laws being used for commercial advantage, similar to what was found in Francisco. 140
The Francisco press coverage clearly reported that the Sunday commercial activity
was expected to significantly decline if Judge Bazile's opinion was actually enforced state-
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See The Scott Forseman Robert's Rules of Order, newly revised, 9th ed., Henry
M. Robert Ill, William J. Evans and James W. Cleary, ed. (n.p.: Scott Forseman, 1990), 3435: "After a motion has been made, ... [i]fno member seconds the motion ... the chair says,
'The motion [or 'resolution'] is not seconded; or, 'Since there is no second, the motion is not
before the meeting."' Ofcourse, Roberts Rules ofOrder could not prevail against the state's
highest court holding, as in Francisco, that the jury could consider the Board of Supervisors' failure to act as evidence of a community determination of beer sales as a Sunday
"necessity." The Rules, however, show how contrary the court's interpretation was to longestablished meeting procedure rules. Although the rule is more detailed in the above 1990
version, the same general result is suggested in General Henry M. Robert, Robert's Rules of
Order Revised (Chicago: Scott-Forseman, 1943), 36-37.
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See nn. 39 - 45, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text.
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wide. The Times-Dispatch the day after the trial, for example, stated "hundreds of articles
now sold on Sunday are sold in violation of the blue law" if the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed that ruling .141

The closing law's, intent to regulate social conduct by banning Virginia Sunday labor,
was not achieving its goal in 1941. 142 Actual public behavior was markedly different from the
norm the statute sought to enforce. Thus, as in Francisco, the comparatively few prosecutions brought probably had an impetus other than a benign desire for uniform suppression of
Sunday labor, most likely a commercial advantage sought by a business rival. 143

141

Seen. 51 [subdivision (l)(b) therein (dated October 18, 1941)], this Chapter.

142

As de Tocqueville observed, "public opinion, much stronger than the law," made
Sunday work-suspension effective. See n. 20, Chapter 6, supra, and that opinion was
changing in 1941 Virginia.
143

Arguably, too much weight concerning a hidden business-competition motive for
closing-law prosecutions was drawn from Francisco alone. However, (1) Indications of
wider problem concerning commercial business-competition motives were discussed, see nn.
42-45, supra, and accompanying text; and (2) The Francisco court, by disclosing the vast
numbers not being prosecuted for closing law violations, (see n. 66, supra, and accompanying text), recognized that (a) unfair selective prosecution was occurring; and (b) since
directly voiding a prosecution for that reason was proscribed by current law, (seen. 63, supra,
and accompanying text), (c) reached the same result indirectly through holdings like
Francisco, making closing law prosecutions more difficult. [All referenced footnotes are in
this Chapter.]·
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CONCLUDING ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS.

Laws requiring cessation of labor on the primary day of weekly religious observances, Sunday in traditionally Christian nations ("Sunday closing laws"), were characteristic

in many States of the United States, including Virginia, until relatively recently. The freq_uency of this practice paralleled confusion about its origins and purposes, still-apparent in
VirQinia closing-law litigation in Francisco in 1942, when this thesis concludes.
Judeo-Christian tradition ascribed a religious basis for the seven-day week and its
recurring primary religious observance on one day ofthat week, commanded by the He brew
deity. Labor also was to cease that day, the deity reportedly commanded, to commemorate
the deity's day of rest following six days spent creating the universe. 1
Confusion, however, about this seemingly straightforward biblical explanation arose,
first, from another Bible passage ascribing Israel's escape from Egyptian bondage as the
origin ofthe week's seventh day rest, not the universe's divine creation. 2 Second, scholars
learned the Babylonian Empire, while dominating Israel, had a new-moon, mid-month,
religious-day celebration, spawning three other similar religious days spread through each
month; each approximately seven days apart from any the of other such days (including the
mid-month celebration). Work ceased on each such day. These four special days were called

shabbutu meaning ''rest" to the Babylonians, obviously similar to the later Hebrew sabbath

Seen. 7, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text.
2

See n. 9, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text.
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for the Jewish weekly religious-observance day, 3 suggesting the latter was derived from the
former. These days of "shabbutu" which the Babylonians feared (except at mid-month),
however. contrasted with the joy accorded the biblical sabbath. This created a basis for
confusion about whether dread or joy was to be associated with the sabbath, among the
earliest ofmanv such confusions about its purpose.4
Christianity's derivation from Judaism created more sabbath confusion. The reputed
spring resurrection of its namesake on a Sunday (now Easter Sunday) caused Christians to
shift their weekly sabbath to Sunday. Since this occurred within the Roman Empire, a wide
venue was provided to disseminate this new religion. It also expanded, in part, due to a
newly common acceptance of the seven-day week.. Traditional Roman ''market days,"
recurring every eight-to-nine days, were incorporated into Sunday. This likely increased
confusion, present in Francisco, of whether "rest" of the Old Testament sabbath or
"recreation" of the Roman market days, was to occur on Sunday. 5
Christianity's widening acceptance presumably influenced Roman Emperor Constantine's 321 C.E. decree to suspend work on ''the venerable day of the sun;" exempting
agricultural workers, however, "lest ... the bounty of heaven may be lost. " 6 The early
European Middle Ages lacked consensus about whether Christian Sunday sabbaths required
3

See n. 5, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text.

4

See n. 3, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text.

5

See nn. 12, 16 and 18, Chapter 3, and accompanying text.

6

Seen. 19, Chapter 3, and accompanying text.
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the same work cessation as the original Hebrew sabbaths. 7 Work restrictions, however,
gradually became increasingly enforced in England and continental Europe. 8
England's views on Sunday work regulation after English King Henry VIII's 1533
confiscation of the English Catholic Church were influenced by a developing Puritan ideology. English Puritans, increasingly dominant in government and church, saw the Sunday
sabbath as critical preparation-time to assure a better secular Kingdom on earth and more
likely salvation thereafter. The protestant work-ethic reemphasized Sunday's importance for
rest and reflection, to better prepare for even more diligent work on the week's other six
days. All this fed into a Puritan dislike of Sunday sportive play, also encouraging government Sunday regulation, to assure worship was conducted and attended, without the interference of labor or recreation. 9
After the Virginia colony's foundering start from 1607 to 1610, its proprietors thereafter applied, among other things, Puritan strictures against Sunday secularism, to improve
the discipline and through it, the performance, of the colonists. Church attendance was
required. enforced by guards locking settlement gates and searching non-church buildings for
shirkers during worship services. 10

This severe discipline impeded immigration, which the proprietors sought to over7

Seen. 25, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text.
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Ibid.

9

See nn. 4 - 19, Chapter 4, supra.
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See n. 20, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text.
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come by creating a an elected colonial assembly. The resulting "House ofBurgesses," though
manipulated by upper classes, reflected self-government unusual for its time. 11 Review of its
legislation shows the importance colonists placed on regulation of Sunday labor and worship.12 The difficulty with laws prohibiting Sunday work, however, as events (including the

Francisco case) would show, was not so much that general rule; but rather how to define
exceptions so essential work could be performed on Sunday, despite the general prohibition.
The result was unremitting tension between heaven's perceived mandates against sabbath
work, contrasted with an earthly reality that certain work could not be deferred, despite
closing-law dictates. The shorthand description of the type of Sunday work allowed was
embodied in the statutory term ''necessitie" the Burg~sses used 13
As a practical matter, the closing law "necessity" exception to Sunday work (and its
first-cousin "charity" exception as well), to a significant degree, swallowed up the general
rule that Sunday work was not allowed. As the years progressed, reviewing courts deemed
a continually wider range ofconduct to satisfy the ''necessity" exception, rendering the term
"nearly meaningless. " 14 The metaphorical handwriting leading to this conclusion was clearly
on the wall in 1942 when Francisco was decided. Indications ofthe problem, however, were
already visible in the colonial era, when prominent landowners considered themselves
11

12

See n. 23, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text.
Ibid, n. 24, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text.

13

See n. 30, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text.

14

Seen. 34, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text.
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compelled to work on Sunday, searching for new lands to replace plantations worn out by
soil-destroying tobacco farming. 15
America's independence resulted in the Declaration oflndependence and Virginia's
1776 Constitution declaring Virginia free from prior connections with Britain. 16 Virginia postrevolutionary legislation voided all English religious regulation statutes. 17 At about the same
time, Virginia enacted, in its 1776 "Declaration of Rights," provisions for religious freedom.
Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom18 was adopted on January 16,
1786. 19 Leaving aside scholarly disagreements on its meaning, 20 its text says that ''no man
shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship," nor be "restrained, molested or burthened ... on account of his religious opirµons," but "shall be free to profess, and

by argument to maintain ... opinions in matters ofreligion"21 without diminishing one's "civil

15

See n. 40, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text.

16

See n. 2, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text.

17

Seen. 3, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text.
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A Jefferson biographer called this enactment the "Bill for Religious Freedom" before adoption, and "Statute for Religious Freedom" thereafter, Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation, 141. Jefferson's self-written epitaph called it the "Statute of
Virginia for religious freedom," n. 1, Chapter 1, supra, herein.
19

Details of its adoption are set forth in n. 20, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying

text.
20

See n. 11, Chapter 5, supra

21

Seen. 17. Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text.
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capacities." This fairly seemed to preclude, or at least discourage, governmental reliance on,
or regulation or support ot: any religion.
A little over ten months later, in contrast, the legislature enacted the first postrevolutionary Sunday closing law, imposing monetary forfeiture on one who, on Sunday, "be
found labouring at his own or any other trade or calling ... in labour or other business except
. . . work of necessity or charity." 23 These provisions were relatively unchanged from 1786
through the Francisco 1942 appellate decision with which this thesis concludes.
At the least, the closing law seemed to contradict major assumptions of Jefferson's
religious freedom statute. The closing law "restrained" citizens from ignoring Sunday's
mandated rest. ·If they did not do so, they were stat:utorily "diminish[ed]" in their "civil
capacities," through forfeitures. 24 Remarkably, research of Julian Boyd, editor of a major
Thomas Jefferson document compilation, revealed that Jefferson, drafter of the Virginia
Statute of Religious Freedom, also either drafted or approved Virginia's closing law. 25
Jefferson's virtually simultaneous proposal of two such philosophically contradic22

Ibid.

23

Ibid.

24

Ibid. The quotations in the paragraph are from Jefferson's Religious Freedom
Statue, as quoted two paragraphs before the footnoted paragraph.
25

See n. 24, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text. Jefferson chaired a legislative committee tasked to formulate new legislation required by the Revolution. Jefferson himself drafted much of this legislation and, as Committee chair, reviewed virtually
all the rest. The legislation was presented to the legislature in 1779, but not adopted until
the Revolution was over in 1785-1786. Seen. 20(3), Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying
text.
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tory statutes is puzzling.26 His statute for religious freedom eloquently decried government
interference with or support ofreligion In contrast, Virginia's Sunday closing law mandated
ceasing Sunday labor, obviously supporting strictures against Sunday work that organized
Christianity required.
Jefferson's seemingly contradictory, simultaneously-held, attitudes about the relation of government and religion, revealed by his involvement in the two above-described
statutes, mirrored conflicting public attitudes on the same topic. This conflict was illustrated
by the United States Supreme Court's unanimous conclusion in Church ofthe Holy Trinity
v. United States that this was a "Christian nation;"27 contrasted with the American Treaty with

Tripoli stating the country was "not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion,"
approved without dissent by the United States Senate in 1797.28
These examples reveal powerful, contradictory, national forces, for and against government attachment to religion, near the closing law's 1786 adoption. Jefferson had a
penchant for what Joseph Ellis called "seductive fictions" and to play ''fast and loose with

26

Jefferson did not literally make these "virtually simultaneous proposals" of legislation in 1786 because he was then in Paris as minister to France. His "faithful lieutenant" James Madison did so. See nn. 159 and 160, supra, and accompanying text.
27

An 1892 case, but relying on 100-year-earlier precedent, see Chapter S(c)(l)
herein, supra.
28

Seen. 39, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text. The quoted treaty text was
was authoritatively determined in the 1920s to be a false translation of the original arabic.
It was nevertheless believed genuine by the United States Senate in 1797, which ratified
the Treaty containing it without dissent. See Chapter 5(c)(2) herein.
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historical evidence on behalfofa greater cause. " 29 Perhaps, a murky record suggests, this was
congenial to his sponsoring the closing law as an offset to obtaining adoption of his Virginia
Religious Freedom Statute and other statutory welfare measures.Jo
In the nineteenth century there was limited appellate activity under the Virginia
Sunday closing law. Appeals in other states, however, gave fair indication of how its
enforcement was developing, providing valuable guidance for later Virginia appeals. It is
evident that nineteenth century appeals in states other than Virginia, collected in Chapter6(a)
( 1) herein, supra, did not arise from an abstract desire to reduce Sunday work. Instead, they

involved defendants, including large businesses of the day, using the closing law as a foil to
avoid otherwise unpardonable injuries to plaintiffs, whose ''misdeeds" were little more than
inoffensively traveling or working on that day, a nominal closing law violation.JI
Other New England courts similarly applied their state closing laws to excuse breachof-contract defendants from liability for Sunday failures to properly care for leased horses
and livery. J2 Still other courts, however, held that Sunday wrongdoings by tort or contract
defendants were not excused by the plaintiffs' traveling or working on Sunday, even if

29

Seen. 63, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text.

30

See n. 72, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text preceding and following that
footnote.
JI
J2

See nn. 2 - 4, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text.
See nn. 5 - 7, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text.
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violating a state closing law.33 Society was becoming too complicated, concluded the 1829
U.S. Senate Report of the Committee on Post Offices and Postal Roads, to have vital parts
ofit, including Sunday mail transport, interrupted for 24 hours. 34 His Committee thus declined
church-group petitions to ban such Sunday transport for religious reasons. Virginia's Sunday closing law received United States Supreme Court review in Powhatan Steamboat Co.
v. Appomattox R.R. (1860). 35 Plaintiff steamboat company sued for damages to goods it
shipped from Baltimore to City Point, Virginia, which were un-loaded on a Sunday to
defendant railroad's City Point warehouse, for transshipping the following day (Monday). The
trial court found the Sunday fire that destroyed plaintiff's goods was caused by defendant's
breach of duty, a finding not challenged on appeal. 36 That court, however, also effectively
held defendant railroad not liable for the Sunday fire in its warehouse destroying plaintiff's
goods, solely due to the Sunday closing law. 37
The Supreme Court adroitly reversed the trial court. Without overtly criticizing

33

See nn. 11 - 13, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text.

34

See nn. 14 - 16, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text.

35

65 U.S. (24 How.) 247 (1860). See also Chapter 6(b) herein, supra.

36

See nn. 21-24, Chapter 6 and accompanying text. Powhatan was a "diversity''
action [federal civil suit with parties from different states; s.v. "diversity," Black's Law
Dictionary (Jh ed.)]. The "Rules of Decision Act" requires that state law applies (unless
barred by federal constitution or statute), see n. 3, Chapter 6, supra. That would include
Virginia's closing law because the damage litigated occurred on Sunday in Virginia.
37

See nn. 30 - 32, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text.
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Virginia's closing law, the Court emphasized interpretation difficulties that law created,

38

disapproving ofit by implication. The Court's holding, consistent with that implied criticism,
significantly narrowed the closing law by first holding that certain of defendant's duties,
such as safekeeping plaintiff's entrusted goods, were independent of defendant's contract to
store and transship them. These duties were, therefore, unaffected by the closing law as well
and thus, the Court held, that law could not prohibit their Sunday performance. 39
Second, Powhatan alternatively held that even if these non-contractual duties were
assumed to be subject to the closing law, that defendant railroad was still required to protect
the plaintiff steamboat company's property on Sunday as a closing-law "necessity.''40 The
failure to do so, evidenced by the Sunday fire destroying plaintiff's goods in defendant's
warehouse, rendered defendant liable to plaintiff despite the closing law. 41
The Virginia Supreme Court's closing law holdings generally, with occasional
exceptions, resembled the United States Supreme Court's approach just described in Pow-

hatan. It espoused no overt distaste for Virginia's closing law, but when no clear precedent

38

See n. 36, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text. The Court was conscious
of the influence ofits opinions long before 1860, seen. 37, Chapter 6, supra.
39

See n. 41, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text.

40

See nn. 43 and 44, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text.

41

Technically, the Court remanded the case to the trial court to "issue a new venire,"
65 U.S. at 257, i.e. a new 'jury panel" for a new trial. See s.v. ''venire", Black's Law
Dictionary (7th ed.). However, given the rulings of law based on undisputed facts in
Powhatan by the highest court of the land, such a "new trial" would be confined to
damages, not liability, since the latter had already been determined by the Supreme Court.
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or statute stood in its way, with fair consistency it narrowed the law's impact, favoring the
freeing of Sunday labor from its restrictions. Though this thesis debated details of some of
the Virginia Supreme Court's closing-law opinions,42 from a different view they can be said
to collectively comprise a complicated verbal tapestry with a defined object. The court first
buttressed, unasked, the closing law's constitutionality, apparently conforming to popular
Virginia opinion. 43 Then, it interpreted the closing law in succeeding cases to generally allow
continuing expansion of labor and other Sunday business activity, contrary to that law's
supposed intention. This apparently accorded with the preferences ofVirginia' s public. 44 That
is, Virginians wanted the comfort of a closing law, but did not, as a practical matter, want it
to to materially restrict their Sunday activities, particularly recreation. The Virginia Supreme
Court's unarticulated but nearly-consistently-followed twentieth century response until the
1942 conclusion ofthis thesis seemed, in essence, to strive to give the public what it wanted,

42

See Chapter 7, nn,: 15, 27(sentence following n.27) 21-32, 50, 52-66, 77, 83-87,
103, 107, 112, 120, 123-126, 135, andl37~147 and accompanying text; and Chapter 8, nn.
118, 123, 127-128, 137-138 (and paragraph following n. 138), and 140-141, supra, and
accompanying text.
43

44

See nn. 39-49, Chapter 7, and accompanying text.

Public satisfaction with existence (contrasted with enforcement) of the closing law
is inferred from the absence of any contrary claims in the briefing of Pirkey, Lakeside and
Francisco, and the absence of dissatisfaction expressed about the law, per the Francisco
news reports quoted, even with reason to fear substantial inconvenience because of it. See
nn. 89 and 92, Chapter 8, supra. For public desire to not actually be restricted by closing law,
seen. 92, ibid.: (1) Times Dispatch, October 18, 1941 ... (b) " ... it would appear [due to
Francisco trial] hundreds of articles now sold on Sunday are sold in violation of the blue
law." Thus, the public, as this passage made clear, understood they were extensively
benefiting from businesses operating on Sunday that the closing law prohibited.
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by interpreting the closing law to simultaneously achieve both these contradictory public
desires, as best it could.
This pattern began in Hortenstein v. Virginia Carolina RR (1904), 45 Virginia's first
twentieth-century closing law appeal. The court denied that a recovery could be solely based
on defendant railroad having caused an injury while running locomotives on Sunday in
violation of the closing law. Proof of negligence was still required, as in any other personal
injury claim.46 By reverse inference, this presumably meant that Virginia aligned itself with
cases collected in thesis Chapter 6(a) (2) herein, supra, denying that the closing law excused
negligence or contract breaches inflicted on Sunday closing law violators. That is, if
defendant's closing law violation in Hartenstein did not allow plaintiff to forego proofs of
negligence to win; then neither, in logic, could a defendant use a plaintiff's closing law
violation, to overcome defendant's negligence, so the defendant could win.
The Virginia Supreme Court further limited the closing law in Wells v. Common-

wealth (1907), by ruling it was not a criminal statute, so that its monetary ''forfeit" was not
a criminal fine, and wa8 collectable only through a separate civil suit.47 Wells, however,
created new confusions which, metaphorically speaking, blew up in the Virginia Supreme
Court's face in Hanger v. Commonwealth (1908) shortly thereafter. In Hanger, a blatantly

45

See n. 2, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.

46

Seen. 5, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.

47

See n. 6 - 8, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.
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improper attempt to evade the closing law48 left the supreme court powerless to fine the
closing law offender, because in Wells this same court had taken away the power ofitself and
the rest of the judicial branch to do so.
Wells and Hanger were legislatively overturned by a 1908 closing law amendment,
specifying its violations were misdemeanors. 49 Ellis v. Covington (1917),50 the first closing
law appeal reaching the court thereafter, construed a municipal ordinance duplicating the
amendment. Ellis's significance, however, is not due to its case-facts. Its closing law
importance was its dictum intimating that Ellis, the appellant, a restaurant-owner in
Covington, Virginia, ''plainly could not, though licensed, ply his calling of selling such [soft]

drinks on the Sabbath day in any way so as to escape.liability under the ordinance."51 Judge
Bazile relied on this passage in his Francisco "Opinion of the Court," calling it "a definite
holding by the highest Court of the Commonwealth that the selling on Sunday of soft drinks
pursuant to one;s regular business is a violation ofthe Sunday law."52 The Judge's point was
that, in Francisco, any County-Supervisor beer-sale approval, still permitted no sales on
Sunday, due to the closing law being engrafted onto the Supervisors' beer-approval statute.

48

See nn. 10-15, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.

49

Seen. 16, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.

50

See nn. 17 - 19, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.

SI

Ellis, 122 Va. 821, 825 (emphasis added).

52

See nn. 109 - 112, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text. Exhibit "C", Petition, "Opinion of the Court," 25.
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Today, with 20/20 hindsight, Judge Bazile's reliance on Ellis in Francisco appears
misplaced. The statement quoted was not a "holding" as the Judge termed it, but "dictum"
upon which, by definition, one cannot rely. 53 The above Ellis quotation ostensibly limiting
the right to sell soft drinks on Sunday,54 was contrary to the express words ofthe statute and,
in any event, was not the precise point decided by the Ellis case. 55 The closing Jaw provided
that one could, indeed, escape its liability by exemptions under its "necessity" or "charity"
exceptions from its otherwise-required Sunday suspension of labor. The Judge, however,
apparently failed to anticipate the ingenuity with which ''necessity'' or "charity'' exemptions
could be found, and the receptiveness of the Virginia Supreme Court to them, rendering the
closing Jaw, like the necessity exception itself, ''nearly meaningless. " 56

This thesis offered several illustrations of the country's mood on matters related to

53

Definition of "dictum" provided at n. 30, Chapter 5, supra.

54

See n. 50, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text.

The danger of relying on dictum, a:s Judge Bazile relied on Ellis dictum in Francisco, was cogently explained by ChiefJustice John Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821): "It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general
expressions in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which these
expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to
control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The
reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the Court is investigated with
care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are
considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases
is seldom completely investigated."
55

56

See n. 34, Chapter 4, supra; although this was a year 2000 viewpoint, for ininformed perception of disuse of existing closing Jaws as early as 1880, see n. 23, Chapter 7, supra (speaker at American Bar Association meeting).
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closing laws immediately after World War I. The first was social commentator Frederick
Lewis Allen's noting in the ''three to four years" following the Armistice, a "subtle change"
revealing, he said, a citizenry seeking to "relax," to have "a good time," to "shake off the
bonds of puritanism," and "upset the long-standing conventions of decorum."57 This
suggested public passive resistance to enactments like Virginia's closing law.
Viewpoints were also supplied from the 1920-1921 issues ofthe Richmond, Virginiabased Religious Herald weekly newspaper, speaking for Virginia Baptists. An editorial,
generating a supportive response from a reader in the Richmond city attorney's office, indicated reluctance by those who were both religiously inclined and educationally informed to
rely upon, or recommend, a law of compulsory sabba~h work-abstinence. 58 The distaste of
those Virginia opinion makers about using closing laws to carry out religious aims, proved
them better predictors ofthe Virginia Supreme Court's constitutional rulings in major 1920s
closing law cases than the briefs of any of the litigants.
The importance of the next Virginia Supreme Court closing law appeai Pirkey Bro-

thers v. Commonwealth (1922) ("Pirkey"), was not about the issue appealed. 59 The
defendant-appellants were jury-convicted for operating their cave-viewing tourist attraction

57

Seen. 20, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.

58

See nn. 22-25, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.

59

Pirkey, 134 Va. 713; 114 S.E. 765 (1922); and n. 237, supra.
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on Sunday. 60 Their briefing to the Virginia Supreme Court was woefully deficient, underlined by that court's describing their case as "anomalous,"61 rejecting it in a half-page
paragraph in the supreme court's eighteen printed opinion in the case. The supreme court
in Pirkey used about five and one-half printed pages to supply a constitutional justification
for the closing law (unasked by either litigant), apparently assisting closing law proponents.62
Then, similar to the technique used by United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John

MarshallinMarburyv. Madison (1803),63 Pirkey next spent about seven more printed pages
imposing closing law trial procedures sure to impede future prosecutions. The CommonCommonwealth could not complain because, like the Jeffersonian executive-branch officials
prevailing in Marbury, it had won the issues actually .contested in the appeal. 64
Thus it appears the court decided Pirkey, not because ofthe importance of any issue
raised in its appeal, but as an opportunity to lay down rules controlling how future closing

60

Seen. 28, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.

61

See nn. 29-32, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text; and Pirkey at 730
(speaking of the case as an "anomalous" appeal).
62

Pirkey held, 134 Va. at 725: "'Laws setting aside Sunday as a day of rest are upheld not from any right of the government to legislate for the promotion of religious observance, but from the right to protect all persons from the . . . debasement which comes
from uninterrupted labor."' Quoting Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1885).
63

64

See nn. 67 - 70, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.

Primary Pirkey rulings restricting closing law prosecutions were: (A) ''Necessity" was not confined to its eighteenth century meaning, but broader contemporary meaning;
and (B) Virtually every issue was to be decided by jury, even if different juries reached
contradictory verdicts under the same facts. See nn. 56-60, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.
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law cases were to be presented and decided at trial. The first rule supported the closing law's
constitutionality, thus seemingly strengthening its enforceability. The second, in contrast,
provided restrictive procedures for trying closing law cases, weakening the enforceability of
the statute that the court's constitutionality rulings had just sustained. Pirkey was immediately used for the latter purpose by the supreme court in Lakeside Inn, Corp. v. Common-

wealth ("Lakeside"), 65 a closing law opinion released the same day. Lakeside expanded the
"necessity'' exception to further restrict the success of closing law prosecutions.
The defendant Inn was jury-convicted for operating its swimming pool on Sunday.
The supreme court reversed the trial court's barring of defendant Inn's evidence and jury
instructions. The evidence was the sheriff's testimony that its Sunday pool operation reduced
nude-swimming arrests, which the court held it was error to exclude. 66 The jury instruction
error, the court held, was to deny defendant the opportunity it unsuccessfully requested at
trial for the jury to consider if ''the work of conducting [Lakeside 's] ... bathing pool is a

necessity within the meaning ofthe statute" and ifso "find the defendant not guilty," because
the Sunday pool operation (supposedly) reduced nude bathing67

Lakeside 's critical widening of the closing law ''necessity" exemption no longer
limited it to the defendant's necessity, or the necessity ofanyone with whom defendant dealt.

65

See, nn. 71 - 87, Chapter 7, supra.

66

See nn. 73 - 78, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text.

67

Seen; 79, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text [quoting Lakeside, 134 Va at
705 (defendant's proposed instruction no. 4)].
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Instead, the "necessity" was the benefit to anyone in the surrounding county, including some
not having any contact with the defendant; all supposedly benefitted by the absence of nude
bathing. The supreme court did not require that the defendant intended any such benefit
(reducing nude-bathing) by its Sunday pool operation. In fact, defendant's decision to operate
its pool on Sunday appeared to be motivated by nothing more nor less than typical business
profit-seeking. No proofs were adduced that it was intended to "benefit" anything except
defendant's bottom-line; certainly not the local county moral climate (through nude bathing
reduction). Further, reducing nude-bathing, however arguably beneficial, could hardly be;
deemed a "necessity" in the ordinary sense of the word. 68
What Lakeside further suggested was that

th~

supreme court was willing to allow,

through the "necessity" exemption, additional avenues for businesses to escape the closing
law. The extent to which new "necessities" could now be "discovered" was even more
tellingly revealed in Francisco, discussed in thesis Chapter 8 herein, supra. Sunday beer
sales, the Francisco court held, could be a ''necessity," ifthe jury so-decided. The court also
reduced the threshold needed to satisfy the statute's "necessity'' standard by redefining the
word to mean "reasonably essen-tial to the economic, social or moral welfare of the

68

See, s.v. "necessity", American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed., 2000), "Pressing or
urgent need ...."; OED Micrograph (seen. 224, supra): "3. The constraining power of
circumstances; a condition or state of things compelling to a certain course of action."
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1969), "indispensability, ... impossibility
of a contrary order or condition, ... urgent need or desire."
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community,"69 certainly not sounding like "necessity" in the conventional dictionary

°

understanding. 7 Further, in no real sense could it be said Hanover County determined there
was any "necessity'' for Sunday beer sales. Francisco deemed this decided (ifthe jury agreed)
by the Board of Supervisors' failure to act, as opposed to taking action, to ban or allow beer
sales. A motion by one of the Supervisor's to ban County Sunday beer sales died for want
of a second to the motion, meaning there was no record of the Board of Supervisors as a
whole reaching any decision on the matter. 71
What was apparent in Francisco, as detailed in thesis Chapter 8 herein, supra, was
that the Sunday Closing Law's effectiveness in late 1941 Virginia, even in bucolic Hanover
County, to actually enforce cessation of Sunday labor.was virtually a dead letter, in place as
a matter of form but actually ineffective. The supreme court, in Francisco, indirectly
acknowledged this by stating that eighty percent ofthe licensed merchants in the County were
"openly" selling.beer on Sundays. 72 The transcript (Exhibit "C") reveals, as the appellate
opinion does not, that this evidence came from the County's ABC inspector's unchallenged
testimony. 73 The supreme court's adding "openly" to its description of the selling,
69

See n. 119, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text, quoting from the Francisco
opinion.
70

See n. 68, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text.

71

See nn. 120-122, this Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text.

72

See n. 66, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text.

73

See n. 65, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text, citing to the transcript testi(continued... )
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emphasized the wholesale dearth ofclosing law enforcement in the area, even though case law
of the period did not allow such considerations to bar convictions. 74 The lack of such
enforcement was what today is called "the elephant in the room," the obvious fact that no one
wants to discuss.
The Francisco transcript, also reveals, in a way the appellate opinion does not, trial
Judge Leon Bazile's deep involvement in generating the prosecution, in this close-knit
community of over sixty years ago, in a way that would be almost unimaginable today. The
chief complaining witness (Nichols) and the prosecutor acknowledged he was "directed by
the Honorable Judge and the Commonwealth's Attorney to bring evidence in Court," before
a criminal warrant was filed. 75

In retrospect, the Judge's involvement may have impaired the prosecution. Confining the indictment only to beer sales76 could have occurred at the Judge's suggestion because
of his long tenuie as an assistant attorney general dealing with closing law appeals, and later
legislative service when enabling acts allowing communities to ban sales of regulated pro-

73

( ••• continued)

mony.
74

See n. 63, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text.

15

See n. 54, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text, citing the transcript in Exhibit "C".

76

CO

See n. 4, Chapter 2, supra, and accompanying text, citing supreme court FrancisOpllllon.
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ucts such as spirits, were adopted. 77 Had the prosecution been limited to non-beer Sunday
sales at Francisco's store, 78 there would have been less opportunity for the defendant to
argue that the actions of the Board of Supervisors authorized Sunday beer sales on
''necessity'' grounds. No equivalent statutory power was given the Board to approve Sunday
sales of non-alcohol items. Accordingly, defendant's "necessity" defense. based on the need
for additional County economic activity could not have been mounted as easily if a beer sale
had not been the basis of the prosecution. 79

77

See nn.115-116, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text. The Judge's "Opinion ofthe Court," Exhibit "C", Petition, 29, revealed he contacted the attorney general's staff
(perhaps his former colleagues at that office) to learn its policy concerning Sunday beer sales
by ABC licensees. He also explained his view ofthe purposes of enabling acts allowing local
communities to set (or eliminate) Sunday beer sale hours (e.g., "During ... the prohibition
regime in Virginia (1916-1933) the General Assembly acquired the extremely bad habit of
enacting statutes allowing the political sub-divisions to parallel the criminal statutes relating
to the prohibition of ... ardent spirits." Ibid., 31-32).
78

There is basis to reasonably conclude that a prosecution could easily have been
based on non-beer items sold. The supreme court in Francisco made clear it was undisputed
that there was widespread sale on Sunday ofmerchandise nominally prohibited by the closing
law: "It developed [from the trial testimony] that throughout Hanover county, which is just
north ofRichmond, and through which several arterial State highways run, restaurants, filling
stations, and the like habitually sell such articles as sandwiches, beer, wine, soft drinks, cigars,
cigarettes and tobacco to the local trade, picnickers, tourists and the traveling public on
Sunday." 180 Va. at 374. Complaining witness Charlie Williams freely admitted he had
bought beer on Sunday from Francisco's store for his own consumption, not as part of any
prosecution "many a time." Exhibit "C", Petition, 45 (Response to question by the Court),
further showing the widespread ignoring of the closing law, even as it concerned Mr.
Francisco specifically, before this prosecution.
79

See n. 119, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text, showing how the closing
law (section 4570) and its "necessity" exception was connected to County Board of Supervisors regulation of Sunday beer sales under the 1938 enabling act.
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A topic for further investigation would be whether Judge Bazile's involvement in

Francisco was more than presiding at trial and advising complaining witness Nichols prior
to the prosecution. Reasons for such considerations include the seeming uniqueness of two
big-city (Richmond) newspapers covering what would otherwise be a distinctly minor misdemeanor trial. Press coverage, or even knowledge, of such a trial would seem to require
notification from someone at court, presumably the Judge or someone acting at his direction. 80 (The Defendant, it is surmised, would want as little publicity as possible concerning the
charges against him.) 81 In addition, the trial was set on the Judge's docket at exactly the time
the Methodists, well known for prohibition sentiments, 82 were holding their state convention.

80

It is unlikely that in Richmond front pages on October 18, 1941, had excess space
due to absence of news that reports of the October 17 Francisco trial were needed to
fill. For example, on October 17, the U.S. destroyer Kearny was torpedoed bya U-boat off
Greenland, killing eleven sailors, raising concern of war commencing with Germany.
Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945,
499, n. 375, supra. The Kearny story, along with substantial amounts of other crisis-ridden
war news, crowded the front pages the same day as accounts of the Francisco trial: TimesDispatch, October 18, 1941, 1: "Berlin Finds Kearny Attack, Arms Debate 'Interesting.'"
81

Conceivably the prosecution could be the source of the publicity, but Commonwealth's Attorney Simpkins seemed, despite his competence, retiring and not given to
such initiative. This, however, is admittedly highly speculative; we simply do not know.
82

In a "lengthy reply to critics," a group of Methodist notables, during the 1928 presidential campaign, including Virginia's Methodist Bishop James Cannon, Jr., declared that
''the Southern Methodist Church had long been 'a prohibition church' and had urged its
members repeatedly to elect public officials committed to prohibition enforcement." Robert
A. Hohner, Prohibition and Politics: Life of Bishop James Cannon, Jr. (Columbia, S.C.:
Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1999) (eBook), 222, incl. n. 25, referencing an article in the
July 22, 1928 Richmond Times-Dispatch, apparently containing the above quotation, in
substance. Concerning the October 18, 1941, Virginia Methodist Conference, whose
(continued...)
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The Judge presumably would have more control than anyone else over setting trial dates for
cases on his docket. Accordingly, the occurrence of the Francisco trial at the same date as
the Methodist Convention is arguably more than mere coincidence.
The Judge's long interest in the details of prohibition-related politics has been described. 83 The Methodists' traditional interest in the political ramifications ofprohibition, was
energetically reflected at their Conference, shown by statements reported in the local press
accompanying the commendatory resolution for the Judge on October 18, 1941, the day after
the Francisco trial, revealing the atmosphere ofits adoption. 84 It seemingly would have taken
a great deal ofpreplanning for passage ofthe Judge's commendatory resolution to be adopted
at the Methodist conference the day after trial. 85 Even µiore effort would be needed to obtain
82

( ••• continued)
resolution praised Judge Bazile's Francisco rulings, the October 19, 1941, Times Dispatch
front-page article reporting its proceedings, listed "Bishop James Cannon, retired," subject
of the above biography, supra, this footnote, as "on the program." The stridency of the
Conference proceedings on prohibition matters reported by the press, very much reflected the
attitudes and approach of Bishop Cannon as disclosed by his biography, supra, this footnote.
83

See n. 15, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text.

84

Times Dispatch, October 19, 1941, p. 1: "LYNCHBURG (AP): The Virginia Methodist Conference yesterday adopted a resolution approving the decision of Judge Leon
Bazile against the sale of beer on Sunday and volleyed 'amens' last night as it heard a report
calling upon church people to 'make America as dry as the Sahara Desert.'. . . . Last night's
report . . . recommended that the State Legislature pass a bill confining the sale of all
alcoholic beverages to ABC stores, requiring State-wide closing on Sunday of all wine and
beer stores ...."
85

Typically, conferences such as the Methodists' on October 18, when convened, already have a full agenda, making the addition of new agenda items difficult. The Judge's
"blue-law" ruling had to have been issued later than 4:00 PM of the day before the
(continued... )
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press coverage of that resolution's passage the day after that. Transmitting the Judge's

Francisco ruling after 4:00 PM or later of the October 17 trial in Hanover County, 86 to the

85

continued)
commendatory resolution (seen. 86, infra, this Chapter). For that resolution to be adopted,
delegates must learn of its circumstances. This could not happen sooner than very late
afternoon or early evening of the day before, of a minor trial, the details of which most
persons in the state probably knew nothing. Further, a sufficient number of delegates would
also have to agree to such a resolution. Typically also, a motion would then be needed to
place the matter on the agenda, followed by debate, then drafting an appropriate resolutiontext and its adoption, and :finally its release early enough on October 18 for front-page
placement on the earliest available coverage, October 19 morning Times-Dispatch. This
appears difficult even if the Conference had known about the judge's ruling the morning of
the trial on October 17. To accomplish adopting the Resolution within these same time limits
when the Judge's ruling was not known until late-afternoon or evening of October 17 seems
very difficult at best, if not impossible based on what is so far known. This suggests,
therefore, pre-knowledge of how the judge would rule, before the Conference commenced.
86

( •••

The Judge's ruling (commended by Methodist Conference the next day) being later
than 4:00 PM of the October 17, 1941, Francisco trial is established through the transcript
(Ex. "C") and Times-Dispatch coverage. The transcript reveals witness testimony until the
lunch-break (usually lasting.an hour-and-a-half in most courts, presumably beginning at
noon). The transcript notes the lunch recess commencement (Exhibit "C", Petition, 86).
After lunch, two final witnesses were examined, ibid, 86-91 (one of whom, the Supervisors
Clerk was, took longer due to lengthy evidence admission arguments), followed by the Sheriff
(see nn. 435-437, supra and accompanying text) followed by "extended argument on [jury]
instructions," 91, ibid. (court reporter notes), which Overton Jones reported consumed two
hours, Times-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 1941, "Hanover Verdict Bans Sale of Sunday Beer as Blue
Law Violation," 1, continuation p. 12, resulting in the judge's instructing the jury, as
incorrectly described by the press, ''that a sale of beer on Sunday is a violation of the blue
law." Ibid. (Incorrect because reading the trial transcript, Ex. "C", Petition, shows no such
judicial statement). Assuming one-hour for lunch, starting at noon, plus an hour for the final
two witnesses, including the argument over admitting the Board of Supervisors' records, and
two hours ofjury instruction argument (as Overton-Jones of the Times-Dispatch reported),
it was not certain what "blue law'' ruling the Judge would finally issue, until the jury
instruction argument concluded. Accordingly, the Judge's ruling was unlikely to have been
final earlier than 4:00 P.M. and very probably later (due to a likely longer lunch-break, and
the Judge's presence on the bench until the end of trial, preventing his discussing the trial
(continued... )

208
Methodist Convention in Lynchburg, over one-hundred road miles away, resulting in a
resolution praising the Judge's decision the Convention adopted the next day, October 18,
and also generating front-page headlines about the resolution on the same day in one
Richmond paper, the News-Leader, 81 and the day after, October 19, in the other, the TimesDispatch88 (also a hundred miles away from the convention), suggest preplanning and

coordination to accomplish all this within the time it happened. Further investigation might
confirm or refute the Judge's involvement, as above speculated, but not within the time
confines of this thesis.
The other two interwar appeals were, first, Commonwealth v. Crook (1927), which
affirmed the conviction of the Richmond and Portsmouth professional baseball teams and
umpires of the game on question for playing on Sunday. From a close reading, however, it
is clear that this one case seemingly supporting the closing law, differing in that way from
most of the other interwar cases, was actually no different. Pirkey had ruled that the jury,
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( ••• continued)
with Conference delegates in Lynchburg until later than his jury-instruction rulings). It would
be difficult for anyone, except the Judge himself, even by telephone, to advise anyone at the
Methodist Conference about just what had occurred in the Hanover trial and what the Judge
had ruled. His rulings on the record did not prohibit Sunday beer sales without exception.
The first public notice of such a ruling was in his January 19, 1942, "Opinion of the Court"
(Ex "C," 22-34, especially 27), not issued until three months after the trial. The details of
this minor trial were unlikely to be known by anyone at the conference on October 18,
without the Judge's elaboration of them.
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See n. 9, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text.

88

See n. 84, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text.
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generally speaking, must decide ifthe Sunday labor was excused by the statute's "necessity''
exemption. Crook followed that rule, 89 and the jury found for the prosecution. However, the

Pirkey case, under which the jury decision was allowed, recognized that there could be
inconsistent rulings by differing jury panels on the same facts.
Finally, the closing law "charity'' exemption, as explained in the commentary of this
thesis on Williams v. Commonwealth (1942),90 allowed a business, to possibly (and
paradoxically) better its overall :financial return under the closing law by donating its Sunday
net profits to charity. An additional irony was that the closing law, in this way, came close to
being stood on its head: It was being used to encourage Sunday employment instead of its
purported purpose of allowing that day as a rest for laborers.

In retrospect, the controversies and confusions that once dominated public discourse
and litigation concerning Sunday closing laws, may provide insights to cautiously draw from
a review of these once hotly-contested and now quiet, or at least quiescent, controversies.
The first cautious insight is, that an absence of a strongly-felt public need for a statute
ostensibly guiding public conduct, like the Sunday closing law, tends to result in disuse of the
statute for its intended purpose, even though it nominally remains on the books. To sanction
its repeal requires, to the inward mind, perhaps, some explanation about why it is no longer

89

147 Va. at 597.

90

Seen. 108, Chapter 7, supra, and Chapter 7(b)(5) herein, supra.
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followed, a discussion the public might just as soon not undertake. So nothing is said, and all
concerned hope nothing more comes of it, without actually taking action, such as repealing
its provisions, to formally bring its influence to an end.
This is often not the end of the matter, however. The ancient adage that ''the devil
:finds work for idle hands to do,"91 applies in a secular sense to idle statutes as well. When a
statute, ostensibly intended to improve human behavior, becomes "idle" because it is deemed
by the public, and hence by enforcement officials the public selects, as no longer appropriate
for its intended use; it can be used by others to commit mischieffor personal advantage. Such
improper use can range from a business person seeking to hurt another's business for
commercial advantage to a crank seeking to tar a

d~fendant

with a criminal record for

engaging in conduct equally practiced by many others without penalty.
The development ofthe Sunday closing law is a convenient vehicle through which to
observe such conduct, since the time has passed when it was enforced with any regularity,
yet the memories of such times are still fixed in many minds. It stands as a warning that any
such statute, intended for the good of the citizenry, if not widely supported, can well become a tool of favoritism for the few. That is among the reasons the title of this thesis speaks
of the "troubled" intersection of Christ and Commerce.92 Tracing the closing law's

91

Derived from the writings of St. Jerome, see Oxford Dictionary ofProverbs, 70,
n. 4, Chapter 3, supra.

92

"Christ" is used here as a metaphor for the public desire to foster in secular society
the Christ-like virtue ofa day ofrest and reflection for its working members, while avoid(continued...)
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development from earliest times to the present era of appellate-court opinions, it would not
be out of bounds for many to conclude from the review herein of such opinions, that precious little benefit was obtained for either alternative, Christ or Commerce, through the
operations of such laws,when viewed in a Virginia microcosm.
The statute's objective of enforcing a uniform day of rest was undercut, in the first
place, by a series of statutory exemptions from prosecutions, such as for ''furnaces, kilns,
plants and other businesses" that ''may" be ''necessary to be conducted on Sunday.''93 Large
businesses, therefore, and their equally large numbers of employees, effectively escaped the
closing law. The public could observe additional amendments further restricting the closing
law's force such as, in 1932, "sale of gasoline, or any ~otor vehicle fuel, or any motor oil .
• • •"

94

This both provided another significant exemption from the Sunday closing law and a

means, through the fuel sales, for additional long-range Sunday travel for the public in
general, leading tO more Sunday commercial activities, also violating the closing law, due to
that travel.
In addition, the statutory opening of the exemption door appeared to encourage the
Virginia Supreme Court to join the legislature in expanding the ''necessity" and "charity"

92

( ••• continued)

ing constitutionally undue deference to the Christian religion's claims on Sunday as a day
of worship.
93

Va. Code §4570, as amended; quoted in Francisco, 180 Va. at 374-375.

94

Ibid, amendment contained in Va. Acts of 1932, c. 328, p. 596.
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closing law exemptions, as additional escapes from its enforcement. In this way the closing
law, designed to reduce the incidents of sabbath work, was seemingly used, to the contrary
to do just the opposite, increasing the amount of such Sunday work. From this can be
generalized a third insight derived from the history of Virginia's closing law as it operated in
the real world: The public's view of a statute designed to improve human behavior, but not
popularly supported and consequently falling into disuse, becomes encrusted with cynicism
when business ostensibly affected by it use their influence with governmental authorities to
avoid whatever rigor the statute retained.
Thus, closing laws were trending towards being used either without reference to, or
contrary to, their intended purposes, leading to their fjnal extinction in 1988. 95 This ultimate

denouement was after the 1942 end-point of this thesis. Crystaliz.ation of that conclusion,
however, could be surmised from the trends and tendencies described in this thesis.

95

Henderson Development Co., Inc. v. Sciortino, 236 Va. 136, 150, 372 S.E.2d 751
(1988) ("[The record discloses] the local-option feature and the fact that over half the
population of the Commonwealth has utilized it to escape the law's effects entirely; . . .
repeated acts of the General Assembly creating additional and broader exemptions ... and
. . . prosecutions only on 'private complaint.' . . . . [N]one of these steps was in itself
improper ... , but ... their combined effects have reduced the application of a general law
to the kind of special legislation prohibited by Article IV, section 14 and 15 of the Virginia
Constitution [(1971)].")(Note that two of the features of Francisco, a de facto "private
complaint" by the husband of the store owner competing with the defendant, and a form of
"local option" through the Board of Supervisors' ability to control Sunday beer sales, in
somewhat different form, became part of the basis for ultimately finding the closing law
unconstitutional in 1988, as above quoted in Sciortino, ibid.)
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PETITION If'OR WRIT OF ERROR.

To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Oo11rt of Appeals
of Virginia:

Your petitioner, M. G. Fl'ancil!<!o, l'espectfully repl'esents
that he is aggrieved by a final judgment entered agamst him
bv the Circuit Court of Hanover Countv on the 16th dav of
l'vial'ch, 1942, in the case wherein the Coinmonwealth w11s the
plaintiff and your petitioner was the defendant. A tl"llnscr_ipt of the record of the cnse is filed herewith.

THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE U>WER COURT.
Petitioner was indicted on the clmrge of unlawfullv labol'ing at his trade or calling, otherwise than in a work of necessity or charity, on !Sunday, in violation of Section 4570 of
the Code of Virginia, the specific charge being that he "did
keep open and maintain o~ the sai.d Sunday a business
2• •for the sale of beer, and did on said Sunday sell beer."
He pleaded not guilty to tl1e charge. The case was tried
by a jury on October 17, 1941. The sale of the ·beer on Sunday was admitted by the petitioner, and the jury, on a manda-

M.

YSiipteme; :Coiirf of Appeals of Virgfula
=.·

·•.

..

.

.R. K. Turner, th'e Insp~tor ··for the. Virginia .Alci>h<ili~
Beverage Control Board for Hanover County, testified that
there were 61 licensed establishments in Hanover County;
that of his own knowledge, BO per cent of them were engaged
in selling beer on Sunday; and that lie did not know how
many more were doing so.
··
4•
•Six or more pe1·sons, who opel'ated filling stations
and restaurants at various plnces on the highwavs leading through the County, !cstified that they i·egularly sold
bee1· on Sundays, the1·e bemg 25 01• 30 such places on No. 1
Hig}1way alone (R., p. 58) and that the travelling public demnndcd it.
It further appeared from the evidence that throughout tho
County genernlly, restaurants, tilling stations and the like,
Jinhitually sold sucli nrticles as beer, wine, soft drinks, cigars,
cig-nrcttcs and tobncco to the local trnde, picnickers, tom·ists
1111<1 the truvelliug public 011 S1111d11y.9.

.tory, or finding, instruction given by the court for the Comt:
monwealth, found petitioner guilty nud fixed his punishmen
at a fine of fivq dolln'rs. A motion wns mnde to set aside thn~
verc1ict as being contrary to the law and the evidence, m1C
for misdirection of the jurv by the court; which motion Wll!t;:
overruled, and judgment was e11te1·ed by the Court againsk
petitioner, in accordnnce with the jury's verdict, on Marci.&.J
16, 1942, for reasons stnted in writiui~ and made a part ot' tho
record. It is to that judgment thnt petitioner now seeks 11
writ of error.

u

THE QUESTION INVOLVED.
'!'he question involved in the cnsc i11: Did the sale of beer
on Sunday by the petitioner coui;titute a work of neces11it,v
within I.he meaning of Section 4570 of the Code of Virgi11i11 !
'l'he uext pri111nry question is: lK tlw nnswer to the first question one of fact for the jury to dc(•i1lc, or oue of law fo1· tlw
court t The incidentnl question11 iuvokccl concern the c1.•rreetncRs of the court's net ion in ret'nsing all of t.he iustnwtions asked fo1• by the petitioul'r, nml iu n•fusiug to ndmil
ns evidence certain testimony otl'<!rc1l hy the petitiouer.

3•
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•ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.

It is submitted thnt tho trinl eotu·t erred in the following
pa1·ticnlnrs, 111unely:

•sTATE·MEN'.l' lW l<,AC'l'S.

l\f. G. Francisco was a country merchnnt operating n general store in Hnnover .County, Vir1.d11i11, at which he so!.l
11:eneralmerelmndise, gasoline n111l oil, cigarettes, cigars, mui I-tobacco, soft drinks, snmlwich<'1'1, hc•e.r 1111<1 wine. He hml
the necesRary licenses to do all ol' thl'.~c things. He hnd b1ii~ll C::l
in business for nbont ten yc11r11. He did not operate hi:o1
!(e11e1·al merchandise business 011 811111l11y11, but clid sell gai;o· ::c:
line and oils, cigarettes nnil tol•m·1·0, 1111ft drinks nud iec ><
~rt!am, and beer aml wine, on tl111t 1l11y. He cliil this openly LU
on Sunday, 8eptemher 7!11, l!J4l. 1111.J Juul done so for a loug
time p1-io1· thereto.
On this p11rticnlar Sumlny, tll'n 11w11, who were sent into
the sto1·e by n Co11nty policenum for th" purpose, each houp;ht
~ bottle of beer. It WllS for tho /m.•im'.•.~ of opernting hi"
dore au<l nmkiug thel'le sale;; thal f<'rmwisco was convicted.
l'here wns no q11estio11 about tli><111·1forl.v conduct or of tlm
store linving hc.>cm imp1·opcrly n111. tu fnct the Sheriff of t hn
Connty, who wns known to l\fr. l<'r11111"ixc•o, wns in the stor•J
Rt the time the sales were m111fo 111111 luicl been thel'C for 1111
hour. 1-fo. himself, pnrchnsed ><ouw ><oft drinks antl ice cr1m111
(R., p. 121).

a.. Franciticio.~o~o~we~itii
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1. In 1·c.>f11ilinl! to set nsiilo the verdict of the jurv ns being
couti-1111,· to tire' lnw and the evidence.
•
:!. In'lwlcliiw thut the snlc of beer ·by the petitioner constit.uted a violi1tio11 of section 4570 of the Code of Virginia
ns n n111ttcr of lnw.
:-i. In givili!-{ to the jm·:v In11fruetion No. 1 nt the i·equest
of the Couunouwcnlth (R., p. 128) nncl 11n unnumbered ve1·bnl
im1tmction hy th!! court (R., p. 124).
+. Ju refusing to give to the jnr:v Instructions Nos. 2, a, 4,
5, ll, 7, 8, J1 nnd 11-A, nil 1·c1111estecl by petitioner (R., pp. 128
to 133).
.
.
u. In rcfusin!I; to ndmit the l.'\•i<lcnco of C. W. Tnylor, Clerk
of tlie Board of Supc1·viH01·s of H1111over County, to the effect thnt n resolution prohibiting the snle of beer iu Hnnover
County on S11111lny l11ul hc.>en offcrecl fo1· ndoptiou by tho
Bonr1l at a meetiug thereof l1el«l 011July1, 1941; (R., pp. 114J Jf>) tlmt clelclgntions both in bchalt'.of nncl in opposition to the
acloptiou of the resolution nppt!llrecl before the Board; aucl
tlmt the Bom·cl clid not adopt it.

_..,,
:M~; ti. 'Franc~ ~>a~~ti~~eiitik::
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,; ARGUMENT.

. The pertinent· part of .the statute involved, Section 4570
Of the Code of Virginia, is as follows:
··

·~If a

person on a Sunday be found laboring at any trade
or calling • • • except in bouseho.l<l or other work of nece:>·
sity 01· charity, he shall be deemed guilty of misdemeuuor

... ,,
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The trial court held that the work engaged in by petitioner was not a work of neccs11ity us a matter of law, und
gave the following instructions to the jury:

UJ

Instruction No. 1: The Coul't instructs the jury t1111t if
they believe from the evidem:e beyond a i·easonable doubt
that the accused, M. G. Frnncisco, dicl keep open and maintain on Sunclny the 7th of :-:lcpll•lllher in Hanover County
a business for the sale of 111wr 111111 llicl on snicl Sunday t<cll
beer, they should fincl him guilty und fix his punishment ut n
fine of not less thnn five doll111·11 (H., p. 128).
Verbal Instruction: "Thnt i,:; .what the insfruction tell;;

ASSIGNMEN'l'H 1, 2, AND 3.

cave was not a nel'essity'aa a.matter of law, but On p~ge~'731;"
it said: "We are unable to say that the verdict of the jury,
approved bv the trial court, is erroneous, and in such cases
the statute· requires us to affirm the judgment of the trial
court."
Before reaching this conclusion, however, the court discussed the ques.tim of what constitutes a "necessity" within
the meaning oLlhe law, at length, and held among other
things:
1. That the issue is one of fal't to be determined by juries
who reflect a community opinion of moral fitness and propriety ( p. 722).
~. Tlmt the word "necessity" cannot be construed to mean
the same thing now as it clicl when the original net was passed
in 1779. The word is- elastic ancl relative nnd must be con11trucc1 with refel'ence-to the conditions under which we live
(p. 722).

yo~ ~entlcmcn, that. the only q1Wl!tion involved is, do ~·011

believe from the evidence hl•voml a 1·cnsonnblc clouht that
~fr. l<'ranci~~o sold beer on Snndu~·· Now, if you helicVl'.
from the ev1clcncc beyond a rcni<onable cloubt that :Im 1<11hl
beer on Sunduy, then you must fiiiil him i..•uilty, and five 1lollars will be n snffidcnt fine to he lixe1l" (R., 11· 124).

\~%~~;;;:
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Since assignment<i of:crror, Nos. 1, 2, and 3 nll chnllcng11 LL.I
tl1e correctm•o;s of the coul't'K hohling mill in giving these two
inHtructi01u; they will he clisctu<l'l!ll together.
It is snhmitted thnt thh1 l'nsc is controllecl bv t11e l'llKcs ol'
Pirkey Brot11ers v. Com111011'11't'111tl1, i:l4 Vil'ginin 713, nml
J.,11k1isitle l1m v. Comm.11111111•11/111, J:l4 Virginia 69G •uml
7• that uncle1· the principles th1•rl'in lniil down, the qneKliun
involved in the cnRe waK 1i11e of fnct for the jury 1111.l 1111\
of law fol' the conrt.
:
In the Pirkey Brothers CRl'l', the defendants were chnl'l!:•'"
with lnhoring ut their trnde or e1llli11g in that they opemle1l
Weyer's Cave and that \hl! 1<11itl work was not one of m•c·l•s·
sitv or charity. 'P.hcre the cviill•IWl' wns submitted to a jury,
and on its vel'Clil't of guilty n judi.,rn1ent was entcrecl. I >11
!!PP.tal, this court did not declare that the operution Qf lh_e

3. 'r.l1at the necessity meant is not a physical or ubsolule
nccessitv, hut a moral fitness or propriety of the work and
lnhor done under the circumstances of ench particular case
(p. 72:~).
4. 'l'hnt 110 fixed ancl unvnrying definition of "necessity"
ns used in the stntute cnn be given1 •·but what may be a
s• necessity in one pla~e may not be m
another, nnd every
cnse mmit stancl 011 1t11 own peculiar facts (p. 723).
5. " 'Laws settiug aside Snndny ns a dny of rest are upheld not from nny riid1t of government to legislate for tho
promotion of reli.i:tious ohservnnce, hut from its l'i.~ht to protect nil personR from the plwsica\ and moral 1lcbnsement
which comes from uninterrupt~cl lnbor. Such laws hnve nlwnys bceu deemed beneficent ancl merciful luws, especially
to the poor nllll dependent to the laborers in our fnctories
. 111111 workshops, and in the heated rooms of om· cities· nncl
·:. flll'il' yaJidity lmR hcen sustained by the highest courts ~f the
. Stntes.' "

"These expres11ions, however, while clearlv condemning
lnhor 011 Sunclny, anrl mlvoenting the observm:1ce of the clay
a dny of rest, conve~· ·but little i<lea of how thnt rest hi to be
taken. The l'Ourts have heh! many things to he works of
.necesRity uncler cxi~tin~ eomlition11 of society, ancl have conclemnecl many more, but lmve heen unable to formulate any
rnfo of univcrs11l 11pplil'11tion. 37 Cyc. 552, rt .~eq.; 25 n.. C. r....,
pp. l41S-142B. Under theM circumstances, with no fixed rule
for our gniclnncc, we find no other course to pursue than
to apply to the statute the snmc rules of construction thnt

0. Franci!CO v. Coinmonwealth
---- ·.
ute has been construed: Pirkty ..Brothtrs v. Commnnwealth.._
134 Va. 713, 114 S. E. 764; Lakeside Inn v. Cotnmonwealt/i,
134 \'n.. G9G, 114' S. E. 769 and Crooks v. Commo11wenlth, 147
Va. 593, l;Jli R E. 51i5. However, these cas1>s considereJ only

'
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are applied to other statutes. The statute should 1ia1•e a rea- 1-sonaile constniction so us to promote the cud for which il
was enacted, and thus cover e\·cry cln.s~ of labor at C\'cr)' ~
trnde, c11lling or othE"r businclls not excepted by the st.ntuk. :::c:
'l'hc statute ~houl<l nlso be ru11.itn11·tl iu Ilic li_qlit of tl•r 11_qr ><
in u.1liitl1 we !ii:e, reco~itin~ the met thnt thcre are thin;.:,; ~
which the communitv rcl{nrd as m~-..·,w1ry thnt were not nl·n·saities when the stat-utc -wus fir:<l cum·k<l; that to e.icapc thl·
pcnnltv pronouuce<l by the stntutc, lhl• L1l>or performed must
l>C of the clns~ c.i:ccptc<l by thl• stutnll', or rceog11itl'<\ liy th"
commuuity n~ a nC<'l's•ity, 1111</ t/111/ w/111/ is or i.i uot a t1,..·r.<irity is gC11er11lly a question uf f11d fur //1t• jury n111l not 11111
of law for Ilic court. 'l'hcre on> rnl'l•,; when• the question i,
one of law for the court. Wlicn· tl•l' net ilonc is plainly ;
\'iolotiou of the stntut~. nK wli<·n• a n111tr11l'lor, without cllll'r~·!ncy, is ruuniu~ n stcntll 1'\11n'l·\ "" :-\l\th.lay, 01· tl10 net i:-..
p!ainly one of IIL'~c~sit_,., 11~ wli,·n· tl1<· """"<'r lifts Iii• ox out
uf tl1c <litch; in t.•itlil·r e1\:'\~, tl1l.' 1jlll''tio11 i~ Olh! of la\\' for
·the court. But if tlil! 11cl lie 11111· 11lu111t whic!1 fain11i11.J<'d
men rni~hl rc:1so11nbh· differ ns to wl><·ll1 .. r ur 11ot it is a work
of nccc.••ity, thc11 it· is a questiu11 of f;1d for th<• jnry. l f
it lie _ohjl'\:tetl that ti.is ll•a\'l'S Ilic 1Jtll''tiu11 1111s<•ttle.J,
!J• •with nothin~ for fut11n"' ):t1i.!a111·<., 1111,\ tli;1t ,1i1Y..n·11I
juries nwy real'l1 ditYerl'lll n• . . 11lts u11 th1..' sa111l' e\'itll'11l·1..•,
we cnn only reply thnt this is trn•· of ;ill qu~~ti1111< of fad
onJ is c'pecinlly uoticcnlile in l'ri111i1111J <'II'-'" 11111\ ens''"- i11vol\'ing questions of 11~:..:li~e11cc" (ilali,•s supplic>t\).
(I'.
7'.!5.)

The most recc11t case dcci<\,.,\ l·~· the \'in:inin Court 111'
Appeals is thot of J/11Hell L .. Jl'illi11111< \". ('0111111011u•c11/llr 1lt•ci1lcd on June 8th, 19.\:!, (not yet '"'l'"rl<'<l).
'
Jt is signilicn11t thnt the opi11i1111 i11 ti"• Willinms en~•· l'll·
tirely il{1111res the ens<! of r:llis '" c• .. ,.;u11l<i11, (1'.!'.? Vo. S:!I),
which ~\'l\S so can1e~11~· t"die<l 1111<•11 I"' tl1<• .l!lll:,:e of tlic 'l'ri;iJ
Cuurt 111 the instant ruse.
ll'illi11111s v. Cu11111101111w11lll. i11\·ol\'1'll the d111r~l'<l violntion
of Section 4!i70 i11 tl111t 'Villi11111,, '" the 1111111ni:<'l' of two
thc11tres in F'arl\\\'illc, opcrntl'd tl1<•111 1111 S1111<1:i\' i11 lll-C11l"ll·
nnce with 1111 ll){r!.'ClllC'nt with tl11· \\'11111a11's Clnh.that till' 111·1
-. 1irocec1ls o~ the thcntrcs fro111 t 11<· S1111.lay perfon1111m"<''
wonld Jie !.i1Vt'll to the C'lnh to Ju• "·""! t'or chnritnhle \'llr)1oscs.
On PBA'C 3 of the opinion, ?.Ir . .Tnstin' Urcgory, Rpcukin~
for the Court, snys:
"There hove been three Vir;..:inin <'nst•s iu which our stnt-

L.)

works of• necessity 1 and not works of' clinrity'. • • •
"In the Pirkey IJros. cnse the question for Jecision was
whether it was n \'iQlf!!ion of the statute to keep open a cave 011
Sunday where an odmission fee was chuq;ed. 'l'hc cu~e was
snhmitted to a jury on the question of necessity um! a couviction followcJ. This Court nffirmed the judh'lnent of the tri11l
Court. Judge Mortin P. Burks, speal:in~ for the Court
anid thnt ••no fixed and unvarying dclinition of "ncccs10• sity" ns used in the Statute cnn he gi\'cn,' thnt the issue
must be de<"idcd hy the juries in the 1·cspcctive locolities
who nrc select ell for their 1it11ess nnd who will ret\el'l the com111n11ity opinion ot' the lllornl titnes• n11d propriety of tlw work.
.l u'11!e Hur:.;s :-:nid:
· \\'e <':11111ut liu\\"e\'cr, ngre<• with the few l'llllrts that
liold tlint tl1e word "m•<·cssit\·'' 111nst be eo11strncd tu
Iltl'Hll tl1e s:uu~ tliinK now H!'\~ it did wl1L·n t\1p ori.~inul
11.-t was pn""'"I in li7!l. ~hwy tl1i11~s that ""-''"~ dec111l'd
luxurit•s then, or h111l IHI existence nt nll, arc now dee1m•<l
11<'1.'l''""ri<·s. I•'or <'Xnmple, "tn•••t rnilwnys, l••le:~rapl1s 1111,l
h·h·phlllll's. '\'h<' won\ i" ..J11,..li<· nnd r<'!ati\'c, :rn<l 111nst lie
l'1111-.... tna·tl witl1 n•fl1 l'l 1 1H.~1...' to t11\! eoihlitio11 . . l\llll1..•r ,,,.J1il'l1 we
Ii"'" nnd ~·..,t lhl' ••lnstirity mnst 11ot h<• cxh•1Hl,•d "" far llH
\u <'"<I""'' thnt wlii<·h is 1101 IH'<•dt'ul 11111 si111ply .t.•sirnlile, 11111!
tlil·n·h~· ,h•t\·nt tlil.• 1uunit\•i;t p1t1·po-;l' of tl11..• ~tntuh• to ~L·l
npnrt ~11nd11y UK u tln.v ot' n·sl frunl onlinnry 111\iur. S/11/r• v.
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J111rr.-s, Sl S. C. 1!17, l;:! S. E. :!14, l~ L. IL.\.(~. S.) 1;17, l:!'l
,\ 111. !-it. Hep. !lO:!, Hi A 1111. Cn,, 277 .
"' J 11 :in l'nrly ~!11ss:i..11ust•tb •·n.sc ( Fl111u1 \" ..lli//l111ry, 4
l~ush. :!4::), it wns s11i1l thnt lhl• ll<'C<'ssitv lll<'llnt was 1111t n
phy,.;ic:il nnd uhsolutc lll'<'••ssily, hut n lll~rnl 1it11<•,.;s or proP•~<·t~- ot' tlll' work nn<l lnlior done 1111d,•r the ,·irv11111•t111"''"' of
P:tl'h pn rt it.·nln r c.·nst..
"It wns 11~1,1 !lint tho hurilen of proof wns upon the ComlllOllW<'11llh to pro\'l' thnt tho work <lonl' ll'llS 1101 n work of
lll'l'1'ssitv 1 or tl1nt it 11'<1.• 1101 11 work of <'lrnritv. 'J'h,• 1111r,J.·11
uf provin~ l'\'\.·r~· t·h.•int•nt of the on\•n..:~ \\':\~ \ )\t\\..'1..•d nputa tlie
\ \n11nw11weulth.' 1
1

•

•

•.'

0

"'l'hc l.al.-i·sit/1• 11111 Corp. l'llSl' fullo\1-.·d \'1•ry .. 1,,s .. ly tl1<•
Pirkey Bros. rnso nml the prirll'ipl<'' of th<• f1in11 .. r ""''"' npplic<I in the lnttnr \\·hen• tlil• qll•'<lion was wl1<•ll11•r 1;,.,,pi111:

11pl111 on ~ttndny n swinuuing pool \\"111-i n work uf lll~ct·s~ity.

'l'his Court re\'l'l'SC<I tl1c j111l~111••11t of the low"r <'unrt 011 i11-
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this. The accused was not so indicted. He

WRS

indicted

for l11boring at n. trade or calling on Sunday. It is no crime

vl•:1rs lit..•fon.•.

· It, tlier,•fon', }..,hooves us to cxuminl' these two case~ with
c111«•. I 11 t lie E\lis ens<', cocn-cula w11s ~,,\,] on Snndny uml
the ~nlc wns u1ndl.' in l ~HG, over lwl'nty-t\\'e years 11:,u. In
tl111t case', thl'1·c wns no jury tri11I, the jnry lo:1vin'( Leen
w:iin·d :111,I th.: '!ll<'s\ious of lnw a!lll fol'! wc•rc· liot 11 ~nl1111itt,•il tu thL' court, who fo11111l the• n•:cns.•d guilty. '!' 11is
l'onrt, in its upi11io11, did nut discn.;~ th,• qllcstiun of what
io n work of nl'<"<'<sily 111al whnt is nut, or wl1,•ther that
'llll':stion i" ou<• of lnw for thl' court, or olll' of fad for t!1e

followR:

jnr.'·, or wln.•tht•r wl1:1t is or is Hot u Ul'~l:'~=--ity l'l'lllnins ~tnti(~
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It will he noted thnt thr Trial ( 'uurt i11 the Russell \\'illiams cnse foll into n similnr Nr11r :1s tli<l the .Jml~'"C uf lhl'
Circuit Court of Hnnov<>r, in th:1t hl' g-ave 11 fimlint: instrn,··
tiun which took tlw clcterminntion of lhl' question of ;,chnrity"
out of the hnnds of the jnry, an1l \\'Hs in violntion of tl11•"'
principles i;o clt>nrly cnuncintcll h." ,Jntlg"c Burks in the Pirkey
nml Lnkeside cnse~.
'l'he forc!(oin!( principles linvin.!( h<•c>u so <"lcarly stutell, wu
confess thnt W<> nre 11nnhle lo <·<11nprchcncl how the lenrlll'<I
.Tmh~e of the trinl conrt arrivn\ nt the <"onclusion he <li1l in
the instnnt cnse. It may hl', hm''l'\'l'r, thnt he wns llllllnly

rrcorJ, he says: "'.l'he accused was indict eel for the. sole
011 Sunday." Of course, he was mistaken in

of "beer

to sell bffr, Ill! sucJi..on Sunduy, and from a strictly legul
standpoint, the fnct that in this instunce the article sold wllS
hecr do<>s not put the case on any ditforent basis t1.1an if tl,iut
nrticJ., had been 11e11r-bcer. or nny other soft drink, wluch
the public 1ni"ht con•idcr t~ be '.' !1ecessity.
•
It further uppenrs frotn Ins op1111011 thnl he buses bis conclusions luqrcly upon the nuthority of lei/is v. Covi,,91011,
l:!:! \'iq~inin ~:!l, 111al /fougrr v. Cumtno11u·ccilth, 107 \'irg-i11ia
~7:"!, thl• lntll:r huving hel'll tlecitkd in l~l(N, fourte<•n yenrs
k•fur,• the l'irkl'y Hruthers case, nn<I the furma i11 1~H7, tivc

><::

q\ll'.'"·

"The Court in~tructs thl' jun· that n 'work of chnrity n-<
used in the Mlntntc menn~ thnt thl· \wrk itself mnst h<• cl1nritnble; that if th(> <l<'f,•ntlnnt was work in!( at his nsnnl \nu\,.
011<! cn\lin!( which itst•lf w:i~ not d1aritnhk', lltlll wn~ n•,·,•ivillg consideration for such work, '""''" thonl.'l• the tll't pruc<•<>cls of lhe result of Iii~ lnh11r an• !(i\'<'11 lo chnritv, J,.., lo:1s
violntcd the Statute, 111dcs.~ the inn· sl1all hL·lil'Vl' that tlw
ucen:-;e<l was <.·n~n~~ll in :l \'t'Ork of \H;l'l•ssih· H'i dcfincll in t 111'
other instruct i~11s."
·

.

impress~ with th<.! alcoholic contents of the J?roduet that w48
sold, for in the very first sentrnce of his opinion, which will
i~ founJ C'ornmN1ci119 on paqe 5 of the clerk's transcript of the

•
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atructionB, and on the failure of the lower court to admit certain material evidence. In the l'Ollrl'C of the opinion, Judge
I.lurks said:
·'' 'Preliminary to this discus.sion, it may be stated that
i! wl111t i~ done by one- is justified unJer the statute a.s 11
necessity, then the labor which is thereby entailed on another
as a necessary incident is likewise justified. Hence we 11ee<l
only inquire aio to the necc~sity of the act entailing the consequent labor, for without tht> labor the 11ct couhl not be douc.
As pointed out in the Pirkev Brus. l'asc, the 1wcessity meunt
by the st11tute is uot 11 physical n<,'<.'ssity, llllt a moral fitm~s•
or propriety of the work nnd lnhor tlone under the circu111Rtances of the partic11lnr case, nn<I whether or not the net in
question i$ mor:d!y f:t nntl proper i~ usually 11 ~uestion
n • of fnct to Le «leterminl'<I !"· a jury alter heurin~ tl1t·
tl'stimony rek•,·:int to th:it parli~nlar net, und n..:civi11;.:
proper i11,trnctio11s from ti•<' <"u11rt, 11pun r<'t\Uest, ns tu th ...
proper i11tcrpret:1tiun ul .. 111.."i..'l':"':...it,·" ;1s used in the statull'.
It i< tlie !nnction of the court to i11l•·q11«·t th<> st11tute, Lnt wlll'll
l!1is has l1cen <lone, it is usua\h- ti"• f\\nction of the jury, as
tile n•prcscntntivc of the muralih· uf the communitv to ,h•t iun. 1
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Hill! is th<' sanw nl nll p\:\c,•s 1111,] 11111h•r 11!! l'1111,!itiotl', or
wli<•lh<•r it mn~· vnn· with thl.' ti1m•s, pl:ic<•s a111l ,... ll,1iH" lions, "hut in 1111 op\niun of !,•so.; t!1n11 n pa;:'' in l.·11'.!'tli,
lll<'r<'IY nl~irrne<l lh<· jmkllll'lll of tl1,• tri:d nmrt, wl1il'l1,
m; "lnlt-tl, ncl<•1l ns hot!1 jn<k•· nut! jury, 1111,J wl1<•tl1"r tl1e
q11cstio11 wns <ll'ci<ll'd ns n rnatln uf lnw ur ns :i lllattcr of
fact. doc~ uot llJ'\ll'llr.
We, then•fon', snhmit thnt thl• Ellis ens<' is 11nthoritv for
1101 hing-, c~cept thnt it wu~ unlawfnl to ,,.11 <'m•a-cula ;;1 tl1c
towu of (\.ivlH~ton n qunrter of a l'l•ntur\' a~u.

Certain~\'

th,• tit11l'.S 111HI l'Un<litions hnvc cli11n\.'.1'd ,:onsidcrnhlv "in1·«·
~hn.t dav'. li~it 11~twithst11n1li11g- thi~, if th,• .trinl l'ollrt Ii;•""'"''!
111 1b op1tllon, 111 the 111st1111t cnsc, th,•n 11 t'ullu11·s thnt it is
nnln\\'fnl to sl'll n cot•n.culn ur other Hoft 1lrinb 011 .'-'1111dav """·
\\'hcrc in thL• ~t11lc a., 11 maller of /,111•. \\',. know 1•1111" t\o,.;..,
l\l"l' ~llllllY S<..'nsillt..• rC'sorts, nnd r1..•cn.•ntion:d l'nrl.;!'I lllld l'l)JJlllllllllty center~, wl11ch hnvc hcen csl11hlishcd lioth hv the "UY·
c;rnttll'llt 111111 hy privnte ctt!l'rprisc, "'.hi,:h tll"l' ,·is~tcd c;ery
:->n11(lt1y liy tltrou:-:s of lonn~ls nntl 111c111ckl'rs 1111d nl whit:h

·.
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10ft drinka are regularly sold. If such sales be unlawful,
as a matter of law, then judgt>R, proi;t-cuting attorneys am!
other luw-enforcement officers arc lmowiugly "winking" nt
1-law violutions all over the Stak
It will l>e noted that the case of R1Usdl L. Williams against
CXJ
I~ (:omr11ot1111eallh (S11pra) not only i~non:11 the Ellis v. Couit1glcm e11se but sustains our position that the luw which cou- ~
trola ia tl111t lnid down in Pirkey llrotl·~r" v. Comn1ot1wealtlt
><
LU
and in Lakeside /nH v. Commonwt'alll•, in thnt the question
Ila lo whether or not the work i~ o ...·ork of 11~-ccssity should
be ~ubmitted to n jury.
.
•
0 ln l!anqa v. Curnr110H1cenltli, ""/ira, tho 111a1D ques15°
tion invoh·<.'<l was the forfeiture of n ch11rtcr of n social
clnb on a quo 1carrClf1to p~t>tlin):'~, uml tlic entire opinion
of the l'ourt wns llevote1l to a 1li>cll"''iu11 of Ilic luw with
respt-ct thereto. It i~ true thnt i11 tlit• t·unrse of the opinion
t!ie ('UUrt ~ni1! thnt ''tlae prl'lcnilc-.1 ·11~:111iwtion of n ~oc·ial
c:1d.1 w:1s fur till' frau1lu'.l!11l purpu•l! .. r ''"·11ri11:.: tl1c privil.::.:c·
oi sc!liux toLaecu, ci~ar!I, cignreth•:-o., :--lll\;l-wutcr, nnll other
soft dri11k~ ou Su111by-privile>:" wlii«l1 au i11clivi1lnnl cou Id
11ot e~ercisc without incurriu>: the furf•·ilml! i11 Sc'Clion :li'!l!I
of thl! Code (new 'coelion 4S:u)" but tl1i, ,c•,•111~ tu l1a\'c IK c•11
· coucet!ed for the 1mrpo":s of tl111t <-:1.'L'. ,\I :11<.\' rate there•
wns 110 discus•ion us to !lac prop<•r 1·•111-trudiun of the "~un·
c.lny Lnw" 11ml no priuciplcs of law will, n·spl!d tlierdo Wt•rc
enn11c1nted.
All lhnt we have· just i;ni<l witli "'''l""·I tu the Ellis cnsc·
mii.:ht l~ repeated here with rl!spl'('( tu tlw llune;cr ease. "\'
1-hes!, it mcrl'iy held lhnt thl! snlc of tolia•"<"'• soft 11ri11k•, ck.,
in the City of l'orts111onth in 1!1e y1·nr l!K~"--::4 yenr" u~o-
cO
was unlawful. I·'nrtl1crmorc, if 1111ythi11.: 1111<1 ht•t•n s11id iu
Ilic llnll!jl'r c&llc whirh wns in 1·11ulli.-1 with th<! l'irkt·,·
::I:
llrotlacrs cnsc, tlccidc1l iu 1!1:22, (11n1l ti1<·r1• was not), it wuul;l
><
hnvc hcl•n overrule>1l liv the lnl<•r C:l'L', wl1id1 sp1'Cilicnllv luilds
LLJ
that 111ercly hccan~~ 1; thin~ 11u1y 1101 11;1\'l• IR"l'll a n~Cl.'~sity
nt one time or nt one place, it 1lul!s 1101 follow that tl1c ~11111e
thinl.\' 11111y not be 11 11t-ccs~it.v 11t n11otl11·1· li111c oi- nl nnotla1•r
place. 'l'hnt thi~ st11lc1m•11t is trn1", we• k11uw •not univ
16° from the Pirlw~· c:1s<! lint nlso fru111 our ):l'llL'rlll knuwicde;c und experie11cc. We lrnow 111111 nt various times
in the )Jn~t it was not considert'll ll<'<'<'':~ary tu kiss one's wifo,
or to 11rcpnrCJ. n hot meal, or to pulih~h n m•wspnpcr, or to
operate n frc1~ht train 011 8nn<lnv. y,.t nll of the~c thin"s
ure now rC!!lll'llcd ns nccc.isnr~· o;· pn>p<•r.
~
I...ikcwiso, Wl' <lo 11ot think tlai11 court will huhl lhnt hcl'nasc
the sale of soft 1lrinks in Port~month in the rcnr 1!)0~ was
11ot n uec~ssi,ty, it follows as 11 111111/•·r 11[ l11tc th:it their sulc
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now anywhere in the State i~ "Still-not a necessity.· In 19M ·
pcoplc stayed at home on Snndny. In 1942 they drive all
uver the St:itc, nnd to sny that on such trips thev coul<l nut
lawfully purchase !'Oft drinks for themselves and their children would work a l1anlship indet>d.
Further in the opinion of the trial Judge, he quotes the
following extract frolll-Eirkcy Brothers v. Commonwealth,
.rnpra:

"' • • • There arc l'n&es where the question is one of law
for the Court. Where the act done is plninly a violntion of
the stntute, ns where 11 control'tor, without emcr~cncy, i~
runnin~ n ~lcnru slaovl'! on Sundny, or tlae uct i~ plninly ono
of m•cc·s~ity, ns where the owner lifts his ox out of till' ditch;
in cithl!r t:nsc, tl1e <JllC~tion i~ one of l:w: for the Con1·t. llnt
if tl1e 11t:t OL' une nhont which fnir111indc1l men mi).!'hl rcuso11uh1'· (liffl•r u~ to wla·1l1er or 11ot it is n work of necL·~-;ity, then
it is u question of fnl't for tlu.~ jnry.' "
th~ Supreme
\ 'nurt of Ap1ll'nls in Iii<' Ellig c11st• lll'l<l thnt tlw snl<! .of coca1·ola in l'ovi11;:lo11 in l~)lli wns not :i work of lll'<'l!Ss1ty, !lien
110 fnir-111i11d<•1l 11111111':111 <litfor on the qm•stion of wh<!tlaer
li• or nut •tlae 8nk• of ht•er in Hanover Co1111tv in 1!1·11 is
n work of Ul'N.'••ity. !11 vil•w of nil of the ,;ll1cr principles, with n•SJl<>ct lo lli<• word "lll'<'l'~nily" ht·in~ cl11stic 111Hl
rPlntin• 111ul ils 11w1111in~ vnn·in~ with the ti1111', plm·e, 1'lc.,
wl1icl1 wt•rt ~o clt•nrl\' J1J1uounrl•tl in tlil' \'l•rv 1•nsl• fn1111 wliiclt
llil· 11110\'l' l:'Xln1<·t i!'\ iula•u, Wl' Nttlnnit thnt rill•rel~· to ~tntc tl11.~
l't1lh'~11siou tlrnwn is su!,icit 1tt proof of it~ f:tll1H·y.
It is s11lJ111ill1•1l thnt the sale of h1•<'r do,•s 11ol 1•0111<' witl1i11
thl• cnh·.1 ~lu·y of n contrnt•tnr npernti11J.!' n t-.lt•:1111 sho\'l'I, for
fainni1ul1•d 11w11 tlu diffor 011 till• quc•,fio11 uf whdlic·r ur 11<1t
111<• forn1L•r is 11 lll'CL'"ity. 1f nil f:1ir-111i11<le1l 1m·11 tlaou;:lat
it wns· not n work of nece••il~', it \\'011ld he nnlawflll tu ~1·11
lll't•r 011 e-;nmlny 11nvwlll•n• in tlw Rt:1te, y1•! it is !1t•i11v; suld
111u·nh·. '!'la,• Ah-oholic Bl.'verni:-<! Co11trol llonnl, wlail'h is
"'l'POS('t\ lo hl' ('Otnpose1l of fnir-111i111h•1l lllCll, ]ll'l'lllits ii to
Ii .. "'''1 on Smuin~· i11 nil pln<'l'S, CXl'<'l'l in 1laos1• pl:11·1•s i11
whi1·la local onli1111ne1•8 prohihitin~ siwh snlc•s 1111\'c• l1<•en
1ulopll'<l. 'l'he \l•:nl'rn) AR<emhly of \'iq,iuin, lik.·wis.• "'l'posed to lw cu111post•«I of fllir-minch•d 111<•11, iu l!J:1-; pns<pd 1111
11<'1 (Acts J!l:I~, I'· 1!14) !!iVini:: to thl' Bo:1rd of S11p1•r\'i>ors lilt•
nnthoritv to n<lopt onli111111t·1·~ prohiliilin'! tla.- snl1• of 1,..,.r 011
!'-;nntln\' in thl•ir l'l'NJlcclivt? Connlil•s. If fnir-111i11th•1l 11H•n 1lid
1111t dilTcr, nnd if it WL'l'l' conce11t•1l thnt lhe snl" of liel'r 11 11
:-;nml:iy viol11tl•1l St•ction 4:'.i70 of tlic Co<le, why, mny we usk,

lie tlien 1lrnws the ('Unrlnsion thnt liL-causc
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·.ahould the General Auembly gh·c to the Board of 'Supervisors thi? power to declare nu uct, that was 11\ready unlawful
under the general law, lo l.>C unlawful 1
1s•
Hfhe full te:it of the Act of 1~:>5 is as follows:
"Be it clll!cted bv Ute Ocuer.il ..\t;J;t>wbly of Virginin, 'l'h;it
tl1e board of supervi,cm1 or otl1l'r ~""\'eming bo<ly of l·m·h
county shall havt! authority to mlopt or<linances effecti\·., iu
that portion of such couul\· 1101 l'llllirut'l'<l within the 1'tlr·
porutc limits of any city ur lm"'q"'rntcJ town, nn1l the council or other governin!(' IJ<xly of 1·11d1 <"ity auJ lowu shall hu\'l'
11uthority to u1lopt onli111111cc,; 1•ff"·ti,·c in such city or bw11,
pruliibitin!{ the imlc of 1..,a mul "·i1ll', or either hct•r or wi111•,
uet\\'ccll the J1uur~ ui twdn· u'duc:k post 111cri1lia11 of l'lll'h
o:-;utun111y nml six o'cl~\; u111l' 1111:ri1liau of t•ucla \!omluy, ur
f::ting- liours within snil1 t>t•riut! ,1uri11~ vd1ic11 wiue unll IK.'1'1',
or l.'it11er, 111uy In~ sulll, nnd pn·-.cril1i11~ filll'S litlll otl11...•r )WtluJties for ,.·juJntious uf ... uclt unli11:111n..•:; wbic!1 :--hnll Ix: ''11fun·L'll by proc-L''"li11,,->' i11 Iii;,• 11.a!lll<'r !Ill<\ with likt• ri;:l1t cd
uppcnl us if ~11ch ,·iulntiu11~ "'''"' 111i,-.k111c:\llurs. !'ru\'i<h-<I,
l1owe\·er, tliul snd1 unli11a11<·t'" -liall 1111! L'il'L'l'l ll1t• tWI,• uf (,,., ...
Hll'-1 wive on pn,sen::l·r train ... ur !"le111u ,·e~sl1 ls wllill• up·
crutiuo; in inten•tutl' cun11111·n·,•.
"Upon the 111loptio11 uf a11y ~1 ... li 11nli11n11ce a copy th,•n·uf,
tluly l'Crtificd I)\' thl' t·lcrk of till' ;:o\·,·rni11){ ix><h• 11.Jupti11,,.
thl• l!l.llllL' shnll he lrnt1•111ilh•I !11 tlu• \"ir;:i11i:1 Ak;1!10li,· (\,.,..
cru~c Coutrul Hunnl, 1111d lln•r,,.1f1t•r l'\"l•rv rct11il lir-l'11M' (...
~llc<l by sni<l boar,\ for till' "d'· ur 1,...... 1111;1 wi11,• ur ,·it111·r .. r
tlie111 in the l"OU11ty, l·ity or tow11 i11 wliit·h slH~h on.li11n11c,· """'-"
mlopk<l, .. !ml! he li111i!t-1l in ""'urcla111·<· with the pro,·i~i1111of snch onli111111cc. lipu11 n•· .. ipl of the n·~onl of llll• c·u11vietion of 1111\' lict'll~<'t• uf till' l11i:11.J for the viul11tio11 uf 1111\'
sncli onlinnnrc, th(' lionrtl 111:iy, i11 it..; tli ... l·nltiou, ':'nsp,·11d .;r

'l'hi~ Act is refcl'l'l•d to,

111111

t!IC' proviso embrncccl iu tl1t·

Inst pnrn!.!rnph tl1crt>of is q11olt-cl. i11 th" opinion of !ht• tri:.J
Jmh:c. ln colllllll!llting tl11·n•1111 Ill' su.1·s tlmt if sc•ctiun .i;,711
of the Coile llill not prohibit 1111• snl1• of hcer, Jllll'sl1a11t 111
one's trnc1e or c:illin,., thc11 lhl'I'<' wunlcl hnve hccn 110 llt't'l'~sity
fur this proviso, nm\ thnt: "Oi' 11<·1·cssity, the General ,\s~emhly must h:ivc 1:011t"illllcd tl1:1! Sl'elion 4.'i70 of the l'o1h·

prohibited the saleof wi.xi.~and beer on s11n:daf~nd Qiat'?
1t was, by "ch11pler 129 of the Acts of 1939, merely !!'iving to tho l0t•alities tlw nuthority to parallel the existing State law·• • • ". He then likens the Act lo the various
statutes enacted during tht> prohibition em permitting locnlitics to ndopt ordinances parnllelling the State luws, so
that such lo<"nlitic~ could colll'Cl the fines, nnd intimates or
concludes that this.Act wall adopted for the same purpose.
All of this appeurs to us lo be fur-fetcheJ, indeed. 'Ve
tl1i11k thnt it is much more loiric11l to sav that if Section 4570
of tl1e Code nlre111ly prohibite;l the sale
ul'er ns a Malter of
/111c, the11 it wns 1111 ubsnnlity to pnss tlw Act of El:oq, for
tl1t•re is cert11i11!y nothing in it tu i11die11lc tl111t it wns passl'<l
n~ n 1·~vcuuc llll':\snrc tu e11uh1e the lol·nlitil·~ to colh~t 111unev
throu::h tl1e i111position of Hues. A~ni11, it' tlie General .A;H·111hlv hml i11kml,•,\ 111erclv to pcr111it thl! lue11!itic~ lo ndopt
11 p:11·;tllt•l onli11a11ec lo 5cctlo11 4;,7u of the Coile, it cou\,J ha\·e
dune :-.u iu so 111:u1y worlls, as it dill du iu tl11.._• . .·nse of tlil.! pro!iihitio11 s\11lntc•, rcfl'l'n·•l to II\' tl1e trial .l11ile-1·.
ls it llul 11111ch 111ore Ioi.:i1•11!. lo "1~· t 11at t'.1,• proviso wns
l']a,•<'ll i11 !ht• i\d b,'l'nu;e uf the lrnlili11!.! of the court i11 t!1e
l'irkc•\' llrull1t•rs 1·11s1• ! It will bt• r1•111c11il1er,•1\ !hut it was
tlll•re la•'1l !hut wli:1t iM or i~ 11ot n 111•ee<Silv is u11e ot' fad
lo be dl'll•n11i11 ..•..l hy jnri1..•s who h·llt~t tlic l'u;111111111it~·'s upin·
iu11 uf tl1l' 111urnl lilll<'ss t1111\ prnprid~· of !ht• net, 111111 that
what 111ay hl• n lll'1..·1..·s"it~· i11 u11t pla~l' 111ay 11ut la! iH a11otltl'I".
l111dt•r tl1is lio!tli11!{ n jnn· i11 1111110\'<•r l'u1111tv 111i~ht
0
:!ll• say tlint 1ht• sa!,• ~1f l><•t•r 1s 110! 11 wurl; uf lll'<'<'~si1v, i11
wl1id1 l'll"<' it wunlcl folluw that slll'i1 11 rn!,• wou!d lie
1111lawf11! 1111dc•r Sl•t•liu11 .1:,;o uf till' Codi•. 011 tl1e olhl'r, tl11•
j11ry 1111-.:ht say lh:1t it is 11 work of lll'l't'"'ity, iu wl1il'!a rnse
li1l' "1k• wuul,t 11ut ht• nnlnwflll 1111cll'r tl1al ,,.,·tiu11. '~'lieu, if
tl1at jnry 1li1! 11ul truly rellt•t•l ll1t• 1·u1111111111itv's opi11iu11 !hut
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su<:h Iiccuse.
"lt is fnrlhl!I' provi11t'tl, l11J\\·,.,·,·r, tl111t 110 pro\·i~io11 lu·r.·i11 ><
co11tninc1l, 1101· 1111~· onli111111<'<' that 11111.'· he pa~~e1l in p11r'11· u.J
!111c·e tht>rcof, shnll he co11strn1·tl a" i11 :111y wny 11!tcri11!.!, 11111•""'·
1n;; 01· rept..•nliu.~ s~ctio11 furt_,·-t'l\.l' l1111ulrt•d n1Hl Sl'\'l'lll ,. 111'
lhl! Code of Viq.(iniu."
·
l"l'Vnke

': >·.:. -~~

w

lq1i11ioll l'U\lh\ lw r ... n.. ·c.:ll•d 1iy the :aloptiu11 uf n lv'-•;d onli;1111H"~'
·In· llfl• lluanl uf ~llp<·rvi~or,;, 111:1l;i11~ till• ~:1h· 111d:1wf11! no.
"'"""''~"of th1• lll'lio11 uf \lie jury. !11 oll1,•r worcls 0 l':ll·i'1 lu-

rnli\\· i~ 11uw :.:i\'t'll twu upp11rt1111iti1•s lo <'Xfll'l'" \11<· rn1111111111it~"s opi11iu11 of the 111ornl litlll'" 1111<1 propridy of sl':li11,,- ill'l'l' 011 S11111l11~', 011e thron,,-li its juri,•s :ind the oilier
thro11c:!1 its 1\111.'· t•lt'l'tl•tl n•prl!sc11tntivc•, wh,•r1•11, it lm1l 01ily
1111<• pruir lo the tms•n:.:l· of lhl' ,\ct of 1~J:\'i.
111 this s11111c l'Olllll!dio11 \\'l' would Iii;.• tu 11111k,. 1111utl1er
\ll'rlillt!lll ohsl'rv11tiu11. \Vhc11 tl1l' <'11\ir1• ,\l'l is rv111l, it will
ht• M't'll th11l Ii~· llll' l'Xpn•ss tcnns \lfl•reof llfl• lul'11! 11 11tl:uriti1•s url' gi\'l'll ll!e puwl'r, not only lo proliiliit th,· s:dc uf 1,..,...
h1•lw1•l'll the pcno1l from S11t11rcl11y 11i;:lit tu ~1011<!11~· 111orni11.:.:,
1111\ 111so tu lix the "/1u11rs will1i11 suicl Jiaiocl cl11ri11y u•l1ici1

1'
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wine and beer, or either, 1nay lir .fold." It therefore follow~
that if the trial Judge's conclusion he sounil, then the Ocuernl
Assembly is placi!d in the nh•unl position of nttcmpti11:.: tu
c011fer upon the local authuriti<·~ the power to dC{'ln1·,. an
net to be !llwful, which it, lht• Cit•11cr:1l Ass<>mbly, k11ows ;,.,.
onlnwfu! under the gent'rnl lnw.
21°
"For th rcasona 11Lov,· nssii.:ne<l, it is rcspt-ctfull.1·
submitted iliat the quc,,tiuu of whether or not tlw '"It·
of beer on Sund11y by petitioul'r wns n work of nl'CCSJ!it~· w;1.•
a question of fact for the jn~· 11111! that the court t•rr..•I i11
holding tliat it wns une of lnw.

therein done was ·morally"fit anQ proper to be done on Sunday,
then ther mav find that the work of conducting such fill22• ing stnllon for tho purposes outlined, 0 is necessary
within the meaning of the stntute and they should find
Ibo defemlaut not guilty (rt, p. 129).
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The court WRS re<JuestC"tl In :.:iw lo the ~ury on ~halt nt
the petitioner nine 111strucliu11', all of wluch wt•re 1cf11,, .. L
'!'he first seven uf tl1~111 arc 11' fulluws:
~o.

Tl1t• Court instrurt" thl' jury thnt tl11~ qnc•,tion of whetlll·r
th,• nrt of kt•1·pi11:.: lht• 1k•fc111l1111t 's pl:tre of lrnsi111'ss open 11n1l
•l'lliur:- l1<'<·r 011 S11111l:tr w11s 11 work of H<'<'•'''ity witliiu 11,,.
111,•1111111g of the !-itatnll', b n 11uestio11 of fud for Ilic jnry,
1111d in t1,•t·iili11i.: tlmt qne•lion tl1c j1wy n111y i:ousitler the rnnll·
111•r i11 whid1 th•• pn•111i~t'~ 11111! the bu~i11cs>1 co1111cclc1l then'with W•.•rt• rnn, th,• l'ff,...·t which the opt•11it1;:?; of lhl' pince 111111
tl1t• ~111,. of l>l'<•r tl1t•n•fro111 hn~ 011 tht• 1:001! unkr 1111<1 rnornl
\n•lfnn• of tht• 1·01111111111ity, 11111[ wht•llll•r ur 110! it ((·11tls tu
the unlerly nntl 111urnl n'l"rcution of the public (It, 11. 1:lO).

'.!:

The Court inMlructs the• jury tloat tl1c liunh•n of proof ion the Commonw<'nlth lo (•stnl1li-li l"•v11111l n n•nsonnLlt• 1l1111li1
thut the 1ll'fe1Hl1111l iu th<' 1111<•rati1111 ·.,f hi~ husinesx suit! 1111
S11111l:iy hccr ns nlk:.:<'d lo li:in· J,.•1·11 ~olil in the i1nlid1111·11t.
nn1l ll111t the 11thor uml h11si1u·-~ in "' 1loi11~ wt•re 11ot 11 1n11 k
of 11eccssity. or chnrity, rn11l 11111:·~~ Iii,, t'ommo11w1•alth '"''
met this hunlt•n, they sl1u11ltl liud Ilic th•fomln11t ttol ~11ill.'

No. 5:

lust rurtiun No. G:

The Court instructs the ju1·~ that thL• purpow uf ti ... law
iu prohibiting wurk fro111 t ... ·i1o·~ .!01"• 011 Sn11d11y i• to ;.:i1···
to the jrnlilic u rest fron1 it• "'"tn111nry l11hnr for tht· l1t·11 .. 1il
of \Juth the morn\ 11nd pliysi<·nl uature of mnnkiml, 1111<1 1101
for the purpose of c11fur1"i11;.: II"· 1... ·li,•fs or teul'ls of 1111.'· n·
li!,oions cret'1.l or denumiuuti1111 (IL, l'· 1:!::!).
Instruction No. 3:

In~~ruction

Tho Court instructs ilio jury thst n work of necessitv ns
meant by the Statute of Virginia, is not 11 physical allli nbsolute necessity, but a morn! fitness or propriety of the work
or lnbor or net done under tho circumstunccs of cuch pnrticulcr case (H., p. 130).
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ASSIGNMENT 01" ~;1moR ~o. 4.

lustniction
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Till• Court instrudK lht• jmv thnt ir tl1t·v lin1I frn111 1111•
c1·itll'llN1 that the opt•niny: of th,• 1ll'ft·111lnnt ;s plnl"l· of b11silll'·'·• mul th<' 1'nl1• tlll'rdrnm of li1•1•r on Snn1l11:·, i' n pnlili•·
lll'l'••ssnry within the lllt'llllill;.:- of the Htntnh', lhl'n 111,· t\d,•n1l·
11111 ~l1011ltl he fo11111l 1101 guilty (IL, p. J:ll ).
I11structio11 No. 8:

(R, p. l:!U).

Instruction No. 4:
Tlte Court in~trucls thl' jun Ilia! if tl1c\· fiml fr11111 1l1o·
cvillencc thnt the kecpin:.: 01n•tt .l1y lhl' 1lefrmln11t of his pl;w,·
of ·l1usines.~ on ~nmlny, n11tl lht• 'ale therein of fh<' l1t•t•r a."
nlle~ed in the i11dictment IC'111h·<I to promote the n·n~o11nl1lt•
l"ccrention, und nccessnry et111n·ui1•111·c of the trnvcllini.t 1111'.ti,._
nncl thnt the premises wlll'rl' '1ti1l h11~i11csl\ wn~ tn111s11d•··l
w~n:,kept in un orderly nnd qnil'I rnnnncr, nnd thnt Ilic ~··n~

Tht' Court instrul't, tho jnry tlint tlll'r•• i• 110 liH·d ur un·
v11r~·i111?: th•finition of tht• won\ "uccc•ssity", lint 1111 the otht•r
hnnd, it i, nu l'lnsti1• 111111 n•lntivc word nntl 1111t• tl111t 111ust l1l'
t•o11struC'1l in thl' li;.d1t of tht• r0111litio11~ muh•r wliil"h we lil'l•
nt the \trt•st•11t, 11111l 11ot iu tho light of th1• I'"''• fur 11111ny thi11g,
thut were co11sitlt•rt'1 l lnxuril's tl1l'.11 1 or e\'t'll lin1l nu 1•'(ist.•ni:c
ut ull, nrc now con~u\crctl 11ccc~s1t1e.~ (lt, p. l:!I ).
0

It is sub111ittc1l tltnt tho fort'i.toini.t i11"tnil"li11n<, 1111111bere1l
from 2 to 8, inclu~ivc, stnte conectly the prinl"iples of luw

S~p~~e
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cases of Pirkl'y BrotJ.rr$ \'. ('011uno11w,alt/1, u!l<l Jl'i/.
li<wu v. Commomvcalt/1 (.rnJ•nl}.
The ue:i:t two in5tructions wloi.-11 wac offered by petitiou<'r
nnJ were refused arc as follow":
23•
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Iu11truction No. 11:

LU

The Court instructs ti.Jc jury lhal l>)· uu net of tho (ienernl ~Sl!CmL!y of Vir:.riuill, pw•~, ... 1 nt tho 193-l Sellllion thi;n·
was created the Alcoholic Bc\'t•r:.\.."' l 'outrol Bonrd with
power to j,;,;ue to rctuilcni in ti"' Sl:itu of Virginia liccusc~
for the ~111! of lx•cr und wim·, :111ol purounut llwrcto ~,.j,1
Board h11>1 proc~'<lcd tu i>P'lll' tu th" rd11ilcni iu Vir;:inia,
i11clu1lin~ tl1l' tlefl'111lu11t, sm·l1 Ii·~·"''°" willwut 1111~· rl'slri1··
tion thcreiu ns to snk·s on S1111.l:I\·: furlli1•r !lint l1v u furll1t•r
ucl of the G1•11<•ntl ,\,_,c111l1l.1· 1~;,;..,1 i11 1!1:·~..; th~ Bonni uf
Supervisors of t11c sc\'t.•ral ..·uuulil·s iu \'ir~inin Wl'l'c •:In·
powered lo pas" unli1111111·1•s tu l'r,,J1il1il Ilic snle of wi11c• 1111d
Le1:r on !';11111\a~·. wliicli nd 111·u1·i.l"l tli:it nuthiu~ thl'n·i11
slouulcl he co1htru.-I 11s ull,•riu;.:, 11111<·111lin;..: or rc\K'nlin;..: s ..".
tion 4~70 of tl11· Co1k• (1:01111110111\· k11uw11 11~ tlic Su111IJ1\' lil11••
lnw}.
·
·
Further 1111: C'ourt tells tl11• jury Ilia! il np]lelln< {nun 11 ...
e~·i1knce tl111t.si11c1: flit• pn""H;..:•· .. r II"' Act of 19:\8 llJ'J•li«:i·
!wn lins lx.·1•11 111:11lc lo the Bu:11·,\ uf Sup<>n·i•or" of l\1111un·r
Cou11t~· lo pn~" 1111 onliuann• p1·uloiJ,iti11;..: the snlc of l11·er 1111.!
wiutJ in ll11110\"t•r ('011111\· 011 ~1111•h\· li11l n•:rnnlh·s>' of ilpuwcr to 110 KO the 11 .. ,·1 .. ,\ of s11, ...... ~·i•ors n·fuSt••I 111 I"''·'
Kll<:li onliualll"t' 1111d tlint th,·n· j, i11 ··~islt•nec• iu Jl111111\·1·r
County 110 onli111111<'l' of si_1i<l llu:ird 11l1il'i1 prohiLib 1111· >al.of !Jeer aml wiut• 011 811111la~·s (II., I'· 1::I).
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'fhc Court inH!rul'ls th" ji:r,· tloat 11111\,•r 1111· lnw~ uf \'irginin since the ycnr 1!l:l~, tl11· Bunrol of Supl'rvisur~ of 111111ovcr County hns h:11l th<.' a11ll1uri1.,· lo 111lopt nn or1li11:111n·
(l'ffodivc 011tsi<lc of tl11• 'l'own of .\,111:11111) "Jll'Clficnlly ui:ik·
i11;..: it unlawful to sell liecr 1111<1 wi111• i11 th" ('ounty, 11ltliu11:,:li
the J>tntntc conferrin!!; thnt Jlll\,·1·r lltH•ll the Hoai«l of S1qwrvi1<or~ further provi1lcs 1hat 11111 l1i11;.: lh1•rt•i11 1·011t11i111•I, 11ur
nny onlin:incc 111lopt1•<l hy tht• llo:iril uf ISnpl!rvisor~ iu p11r.
~111rn1:c !hereof, "hall he co11strn .. d as iu 1111v wav el1:111!!;i11;.:
01· repe11li11:.~ the lnw g-c11c.·1·all~· kuown us tlH.' ''~11iltl:tv 11 law,
1111dcr•wl1ich tl1is prosecution is li:ul (J!., p. 133).
·
·
0

• ASSIONMENT OP EH HOH NO. 5.

At the trial of the cn•e, petitioner cnlle<l C. W. 'l'uylor,
l'lerk uf tl11• Honn! of Super\'isors of 1!1111ovl'r Count~', us u
wil111•'S in his h1•hnlf, hut th1• tour! n•fu~e,l lo llllmit his testi111u11\· ns l·\'itl1•111·l'. 'flio l'\'i1lenl'o thnt hL• would lw1·e "i1·l'11
if 111; !inti li<'L'n nllow1•il to testify will be fo1111d i11 trn11.,eript
uf 1·vi,k·11«1', pni.:1• 114 of H<'<.'onl, nud is ns follow~:

><-

Instrnclion No. 11-A:

•rn the Pirkey case; .r~ .Burks said that ihi:qti~s·
lion as to whether or not the work was "a work of neeeS·
sih·" as co11templ:ited by the statute, should be submitted
to ·a jnry "who nrc selected for their fitness nnd who will re·
fleet the co!llmunity opinion". It was therefore essentinl
11ut only thnt the court permit the introduction of evidence
o( the uction of lliiLBonr<l of Supervisors but ulso thnt the
court iustruct the jurv thnt the Boord of Supervisors of
Hnnonr County had the power under !be statute to enact n
local or<linoucc lo nllow or to prohibit the sale of beer ou
.SuuJny, nud ulso thnt n petition hnd been filed with the Board
i<cl'l;iug to prohibit Much snle and tho Bonn! hnd refused to
tnke uction thereon. llnd thifl been done the jury would hnve
hc'<.'n in u po~ition to l'Xercisc their 1lutics n~ the relk><!tors of
llllhlic 01>inio11.
'fhc nctiou of the court in giviu!{ the fi11<li11g iustruction
nW\'e, pr<?wntc<l tliia.
·
2.i•

which nre applicable to the !nets in thu case and &houhl
have been !{iven to the jur." 111,.!cr the authority •or thu

"Q. :'>Ir. 'f11ylor, ~·au nrc now 1111<1 Wl'ru the Cl1•rk of th~
Bu11nl of ~11111•n·ison1 of 1111110\'l•r County 1111 .July 1, l!I.\ 1 t
"4\. y l•"\. !'lt·.
"q. Di,\ yun 11th•111l the llll'cli11l("~ of th1· llonrol of Hu per·
vi:<urs 111•1,\ on July 1, 1!141 t
"A. ,\...... ~ir.
"(J. l'len'l' 'Inf•• whdlll'r or uot fill' qupsfion of till• nuop·
lio11 of 1111 onli111111('e prohihitin~ !]10 1111Je of hr1•r ill llllllU\'CI
('0111111· l'lllll1• hl•fon• the Bonn! for its l'o11si1:1•rntiun nt thnl
t illlt'. .
"A. It <lid.
"(1. PlenK1• i;lnte whether or not then• Wl'l'l' d1•lei.:11tiu11t
l11•f11rc• 1111· !lonnl iu hehnlf of nm! in opposition lo tl111t or·
di11111u:e.
"A. 'J'licr\! W(. re.
"<l. l'lc•nsc :<l11tc whnt nr.tiou, if 1111y, w11s t11lw11 !iv tlu
Bonni of Snp1•rvisors nftl'r the hc11ri11i.: 011 thnt 11111tlcr 01
thnt 1l11v.
''A. A resolution wns offl!red hy Mr. 'l'hompson prohibit
1
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?.L 0. Franci~_y. ·Oommonwealth

ing the aale of beer and wine in lLrnover County au Sullll;iy,

wn~ losl
"Q. I will ask.you if you will filt:' n Ct?rtified copy of tlw
minutes to which you refc:r in the re<:ord.
26°
"'"A. Yea."

which received no se<:ond aud

We aubmit that this testu111111'·

i~

rclc\·nnt nnd mnlc>rinl 11,
tending to. ahow tht:' community" upiniun of the morn) tit11l'."""
and propnt:'ty of the net invuJ\·,...I, nm\ Khould luwe hl...·11 a,1.
u1iltL-<I in evidenc" ht-fore !Ill' jury, 1111d<'r the nuthu1·ih· .. r
/'irkcy Brot!.u.< v. Corn111<1t11c ...1/ll1, 1111d J/ussdl lh ll"i/li11.11.,·

the judgment compWned o! in- tLe foregoing petition ilNlrroneous and OD)!'ht to be reviewed and reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginin.
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GEO. E. HAW,

~

><

ANDREW J. EI,LIS.
Reccive<l Junc·t6, 1942.

LU

M. B. WATTS.

\", Cu1111110111aultl1, 611/)rll.

Writ of error awnnlrd. S1111crscdca& allowed. Bond $100.00.

CONCLl'Slll~.

July 29-42.

EDW. W. HUDGINS.

For the forel!oing 1't:'nsuns, IK'I ii io11l'r pru~·ri tlant " "'i I
of error 11111\ s111icr;cJ1'<l.< 11111y 1•. :ow;ink-.1 him; thnt tlo,· jud::·
111cnt complnim... \ of may 1,.. n·,·i""''d 111111 rc\'l·1·s,.,l; lli;il ;1
new trial l>e nwanlc-.1 lti1u; 11111! 1li;il 111• 11111~· hll\'l' hlll'i1 .,11.,.,.
rt:'lief us he ni:w 1,._, enlillt'<\ lo 111ul<•r th,• law.
Your 1ictitiu11.er 11\•ers lh:1t h,· loa•, 011 lhL· lGth d11y of .11111 ...
19~2, llcliwrl'<l u copy of thi~ pditiou to the llouurnhl1• 1·:. I'.
::-li111pki11s, Jr., Cu111111011w1•11lll1'• Attorney for llnli"''••1
County, nud !ht:' 11 llonll')' for 1111· l 'u111111<111w1•11h h in t 111· l 1i,d
L"Ourl, in Jll'rson; thnt this p••ti1i1111 will he fik'<I in 1111• tolli.~·
of the clerk of this 1•ourl nl Hi .. 11111<11111; that 1·01111s1•l for 1•·1i.
tioncr tlesirt:'~ lo slate• ornll." 11 ... r,•;1su11< fo1· n.•\'il•wi11~ 1lw
ju<l~111c11t co111pl11i111'\I of; 1111<1 lloat (K'liliu111•r nilopls tloi• 1•·
ti lion n~ hi~ up1·11i11;: lincf.
tfiCij!JL'Clfully
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~11lo111illl~J,

:\I. i:. I·'H,\Ncrnco,
By Clilll1S"1.

1:1·:11. K llAW,
,\:-\Ill: I·:\\' J. EI.LIS.

27°

•QEORflE E. IlA W,
'rnt\"el(•rli Tihl~., Hi1·l111111111I, Va.,
ANDHEW J. ELLIS,
Lnw Rh\~ .• Riehmoml, \'a.,
Counsel for Pl!titiu111·r.
\Ve, the umll'rsh.:ncd 11ttm·111•_,·s at lnw, prnctil'in;.:- iu 11 ...
Snprt:'lnc Court of Appenls or \'ir'!i11i:1, 111111 whos(' r"~l'l'l'li\'l·

nd1lrcsscs nrc ns 111Jov1•-stah•,J, du ""rtiry thut in our upi11i1111

H1·c1•iv1•1\ July 2V, 1942.
M. 13. W.

RECORD
VIROINIA:
111 thu Cin:uil Court fur the County of l11111uvcr.
1'11•11>1 hdor1.• the Cin:uit Court in :iml for th,• County of
I 111110\·er.
ll1• it r1•mt•111h1.•n't\ lhnt hL•n•luforc, to.wit: Scpll'mlicr l:itli,

1!141-

CO
::i::
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c....:

E,Jn111n1\ \\'i11stu11 1 l"ur1•1111111 1 H. I'. Vn""• 11;1;.;h C11111plll'll,
\\",.I. Cl11q11111111 nml ,J. I.. Oo1hli11, who hl'im; "'·un1 11 :-;l''"'i11l
llrnnil .Jury, hc.•iu.~ l·lml'J,"l'<I b:v the Court rdin•1l to their roou1
111ul nflcr i<ome time rl'1111·111.•1l into 1•ourt 1111<! rdurnc1l llol'
followiui:- hill of imlichul'nt, tu-wit:
Co111111011wcolth
v.
M. 0. Fruncisco

INDICTMENT FOH A MI::lDEMEANOH.
A Truo Ilill,
(Si1.,'Tlt:'<l) EDMUND WINSTON, l•'or<'1111111.

20
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Which Indictment i.s in the worJ~ and figures, following,
to-wit:
Commonwealth of Vir~nin,
County of Hanover, Tcrwit:

page

3~

v.
ht. O. Francisca

,_.

INDICTMENT FOR A MISDEMEANOR.

In the Circuit Court uf thL• '>lli<l County:
The Oran<l Juror11 of the ('u111111011wealth of Viriduin, in
nn<l for the b<xly of the ('-01111!_1· 11f11n•"'1i<l, nu<l now attcmli11i:
the l!lli<l Court, upDI\ their onlh. 1•n•,,.•11t thnt M. O. Frnuci><et•
ou tl1e ith da~· of Sl'ptembcr, in 1t11, yeur one thousn11<I nim·
liuntlrcJ n11<\ forty-~:mc, in till' ><:ii1I County, <liil u11ln"·full.1·
lnLor nt Li" trndc um\ cnllin::: 1111 ... rn j,... nnd except in huus1 ..
hold aml oilier work of 11t'<'t"•ily :1111( chnrity, ":iid 8<'\'l'lith
tb~· uf Scptcmllt.'r h<·i11::: a S11111lnv, in this, to-wil:
pa~c 2 } 'l'liat t\1c "ni1l ~I. (l. Fr:111•·iN... 1 di1I h't'p opcu 111,.\
rnni11tni11 011 the s11i1I S11111\:I\' n hnsine"s for thL• "'ii"
of beer ni11! 1li1I un ~aid 8111111:"·· ,-.·Ii l1<-er m.'llinst the 111•an·
nnd <li:..'11ily of tlw Co111111011w.·all Ii 11f \'in.:inin.

a:>
L.ll

:I:

><
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'l'loL·n•upon llol' 1<11i1l '.'.!. 0. l•'ra11riscu wns rcc:ug11iz1•d for l1i8
11pp1·arn11L'C l11.•fore tloi~.l'ourt 011 the 17th 1l11y of Novl'ml>cr
l~l.11, i11 the 111·1111111· of n11c llumln"I Dollurs (~lllO.llO) 111111
1101 to 1h·p11rl tl1<·11L·~ witloont lt•11v1• of thi• Court.

And upon. nnolhl'r 1\:iy, tu-wit: I ldoher 2111\, l!lH."

INDICT~IE~'l' FOH .\ '.llSDE?>mANOH.

uot guilty to the indictm<mt, thereupon cnme n jury, to-wit:

11. C. V11lc11tiuc, .Jos.-ph Jones, .Jr., l~dmum\ C. •rnylor, W.
!ii. Alcxuudcr nn<l B. P. \Vood, who bciuy: 8worn the truth

,.i!"ll'lll<."nt.

"'it1wssc>11<wor11 in open C'u11r1 :0111\ •l'llt to thL• Orn111! .J11r~·

''· Frnncisco
M. 0.

This <la~· came the Attorney for the Commonwealth, and the
accu~ed M. 0. FranciN.'o having appeared in Court pursnn.nt
tu liid r(.'('ogniumce, and bciu~ represented by CounBcl, plead

upon the pn·mise8 to Ppcok, hnving fully heurd the cvidoucc
111111 bci11:.t instructl'tl liy the Conrt, retired to their room nml
11fll>r sun1L• time returned into court ma! returuc1I the follnwin;:- vcnliet, to-wit: "\Ye tho jury fiutl the ncc11sc1l guilty ns
cl1aq._'t.'tl iu the within imlictmcnt 111111 th his 11u11i~lomcnt ut
u tin1· of ~.lXI." .Sig-UL'c.I, J. JI!. ,Jonl's, .Jr., l•'urc111an.
,\1111 th .. jnry liri11).(' di"<'lmrµ:1•d, the dcfcn<lnnl by his Conn"''' 11101'1'<1 tl11· Court to B<•t nsi<lo Ilic venlict of the jury us
l>('i11;: c·outrnry to the luw 111111 the 1•1·idc11C:L', n11i1 by 111istl1rccti1111 b,\' tht• l'c>urt; which motion the Co111"t tnkL•s Utulcr 1111-

UpOll the c1·i<l1•11cL' of Chndi« \\'illi:1111•, l 'onw:iy Cn11tl111r111·
nml Willinm .T. :\'ichol•.
.

Cm11monwcnltl1

And upon another day, to-wit: Octob~r 17th, 194:1.

Commonwealth

1--
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This duv cnmc the Atlorm·1· fur tlu· Cu111111011wcnlth nn1l tl11• u.J
nccu8cd, ~f. 0. Franeisl'o h111:imr "l'i'"lll'l'1l iu Court pur-11:1111
to .~11111n10nM i~Rlll'll n.!!ni11"t l1i111. :11111 plL•nd not i:uilt1· to tl11•
imlietrncnt, nml for l'l'nson'< app"arin!-! to th<.> Court the ra,1·
is co11ti1111cd until th~ 17th <ln1· 11f I ktol•l'l', J!l41, nt JO o'l"lcll'k
A. 1-l., wlwrcupon I he sni1\ M. Cl. l~r:1111·i-«o w11s n..:o~ni1.L•1I f11r
his 11ppcarnnel' lwforc this ('0111"1 "" tlol' lith <lnv of Od11h1•r,
1!141.. nt 10 O'cln<'k A. M.
·
'l'hcronpo11 ChnrliL• ·wminrn-. ('uuwa\' <'nnthornc nm\ "'illimu .T. Nichols, witucsse~ for 1111• ('1111111ionwenlth, were rrro:!·
uizc.l for their nppcnrnncu lll'fon· thi~ Court on the 17th 1lay
of Octohcr 1~141, nt 10 O'clm·k ,\, ~I.. in the i;nm of Fif11·
Dollnrs respectively.
·

w

:\111111111.111 1111utl1l'I' 1l11y, tu-wit: !1111rd1 lli1l1, l!H~.

('11111111uUWl•lllth
t'.

".\l. <l. l•'rnnrisc:o
I :\DH "l':'.!J.;N1' FOH :\ M J.SDE.\11-:.rnol!.
'I'll(• rourl ha\'ini: 11111lurcl.1· conRhll'rl'1l the 111otion of th,,
<ll'fo11dn11t to sl't li'id<• the vcnlirt of the jun in thi" l'llS1', ns
l•L•i11g- 1·011trnry to the law n111l the cvitlrurn, '1111il l1y 111i"lin..:tio11 lov the Court; llll<l for n•asons st11tL•1l i11 writ in:: 111111
l11•n'hy mn<lc 11 pnrl of the recor,\ in this cnsc, doth 01,-,•rrn\L•
till• -suid 111otio11, lo whil'11 uctiuu of thl' c:onrt thL· <ll'f.,111l1111t
l'XCl'ph•1I; WhL'l'l'llJlOll it i~ th{' j11dµ;111c11t of tlll' l'lllll'( thut the
1tL'l"lt"1'1l M. <.l. Fn111cisco pny u lint' of $:J.OU nnil thL• ''"'ts of
the prosecut10n.

r;·•, ,.

;~~~:·:

bt. · u . .rnncil!®~ ~u4iiluvu;;.:. ... ~

Supre!Il4·Coart of .AppeAla of Virginia
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For reasons appearing to the Court execution do not issue
in this case for .s~xty (GO) day~.

Pagti 5 } Virginia :
In the. Ci.ttuit Court of Hnuovcr County.

1--

co

The Commonwealth
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.Y. O. Francisco
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OPINIO~ 01'' 1'11~ COURT.

Tl.le RC(:Uwd wa~ in<liclt•1l fur Iii,• sale of bt.~r ou Su111lay.
He plcnlfod not f;uilly. 011 Jij, !rial three wituc$l!~ int•"·
duce<! hv the Co::1111ouwcnlll1 l1•... tili1~l that lhc accns,.,1 ,...,1.i
0
Leer at hi~ store iu l!anu,·,·r l '1111111\· 011 Sun,luy, Sepll'111io,·r
7, l!JH. 'l'hi: 11N:llscd kstili1•l tli:d lot• ... ol1l !><.•er ut his pl;11·1·
of lousiness ou that duY n111l llml Ill• thom.:ht llml Ill' hail a
lnwful right to sell 1.JCcr 011 Suuda_,. ur1<l tl11it he 111nd,• a pr;ll'tice of so doin". ~{rs. Frnm·iH·11, Ilic wife of the 11cc11s1'tl, "''"
testified thnt h('r husbi1111! ,;old !K't'r at lois pl:iCl' of J.11,i111·•011 the Su111lny in <1uc~tiuu. So di1I !-ilwri!T Sumpter l'ridd_,.
wlio 'vns 1ircseut iu the i;tor,• wl11·11 till' ,;ales wt·rc 11111111· lu
the wil11cssc1 who testific,I for tl>t' ( 'u1111110111n•altlo. Tiu· ,,, ..
cuscd tcsti!il'<l thnt he sol1I fn1111 lifly to sixty (~ll-GO) ""''"'
of beer pt•r week sn<l thnt frn111 1111c-fo11rth to om•-tl1inl
(l/-l-1/3) of thnt nmouut wns ... 1,1 011 Sm11l11y. The :ll't'll""'
testified thnt he kept hi~ 11tim· "I""' fur lousiness nl! St'\"l'I•
( i) days of en•rv week.
It nppcnr~ fr~m the cvi,h·11n• 111T,•rc1I by the :ll'CllSl'1l 111:11
then: arc sixtv-onc liccnsl'l'S 11f !Ill' ,\kuho\i,• Tk\'l'rtl\!l' \ 'u11·
trol Roanl wftli pince~ of l111>•i111'"" i11 llanover Co1111ty, a11.J
!lint nt lens! ei!l;hty (Sll'fv) , ... ,. n'l1l11111, of these lil't'll'<'•'s "'"
beer nnd wine, 01· lu..•ef u)out', ou Su1ulay.

A nmubl•r uf li~

CCllSCCS !cstili1'<l lli:1I llu·ir 1·11"t111I1l'l't\ th•111:1111h'll l····1
pngc 6 ~ on ~11111lay 1111d 1111<· li, ... 11,l't' l<'slificll that 11111-111"slnte tourists 1101 1111k <lt'11111111ll'tl lil'l'f on S111ula\"
~ut complained hcc1111sc till'~· ,:0111.1 1101 Jlllrl'linse 1li•till1•;\
liquors from t ht:' lict•nsl'c.
'rhe nccnscd offerNl to sl111w llo;ol tl1e Bonni of Supervisun·
of llnnovcr Conntv, nlthom:h \11'1 ilio11l't\ ~o to <lo hY n111111·r1111s
c_iti1.~11~ ?f the County lon.1! faii. .. 11 .. :1tlopt n Counl.v Onliu:~u<"'
prol11lnt111~ !he i-alc of w111e 11111! 1..... ,. 1111 811n1lnv n~ 1111tlo11nz1•1l
hy Chapter 12!l of the Acts of l!•::s. 'l'his c~iclencc w:1s l'X·
eluded II!! \Jein~ irrclev11nt, to wl1id1 t>xccption was tuk<·n.

It was stipulated that the n0011Sed had a merchant's, resl~u
rnnt, a tobacco nn<l 11 wine nncl beer license. All of these
licenses nrc sepnrate license11. The merchnut's license (retnil) is provided for by Section 188 of the True Code; ti.Jc
rcstauraut license by Se<'tion 197 of the 'Tux Code; the tobacco license by Section !Wl of the Tax Code nn<l the wine
nnd beer license b~· Section 4765 (18) of the Virginiu (lode
of 193G. Each license nuthorizes thtl conclncting of nn entirely scparnte.b11_si_J!c~!I which could not be luwfully conducted
without such hccn~eo.
The prosc>eution is bn~t'<l upon Section 4570 of the Code
which reads ns follows:
''If n person on n Sunilny be foullll lnborin~ ut any trndu
or c11llin/;, or clllploy his npprcnticc~ or scrvnnts in labor or
0!11t•r hn.,ine~s, l'Xccpt in houschohl or other work of necessity
or t•l111rity, Joe i<h:ill h~ 1h•P11t•!1l !.!"1tilty of 11 111i-<lklll<'llnor nml
upo11 <'0111·il'1iu11 1l11•rc•of ~lmll Ii!' tinc•1l 11ot !cs, !111111 live llollars
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for <'llc.'lr offen .... e.

Evl'J',\' d:1.v

nn~·

persou or servnut

or llflfll"t'nli<'<' is so t•mploy<'il .,Jinll t•onstitulc n ilisti11l'I 01Tt•ns1• 1111<1 llil' courl in which t>l" !lie jnstiec
l1v whn111 1111\' j11d'-!11tt•11I of co11viclio11 is n•11.!<'rl'tl 11wv reqnirc
of tl1,• pt•rsoi1 1<0 l'llllYictl'<I n l"l'<'t1'-!llirn11cl' iu 11 pc·1111fty of 11ot
h•ss tli1111 t>n1• hm11ln'll or n1on• thnn tin• lltou,111111 <lollarn, wilh
or without Sl'<'llrit~·, 1"011ditio111•1l tlont "'"li pl'rsun sl1111l be
of!.."""' lwhnvior, llllll l'slll'l'inll~· to rcfrnin from 11 rc1ll'tition
of ""''h uffcust', for n pcri0<! not l'~l"t't'diu~ lwelvc• months.
'l'lois M'<'lion sl1all not apply to furnnc,•s, kilns, pl1111ts ntul
nllll•r linsim•-.sl's of liko lan<l lllllt Illa\' he lll'l'l'%111"\' tu he 1·011·
1l11l'lt'1\ nu Smulny, uor In lh1• ~ak• o.f .:11'11li1tc', or. 1111y mot111
n•l1idl' rn,.1, or nnY motor oil or oil<.
'l'l1e l'Xl'l'flli1111• j1ru\'i<h'tl for in Ila• st11ln"', wlii .. 11 wns lnst
lllll<'lllll'1! iu l!rt'..', (Al•ls rn:::!, p. :»Hi) a1·1· 11~ si!."11ilil'll1tl us
11n• !lot• proloihiliu11s l'Out11i11l'1l in llil' st11l11li', 1111.! it is np·
p11n·11I from 1111· n•111li11~ of th1• 1rnnl, 11f 1111· st:ll11t 1· !\oat ""
work or lntsitu.t""' uf n f\('>(~ulur nnf11rl.) 1...\xcept liouselioltl or
ntlt1•r work ot~ m'<'<'~'ity or clo:orit~· 1111<! li1l' 'fll'<'iull 1· l'X<'l'fll<'il
works 01· li11s1111•ss 11ut of llol''l' tlonr:1t•f<ors, "'"'" l:twfullv lie
Jll'rformc1l or 1·111·.-j,.,1 on on Snmlnv 1ml<'ss Ilic·· :ll'<'llS<'ll ·foils
within otll' of tl1,• l'Xl'Cptions providl'll for in St'l"lion 4;,71 of
tlll' l\xk'. wl1irlo l:illt•r t'Xl'l'plinns nrc not npplil':il1k• l11•n'.
'l'lll' C\'illt•net• showt•ll thnt whilt• tli,• lll'•'ll'"" li:id 11 rl'stnu·
rnnt lict•usc thnt hll hntl 011lv two \11\oll's nnd s<'rv1•d univ sallll·
wid1l's nnll thinks. lt llJIJll'lll"l'll tlont his primarv 1i·11sinl'S'
wns th11t of 11 mcrchunt, 1111<1 he 1l'stilil•1\ Ii•.• 11lw:1y~ '"\.\ \1e•l'1
for "off Jll'l'lllisl'" consumption on ¢-;111ulny.
·
IHl).:l'

M. 0. Francisco !· Cl)mmonwealtb

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
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!\Ow Section 4.'>70 of Ilic Co<le, in th11t he In bored ut his trndl'
or l'lllling or bC'lling l'Ol'a-<:olu OJI the Snbbntli day.
.
'l'he Court of Appcnls sni<l (122 Vu. 824):

Counsel for the 1w,·ns,.,.} requested the Court In

page B ~ give the jury a ~cri''"" uf instrnctions, the l'ffwt 11f
which woulu b:in• 1...,..11 lu 1,·nw to the jury the 1111,.,.
tion ns to whether tlw snl!! of 1..,.r un 8umJn,• wns or wn" 1111t
DC'f.•min·: tla,• "''le or"bei!r 011 :Sn111la_,.
in the l.'OU!'SC of one'11 l"C',.!'Ulnr lo11•illl'"'' to 1'e plniuly 11 \'iul:a·
tion of Section 45ill of the l 't"''" tl1t· l 'uurl rcfus..-<l ll1l'>'<' instructions nu<l in~tcnJ tlu.:11... ,f. i11•lr11rll-<l the jury 11s 111 tl1t·
presmnjltiou of inu~ucc Ullll n·:1 ... •11al•ll' llou!.Jt, nn<l then :.:a\""
111!! followin!( in,truction:

a work of uccC?ssitr.

"Th<.> l'ourt instruct,; ti.,. jun tlia\ if the,· !.Jc\ien· fru111
the evi<lt•uce lx·~·on<l n n·11 ... 111alot,. •l•n1lot !lint tl1t' ll~ll~l·•I. ~I.
ll. Frnu~i><eo, lli,J la-ep upl'll a1ul 111ai11t;ai1111n 8untlay, tl11•.itl1
uf Scp1<'111lx•r in lln11un·r l 'u1111t' ll 1011,inc'~ for tlic ,..,,1,. ul
!><.-er uni\ lli1l 011 sni<l S1111d:1~· ·•·II 1.,·1-, lhl'.'" ~i.oul,1 fiu,I lii111
i-:uilly uml tix hi~ p1111i•l111u·11t :ol 11 li11l' 1111t k•,s than l·'j,-,.
(~:,.oo) Dullat><." ti"• l'!Twt uf "1,i,·l1 """' to l1ul,1 tloat a• a
111nttcr of law tht:' ...alt· of 1...... ·r (,\ 11llt· iu tl1c n·gular 1·u11r .. ,·
Uf }1iS lnt"illl""'\S UU ~l\lH\:l\' l·1111 .. lillllt·1\ a \'iu\ntio.U Uf Sl'1·li1111
4!jj() cf tlw ('o<ll'.
·
llitl-ll1t• l'u11rt l'IT in ,.., liuloli11:'.:
111 l'i,/:1·!) /fru .... \'.

('1111111101·11··

"On the merits of the r11se, we have no <lifficullv iu affirm-
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ing- the jmh.'111Cllt. Ellis wns cnrn·ing on two well <lcfincd
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1111/1. t:~" Yn. ;1:1, ';:!ti ( \~1·..:'.!)

,, • • • Tlll'rl' nn· l':ll'>l"... \\"lu•i-1· llu· 111ll' .... tiou is Ulll'.

\\'lo,·r1• ti"·

ur

l:I\\

11 \'i11l11ti1111 111" 11..~tntntl\ n:oc whl·•·t.· a t.·11ntn1dur, "i_ll1111tt l'llll'r~l'IH'Y, i~ run11i11·..:.
n st ell JU ~llU\'l•l 011 R111nla~. ur 11, .. :wt i"" plai11ly lllll' 11( lll't'1·_...
ad

i· l'l;oi11l.1·

..-ity, ""' \\'lll'l'l' 111l' uw1wr lift ... Iii ... ,,, ioul t1f tla• dih·li; i11 ,·i1l1c..T tc.·w.;e the '1lll'stiu11 is lllll' of la" 1'11r 1111• \ 'uurt. Hut if tl1i• ;11 l

'"! OJlt• aJwul wJ1j1·l1 L1ir 111i111h ... 1 HH.'ll 111i':!,l1t n·:b111i
1Hl1!e H} olJ}y tliffl'r :h to wl11·1lwr ur 1111\ iii"' n wu~·k of 111·,···~
:-:ity, tlil'll it i~ n qn,·-1 i111.• 11f fad fur the jury."

:::r:

><

Such nu ul"l i~ tiut u w11r~ 111' l1t•t·P:--:--iih· hnt H"' u 111all1·r

or"lnw pl11i11t~· 11 \'iol11tio11 or l}1<• >t:ilnh•, ,
.
1.11 l':llis \'. r111·i11.fJ/""· 1:!'.! \'a. S:!l, s:!.\ (1!1\i) t\1<· 111.,.11-•·ol
wn~. th<' propril'lor .,fit n•><la11rn11t. I Ii· l11ul :1 lil'l'llSl' tu ,......
llll<'t s1wh h11si11C'ss 111111 al"' a li1·0·11"'•' tu '"II soft 1lri11ks. !·:11;,
wa~ l·onvid1•.l for ,·iolati1111 ur a tuw11 or1li11:111<·e whi1·li 11 ...
Cunrl of App,•nls ~nit! wa~ "s11l1,.l:a11ti:1ll.1· i11 tl1l' 11111.c:nnc: .. of
Ilic Ad n111c111li11~ a111l rc-c11:wli11:~ :-;,.l'liou ::i9!l of the l'1i1\,.".,

0

'l'his is n 1\1'fi11it.• h11l.li11::: ll\' the hi:_:l1t•'t ( 'uurl 11f tlll• C111111111111w,•11lth tl111t tli" sl'lti11:.: ui1 S1111d1l\' ur .s11fl drinks jllll"sll·

co

"'h,•rc the 811pn·me Conrt or .\111•·al>< hn~ 1kdan•1l n ;.:i,,.11 u.J
ad lo he a \0iolatiu11 of tl11· :-;1111.ta,· law 11ml 111>t 11 lll'<'''"'il\
110 fai1· 111i111l<'1l 111:111 11111\ <'1•rt::i11I_,: 1111 11i.'i 1iri11., l''ourl 111:i:,
n•n,011nhh· <litfor :1s to wl ... tl1<·1· .,,. 11111 it is n work 111' ,.,.,.,.,
~ih·.

trndcs or c11lli1~11<ler 11epnrntc Jlcl'nscs. (1) Ho was condnctiug 1111 enli11~ ho:i~c, or restuurnnt, tho exercise of which
l111•im.,;s 011 tlie Snbbnth <lny, mlmittcdly, wns not a violation
uf the onlinn11cc; nm! ('.!) Ho wns <'11!-.'llgcd in selling soft
lld11k~ (iuclmlin:: NX'n-<:o\n) from a i;ouu fountuin, 17.e sale
•if wliicli uu tl1t· Sa/1/intl1 clay is « p/ai11 t•iolntiota of IJ.e ordi.,,,.,,.,.. Sur\1 l><•l'l'r:t~l'S, tliou~h not spirituons or nlcoholic,
l'111111ot he 1li'P''""Nl withont u license; nntl they constiluto
11 1li-ti11rt l'lass from eotTt·c, tea 11111] other 1111l•:lgl' 10} li .. e11:--.·1\ 1lri11ks, whieh urc• cun11111111ly usl',\ nt meals
with fo111l. Iii~ ntt,•111pt to j11'ti(" ll1e iufrnetion
of th,• or,\in:llll'l' 011 th,• plen that he ,\i,t not serve coca-c11la
nlone, lo11l 1111ly i11 l 0lllll'<. liu11 wit Ii 111l'al', lum·lil's 111Hl 1iie when
1·1111,•d fur 11~· 1·11sto111l'I'>', is n f1:1lp1dil1• 'ul_1!1•rfu.~1· 1111<! l'o11stit11t1•., 110 11iofcn~'" ( '1 ..·11-eula is 1111l witl1111 tli" l'lass of hevl01"ac_:1·~ ,... ,., ...... \ 1._,. th .. l'nlin~ l1011sl' Ill' n•st1111ranl lit'l'llSl!.
Ir
it Wl'l"l'1 11l1\'i1>11,oh· II Sl'pllr:ltl' li1·1•11st• wol'.J,J 1101 lie lll'l'l.'SSHI"\'
tu 1111t11ori7l' its s:il1•. Elli• l'1111l,l 1111\ lawfulh· ,lisp••use soft
.Jri11k•, l'\'1•11111111 W1'l'k-<ln\" witl11111t li<"''"'''; .,.,., 11l11i11l11 c1111/,/
1111/. tluJU.rJlt lin·11s1·,/, 11/.11 liis ndliurJ of sc•lliurJ -'"tt<'ii 1ln.11/.':.; pll
t/ .. · . . .·,,1i1111t11 dt1t/ ;,, 111111 tl"IUJ siJ er.~ to 1·s1 t1Ji1· linl1ifitr1 uucf,.,..
If,.. ,.,,fi11u1,.·o•." (lt11li1·.• '"PJ1li<•1l.)
.
0

tlac Court ><aid:
for llll' l'o11rt.
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11nt tu Ulll'
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n.·~ular hnsiHl':->~

i"' n \'iul:\ti1111 of tlH·

S111ubv

11111".
.
111 //um/r·r \'. ('r1111t111111w1·11I//,, lll7 Vn. Si:!, siK-!1 ( l!lllS) ""''
111111_~,·r who \\'lls the 1·hi,•f slol'l;hohh-r of 11 1•orponali1111 op·
1•r:it1u!! 11 tlrll.!! ~ton• 1111<1 lh1• ol11<·l'1·• of tlo,• dru!! co1111>111>)'
sul1l tol11a·1·11 1 1'111!11 wnh•r, I'll'. 011 Sn111l:1\', lla11c'l'r was 1111tili1•1l Ii~· tin• poli,•1• that 1111ll'~~ t11,• t•111111;am· "'''"'''\ vi11l11li11!!
tl11· l";11111\m· law that it wu11t.\ lit• prn'<·1·11t.•1l. '!'lo" l'Ul11p; 11 1\'
1·•·11.•t·.I >'l·llin~: ~lll'h m·ti,·ll's 011 S11111\a~·. ll1111;.-;1•r \h,•r1•upu;1
11),111;111•11:a1·l1:1rt1•r fol' II l.\lll•i11J l•\uh or wliil'h hl', 11 sl111·k\rni&l<'1"
i11 _his tlru~ l'UIHpany, nntl n t·h•rk i11 tliv .. ·11qi\u\'ll1l'lll ot' snt·li
,·ni1111nu~· \\'l'rl• tlw i1u•orporntor~.
·
'l'lll'l'l \\'HS 110 i11ili:1tiou ft·c; no <hws :1ud OIH'
1

)H't'Jlllll'

H JlH'Ill·

hl•r 11f lhl' 1•l11h h~· si:::11i11!! 1111 11ppli1·alio11. 'l'hc
pa~t· 11 ~ 1lnw: l'Olll}lllll\' l1·n~1·1l th" 1·l11h 11 n•nr n>t1m in thl'
hlore occ11pit•"I hy th,• drn!! t11111pn11y. 'l'lierenftl!1

,":'
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on Stlildaya Han~r and hU eruplo,·~s solJ "tobac.:o, cii-.'lirs,
ci~arettes, aoda water, etc." to th~ 11{)-callt'd members of th•·
club, but not to the public l-'1.'llcrnlly. Any .member of !Ill'
club could buy iu the open ~tort• of t11c <lrug company 1111
Sunday the urticlcs abo\'C. men! iollt'll nml prncticnl!y no otln·r
use was made of the ct>rtifil'alc of 1m•111bersltip in tltc ,-11111.
The Cuniruouwealth institult'<I n IJ"" 1ntrr1111lo prot"l'l'tlim:.
to annul the ch11rtcr of the i<0<·i11l duli. 'rhl! tri11l Court all·
nulle<l thc charter nnd on writ of t•rrur tu the jud~'lllClll tin·
Court of Appt•nls, after rc\'it·wi11~ the C\'i,tcnrc', ~ni<l, ( llli
\' u. l'P· 875-~) :

.........

u:::i

::x::

t....)

>c;:

UJ

"Upou the fure;.:oiu~ fud.~, ii I••• plainly 11ppt•nrH to 11<li11il
of discu~sion, thnt !hi! obtui11i11:: 11f lht• t·harlcr in q11t·~tiu11
oml tltc prl'lcn1lt'\l or1-tnni111ti1111 uf 11 .-.iciul dub thcn.•u111l1·1
wns fur tltc fr1111.!uk·11t puri••"'<' 11f ,,...·11ri11~ the pri\'ih·c:" uf
drinks 011 ~nn1by-n pri,·il,•;.:1• wloi,·h au imli,·idu:1l t·otd1l ""'
e:.:crcisc without i11('uq;i11~ llo1• fu1l\·it11rc pn.·s..·rilx.'ll in ~ ....
tio11 :.lii!l of tltt' Coile, .>1111r11."

( l '.1"!8).

Tht' Court further s.1id, (107 \'a. l'I'· S7!)~'l0):
"\\'e nre 110! cullt'tl upon ht•n· t11 1h•d:1rc wlmt wonl,t 1111.I
whnt would 110! be 1111 nlou"e of ii- 1·harh•r I"· u ~lll·iul 1·l11lo. "'
tl111t CJUt'•tiou hn" to he dl'll'n11i111·1l 11111111 tl1~ fact• uf lhr par·
ticnlnr en"~- In tht• cuse hefor,• 11s, i:s :1ln•111l~· ohst•n· .. t, tlw
proof lenves 110 rno111 to 11011!1! tlwl 1111• 1·lt:1rler in 'illl"·'i""
wn,.; ohtnittt•d nnd wn~ Leiu~ \l ... l'tl :i~ a 111'.'l'l' 1nnl.;l~~shift to •'II·
111Jlu the prncti1·11l owner n1ul prupri .. tur of the Ilnnt:•'r llrn::
Co. to 110, n111k•r t111· 1·111111; of ti"• d1arll•r, tlo.11
png-c 12 f wl1ieh 1111individnal1·011l1l 1111! 110 :11111 e"""l''' p1111i-l1
11
llll'lll.
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'l'loe• lnw wo11l,l sou11 l'l'llH' !11 ht• law nnel l1t'<'Olll<~ 111111rd1y
if trinl l'u11rts ur juries were• nt Jil><·rty lo oli~n·vanl n11d sd
111 111111;:lot tltt• 1h'<.·isi1111s of till' S11pn·111c Court of Appe11h
that 11n· 1•l,·11rly in point.
1\Ni1l,• fro111 tltis 011 priu('ipll', how 1·1111 it be• s11i<l thnt thl•
~nle• uf l><•<•r 011 S11111by is 11 work of lll'<.'e"il\' or c11p:1t.J,. of
h1·i11~ 111111le ~lh·h r 'J'lit• \'l'llllur of l1t'l'I" ('llllllol ''"'"" lli:d ih
r-:alt. .un S\\11\\ny is lH!l'e"\,:\ry to 2".:l\'L' hitu~1,,·lf fro111 !"l'l'i1n1s ul·
HnL·Xp1•t•IL-d h"~ or that its "al" 1111 ~1111<1:1y is 11t•n•s,;:1ry to
s:11·,• tht• puhli,• from u1111'1111l <lisi•11111fon ur i11ro111·1·11ie•11<·10.
••No onl•,'' t::nill the Snpn•111e l 'onrt of \'l•r111011l in ,\'faf1·
"· ('111·11/01JV.<. ri!l ,\,!..I/. l.'1~1. l."1lli-i (1~1:!.'i), "li:ls ('\'l'J' 111111
iht• tr11writy t11 l'lnim thnt lht• hut1·h1•r 11r ;:r"""" <'llll k1•e·p
"\l<'n 111J1rk1•t 011 Su111lny ~imp!~· 1i,.,.,.,"'' ti"' artie·h•s in whil'\o
tl11·~· <h•11l ,·u11s!it11tt• lll'<'l'><~arit•s. ALl111itti11,,. tl1:1t :1 n•:1so11:1l1l,•
1

I-

The dt'Cisio·n in JI1111.q1·r v. ('.,1J1111111Jw•·11ltl1, s1111nr, i" 11 ><
definite holdin).: thnt it is n \'iulati1111 of thl' ·Su1ul11~· law f11r LU
one licc11st'<l tu sell tohac('O, <'i~1rs. 1·i~·ar:•lte•, n111l tiO<ln wnll·r
to sc•ll the ~Hill(' on 81111cl1n·. II i, 111a11ift•st that wlll're tl11·
Court of finnl resort h!i~ ~011sti-11"d a slalnll• 1111Ll d1'l·l:on·d
!hut n g-ivcu n<'t or st'rics of 11<'1" 1·1111slitutes 11 viol11tio11 thl'n'·
of. thnt n Rimilnr net neccs"nrih· i-< a ,·iulation of tlu• statuti·.
11n1l-the <loin).: uf the net l"·i11!!. pr11\·,.,1 111· 1uh11itt .. <1, pn•:<,.11ls
11 quc"tion of lnw for the ('011rl :1111! 1101 a queslion of fa..t
for the jury.
I11 /fa11.f/1~r v. Co111111011wP11lll1, s1111rn, it wn~ clcurly 11('1<1 thal
the snte of tohacco, ci~nretlt-s, l'i•!ars, so1l11 water 11111\ otlwr
:1

.

wft drinks by a nierch11nt on Sundav was A violation of the
Sunday l11w. Ellis v. Covin,qlon, s111;ra, clearly holds that It
is unlawful for ono engn~d in the selling of soft drinks to
~ell the sume on Sundar. Tlu.i opinion~ in those cnses were
written by judges of rcco101ized nbility nnd concurred in l.iy
u <.:ourl compost'<! o!:_ some of tho ulile8t judges tlml l11w11 s11t
upon the Court or::Appcnls. 'l'hc opinion in Jlc1119cr v. Com·
11w11u:rn/tl1, supra, wns written by l'nrdwell, J. und concuncd
in b" Keith, P. nud Buchnnnu, Hurri~on null Whittle, J. J.
'J'he · opi11ion in Ellis ,.• Cot•iugluri, .<11/'ra, wns written by
\\'hitth', I'. 111111 concurrt'\l in hy Kelly, Sims, Prc11tis 1111'1
Hurks, .l. J.
'!'la• 1lt•cisium1 in tlil'Se cr.seij hn\'c UC\'cr been 11uc~tio11cd in
tl1is Stull' 1111d nre in ll<'Conl with the ~n·nl wei~ht of nutltotit,· . .'ilulr \'. J11111< .i, 81 8. C. )'.17, G:! S. E. :!14, .18 I..)(. A.
•
(:-.l. S.) lili,-1:!8 A. S. H. ~11r2, lli ,\1111. L'.ns. '277
pngc 1:.1} (l!l08) dtt•1l will111p(lro\':d in J'irl.-.-y /lrns. "· Co111·
wu1111•1·ulll1, 1:1~ Vn. il:!, 7:.!:! ( l!I:!:.!); .lfc ..1.f,.,. '"
('0111M•11111'<·11/tl1, 17:1 K~·- s:;, J!lll R \\'. liil, L. IL A. l'.117-C.: '.377
(l!lli): J/r/\1·011·11 "· St11I•", !~Ii Ark.~:,~. l:.!1 S. \\'.:2nd. 1'.l
{1 1 1::~1),u11,l.'il11li-\-. <",,·vlvgus,!l!IA. L.1!. (\'t.) 15·11, J;i-t(i.47
0

h"lliu;; tobncl·o, ci~~ur:-0, ci!!al·l•llt·:-:. -..uc.b watl•r, a1ul otl11..•r l"'11fl

••

1''ro.nct~~commonweattll

w

llt't'1•s~it\' for nil\' l't>llHllotlitv nrnv l'Xl'Use ·n salt• tlivn•ot' 1111

~1111tl;1y~ notl1iu.~· ~hurt of !'l;t·h u;•c1•s.,.itv will PX1.·u~t.· it. 'l'u
ltolil uth,•nvist' wo11hl he lo n•p1•11l, i11 1•lfrct, tht• express li111i-

tntiou i1npo~l'tl hv tli~ k·~i~lnhtl't.'."
Hl t•r i..; n "'JWl·io~ of nh•oliolic hl1 \'L\ra~1.'"\ 1111<1 alcolmlil· l1l'\'~rn~e~, inl'hulin~ hl l'r, hnvl' llC\'l'I" lH.'l'll n·~nnh•tl ns n IH'L't'ssit.'" At 1111.' most 11k11h11lil' lwv,•ri\'~1·" nrt• 11 per(ln);ll 14 f 111i~sihk• luxury, t'\'<'11 tho11~lo thl'." 111:iy he• in c111111

1

mon use .
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All hu been poinW out above, the accu&ed admitted thnt
he engaged in the indiscrimiuntc ,;.:1le of beer to the ~nernl
public 011 Sunday. ·Neither connuon fCll!!e nor aoanJ morality
would or could regurd ~uch :a·rs us 11ecessary. J!c.Afu v.
Co111mOJ1weallh, 17 Ky. 83, 190 S. W. 671, L. Il A. 1917-C 3ii
(1917}; McKr.Otl:fl v. Stale, l!li Ark. -4!">4, 124 S. W. 2nd. l!l
(193!1).
'l'he decision!! in Pirkey Bros. ,.. Cor1u1to•1cealth, 134 \'a.
71J (192"1); l..ah!idt l1tH v. c.•.,,,...,ouu:talth, 134 Va. G!>U
(l!l.?'2); nllJ Crook v. Co111uio111r~rr///,, Hi \'a. ti93 (19"!7) n1-c
1111 cusc5 which iuvolvl'<l ucb nbout which fuir-1nin<lt'tl 1u<'ll
111iid1t reu~u1111bly ,Jiffer 8ll tu \li'lll'llll'r ur not the act in q11estio11 WllS 11 work uf ne<:essit~-. Th,• Court of Appc&ls hn1l
nc,·cr <lcclarl'<l th:tt the ucts <·u111pl11i11<"<l of in thosl' ens•·~
were pluiu \'iulntiuns uf the S111ul;"· l.nw. They were net•
nbout which ren~onuble 111e11 '"111.1 ,litfor in the nbscll\'c uf
5nch a <ll"cisiou.
'l'he cas,• 11t h.u is entirch· 1litT.. n·11t. Herc the nccusc,I, 11
llll!n:hnnt, ,;u\J tu th" ;.:t•11er;d pufoli" ft1.·c·1· un Sundny. S11.-l1
an Ill"! lllls l>ccu twice d,•d:irt... 1 1••,. ti." Conrt ul AJ>l"-'nl,; 111
'"' n violation uf the :->u11,lav Law. JI.,,,,,,.,,._ Co11U11u111rr11lll1,
lUi Va. X72, ~78-'J (l!l:IS); 111 ... l /:/Ii• ~.. Cv1·i;i9to11, 1:!:.! \'a.
i<:!l, 1'1:!4 (l!ll7).
ll 11111h\, thcn•fon', Le cu11cl111l1•1l tlial th1• 11uestiu11 pn•s,•11l1·cl
by the evidc·11cc l1e1·,. i~ 011e uf law fur t11t• C<iurt 11111\ nut a
quc,tiun of fnct fur th<' jury, 111nl it i• so hel1\.
'fl11,, ll{"<"U'<'1I n·qm·,lt•tl i11>'t nwt iu" :'\o. 11 wl1ich wn., 1·l'·
ru.cd. 'l'lii.~ i11stn1rtion rc:ul,; a,; full11ws:

M. G.
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"The C-0urt i11~trnd.• 1111· jurv thnt Lv 1111 11..t 1-pui.:c 15} of the· (ll'11t•rnl AKsc•111\1\,· 11f \'irduiu pn~,;·,1 nt llw
l!l~ Re•Hsiuu tlwn• was l'l'l·all'd 1111 Alcuhulil' JI,., ..
co
crnge Co11trol Tlonr-.1 with pow1·r to i"ue to rctailc•rs in 1111·
8tnte of Virgi11i11 licenses fur 11i,. salt• uf b<'er nml wine n111l :::i::
p1nsuRnt thereto snill llonr1l J111, 111·11..1•<-tlcd to is.-111• to lht• n•.
tnilcrs in \'irginin, incl111lin)." t\11• 1h·f .. 111l1111t, snch liccn~c·s with- ><
Ll.J
out nnv restriction the•n:i11 ns 111 ""!"" un Rnndnv · f111·t li"1·
that IJ~ n furtl1<•r ud of th,, l:1·111·1·nl AKscmhlv ·1;:iss<'1l i11
1~138 the Honn\ of 8npcrvisurs uf the• ~everal ·counties i11
Virginia WHc e•111powere•1l to pa"s 11rdi111111ccs to prohibit ti"'
~ulc of winl' mul hce1· on ~11111lny, \d1i1,h net proviik11 that
notltiuic tltcrciu sl1ouhl \)(.• <'1111slrt1l'1l as nltl'rin!!;, umc•mlin:::
or n•pNl!inir Section .J:i70 of ll1t• I '•><h· (c:ommonlv known 1;s
~h" ~umlay hhw law). F11rtl1cr th•· I 'unrt tell~ tl.1e jun· tliat
•t nppenn• fru111 the l1vi1lcncc that si11,·e the pa~sal('c (1f tli1·
A.ct of J!l:IS npplicntion hm; hc'l'll 111111lc• to th" Ronni of S11p,·1·v1sors of Hnno\'cr County to l""" au onlinnncc 11rohibiti1u.:

<..J

. '"

The purpose of this instruction was to tell the jury that
the Akoholio Beverage Control Board baa licensed the sale
of beer nud wine on 8unday 11nd that the Board of Supervieurs h11d a~uie!!Ced in this by fuiling to exercise the powers
cunferre<I on it by Chapter 129 of the ~ts of 1938.
It is snid thnt the Alcoholic llc\'erogc Control Board has
knowin1dy pcm1itted its liel•rtsecs (except in counpn~o 16} til's nnil cit1c•s whose l(O\'crni11~ ho<ly hn\'O nvnilcd
tlll'111sel\'c~ of tit" provisions of Cl1npter 129 of the
Acti1 of 193:-i) to sell wine mu\ l>e<•r un ~11111\ny.
It is tnw tlmt the Alcoholic Hc,·crng-., C'o11trol Bonrd hns
rnised nu

'-'

'

.

re~11rdless of its power to do ~o the Board of Supervisors .
refused to pass such ordinance and that there is in existence
in Huno\'er County 110 or<liunnce of said Hoard which prohibits th5 salo of beer and wine on Sundays."

._
><

'.·:l9

... ~_,·
the sale.of bee: and wine in Hlll!over Connty on Sunday,"bbt
-,..

objN~tiou

1o its

lh"t'llSl•t•~

SC'f!ing- wi11e und heer on

S11111l:1y L'Xl"l'Jlt iu those politic11l s11b-divi,io11s wl11"e ~u\•crn
i11;.: ho1li1•s have c1111cte'tl onliunnrc•s pursuant tu t lie pro\·isious of Cl111pl<!r l!.'!J of tl1c Acts of I !J3'i {:\,·rs I !J:lS, p. I !H ).
I 11111 mlvi~,... 1, howl'Yl'r, hy Hou. 0. Stnnl<'y Clarke, thl'
Assist1111t Attorn..,v <lc1a•rul ns~i~nl'd tu the All'oholic Bl'\'·
1•rn,_,,. Co11trol llo1;,.,1, th11t tl1t• lioanl l111s 11p1·1•r :111tl1orize<I
or 11tt..,111ptc1l to :1uthori1.e u11y lit•,•nsc•c to sl'll wiue 111111 hel'r
011 :->1111,\:iy. '!'lie rt·n~o11 for thi~ is J><-•rfoctly ubvious. ;-{o
111l111i11istn1ti1·1· ll~Clit'I' or Ilic t'Xt'l'Uti1·l· brn1wh uf th1• "llY<'l"ll·
111,•111 l""'''''''<l llil' ,;uthoritv to rcp1•nl or -.·t nt 1111u.:?lit 11111·
'""itin• l!11ndrrll'nt of tl1c Ue111•rnl As,emhlv.
·
·
\\'hill' th,• pow1•r to d,•lc•).:nlc lo 111l111i11istr;1tiv1• 11_,:,•11L"ics tht•
1111thority t11111lopt rule~ 11n1I n•g:ulntiou~ h11vi11,~ th,• fore<' 111111
1•iT1·1·t of law, tu ll lirnilcil l':'Cll'l1I, Sl'l'llJS lo !,,. r1>cocc11i1<'il i11
this Stall', it hns lte\'l•r h1•c11 h1·hl 11111l1•r onr sysll'n1 of g-ov1•rn11:i•11t thnt tli1• powe•1· c1111 he• d1•l,·1•11tc1l tu 1111 nd111i11istratiy,. n~e·nt•y of the• e'X<•cutive hr1111d1 of '-"11·1·n1111,•nt to n•t>t•iil
•1r s11spcn1l th1• op;:r11tio11 ur po~itivc lnw. Slu/1• V. f.'ic·ld, 17
~ro. ;i:!!I, !'i!J Am. l>t'<'. :r;;, (18.'i.'1).
S1·<"1in11 40 of the ('onstitutiou dcrlnn•>1 thnt:
"'l'hc l<>i..:islntivu powl'r of till' Rtnt" slinll I><> l'cslvil iu a
Assc111hlv· which shall eon~ist of n Senate 1111.J llnu~..,
G,•1wrnl
of
Dcl<'g-ntes."

pn~e·

17 }

Se•ctiou :l!I of the Constitntinn 1livi11l'H the powern'
of g-ovcrurnl'ut into lhn•c hr111iel"'"• l<·.~i~lntive,
executive nnd jllllicinl, nnd 1lcclnrc~ thnt, l'Xeept ns otl1erwise
provitlc,I in the Constitution, that thcs.., thr"" depart111,•11t:;

·~.·-(j·,";·~~:C~v:~~--~~·~:;::;;.~w-~
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of government 11 &hall be sept1rutc aud distinct, so that ueithe•r
exercise the powen properly helo11gi11g to either of the otlll·rs,
nor any person exerci,e the power of murc than one ur t h1·111
at the aanic time."
Tue pawer to make lav.·11 fur the· people of the Cu111111u11·
wealth 15 \'estcl in the Oencral ,\~"'·1111.h· which in it~ """'"''
bly represents all of the p<'()pl•• or till' t~mmonweolth. •r1,;.
lawll enacted by the Assembly 1h•ri,·e the•ir fon.•c fn1111 1lu·
fncl thol thev ttre tile will of tlu• who!.• p<.>-0plc c:qm·s,...,I 1.y
their outhor[%c.J rcpn·~c11tnli\·,·s i11 the• funus pro,·i•h•I Ii_,
the Constitution nm! 011 snJ.j,"·I~ or qm•,lioll't u11 wliil'li 111,.
reprl'Sct1tntivc~ ha\·c be-en 1·11t rll'll'l tu net. A~ wn~ "''i'l i11
Stnlc: v. Fir/ti, s11J1ra, (W A111. II<'<'. l'I'· :!ii-8):

iDoonsiatent with the general lawa of the State which include
Section 4570 of the Code. If tho Hoard had nttempted by
reinilations or license to authorize: the sale of wine and beer,
either or both, on Sunday, such regnlntion ·or license would
bo in conflict with the statutory ~rnnt of power under which
it is nu tho rited to act as wcll ns in conflict with Section Seven
of the Constitutillll.JVhieh declares:

-
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If Chnpter 129 of tho Acts of 1!138 (Acts 1938,
p. 194) hnd contnin~ uothing moro limn the first
two pnrnJ.?raphs fo11n1l in tlrnl net there would lie
forco in tl1e co11tc11tion th11t this Art wn,; inte111le,l lo conti.J,. in tl1!' Bonni< of S1qll'rvi~ors uf Ilic C011111i,·s und tloe
<'ullneils of citi<·s 111111 town~ the• nuthorily to r,•<.:11late the snlc
of wine nnd IJL•l'r on Snntlnv <'\'l'll to thl' cXll'llt of pcrmitti11:;
''" unliu:111<'<' the s:tl,, th<•rcof 011 Sun.Ju~-, 1111d tl111t 1l1e Al..;,holi,• 11,.,.,.rn<.:<' Co11trol !loan! hnd 110 d11tiL < in the matter
1111!,•ss s11d1 nn onlinnncC' \I'll< 11dupte1l.
Th,• (l,•m•rnl :hs.•111bly, how<•\'<'r, did nut slop with the firnt
two pnrn).:rnphs uf th!.' Ad. In thl' Inst pnrnµ:rnph thereof
the~· 1'!111·,·,\ n prm·iso whi,·h l'l'tllls n~ fu!luw':

.... ,

f

0

It must, therefore, IK' CUlll'lll.l"\ lliat uot C\'l'll th.· l1<'1wi:d
Assc111!1ly l'l111 ddc~ntc tu 1111~· ,.111.•r l""ly tl1<• l'oll'<'r tu 11·1 .. ·al
n 11111' wliil'h it h:1s lnwfnlh· ,.,,,,..,,,\. lllnd;'s l'<•11•tit11tiu11:1l
Low (:!11<1. Eal.) pp. :l:.!1-:1~:.!; ,..;,.,,,.,., ('U1111ly /f111rl: '" /,.1,,,f._
:!G Baril. (N. Y.) ;,9:) (I~).
.
:!ilorC'Ol'Cr, wh,•11 t Ii,. li·c:i,Jatin· ~rnnt uf I"'"'''
pnp;c 18 f to tl1<• Alc-o!wlie 1:,.,,.-r;o;!l' -l'o11trol llnar1l j, ,.,
1-n111i11<-.l it will lo<' ,,.,." lhal Iii<• lll'111nal ''"'''",J,h·
has not ntk111pt1·.! to co11f,•r ""ii ;111_1· •111·h powl'r. 'l'lw S1:oi- c::l
uto which nuthori1.L'~ t!JL• J\oar.I tu 111:1!;.• l'l'!•lllnti1111• is :-;"-.
lion 4Gi:-1 (~>) uf the Vir~i11i:o I ·,,.i,. uf l!J:;1i.. So far 11• ii j. ::::I:
upplicnlile it pruvi1lcs:
>!'=

It will be seen thnt Ilic 1111tliuril\' 11111h•r whi1•la !Ill' lloar.J
pronm\µ;nte!I rcgnlnti<mH hm·i11~ ti,;. fur<'<' nllll e1f<>ct 111' l:iw
p1:ol1ihit8 it from promnlgntin~ au~· such reµ:11lntio11 whi,;J, i~

of the people is injurious to their ri:;hts and ou~ht not to be
exerdse'tl."
p.n~ 19

... • • Thi8 power, tl11t't n·:wlii11c: ,.,·cry citit<'U in .. n·ry
rclntion ma\ intcre~t, is tu 1,.. n·:<:inl,-.1 'ns n ..:a·n'<l I r11,t.
which is tu \)(! c!en.·ise<l 1,,. tl1n ... · In wloo111 it ha~ lt1.'t•11 ,.,, .. ,.
111itlc'<l, n1a! l'l'<'l'~' citiz,•11 ),;,,:a ri'-:l•I tu ,!,•111:111,\ that llw ml.for hi~ co11<llld ~hall l.c 1•st:doli-l .. ·,I lov that l>0<h· i11 "l,i.-1:
he, with lois other fdlo"'-<-"ili>c11•, lo:l\;C n»IL'<I llll' I""'''"'

"Tho Ronni mil\' from ti1111· lu ti11w 11111k<• s1wl1 n•:1so11alol•·
rcgulntions, not i1ironsistr11t witl1 lhi' n<'I, 1111r lfri· !I""''"'
lawH of tlrr S/a/1•, us the B11ai·1I ,i.all dl'<'111 lll'C<'s~ary to 1·111-r~
out the p111·110sC'>< 1111 11 pr11,·isi1111s ui' t liis nd 111111 to 111·,.,·,.111
the illc~nl mnnnfnc!nr<', liollli11'-:, ··11/r·. clistrib11tio11 111111 t r:111-portntiun of uleoliolic- hc.•\'1•n1~·· ... or a11~· oue or 111orc (1r :--111·l1
illc~al net~, n1ul f1·01n tluu• (11 t i11H• :dlc'f". ·1·clpe:1I, or ;11J11•11i:
suel1 rcµ;nlntion~, or n11y 11f tlu·111. ' • •" (ltnlics slll'l'li<"<L l

••That all power of suspending lows, or the execution of
Ltws, b\• any uuthority, without consent of the representatives

LU

"It i.• further pro\•itletl, howC'\'er, thnt 110 prol'i"iou herein
contuinl'<l nor 1111\' onlinnnrl.' tlmt 11111~· lw pn<s<·•I in pnroll·
1111<'<' tlll'n•of, .hnll he• «1111stn11•.t ns in nny wn~· alterin'..;, 11111<'1lll·
i11~ or l"l'l"-'llliu~ ht.'t~tiou -~~>70 of tl1<' Cod1..• of \"ir'.-!,inia."
(_)

It wonlil hnvl! hC'cn impo••ililc tu hnvo 1lrnw11 n proviso in
lnore ""'<'<'pin~ 1111tl 111l indnsiv,• knn.~ to lll'<'11111plish th,· pnr·
111>s.•s 11,,.,1 in th,• proviso fn11111l in Chapt1•r l'.."I llf ll1t• .\ct.'
11f l!l:ls. It <•xpn•s<ly provith•s lhnt 1wthi11c: •·1111t11i11<•d in t11<·
:\cl ilsl'lf nor in 1111y unli111111ee 111lupl<'d th1·rl't111d,•r ''sl1nll
be ronstnH.•<l o.~ iu orry tl'flr/ nltrriu.<J, c1111cudiuq or n•JJ1•1i/11111
S,•etio11 ~r,70 of till' Co,llJ of Vir!'i11i11."
·
If Sct•tion -t::iio of thu l '01le of Vir~ini11 1liil not pruhiliit
one from l'lll!lll!inl! in tho s11ll! ·of wi1w 1111<! lll·i•r 011 Su11d111·
pnrsnnnt In his lnllle or cnlling- tliero wo11!1I hnvc lll'en 11~
ll<•ce~sity fur th<• proviso.
Dnrin~ th<' conrs(' of the prohibition re~irne in
.
pngc 20 ~ Virµ;inin (l!HG-l!l:l:l) the ll<•n••rnl Assellll•I\' Ill'·
q11in•I\ thC' t•Xll'C'll!l'lv b111l lllll•it of 1•11;1cli11 ..: •l11tutes nllowinv; the political s11b.(livisio11s lo p11rnlll'I thl'~crillli-
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nal statut~ relating to the prol1ibition of the manufnctur<',
sale and pcues5ion of anlent spirit~. Set' Sec. Z1 of Cl111pter
3~9 of the Acts of 1918 (Acts 1\.118 p. 59S); Section :r. o{
Chapter 407 of the .Acts of l!t.!-l (Act.a 19"24 pp. GOG-i); Chup·
ter 112 Act.a of l!l'ZS (Acts l!r.!~:!0.'.!1); Chapter 3\.1-l Ad~
1930 (Acts 1930 pp. 830.1); Vin611in Code of l!r..?4 8l-ctiu11s
..Wf> (34) and 4675 (35); Sc<"lio111< 4675 (3-l); 4675 (SJ); 1111.!
-lul5 (Ji) of the Virginia C0<\l! u{ 1\.130.

Onliuan~s 11tloplN pursuu11l to ~uch legislation were cnforct:<l in mnnv juri!<lictioni< i11,.k:1d of the Stale prohiLiti<111
luw. Collius ·v. Jlotlford, 1:\4 \'n. ~\8 (19'.?"2); Ca1111ibrll \".
/Ja11dlle, 13S Vs. 817 (19".!4); Y.im111rr111n11 \". Bedfurd, i:~
Vu. 787 (l\J"!'.!l; Jor<fa11 v. Suu//. /lo.,fo11, 139 Va. f':ig (l!l·.!tl
1111d ffrooL-c v. TotNI of !'11low11r, H!l \'n. 4:!7 (l!l:!S). \11
!lrya11 v. Comrno11u·rnltl1, l:!C \'11. 74!1 {19l~l) it .,.·us li<·hl tliat
n prosecution unJ~r ~uch 1111 or.li111111cc wn• n bar to fllrllic•r
prosffntion ll!H!«r the stat111L• fur tl1" 1<n111c net hy ,·irtll•' of
8C'ctiu11 t'l of t!1~ ('011stit11tio11 which 1h-..·!:ln's that 110 111a11
bhnll ••tx• put twii:c \n j~opanly fur tin.• :-:uu~ offl'lhL'," tl11·
prohiLitiun Act hnvi11;:- prul1ihi1,~1 tlll· localities fru111 «\ad·
i11g- unlinnnccs th:it 111·0\·i1l"t! a l<·s,,.r pl'11nlty thn11 tliat fj,.,l
for ~irni!ar off en'"'~ 11111ll'r tlil' statuh•.
Jlv tliis 11w1l10,I Scdion t:t~ of 1li,• l'o11stitutio11 S<'t:n·;.::1ti11c:
11 ull fi11l'!i l"ulk"t_·tt•tl for utTL·11"1'"' t·o111111ittc..•tl n~ni11~t tiw ~tnh"'
to till" Literary 1·'11111! \\"11' for all prn..ti«:tl jillrpo~c"• 1111l!i1i .. tl
n11d lllllll\.' thuus111d.;, 11f tlull:lr:-' diverh•tl fru111 1lh'
pn~c '21 ~ L.ite1·nr~· ·F'nllll i11tu tlw lr\·a:-uril''"' of tl1e p1i!iti\·;il

......

have been within it, or iu some men~ure to modify the enacting Cl11usc."

1--
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The C'-0urt of Appeals in Commonwtnltli tv. Ford d al, 29
OrntL Ci83, (1Si8) after quoting the foregoing definition of
a proviso said:

LU

"Substuntially lLe same definition is ~\·en by Mr. Justice
Hnlilwin in 15 Peters R. 4:!3: 'Tho Ot~icc of the proviso,'
•11~-s lie', '!{e11crnlly i~ either to e:i:cept so1ncthini.: from the
c•1111cti11~ rlnusc, lo restrain its )!•"ll<'rnlity, or to cxpu~e :!2 ~ clud,• s.11111• pos~il,lc f':t"Utlll1l uf 111i<i111,•rprclt1tion
of it us l':tll-11tlint: lo c:t,<'s not i11tc11dct! lo L11!
Lroui:ht within its \lltn-ic•w.' "
'fo the s:lllll' e{foct nrc Jorda11 \". Soul/1 /loslou, 13~ Vu. &1S
1:c>4;,c ( l!l:.!~); /,o!f,/ Corporntiv11 \". Commor111·,.Cllll1, l'.!G Vu. :\~l,
(l!l\!I); .\'or.f11nl'. 7'raction Co.\'. ll'liitr, l l:l Vu. 10:!, Wli
{ l!I\:.!) 1111<1 ll"at/1 \", Firr .·lt!iust111e11t ll11rn111, lCll \'u. t\-1\

,r

~:,;

( l!l:tl).

!11 /.1111il Corziornlion v. Cvmmu11u•re1ltli, suprn, the Court
lll•l,\ thnt if there i,. n <"Olltlict hdwcel\ the bo,\v uf u stutute
111111 u pru,·i~11, th<•n lh1• prn\"iso 11111st pr1•v11il "~ th,• Inter expr1•ssi1111 of th<• h•t:isl:ttiv._. i111<•11t.
111 .\"or/ull; ,(· J'. 'J'r11ctiou Co. v. \1 1/1ilc-, -""!""• thl' l\>urt
snid ( 11:1 \'n. 10<;);

suh-<livi~iou' of tl11• l '01111111111\n•alth.

It is n 11111tll'r of rn111111011 ~""''·t.-,lc'l' 111111 Chnptcr l:!~I .. r
Ithe Acts of 1\l:~q wa~ ~·11ad1«l l:tr~1·lv as the n·•1~lt of 1111· .. r.
furls of pressure !!l"Ot1ps. 'l'hl' l : .. 11... ral Assemlih· was .. ,., ....
fnl, howl'vcr, lo mnkc it d1•11r lli11t 11nthi11c: l'u11t:;i1ll'il in 11,.. co
t\ct or in nny Onli11:111C<! pas"<«\ in \1t1rst1a11ce th,•rl'of slio11hl
~
be consitlcrcd 11 ns in nny wny nlll'ri11.~, n111cw.li11" or rl'pt•;1l·
><
i11)! Section 4~70 of the Co.11'."
~
u.J
Of nec('ssil\", th<' \lem•rnl 1\ss,·11111\y m11st luwe co11dud,.,1
that section 4570 of the ('01\i• pr11liil1ili•1l Ilic >nle of wi111• :111<1
bC'cr on Snntlay n11tl thnt it "''"· II\· ( 'hnplcr 1:..~l of Ilic• ,\..t~
of 19:l8 111crcl~· l!iviu~· 111 tl11• )<1t·11lili1•s Ilic 1iuthoritv ltv urdin1111ce, lo pnrnllc•l the l'Xi«ti11!! ~tali• lnw in11·st1ai1t t;, llu·
cvi\ Ryste1n which hns hccoun a part of unr lc.!..•.i··dntive t•11sl0111.
'l'he ;renernl 111111 usual fu1wtio11 of a proviso i" to c~1"l111\,.
whnt follows from the ~l·11e1·nl ~1:r+«111e11t or provisions wl1id1
pn~cct1c» ii. As WO'\ Rllid h~· ci.; .. r .111.ticc ~lnrshall i11 ll'11•1m1111 v. Suutlwnl, 10 When!. 1, :111 ( l~:!~1);
·
1
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"The proviso is generally· intended to restrain the enacting Clause, 1rnd to except something which would otherwise

w

"'l'hc• ).:l"lll'ntl rule un1lo11hl<•1ll~· is thnt tl1e upprupriute of
Ike of n pro\"iso i• to rcstrnin or 11101lify the <'11al'li11g clun.«
ur pn't"l'tli11~: 111111\<•r, 111111 thnt n proviso lo 11 pnrtil"lllnr "'C
lion 1lO<'S not 11pply to olh••r st'C\tuns. But if, fro111 th,• l'Oll
tl'xt, 11111! u l"Ollll':trisou of nil the pro\"isi1111-. r1•l111i11c: tu tJ,,
s:11111• sulikl'I 111atll•r, it is ch•11r thut it w:i,; i11IP1ldl'il to t<iv
1111• provi"' 1111 t•lfod bcymul the phrase i111111 .. di.,t..ly pn•,.,.. 1
i11u: it, 01· a s1·opc heyo11<l th<• ~l'Ct1011 of wl1il"h it is 11 \Hirt, i
will lie con~truc.•tl n~ ff.!strni11i11.1' or qunl!fyi11!.f JJJ"l'l't>ding !"Cl
tiu11s n.•lntivc to tl1c snrnc ~ubjl'l'l 111ntll·r ot' tJ1p pro\'io...:u 1 ll
ns ln11t11111m111t lo thll <'l111clnw11t of u s••1111ra\,. ,,.,·tiu11 wit\
uni n•gnnl to its position nut! l"Olllledion. • • • ''
'l'lw offit•e of tho 11roviso 111< UKcil in Cluq1k1· 1:!!) of the Ac
of l!l:lB, wnH to mnke it clcnr tltut nothin~ cont11i11c1l in ti

J4

Y. G. Fra.ncllco v.

Supreme Court' of Appeals o! Vuginia
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A.ct "ahould in anv wav be c:onstnicd ae altering,
pag11 23} amending or repealing section 45i0 of the Code of

::

,;.J~·

William L'Niihob.

LO

Virginia."
Yort>Over, the declared purpo!e of the proviso of Chapter
129 of the Acts of 193S is strictlv in uceonl with the dcclnrt'<l
policy of the Commonwealth ns· set forth in Se<:tiou 5, Subaection titteenth of the Code v.·hich providc-:1:

09..I!!monwea1ui ·:

l-'>
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In the Circuit Court of Hanover County.

"Where the Council or authoritit·~ uf nny city or town1 or
any corporation, board, or number uf t><'n<ond nrc authonietl
to mnke ortlinnnct>s, by-laws, rult>:<, rv;.:ulntions, or onlers, it
tiluill lxJ umlt'rstoo<l thnt the ~!lit' '"'"' •wl /,., inc..iusi.•frn/
11,-itl. the Constitution uml luws of Ilic Uuitl-<l Stnte5 or of thi•
Stnte." (ltnlic; supp!ic<l.)

C<immonwealth of Virginia
l'.

M. 0. FrancisCQ.
October 17, l!JH.
I<lcntifil'tl this 5th duy of May, 1942.

To hold otherwise would be for t lo,• l'unrt by ju<licinl tlocisiou to chn11~c or ultrr tlic luw us <'1"\rll"<I L,· the Ucncral
Assembly. 'l'liis woul,! not be J"-'rt11i,,il.J,. c\'<'1'1 if the t '011n
w~rc i11dinctl to ,Ju su. If tl1c lnw j, lu 1.... cli:lll!:t'<l it 11111,t
be 1lolle Lv lc~islntivc ennctmrut. "It j, th!' fo11~·tiun of th<•
Courts to 'interpret the lnw, 111ul tlint uf ti"' IA•)'.i,lntllrl', wit!1·
in Constitutionnl li111itR, to mnkl• or alt.-r tlu• !:"''·" ll'rl/< v.
/ns11nu1r~ Ca., :!l~ :--:. C. 17~. llli A. I~ IL i::u, 134 (J!l:\S);
1J11rl.11111 v. lV ootlsou, 155 \'u. ~i:i. !Ill ( l!J:l\I); O/sl•1111 v.
Clir·ystal, 54 A. L.. rt. (~. J.) 1:?:!7, 1:?".!!1.::o ( 1~.!i); nm! :?;;
It. C. L. !JC3, 'l'itlc Stntutes t'l'C. :!!~.
It is, therefore, conclutll'l.1 thnt l 'li:q11<·r J :!ll of the Act~ of
l!J:l'l hns 110 henrine; on this l"Unt ,. .. , ... ,."Y ,incl' it c"lprl.'~51)'
provides thut no provision therein r1111lai1a·.! shnll be "construct! ns in nny wnv :iltcrin~, llllll'n<lin.e: ur n•pcnlin;.: S!'Cliun
4570 of the Coile of Vir!!;inia." lh•ncc nm· ref,•rpage 24 ~ enco to the fnilnrl' of th;. 1:011nl of Supcr\'.isors to
udopt n County onlin:int'<' 111111,•r 11ntho1·itv of
Chapter 12~ of tho Acts of l!l:J~ was 1·li·arlv irrc!c•vant nllll
properly exchHled, mHl not 11 prop<'r s11hj,•,•i for 1111 instruction to the jury.
'1'11c motion to set nsi<lo the \'enlil'! uf till' jury is, I herd or,•,
overruled, nm! jud~'ln1?11t will he 1•nh'r<·d on the vcnlict.
LEO~ ~I.

BAZILE, Jmli::e.

J1111nnry l!J, l!J42.

LEON M. BAZILE, Judgt'.
Mny 5, 1942.
[lll\.!C

,'.!G } Virginia:
In the Cin:uit Court of Hnnovcr County.

Commouwt•nlth of Viq~·iniu
t'.

~I.

CO
::i::
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Frnn~is..•o.

'l'rnnS('ript of testimony nnJ other incidents in the triul
of thl' nbove-~t~·lc<l cn•e hefor<• 11011. Leon ~I. Bnrill', Jud~e
uf said Cunrt, uni\ 11 jury, on the 17th 1lny of Octolo,•r, 1!1-11.

t-

-

ll.

w

Aplienrnnrcs: Edwnnl P. Simpkins, Jr., Esq., Cummonw<'nlt 1 's Alloniev.
lll'or~l' E. Iln_;.·, E~q., Andrew J. Ellis, Esq., Gounod for
thl· <lcf,•nd:rnt.

LU
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Iu1\e'.'(.

WILLIAM J. NICHOLS,
a witness intro1\uccd on hehnlf of the Cummon-

wcn \tb, ~in\:: first duly sworn, tei;tifi~d ns follows:
DIRECT J<~XAMINATION.
Hy Mr. Simpkins:
Q. Yon nre Mr. Willinm J. Nichols!
A. Yes, sir.

/'k

·,:Sap~m~ ·Court of .Appeale o! Virginia

M.

a.

Franeaca...:v:~oonuiionwealth

"''17·:

......

WJliam J. NitholJ.

Q. Where do.you live, Mr. NicholsT
A. I live at Tyler, the upper end of Hanover Connty.
Q. How far (lo you live from ~Ir.~{. O. Francisco!
A. 'l'hree miles, aCC1Jnlin;: tu my s1>N'<lometer on the cnr.
Q. Does !l(r• .!.!. (.I. Francii;co li1·e in Hano,·er Couutyt
A. Yes, air.
Q. You are a special officer of Hanover County, as I un<lcratand it f
A. Yes, ftir.
Q. What buaineu dou Mr. Prnucisco operate in lla1101·cr

William'.1.·Nichola.
page 29 ~
t-

co
:I:

w

><

cense as a !tl'Ueral merchant.
'l'he Court:"---C-ouldn 't you stipulate what licenses he has 7
~Ir. Simpkins: We are perfectly willing lo stipulat" it.
'l'lie Court: I think that wouh! be the simplest wny to do
it. and then confine the evidence to the fncts.

~Ir. Ellis: All rii;-ht. . It is ~tipuluted nnd ugrecJ by nnd
bctwt'en the Attor11e1· for thc Co111monwealtl1 and counsel for
the <lefrndnnt thnt tl;c defendant, ~!. O. r'rnncisco, i~ now, und
wus on Sumluy, September 71h, 1911, nml fur 5ome time prior
thereto, a duh· lireim•<l merrlrnnt in lhe l'ounti· of Hanover
operating u ;tore loc:ite,\ within the sni1! L'ui°mty; thut he
111$0 11ossesscJ n license to sell soft drinks, n !ict•nse to sell
ci~nr,·tll'S, d;..:11r:1 1111<1 tulmt'co, 1111.J u lit'l'll.''' lo ~t·ll l>eer both
011 prl•mises nlll\ ofT premises, JI license tu ,,.11 wi11e for co11tilll11ptiu11 off pr<.'mises, nnd JI licen~e tu uperntl.' n restunrant.

LU

Countyf
A. Well, it is ~neral merd1umlise, wines and be-er, 1<oft
drinks.
Q. General merchnndis<.', win,·, nllll what f
A. Beer.
Q. Becrf
A. ,\nJ soft drinks of nil ki1111'.
Q. Soft drinks, l'-•"'"linl', and oilt
page 2S ~
A. Gnsoli1w 1111.I oil.
(). C111\cr g-cm·rnl llll'rchnndise docs he H'll
groceries T
A. Yes, sir.
(~. Does he handle dOllll! noliu11~, surh ns wnsh tut., 1111d
things of that kint!T
A. Yes, sir.
By the Court:
Q. Does he opcrnte a rc>lnura11t?
A. :!\ol tu my k11owi11){. 1 lll'\'<'r ""cu him serving meal".
Mr. Ellis: I submit, if Your llu11or pl<.'nse, thut nil of thal I evi1lcnce us to the store id i111111all-rial.
c:O
'!'he Court: '!'hi~ i~ i111111:11PrinlMr. F:llis: In this cnse. 'l'lll'l'l' is nnother case in whid1
thut is nrntcrinl.
><:
'J'he Court: Yes.
Mr. Ellis: But in this pnrticular 1·nsc the imlictment char~l'~ UJ
thnt hC' muintnined n'l'hc Court: I will snstni11 th<• ul1j<'clion.
_Mr. Simpkins: It shows the had;g-ro1111<l und circumstance~
under which the b<•cr wns Holt!.
'l'hc Court: He is eutitk'<l tn Khow whut licenses hl' l111K
nnd the business thnt he comlnl'IK UH n genernl Kroumlwork
for whnt he hns lni<l the fouJHlaliou for. You cnn show ll1nt

he has a license to sell wine and beerMr. Simpkins: Yes, I will show that.
Mr. Ellis: We will admit it. And also his li-

w

lly Mr. Simpkins:
•
(~. ~ow, Mr. Nichols, t!iJ ~·on visit .\fr. !-'run·
pngo 30 f cis"u's plnCl' on ~m11l11y, ~,·ptc111licr 71hT
A. y,,,, sir.
Q. Dot'M lit> Ofll'l'llll' ll r<.'staurunt r
A. !\ut tu tuy knuwi1q.~. I lia\'l' Jll'\'l•r tH~l'U uny 111t•11l~ Herved
in 1lll' liui l1lim::.
!) . ..\11y l11bles in lht'ro lo sen·<' llll'nlsT
A. ~ot in tl•l' >1tOrt• room.
l}. '!'hat is wl11•re lil• 1101•>1 l1is bl'Cr busin<•ss, isn't it I
A. y,.,, sir.
l~. Who 11·11s wnitin~ on till' tru1le thnt 11ft,•rno1111, thut Sundn v tl1:1 t vou wt> re 1lll're T
;\. :\Ir.' Frn11cisco, from whut I Hnw.
(}. ~Ir. l"rnnl'isl'oT llow 11111ny !ll'ople wen• th,•rcf
A. I tlon 't l'l'lll<.'111bcr.
(). Appro:'timnt<•ly T
A. I don't n•111e111ll<'r. I snw 11 cnr ~ittin~ out there 1n
front.

By !hi) Court:
Q. Were tlwrc mnny or ft.wt
A. 'J'hl.'re was nbout two or thret•, us Wl•ll as I c:111 n•member.
I don't know, to he positive J1bout it, but there wns nliuut
two or tl11·l·c curs sit ling- in fro11t of the slure.

•.
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William J. Nichol!.

· Williarn-J:Nichol!,

Q. Did you ubeerve Mr. Francisco make any sales of beer
while you were there 1 Did you see him make any sales t
A.. Yes, sir, I saw him sell some to ~Ir. Williams and Cnul-thorne.
Q. You saw him sell some to :\[r. Williams and Mr. Cnuc::i
thorner How much did lie sell Mr. Williamst <....J
page 31 ~
A. Just one bolt le.
::I:
Q. One bottle. llow much did he sell to ~I?:<
LU
Cauthornet
A. One bottle.
Q. '.Vus that beer consumed on the premises or was it token
awayf
A. It was taken awav.
Q. Did you see I.Jim s~ll any for ron~umption on the premises 1
A. No, sir, not that dny.
Q. Not that clayf How )011~ di,) you stny theret
A ••About five minutes, I suppo'L'.
Q. A bout five minutes 1
CROSS EXA~II~ATION.
By Mr. Haw:
Q. Did .Mr. Williams nud ?\Ir. <.'1111t!1ornc go to .Mr. Frn:icisco 's place with yon T
A. Yes, sir.
Q. For what purpose did you tlm•e !;O there!
A. 'l'o buy some beer.
Q. For what purpose were ~·011 g-oiu~ to buy bcerT
A. •ro bring to Court this t•vi1h•tll'e a~'.ainst Sunday scllin;:-.1-Q. Did you three i\"O tO){L•th<'r for the purpose of ~uin.~
thcre in order to lay a fou111latio11 for this prosecutionT
CO
A. No, sir, we di<l not. I jnst w<•nt hy this mnn 's pince 11111!-pickecl them up in my car mid L·arril'd them up there.
::I:
Q. \Vell, then, ,·on ~fartl'd off with yourself?<
pnge 32} picked up Mr. Willi:1111' nnd Mr. Cnuthornr, nllliLU
went to !lfr. Fr:111ciscn '~ pince for the purpoxe ol"
securing evidence on wl1iclt lo prn,t'e11le him for violntion of
the Sunday lnw; is that ri;d1t I
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, nt whose direction 1lid mu do thist
A. Wl•ll, I wns directed hy th,:Honorable Judge and th<•
Commonwealth's Attorney to liri111t evidence in Court. Then•
hnd been scvernl c01nplnint>1 fro111 different people.

,

<i. Fr&iici'~~2~c~·~ri~;;1ib>'·

w

Q. I didn't ask about complaints. I asked at whose direc·
lion, Just answer my question.
A. I nnswere<l correctly.
Q. So the purpose of going ti.Jere was to attempt to entrap
Mr. Frnncisco into what you considered a violation of the
law; is that right TA. No, sir, I wasn't attempting to entrap him at all.
Q. 'l'hat is what you did, wasn't itT
A. Nu, sir, I don't consider that trapping. He just sells
beer to anybody on Sundny over 21. I don't believe ho sells
!o nnyonc under !?I, not to my knowing,
.
Q. How mnny lillin!( stntions 1111d stores in that section of
Hnnovcr County do likewise on 8undny, sell beer on Sundavt
_
~\. Not in my neighborhood. 'I'hat i~ the only plne-0 thn1.
stays open nil duy on Sunday.
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(~. How 1111111y more pine<'~ do you know of thn t
st:iy 01w11 nil day 8umlny !
A. I couldn't tell yuu. 'rhL•re is some in the County, but
mv business is·Q. How nbont Montpcliert
A. l don't go over tlrnt wny but very little.
Q. W,•11, yon know thnt there are pl:ices gc11crnlly nil over
the Co•111t_v thnt do kl-<·p OJll'!I 011 S1111<111y 1111<1 do sell O<'<'r;
thnt is u fuct, isn't it t
A. So I h11vc hcanl snv.
Q. You hnvc SN•n tlwrri, haven't youf
,\. No, sir. I don't ~o by those plnces 011 81111,]ny.
<J.
Do you ever trnvL•l up m11l tlown the W11shi11.~to11 highwnvt
,\. No, sir, not on Sundny,
Q. Whnt do you do, stnv ut home 1111 1lny Sundny f
. A. I i:;o to church nnd 8unduv sehool. ~lost of thL• time I (l. But you do know thnt gt•i1ernlly throu~l1011t tl1e County
beer is sol<l on 1')1111d11vr
A. I know thnt is ti1e report.
RE-DIRECT EXA!.rJNATION.
By ~h-. Simpkins:
Q. You hnd <liscussell, Mr. Nichols, I l>elil!ve, with the
J mlge und with me here whnt yqu could do to bring- a pro~ccu,
lion, Juul yon not 1
A. Yes, sir.

,.,

William J. Nicliols.
page 34 }

Q. Before tl.Jis oocasion r

g;..,t-

'·"'

:~'1'

·

A. I don't know. I was in and out there real often, I have
been, until I went to llicLmond to work.

a:>

w

~

RE:DIRECT EXAMINATION.
Dy Mr. Simpkins:
Q. Had yon observed sales of beer on any Sunday prior
to thntf
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You hadT
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A. Yes, ~ir. He stays open nll the time.
Q. He stuys open 11!1 the timeT This wasn't
uuythiug uuusunl. us far as you knew r

LU

A. Sirf

Q. You are 11 com1~titor!
·A; No, sir.
Q. Not 11 competitor, within I lm•t• miles of him t
A. ,\{y wife opcrates the :<!Ort' iu ht•r own nnme. I hnn•11 'I
anything to do with it.
Q. Well, your wife is 11 conlpl'litur of Mr. Frnncisco'sT
A. No, sir, we tlon't con~id,·r it that wn~·· Thnt hns l11•t•11
our home dowu there for nl.011! :!ti yc•ars, u Ion~ time lieforl'
he cnme iuto Hnnover Cou11t1·.
Q. \'. ou work in Hichmo11tl, 't10 ~·on uot, sirf

RE-CROSS J.~XA~fINATION.

Il\· .\fr. Hnw:
·Q. Wus it Hold in your presence the other times T
A. Yt•s, sir. Ifo wns sellini< it all the time.
When were you uppoi11te1l 1111 ol1icer1
A. I <1011 't l'l'lllcmber. It hus11 't Leen so very long.
huvcu 't Ilic ilntt• here. I <1011 't remember the <late.

ll.

A. Yes, .sir.
Q. :\Ir. :\ichols, tlo you lim'P Ifie· bt>t•r thnt wns 1n1rchas..1l
thnt <lavr
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you get that nml liri11)..: ii iu r
A. I will.

page 35}
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JViliiam-3;-Nichols. ·

Q. And yon werc tohl that was what you liml
to do if you desireu to bring a pros~utiou, to

evidence r
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You operate a store yourself, don't you T
A. 'Ve operate a grocerv 8torl'.
Q.·About how far from.Mr. I•'rnnciscoT
A. About three milt•s, 11ro1111il three miles to the cast.
Q. You urc a competitor, nrc you!

,. '

M.' a. ·Ft~.ri~is'Go:::v:·;ctirt~611~~)11t'ii'!

·;s~;t.em~ Co~t of Appeals of Virginia
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RE-DIRECT EXAMINA'l'ION.
LJ~· .\Ir. ~impkins:

RE-CROSS EX,Dll'.'JATION.

Q. \Yill Y.ou
A. i L'S, ~Ir.

By Mr. Haw:
.
Q. Di1l you ~o in Mr. Frn1wisl'o's 11ouse that tlay ur 'ta~· 1-on thl' outside?
A. Stayed on the outsi1fo n11tl l11okt-1l throu1?h the wimlow.
a:l
Q. \'-;taye1l on the outsid<' 1111<1 loukt•d lhrou~h the window!
A. An1l watcht>tl the snle n1111lt'.
:I::
Q. Why dicln 't yon gu int
><
A. I li~urcd Iw wouhln 't wnnl to '('!I, kuowin~ tl1nt I wa' LU
Rn officer.
t). Ifo was licensed to sell, wi1'11 't hcT
/\.. Sure.
Q. An<l he nlwayi;o lin<l sol1l, lm•lu't hcT
A." I don't know about thnl. I <11111 't drink beer am! I d1111 't
buy it from unylJody.
Q. Wh('n was the lust time yon were in Francisco':i plucc!
A. ,It l111s been nbout u we('k n~o.

-

g'O

nml gel thut beer now !hut ~·uu lrnvef

Note: Witness pro1luces two bottles of beer.

t...J

Q. Is this the beer that was 1mrcl111sd by Churlie Williums
1md Couwnv C11utliornc t
A. Yes, s il'.
Q. Was it turned over to youf
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You hnve hntl it since thnt timet
A. Y cs, sir. Oue Lott le of IIortou Leer uml one Lottie of
0!11 Dutch beer.
0

\Vitnt'Ss stood uside.
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CHARLIE WILLIAMS,
a witness introdurt~l on beh11lf of tho Com111011wealtb, being first uuly 8\\'01'11, testified as follows;

=-=

><

DIRECT KXA:\IINATION.

UJ

By Mr. Simpkins:

Q. You arc Charlie ,.,.illin111~ !
A. Yes, sir.
.
,
.
Q. Did you go to Ji[r. Frnul'I"'-"" s pince 1n the Reaver Dam
district on ~un<lay, the itli u{ St•ptt·mbcr 1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was the pince of busim·~s 01~11 I
A. Yos, sir.
Q. Who wus there f
A. All I saw was Mr. Frn11<·i~eo uni! his boy and 111yH·ll"
nnd Cnuthorne. I stnyed therl! about live miuutl•s nml I 1·11111«
on out.
Q. Di<l you purchase 11nythi11.c: while• you weru thNc!
A. Sirf
Q. Diel you buy anything whill' you were theref
A. Yes, ~ir.
Q. Whnt dicl you buy wheu you were theref
A. I bought one bottle of ht•t•r. 'l'hnt is all I bought.
Q. You bought one bottle of lll•t•r!
_A. Yes, sir.
page 38 } Q. Didn't buy 1111yt l1i11~ else f
A. No, sir.
.
Q. What <lid you clo with tlwt ho tile of heer I
A. I stnrtecl home with it, m" n1u\ :\Ir. Nichols, uncl "Ut in
the car witu l1i111.
"
Q. And wlmt dicl you .do with that bottle of beer1
A. I gnvc him the hcer.
I-

By the Court:
Q. Whom did you buy tlw ln·1·r frn111 !

cx::t

A. Sirf
Q. Whom clicl you buy th•• 111••·1· fr11ll1 !
1\. I bought it from hlr. Frn·11ri,ro.

::c
><

Bv Mr. Simpkins:
.Q, J\fr. JII. 0. Frnneisco r
A. Yes, sir.
Q~· How much <lit! you puy for it!

CD

UJ

<...>

43

Cha,.lie ·Williams.

J

By the Court:
Q. That gentleman thereT
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. SimpkW-rQ. How much-di(] you pay for it f
A. SirT
Q. How much did you pay for it!
A. 'l'cn cents.
Q. Ten cent.!'. Hncl yon been accustomed to gopnge 39 ~ ing there on other dnys before thnt f
A. Sure.
Q. How long lrud you livecl in the community T
A. I don't know. Ii1nvc bt•m living there for u good while.
Q. 'l'cn yen rg f
A. More th1111 that, I rrckon.
Q. And how fnr do yon live from this store 1
A. From his storeT
Q. Yes.
A. I supposl' nbout n milo um\ a hnlf.

CROSS EXAMINATION.
Bv Mr. Elli~:
·Q. Your nmnc is Mr. 'VilliamsT
A. Yes, sir.
l~. Wl1cre tlo yon lh•e, Mr. Williams 1
A. I Ii vc on J\I r .•John.son's place.
l1. Whnt JolmsonT
A. ,Joseph .Jolinson.
l1. Jost•ph ,lol111~011T
A. \'t•s, sir. Ile is in the courtroom.
{1. You live on his plnccT
1\. Y cs, sir.
l1. Where docs JII r. Cuuthornc live f
A. ;\Jr. C1111thome, he lives 011 Mr ..Johnson's pince.
Q. 'l'he snme i\lr. Joe Johnson who is sitting in this courtroom f
pngc 40}
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Ho is the other witness in this c:isc, isu 't hcT
A; I suppose so.
Q, "'lio took you up there to Mr. Fn111cisco'sT
1\. Mr. Nid1ols .
.J. i\lr. NicholsT
!\. YeR, sir.

·-«:

.l•

i· .•

~.-..~ ",..·~ fL- ..-' ·· ·

•

•
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•Charlie •lYilliams.
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Q. I thought -you told us you met Mr. Nicbola after he
c.=:
came-after you came out of the store.
A. No, Mr. Nichols carrbl me from Mr. Johnson's.
.::z::
Q; From whose houset
><
A. Mr. Nichols carried me from Mr. Johnson's bousc.
L.u
Q. Where Mr. Joe Jobnsoii livL>dt
.A. Yes, sir.
·
·
Q. You don't live in the &11m• house with Mr. John~on. du
you1
A. 'Vent from Mr. Johnson'" l1ouw to Mr. Francisco'"·
Q. I suy, you dou 't live in ·thl• 1mm~ house, in J olmso11 's
house thnt he lives in, do you!
A. No, sir.
1-Q. WbntT
A. No, i<ir, I don't live in lhL' snme house.
c:i
Q. Was Mr. Cnuthornc in ~Ir .• luc .Joh11son'11 house luu ll1at
Su11dnvt
::c:
1\, Ycs, sir.
><
Q. Auu you cani•·d .\Ir. Cnuthornc from ~Ir .•Joi·
Lu
11ngc 41 ~ Johnson's hou8e!
A. No, Jllr. l'nuthol'llL' Wl\8 ut Mr. Jolin~un's.
Q. When you !';Ot thcrct
A. And I was !here, 1111,\ :\Ir. :\irl1ob wns there too.
Q. How di<] ~·ou h"'t tlll'rt• !
A. ·we v;ot in the cnrQ. 'Vnit u minute. llow ,\i,l yun get from yonr hon"· lu
Mr. Joe Johnson's hou~et
A. I wnlketl.
Q. How fnr is it 1
A. F'rom 1uv house to Mr.•Juhuson 'st
Q. Ye~.
.
.
A. Well, ns ueur ns I cm1 pnl it, l reckon nhout two 111ik~.
Q. llow for is it from ;\Lr. Canlhornc's house to Mr.. lo,·
Jolmson 's 1
IA. I don't know. He will ha\'<• to nuswer thnt himsl'lr.Q. I will ask him thnt; yuu .1011 'l kuow thnl T
CD
A. No, sir.
w
Q. Well, how did you hnppl'll to ;..:o to Mr. Joe ,Johns<;;:µ;
house Snn<lny afternoon, this j111rt.i.,11lnr Sun<lny uftcrnoott,
A. "'ell, I had hccn usually l!,'lllll!'; thcru 011 Sunllny.·
.
Q. Every Sumlny 1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Up to his houset
A. Ye~, sir, nntl i;onll'timcs in the week.
pngc 42 ~
Q. In the Wct·k t

'~·''I :, "'''·''V:·;:<:;·~~'f,~;~.

o:. Fra~~186~;'.•..co'fumoawe~ltii?;
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-
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Charz?e-m11ic'icis: ·· ·
A. Yes, sir.
.
Did
anybody
send
for you this Sundayt
Q.
A. Sirt

Q. Did anybody send for you this Sundayf
.A. No, sir.

Q. Well, can you explain how you and .Mr. Nichols and Mr.
Caut11orne
happened
this
Sundnvallafternoon
T to rncet in
• Mr. Joo Johnson's house
A. Well,'! couldn't
tell you that. I can't answer that ques.
tion.
·
Q. You can 'tf
A. No, sir.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Who gavo you tho money to buy tho b<.>erT
Mr. Nichols.

Mr. Nichol~T

Yes, si1-.
Q. Do ~·ou know where he got it 1
A. No, sir.

Q. Ro, bet>rf
whcu you bougl1t
Ni~hols'
A. I
lllOIW)'.

tl10

beer, wns it your beer or Mr.

1rnpposo it must hnvc been his beer. He 1,'flVo Ille the

Q. Su tlieu
you tlhln 't just givo lii1U tho bottle of beer after
you hong-ht it T

png-c 43

f

A. No, sir.

l'011 h11d11
h11<1 bought
before,
't you Tbeer down there in Mr. l•'runl'isco '11 store Q.
J\. Yes, sir, lllnny 11 tiruo.
<). 111nuy 11 time T
A. Yt•s, sir.

Le <J.
for~You
diddid11
vou 't1 give it to Mr. Nid1ols when you

No,

bou~lit
'

A.
si;._
Q. llrnnk it, didn't you T
A. Yes, sir.

llv Ilic Court:

·Q.
Di1l :vou ever buy beer then• on Sununy beforet
A. Sil'f
Q. Di<! :vou ever uu:v hcer there on Sunduv before f
A. Yes, sir, mnny u time.
·
Q. On SunduyT
Yes, sir.

A:

it

--

· M.:G. Franei'°o

·s-dj,-· Court of Appu.11 of Virginia

to

ConilxHJ.Ca11lhorne.

Conway Cauthorne.
RE-DIBECT EXAMINATION.

By Mr.

L.:

Simpkins:

Q. When you bought it before, whom did you buy it fur I
A. Who did I buy it fort l bou~ht it for myself.
Q. You didn't gi>e it nwny, <lid youT

><

LU

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever huy it for anybody elseT
A. Did I ever Lny it for anybody else I
Q. Did you ever lmy it [or anybody else bcsiL!c~
this bottle you bom~bt for ~Ir. Nichol~ f
A. No, sir. Wht'n I buy it, l 11lw11ys buy it for mysdf. 1-Q. On Sunday you buy it iu a bottle and tnke the· 1,ottl..-

page 44 }

awny, don't youT
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you ever buy it there oil week <luys T
A. Yes, sir, sometimes.
Q. You cnn driuk it there 011 Ilic premises on week

47

v.'"CQmin~nwe~lti(

co
::i::

><
Llay~ !LU

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But he won't let you <lrillk it there on the pn·miscs oil
Su1idnyT
·
A. No, sir.

Witne&s stood nsidc.
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CONWAY <'A O'l'llORNE,
n witness illlrmllll:l',1 011 hehnlf of the Cn111111011·
wealth, being first Lluly sworn, tc>tifil'<l ns follows:

DIIlECT EXA'.\llNATION.
By Mr. Simpkins:
Q. You urc J\!r. Couwny l'ai1thorncf
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know where ?llr. :\I. U. r'rnncisco't1 pince islil•a1
Beaver Dnm T
c:O
A. Yes, sir.
W
Q. How for do you li\'c frn111 thercf
:I:
A. I reckon it is nbout thrt'L' miles n111l n hnlf; somL-l't1lll~
Jikc that.
u.J
- Q. Arc you nccustometl tu ~oin~ thereT
A. Not much.
Q. Did you go there 011 Sumlny, September 7thT
A. Yes, sir.

~

(...:>

Q. And did you see Mr. Francisco1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was the place of business open 1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Being operated by him T
A. Yes, sir. - Q. Did you make anv pnrchnse thcreT
pnge 46 } A. I just went up th~rc to buy some beer.
Q. Di<l you huvo uny conversution with him when
you bought the beer T
A. No, sir. I told him I wnntcd some beer nnd 11 bottle of
Coen-Coln. He snys: All ritdit, yon wnnt one bottle 1"
Q. Sny tlmt O\'er. I <lidn 't undl'rstund yon.
A. I went in thL•re 111111 l tol1J him I wanted n bottle of CocnColn nm! u bottle of lll'er. Ile said: "Du you wnnt som1•
inore Lcerf"
Q. A ftcr you boul::ht the tir8t bot!IL• lie uskcJ you ,Jiil you
wont some mornf
.A. A~ke<l me di1l I wont 801110 mo1·e.
Q. What di1l you tell him!
J\. I told him, no, Mir, thnt wnH enou1,:h.
ll. What 1liil you do with the bottle of beer you boughtf
A. I gn\'C' it to !II r. Nichols.
Q. \\'lio el~L· wns in thL• store nt the time, do you know T
,\. !1!1-. Williams wns in there.
lJ. ?II r. WillinJ11s wns in the rd Who elsef
A. J\l r. l"rnnl'isl'o nm! mvself.
(}. ,\ uyhod~· L•lsd
·
A. 'l'hnt is nil I seen.
lJ. What time of dny wns it I
A. 1t wus nroun1l nhont fonr.
Q. 111 thl' nflernoonf
)rng-c 47 ~
,\. Yes, sir.
CROSS EXAMINA'l'ION.
By Mr. Ellis:
Q. J\!r. Cauthorne, nfter you bought the bottle of hcL•r,
didn't ?llr. Fnm1•iseo sny would you hnve somethin!!; else I
A. No, sir, lw snys: ••Yon wnnt so1110 JJHHo IH'L rT''
Q.' Didn't you say, yes, you woulL\ tukl' n plug of tobacco!
A,· No, sir.
Q. Did you buy nuy tobuccoT
A. No, sir.
Q. WhntT
1

.M.
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Conway CautlitJme.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

No, sir, I-did not.
You didn't .buy any

cl1ewin~

tobucco there that !la\'?

co
~

><

LU

A. Yes, sir.
Q. How ol<l are you, Mr. ('11uthor11ef
A. I•'ortv vears old.
Q. Aml where <lo you liw?
A. I live nt Mr.•Johnso11 '~.
Q. Ou whose property, ~Ir. ,Ju,cph J. Johnson'~t
A. Yes, 5ir.
page 48 ~
Q. 'l'hat ~~c11tll'tlla11 who is sittin~ in the ,·uurlroom T
A.
Yes, sir.
Q. How fa1· from ~Ir. Jm•q1h .I. .Joh11son',; housd
1
A. I do11 't know, I n"t·ku11 :ilouut half n u1ile. I la:1\·1·11 '
0

measure<\ it.
Q:How fnr from !llr. l 'h:irh-~ \\'illinms't
A. Cliarlic \Villi:rn1s r l ~1 ... 111.i ~:I\' :ilwnt II 111ilc.
Q. Ami your holl'C' allll ~Ir. \\"illi;1111s' lious<J hu\11 nr" i11
the sn111c directi11n from :-Ir. ,J11li11"111's house!
A. \'t•s, .:-;ii·.
,._
Q. How ofk11 !lo you l!" hy ~Ir .. Johnson's on Sunday afil"1""'
noon f
·
a::J
A. I hnve been l!oiuµ; np tl1l'l'l' nhout every Su111lay rur+
don't know how
:::C
ll. What ,\o yon 1\0 for a
><
A. l form.
·
UJ
Q. Farm 011 Mr. Jolm~on's fann !
A. Ye", sir.
Q. Where clicl you l!L't till' 11111nl'y tu buy this beer!
A. I !.(Ot it in my pol'k<•t.
(~. You linve ~ot it 11ow t
A. 'l'he mouev 1
Q. Y1•s.
A. I hnve got enough to ;.::"I 111101 hl'r bl'er.
_Q. I said, wherl' 1li1l you ;.:"I the 111011cy with whid1 ,·011
bou~ht the hrcr!
pri!,(C 49 ~
A. I workc<l for it.
ll. \Vns it your 11101w\'?
A. Y cs, sir, it was m)• mun<'Y. ·
Q. Mr. Niehols tlill11't ~in• you the money!

Ion~.

Ji,·in~!

I<'ra.ncillc9.j'i~.Ciimmon'Wealth

Co°'nwrry- Cauthorne.
1--

No, sir.
Di<l anybody buy any l'licwiug tobacco while you wcn·:::C

in there that <lnv1
A • .Mr. Butll•r bought 11 pi<'t"l' of chewing tobacco.
Q. Saunders Butler, '\\hil<· you were in thcret

u.

w

A. No, ·sir.
Q. But you took what you got for the money nnd gnve it
to ~[r. Nichols!
A. Ycs, I told him if he wanted a bottle of beer I would
give him n bottle-of beer.
Q. You did f Hnd you ever bought any beer there at Mr.
Fruncisco 's before r
A. I hnve bOU!(ht some of it before, but that was the first
time I ever bou\:"lit any on Snn<lny.
Q. When yon bought it before, clid you give it awayt
A. I thi11k I drnnk it.
Q. You thi11k ~·on drnnk itT When you purcl111se<l somethi11g like tlint you <lrnnk it f
A. I 11011 't dri11k hecr much.
Q. Pk•nse tell the jur~· whcthor or not somebody else supplit·<l you or fnrnish<•il you with the money with which to
11111ke this purclmsc.
i\. Nu ~ir. l\uliudv didn't \:"iVe me 110 moncv to buv no
beer.
'
·
..
·
·
l/. Who took yon down there to the storer
i\. :\lr. Nil'hol~ t•nrrie1l 111r up there.
l/. Did you SL'e nnyhoily when they gnve Mr.
pa~c f10 f Willin111s t[i,. monuy to lmy the bccr1
A. l ili1l11 't ~N· him, 110, sir.
Q. WJ1,•11 ~·ou ll'fr Mr.•Jul111son 's, hef'orl' you left ]If r ..Jol111"u11 '8 hons!', ili1~ you all t:dk nbout g-ui111! iluw11 ther,• fur the
pnq1osl' of g-L•tt111;.:: hccrt
A. No, sit·.
l/. l>it\11 't sny n11ythi11;.: i11 tho world uliunt it f
A. No, sir.
(/. Wlwn yon. left the ynnl, clid yon nil three t.•11\'e together,
von 11111! ~Ir. Nwhuls 111111 i\lr. Chnrlie \\'illi:unsf
·-. A. No, ~ir.
lJ. Y011 nil left scpnrntclyt
i\ . .Ille 1111'1 }.Ir. Nichols went on down tl1e rn111l, 1111<1 Mr.
\Villin111s wns nt ho111e.
ll. 'Ill r. Willi111ns wns ut homcT
A. Yes, Hir.
(/, llnd yon S<!cll Mr. Williums up there nl Mr .•Jolmson'M
house that nfternoon T
A. 'Until we come hnek, no, Hir.
(J .. Yon di1ln't ~ee l1i111 theref Why di1l you µ;u liy 1'1r. Wil!illlns' hous,•T
A. I do11 't know why ~h·. Nil'hol.1 wnntc<l to go hy there. I
never-

__ - --=-.........-.. ... "'v.1.uwuuW*'ann·
Conway Caut11orne.

II--

Corucay Caull1orne.
Q. Why did.you get in the cnr with Mr. Nichols to lcnw
.
Mr. Johnson's bonseT
.
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A. !l{r. :->ichols i<:iid: "Come ou and go w1tl1
me anu riue about suu1c." l didn't know wlinl

~

John~ou'i;

co

-

J,

~

1.U

.
~ent to rill<'
~mg or wli:it

they
to do.left Mr.
Q. wanted
When you
l1ouse you
about and yon didn't know where you were

you were going to do1
A. l didn't know where he wu~ b'Oing.
Q. Well, then, you knew wh<•u you got to Mr. Willinm>''

~

house,
dicln
't vou"Mr.
T
.'\.. lfo
saiu
"'illinms, cou1e on and go with 111<·.'·
Mr. Willinms said: ·•All ri~l1t."
Q. Where was !l{r. Willi11111s wh<•n you got thcrc1
A. He wns nt home, sittiu'-': in Ilic yunl.
Q. Diun 't suy whnt fur, ditl lid
.
A. Mr.
di1ln't tl'll lii111; 1 uever lwnrJ I.inn.
\Villinms was there; he 11111> '"""~ hcnnl it.
. ll. So nil three of yon j11.-i ;:111 iu lu gu riding nhuut 1 \\" ,.11,

Nichol~

~Ir.

wl1ere did you goo from therd
A. Went bv Mr. Nichols'.
ll. By ~{r .. Nichols' hon,cl
,\. \\'cut liv :li!r. ~iclwl~ '.
Q. Alll\-wcnt struig-ht to !II r. Frnucisco'g 1
sir. hnve to ride nhonl lo get there, or 1li1l you 1-A.
Yes, yon
Q. Did
take the strniglit roml ullll ~" 011 until vou i.:ot thcrc1
c:i
A. 1l wns a st rai~ht rom\, uhout straight..
page 52 ~
Q. Ilow fnr £ro111 lh1•n• \\'llK it!
A. Fron1 where ~Ir. 11'illia111s !ivesT
:::c:
0

Q. YeR.
><
A. I reckon about a mile 111111 11 h11H.
LU
Q. Yon 1li1ln't know wlmt vo11 wl'nt hv !i[r. Frnncisco'R {nr~
A. I went up tl1cre to
s111111• ill'l';..
Q. I tlion~ht yun didn't J;1111w wlil'rc you were goin~ wl11•1,

hny

yon got in t\1c corf
A. Well, I hnd nn iden when• 111· wns ~oing.
Q. Where did you !!:l't tl111t hh-a from!
A. Don't we nll l111Vl' ii\ens ! ()1111't wcT
A. Yes. Smm• people have idl'as without nny ba~is, 111111
Rome hnve some bnsis or n•ason f11r their i1lca. 'V\1nt wus llu·
rel\SOH you !1111! uny icle11 you w<·rc i.:i1illl!; to Fmnci,;co's!
A. 'Vell, you ~o 1111 nnd d11wn l!1l' roa1\ nm\ see uuto111ohik<
just stop to i;ct u clrink of beer ,,,. ~et n drink of Coca-Coln.
I clon'tthink thut is-

SI

w

Q. You drink beer, don't yout
A. I don't drink enough to Jiurt me.
Q. What I uskcd you was, how did you get the idea that
you wer!l going by Mr. FranciEc~'sf
A. Well, everybody has some idea sometimes.
Q. Well, did you Lave any other ideas that Sunday afternoon T
A. Sir!
Q. Did you have any other idea that Snnday nfpni;:c 53 } tcrnoon but that onef
A. That is the onlv one I had that I remember.
I thought it ought to be broke tip .
Q. You wauted to break it upf
A. I wantl"<l to break Uf> such doings 011 Snndny.
Q. Isn't thnt the rcuson you went theref
A. That is the reason I went up there.
Q. 'l'lien ~·on kuew you were goi11,; lheref
A. I hnd 1111 i1len we wu~ ~'Oill!!; up tlwre. You get in 1lll
nulonwl>ilc 111111 you tl1i11k ~·on ure ~ui11g to Richmond. You
mny die Lcfon• you get to Hicl1111ond. You can't tL•ll wlwt you
11n• goiug: to do tlit•se dnys.
Q. ~[ r. Cnulhon1l', diiln 't you know when you left Mr. Willi11111s' thnt tlie purpos<' of your goinl(' up thel'l' with Mr.
Willinms 11111\ Mt·. Nichols wns to hnv beer s11 tlint it 1•011!d
lie bron;:-l1t into llti~ eourtruom und "you could testify that
you hou~ht the lieer fro111 Mr. l•'runeisco on 11 S11n1l11yf lsu 't
thnt tlw n•n.~1111 you wc11t up thcret
A. I Wl'nt up then• to try nud hrenk it up if I l'Olll(l.
<l. ls11 'I 1l111t !lit• rc11-;v11 you we11t up then•, tu buy hcer 011
11 S1111tlny so th11t you could hrinl!; it down her<• lo the 1•om·l
hou,;c ur tnru it ovt•1· to Mr. Nichols to lin Lromd1t (l11w11
!il'rc so thnt you could tell this jnry thnt you we11t i11 lh••re
on n Snn1lnv nml homdit ii f
· A. Yt·~. sir.
1m;:-e :i4 } Q. 'l'lint i~ tlie rl'llNon, isn't itf
·
i\. Y l'~, sir.
Q. Why 1lid11't you tell tho jury that to sturt with!
Witness Mtood nside.
:"II r. 8impkin11: Tl111t is tilt:' Commonwt:'nlth 's ease.
'r'lll' Con rt: Hnn' \'on nuv further cvid1•111~\'T
~1 r. Rimpkins: No·, 8ir, thnt is nil.

Soprerile Court of Appe.ala of Vuginia

s2.

; M. G. FranciSGO- v>ColIIJllD~wealtli
1--

LO. l<l-~ETON,
c;o
· a witnes11 introduct.'tl on behalf of the defcmluui...
being first duly sworn,
11s foilows:
::c:
::><

1. O.'Keeton.
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te~tified

DIRECT EXAMINATION.

in a great many other considerations; what people in the
community consider; that is the best evidence.

....--

(....)

.....

U.1

f

The Coin t. If I ctl'!lclude that it is not a neces·
sity 11& a matter of law, I can control it with an
instruction to the jury. I think I will ndrnit it in evidr.nce.
Mr. Simpkins: You think you will admit in evidence whut
other people have licelll!es, and so forth T
The Court: I think I will admit in evidence, if they want
to show it, that other people sell beer on Sunduy.
Mr. Simpkins: \\'ell, it is common knowledge anyway, l
think. llut I try to keep tho record straight.
The Court: Yes. Of course the question that we nro going to hnve to rench when it comes to the li11nlity of this c11se
is whether the ~ult• of bt>er on Suml11y is ll. lll'Cessity:\!r. llnw: In thi~ communitv.
'l'lie Court :-or not 11 11ecessi.ty as n nuitter of law.
Mr. llnw: Aud undl.'r these prt>sent comlitious.
'l'he l'ourt: Yes.
page 57

Bv Mr. Haw:
• Q. You arc Mr. I. 0. Keeton!
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What i11 vour busiue..s, ~Ir. Keeton T
A. I operut~ the Wigwu111 un No. 1 Highway.
Q. Ii; that a place wlit•rc they lmvc duncingT
.
A. Yes, we have nu ord1est rn tu dunce. Hestauruul, culll·
plete restaurnnt.
Q. BestaurnntT
A.
Yes, sir.
(,!. Ami huve you nu A. II. l '. lii·cnso for the on nllll oi1
prembcs sale of heer1
A. Yes, sir, I hnvc un 011 1111<1 o1T with beer uinl on wilh
wine.
Q. Y.,Slll_!lrc ou the Wnsliim:lu11 !ti... hwny in

: 53

llanov~

~es, ~nr.

Q. How munv rcstu11ru11ts 111ul lilliu;: stations arc th1·rc 111
our knowlcdg~ that 1111\"1• 11 IH.•t•r liccuscT - - - - - - - -

~Ir. Simpkins: Ju~t um· 111i1111tt•. Is thut the end of y1111r
question r

~lr. Ellis: \\·'·
t-~! r. Si111pkins: If Your Honor pknse, I ultj ..d
to thut line of 1·:rn111i1111tio11. 'l'bo qul'slio11 is 1101
who else is violntin~ the law, if !hr luw is hein~ vi11lul1·.l.
'l'i1c question is whell11•r or 1101 this s:ilc W!lll 111udc 1111 :-\1111· ::x::
dny, nml lhll Co111mo11wc11llh l:1kl's the position tl111t 11x a 111al- ><
ter of lnw it is nut a 111•1·•·,,.·11\', 1111<1 nu evidence nlull!.: that LL.I
line is mlmis~ible, nml, 1.!V•"" if it lie• 11111tcriul before tl11· jury,
tlmt tlmt line of evit!cn~c "" lo whnt othl'r people un• d11i11::;
is still not udmis~iblc.
Mr. llnw: Your Ilonor, lhis qn1•,;tio11 of whetlll'r or 11111
something is n neccRsit~ willaiu the 1\cfinition of ue1·1•,sily is
pnrtinl. 'fht> qncstiou whic·la ~I 1·. Hi111pki11s refcn"l•tl !11 i11
his opening stnll'llll'llt is t 1... q11l'sti1111 us to whnt is 1·011si1lercd n necessity i11 lh1• •·ot111111111ity in which this thiuc: "1s
1\onc, thut is, the Couuty i11 I his l'nrt"1culnr cn~c. :11111 ii i11volve~ more than siu1plv thl' qm·slion of whether or 1101 it
is something that the st;11 ulc docs not provitle for, II l11kt·s

pugt> 56 }
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?.Ir. llnw: You 11rc i..roing lo let it int
'!'he Court: I think I will lPt it in.
?.Ir. Si111pki11s: All ri~ht, 8ir.
'l'ho Con rt: I don't wunt lo prejudice this rcconl rc11;11nllcss of whnt conclusio11 I n1uv rcnch ultimntl'lv us
Jl"~'' 58 f lo wh..ther ii is uot u nccPssity us a 111nttei· cf
lnw.
l'\ott•:

Lnst question l't•pculed, ns follows:

"'Q. How n11111~· reslnumnts nnJ lilli111' i;tntions nre there
lo your knuwled.i:-c thnt hnvc n I.Jeer licenseT"
;\, That would bo hard for me lo nnswcr, hccnuso I don 'I
kllOW. I imugiJll' tllel'l' WOUid be 25 Or ;!() in the C<Juutv Oil
1\o. l llighwny.
·
?.Ir. Bilis: :Mr. Tm·mn· is he1·c.
l"Xnd informntiou.
A. I coulJn 't do it.

lie could ~ive you tlmt

M. G. Franci&co...L..C~~onwealth

t;:.s,:E·~:

Supfoini{Court or Appeals of Virginia
I. 0. K f('!Oll.

1i'!YQ.Mr.
Haw: ·
That is, according to your 1•sli11111te, 25 or 301

cc

:::c: c....:>

><
l.J..J

A. Yes, I would imagine it would be tbnt much.
Q. Do you know whether ur uot these licensees, filling ~tations and stores along the hil.!;hway, generally looke<l upou
for the sale of beer, sell b<.>er 1111 Humluy T
A. Yes, sir, I think the mnjority of them sell beer nu<l wim·

on Q.Sun<luv.
Yes: Well, now, do you operate a filling station ut your
pince ulsot
A. No, sir, no gas solcl.
Q. You operate u restauruul !
A. Yes, sir.
page 59 ~ Q. Anu nlso, l 111uh•rst1111<l, you huvc II 1l:11w1·
hull, nm\ restnunll!l !
A.
Yes,
Q. Now, sir.
the people thnt 1·01111• 111 yonr pince: how 1\11 llwy
truvcl
onliuurilv1
A. \Vh~·,
onr ·day business is practically 100 per ct•11\ \11111 ..
ist.
Q. i>ructic11lly 100 per cl'11I l1111rist f
A. YcH, just 1-(0in~ thro11~h th•• l'uuuty.
t}. Driviug nutomobilcs 1
A. Ye~, from north and s11nl Ii.
Q. Aml the other p1•opl1• that 1·11111e there nt uit1;h1 an·-~
A. Nim•ty-uine per ct•nt Hi .. 1111101111 people.
Q. Hirlnnouc.1 p1•ople 1
A.
sir. do they ruu11· 11111 \111·r~· ! Jlow <lo thev Iran·!!
Q. Yes,
And how
A. Drive out iu nntomohilcs.
•
Q. 1n automohiles !
A. Yes, sir.
l~. 'l'he tourists nnd your .'-!:1•111•r:d 1·11~to11wrs out~hh• 111+-ni1·

tourist trndc, I uu1lcrst11111l, all tran•l hy automohill'! A. 'L'.11ev ull come hv 1111t011111l1ih·.
cc c....:>
Q. ·w,·Jl, 11ow, is it 'tlll' 1·11--111111 111' th,• !.(encrnl p11hli1·,,-•··
tonriHt trmlc us w1•ll as y1111r 111111'1' l'11sto111ers, to !111\'
on Humlav•
well us on 11t l1<•r .
· l.J..J

11~

.ta\'~!

~r

Mr. Simpkins: J11sl a 111i1111t .. prigo liO

~

Q. l will d11111'-!:•' l liat '111eslio11.

Mr . .Simpkins:

Go nlw;ul, ii' yo11 nrc ii;oill!.( tu t\11111!.(l' ii.

:15:>·:·"

1.-0:Koetoti.
Q. What jier cent, we will say, of the tourist trade, as well
as the general public who come to your place on Sunday, call
for beert
Mr. Simpkins: Just one minute again.Mr. Ellis: How-many people come to his place 1 1'1ftv
per cent would be large, but it might be n small number.
•
'I'hc Court: I think it is sufficient to show thnt people
usk for beer nntl thev sell beer.
Mr. Simpkins: ·It" should first be shown how many cl1~to11wrs there nrc.
Mr. Ellis: You cau do thnt on cros~ cxuminution.

By Mr. Haw:
Q. Abo11t how many i1eoplc <lo you hnve ut your pince on
1111 avernt1;e S1111day 1
A. S1111lluv 1
Q. !-i1111tlay.
A. S11111lny i-i 11 little better nverugc thnn we1•k tluys.
l~. ,J nst liuw 111n11y people wouhl you sny 1
A. Iuel11di11g the wine 111ul 11le trmle !
Q. Yes, those 1·omin!.( 011 S11111lay.
A. I i11111)!i11e we hnvc :mo people on u Sumlny; n111ybu
Ill Ore.

Q. What pcn•t•ntn!.(e of those :mo people fl1at
eo111c to your plni·c, thnt come to your plnc1! as
tourists, n11 11 nlso as pcrsons that co111c tlicre for s11ppc1· nt
11ig-ht from Ilic loeality, de11111ml hc1•r or wine on Snmlny wl!ea
lhev nre lhercf
1\. Well, 1 lmvc 11cvcr fiJ,tnretl it out, hut-

JH1t1;e lil

~

i\l r. Simpkin>!: J11st confine it to beer, if Your llonor
Jtl<·asc.
'l'h1• Court: .Just confine it strictly to hecr.
Q. Yt•s.
1\. I will ~n~· h11lf of tl1t•111 will n~k for bc1•r 1111 a S11111lny,
111111 tlint is lenving wine out.
Q. 111 ~·011r l'Xpcril•nre a~ 11 kCt'\J<!r of l't'sl11nrn11\n-TI uw
1011!{ have )·on lll't'll k1•t•\li11~ a reslnnmnl Y
A ..Fou1· vf!nr:-;.
lJ. 'In yOlir l'X)ll'ril'111•c of fo11r years, your l'Xp1•ril'lll'<' with
tlll' trnvcliu!\' pnulic thnt come lo your pince-
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I. 0. K el'toti.
The Court: Now, you ha,·c !:ot him on direct examinatiuu.
That is b'()ing to be

lea<lin~.
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I. 0. KeetOfl.
L.:I

Q. Cut out that queKlion. \\'hat is your experieucc wilh
respi;ct tu the demau<l for lic«r hy the travcliug pu!Jlic wilh
relation, ~ay, to their mculs, 1111,1 so fort~, that they tnkc al
your place I )\T]wt L-1 that c~Jll'l'il'UCe with reference tu till'

.A. For iced tea, yes, sir.
Q. You say as much. as they call for iced tea f
A. 'l'J1ey will, yes, sir.
Q. Do they drink it with their meals at your place as

11

part of their mealsf
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Ruther than u beverage f
A. Ye.~, sir.

trave\iug publict

CROSS EXAMINA'I'ION.

:Mr. Simpkins: If you lm\'C 1k'('iclcd he cnn go into lh:;t
type u{ thing I will just 11top objectiug.
Jl!l!{e 62 ~
'l'lie Court: 1 tltiuk l will let him show thut. ll
il' ultimntdy i.:uiuc: lo 1·0111e tu a question of luw
ns to whether this thi11)! is 11 "'"''•ssity ur not.
Mr. Ellis: I would like tu l1t• lll'ard !Jefore Urn Court ulti·
matelv conchllles that it is u 'l"'·stiuu uf law. It cu1111·~ !11
11 quc~tion of whether or 1101'l'hc Court: \\'hctlll'r 11r 1101 it i~ n question uf law ur
whether it is u 11m·stiu11 tltat 1111' jnry must l\etermilll·, whl'll11.,·
it is .u necessity or 1101. :\uw, I du uot expl'<'t to 1h•1·id1·-I
have ~.-ot some i1kns nhout tl11· thi11)!, \mt l tlu nut CXl''"'I to
dcci1le the mutter uutil \'Ull ;.:1•11tli·1m·11\111\'C11 cl11111cc tu ar,:111·
the matter, if it is ~uiu:c: 111 1,.. " 1p1esliu11 for tli1• jury tu d1··
termine.
Mr. Haw: They shuul<I li11d 1111· facts.
.:llr. Si111pki11s: Your ll111111r, l11L'll tlmt dues 110! l1·l 11,,.
barn down for unvthi1l" !
'l'he Court: It. 1101·;· 1111\, ln:I th1•\' hnve 11 ri~ht to i11t r11·
duce evicleuce to ~how what 1111· l'll;Hlitions un: hcfun· 1111·,·
~tn rtecl the husi nl'ss 11111\ si 111·1• I Ill· li11si ucss ]ms been "I u•ra 11'• i.
I thiuk you ou~ht tu i·1111li1ll' it to what tl1e 1·01111iti1111s w1·r1·
before :1111\ wlial th<• 1·1111.litiuu:< l1m·1• h1'l'll si111·e :doll" II•"
-line imlic·:11l•1l i11 till• J.ala•sitlc Inn ca:c. \'1~ 1 :i:I
p11ge 63 ~ urc tryin).( tu liri11.e: lhi:< within thnt cnse a11.\ ti••·
Pirk1•y '"1S<' 11\:'11. \\'1•11, tltc l'irkcy l'llSt', y1111 1·:111
hring ~·ourselves within whal lh1· l 'our! of Appeals "aid, 11111
what the l.'vi1lcm:clll 1·. l<:Jlis: 'J'lierc wnsu '1 a11y .,,·i,\c11c1• in that.
'J'hc Court: There wns-il wa" 011 :111 11gree1l ~t11k1111·1<l 111'
f11cls.

By Mr. Huw:
Q. Cut out !hut Inst lllll'~I i1111.

~1 r. Keeton, do you 1i11.I i !1
your restuurnnt. hu'liness that 1u·1.,:011s cnll fur \Jeer ns ut'11•,1,
.wo- will suy, us they call for i1·1·tl teat

By Mr. Simpkins:
Q. So, Mr. Keeton, your conclusion is thut fifty per cent
of the people thnt eut·me11h1 ut your pince drink !Jeer with
the meals f
pug-c G4 ~
A. Ye~, sir. 'l.'hut is, ns nenr as I cnn estimute
it.
Q. As clo~e ns you cnn get to itf
A. I 1·011111 brinl{ records to show it, for thut matter, as to
whnt it woul1l hl'.
Q. Whnt per cent of the people that come there that do
not cut men ls drink it T
A. W<•ll, now, for hecr um\ wine, if yon will nllow me to
11nswe:- the question-

llr r. Ii:Jw: .Tu~t beer. .Just confiue yourself to beer .
I-

c:o
::t::

.><
UJ

A. What percl•ntn~f

~I

Mr. F:llis: II' Your Honor plc>nst•, I submit tl111t !lie qnc.~·
tion with re><JlL'<'I to wine i~ revl.'!nnt; just n tlrink of the same
<'hnrnl'fl'l'. Tf, for l'Xnmpll', we Wl'r1• 1ll•alin!! with thl' otl11•r
i11dil'!ml'11!, on the q1wstion of Rl•lling C1>t'n.Coln, Pepsi-Cola
is on the snme hnsis ns Coi•n-Coln.
'l'hr <'our!: Yci<, T think tl111t is on the snme hnsis.
:'<Ir. llnw: Bl'er mu\ wine.
A. J w11ul1l i<ny 75 per Cl.'ut of the peopln tlmt come to my
plnrl' 1lri11k beer 11ncl wine.
M1'. l<:llis:

Beer or wine, onct

A. Yes, 1<ir.
Q. Whnt per rent of them thnt come thnt do not ent menlst

lH tl1ut whnt ~·011 menu!

Supreme Court of Appeuls of Virginia
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I. 0. Keeton,

I. 0. /\.edt•u.
A. I say, all of tlll'm. ~fovcuty-five per <·eut •.L.
pnge 65 ~ everyone will driuk f~·1·r or wine.
:z:
Q. What per tt·nt 11f the :lOO people that t·111~

.A.. Yes, sir.
Q. Sunday is next f
A. No, sir, Friday.
Q. Suturclay, Friday nnd Sundayf

U

there on Sunday buy ll<:cr or wi111· tu take uwuy with tht•1&.LJ
A. Very little. In fnct, W<' 111111°1 have off-111·t'miscs winl'.
Q. You tlou't have otf-)11'1'111i,1•s winct \.'on hnve 1111 •ill·
premises ~t·r license, tho11;d1 !
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Autl very fl!w people liuy IK·l'l' nuil take it away with
themf
A. Very few.
Q. Antl ~·our <"onclu8iou, fr11111 y1111r tc><ti111ony, i• thnl ),.:,.,-:
nud wine ure served aloug will1 llll'a!s, UM 11 purl of the llll'als.
usually t
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But you know nothing- al11111t l111yi11g- it to take off pr1·111isesf
A. Yes, I ha\'e off pren1is""' '''"''"
Q. _But you tlon 't sel! hut 1· .. r." li!llt• of !lint!
1\. ·Vt'I)' little.

:\Ir. Haw: They only 1!11 I h:i I 1'111· t 111~ pnrpost• uf t·1·id1'lh·1·.

Q. You operntc tht· \\'kw:1111, whil"\1 is po11ul:1rh·. 1·1111<-d a

ni~ht cluh f

· ·

·

A. \\'<"II, yes, nig-hl clulo 111111 n·st1111nmt, we will sa~"
CJ. Atul you hnl'c tlnm•<•s ll11•r1• 1111 Halur<lny uig-ht !
A. We Jmvc 1l:1111·t•s llll'n· 'i' 11i•..d11s 11 \\'eek.
Q. ,'iix nii:hts 11 "'"''" !
puge (j(j ~
i\. Ycs, sir.
l.). J11elutli11i:- S:il11nla.'' 11ig-hl !
A. Yes,.>1ir.
Q. Allll whnt. ti1m· <lo r1111 1·!11~1· 1111 H:itunlny 11i.t(l1l !I-A. \Vt• 1•losc at twelve now.
~T~w!

A. Ju fnd.

~

WO .. top till'

t!1111<·1'" al {\\'Pl\'('.

-

ll. \\'hnt ti1110 110 vuu t<l111• s1•lli11!.!: lll'l'I' 011 Hnlunla,~··hl
A. 'l'wl!l\'e o'dod;.
·>cl~. \\1h:it tit111J 110 vou i<tarl 1111 Su111!ny 111orni11:.i; ! LU
- A. \Ve 11011 't op1•1; 1111fil 1•l1·1·,.11-ll1irh·".
·
.Q. You :<tart Sl·lli111~ tlw11!
·
A. Yes, sir.
Q. A 11<1 8u111l11y is your lii·~~i·sl da~· t
..A. No, ><i1".
'Q. ~nhmlny is your hi:,og>t'"I 1lay I

A. Yes, sir.

--

Q. So that stopp1n!l' t11e sale of beer in Hanover County on
Sunday would mutennlly reduce your profits, would11't it?
A. I would Jose 75 per cent of my tourist lmsiness.

Q. If we stopped it r
A. Yes, sir, my menl business.
Q. And thut is cliieHy why you nre down hC're
to<lny, looking uftcr your lmsiut>~s f
J>nt(c li7

~

A. Looking nfte1· my ,!>usiness.

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATlON.

Jh- !II r. Haw:

·q. 'J'o wliat extent do you S<'ll beer nnd wi11e without men!,.; t
l 111e;1u, what pen·t'11!age of the people tlint comv there wl10
1)0 1101 l'lll llll\'tl1i11g-f
A. Wl'l!, 01;r uiilit Lusiness, there 111·c very fow 111t•nls; we
sl'r\'c 11 frw ~a111lwit•lit·~; \'cry few di1111ers nre servt•tl at ui!{ht.
'l'lw 111njurity uf lht•111 tlriuk lll'cr 111a] wine.
Q. J\I 11ight f
A. Yes, ~ir.

<l. ]Jo
tlii11g
liketllt'y
tlmttusunlly liny sn11,Jwh·l1l's 11!1111g- witl1 it, 111· so111l';\. 0!1, Y<'s, lh<•y huy smalwid1t'S 11lo11g with it.
(). Hut lht•y don't ent full 11wnlsl
J\. '\'e st•rvc th,•111, hnt \'1'ry few nre onk•red.
Q. But during- the tlayti111e, the tourist trn,lt•- t
1\. J,. 111enls.
·s). l'radil'lllly
nil ftl1c lict·r 1111<1 wine !lint is ,old is with
l11l•11ls,
I u111ler~tnu1]

w
!
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i\. Yes.
t lit•111.

pngc

ns

11

Of course we se1'\'c sn11tlwid11.>1:1 if 1!1"''. ask for

Q. I 1111clcrst1111t1 from you-r tlon 't n1l•11n 1.. /l•11d
tlrn witncss-thnt lht> llllljllrity or the lil'l'I' lf1111 i.~
st•n•ctl with 111t•uls is ns n )lart of Ilic 111t•nl nnd 1111(
hevt•rnorct

r.s ~

h1 .~OlllL'

A. "'cll,
cnst's it is served ns
counte>r.
Q. Jr they usk for itt

11

lx!Vt'rn;,:l• ol}' the

1\. If lf1t•y nsk for it i1y1tt>11tl of milk or 1<011w ten-cent tll'ink,
we will nllow hc<'r 01· wme.

,_
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~~,

n~ :1 food,

(....)

as a part of the ::t:

x

A. Yes, sir.
Q. At your plucef
A. Yes, sir. ·
RE·CROSS ~:xAmNATION.

LU

of the people thnt come tlll'n' i11 the cvcniug nml dou 'I huy
mcnls but buy bl'cr 11rc I""'""' who arc there nttenllillo..: a

~11y

f

-'Phnt your store is opcrntc<l int

A. No. sir.

<l. Do vuu huvc n merchant's licenset
•

uf nn• 11t1'·1,.l-

A. Yl'~, ~ir.
Q. l'rnctic11lly 11 1,11111\rt••l per cent of th,•111, an·11 '1

111". Hi111pkins: It hns ull heeu stipnl111l'<l.
tll r. Ellis: Lil'l'll'cs nil stipulnt.ed. Cut thut question out.

spl'nkin·~

·

i'H1'l' il

·

thcvt

t--

A. W<•ll, ye~. nt uio..:ht.
Q.
of thl'111t
A. All
Yes-uot
nil of tlll'll'-

\\'1• h;i\"<' tourists thnt

niu·ht.

t/.

Hnv<' 11 ft•\\' tourists stu:• al ui:..:hl !
J\. Ye8, Hir.
Q. Hut 11rnrticnll~· nil 111" 1111·111 11tll•11tl the ,\nucl't
A. I wonhl sny !lO pl'r '""111 .. r 1111·111.
Q. Hnt yon ,Jon't h:\\'l' ,\;1111·i11•! "" ~umlnyt

~'""
0::)

=c:
><

al

w

UJ

'Vitncss ,;tom\ 11~i•ll"

M.

f

Q. llow long- hnve yon l>ecn eng-n!.:'Cl\ in the 8cvcrul !Jusiin that l'o1111111111ity, Mr. Frnnciscut
A. Ahuut ten Years.
<~. Do you n~·all the Sumlny, Scptl'mlier 7th, when Mr.
\\"illi11111s uml ML Cnuthorne cnd1 11111<\c the p11rcln1sc uf n
hot IIt• of '""'r nt yum· plncet
A. l <lo.

lll's'''"

A. 1\o, t-:ir.

pn~c 70 ~

Yes, sir.
Is this M1·s. Frnucisco who ~its hen• by me, your wifef
Yes, sir.
Where do you and Mrs. Francisco livef
Near Beaver Dam.
In Hanover County!
Yes, sir.
Do you operate n. store nt tbut plaecf

A. Yc8, Hir.
Q. Do yon linvc 11 license to sell wine uuJ lw<'d
A. Yes, sir.

i11~ 11 d1111cc nt your plneet
pngc G9

<1.

half of the tll'op\e will ,.al

wmhvichc!! nt ni~ht.
<l. With the h~·crT
A.
Q. Yes.
And si1·.
those peopk that ,-.,11 arc

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A. Yes, sit·.
ll. Is thnt nt your homef
A. Vcrv close to my home.
ll. You' <lo not reside in the snme buil<lingtA. No, sir.

ByQ.Mr.
Simpkins:
Now,
bn't it true nhm, Mr. '''"•tun, tlrnt tl1e 75 per "'·11t

<lance
nu<l sittin2:
nt tnhlcs
A. They
hny it-1
wuulil!

~1

!if. G. Francisco.
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Q. Ju other words, it is iscrn"l

M. G. FranciEco v. Corqmonwealth

l~.

Who 11111<\t• the ,;nlet
;\, l 1lill.
l,1. \\'!mt pun·hnses ,\it\ Mr. C1111thornc mnkc i11 there thnt
.Jay!
;\, lll•er, l'hl•wi11~ tolua•l•o, nm\ I hdie\'C n hollle of Col'll·

<'11111.

n. 1"1L\:'\l'IHCO,

the dcfl>111la11t, i11I r"'h""''' 11>< n witucs:< 011 hi, "''"" • • •
hchulf, beiuµ: first 1\11!~· sw11r11, l<•sli lit•ll 11s follows:

DIREC"r 1·::\ :\ ~11 ~ ATION.
Hv· Q.Mr.
Ellis:
Your
unmc is M. ll. l•'rn111·i·"·•>, and you nrc tlll' 1h·1""11d11nt iu this prosecution, lll'l' ~·1111 nut!

l/. Do you ret•nll till' order in which he made those purd111s''" I
A. y, ..~, I do. I thiuk he cnllel\ for n hottlc of Lccr-nt
h•nst, I kuow he called for 11 hotllc of beer, mill I think 11
holtll• of Coen-Cola for 11 l'11ihl.
l~. A1Hl whnt dill you llot

,\, 1 11skr1l hi111 if thero wus so111clhi11~ ch:c, 1111,] he suiJ
Ill' w1111t,•d 11 pin!( of chcwinµ- to!Jncco.

~-,.,,,
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M. G. Frauet'sco. •

co

Q. 'Vas Mrs.

page 72
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M. "a. Francisco:

r'rnul'i~co iu your 11laco of busiues.~- '-

~ during
that .d11y t
A. Yes, 511'.

.::X::

><

Q. Was the Sheriff of lla111J\'l'I' Gouuty in your p\11l'C af.U
any timo during that dayt
A. Yes, sir, he was there ul the time.
Q. He was there nt the ti11ll' this liuppened 1
A. Y cs, sir-whut 1
~l· He wns there nt the ti111l' thi~ hnppeued f
1\. Y Cli, sir.
Q. ln what muuner wnH your pl;1ce c0111lucted then.! 1111 I 111•
f;;u11d11v with 1·cspL>et to onh•rlilll·s~ or dison\cr1
.
A. \Veil, it was Vl'l'Y onh·rly. Wl· 1111'1 n ri~d1t big: cr11wil iu
thern ut thl! time, but every I hi11:~ "·;1s very onlcrly.
Q. Did you on that C';u11d:1.1· ,.,.11 hccr for co11sumpti1111 1111

.. i;\uurs T

They do where you have an on-promises license. We
hnd an on-premises license for ovel' four yenrR.
Do you sell gns and oil t
Yes, sir.
Q. Soft drinkst-A. Yes, sir. - Q. In other words, you do not keep your storn open jugt
for tlie sale of beer!
A. No, sir.
pnge 74 ~ Q. 'l'hnt is not your sole Lushietis 1
A. 'l'hat is right.
Q. Tho 8nle of beer is one of the things thnt you do in
opcruting yo11r :.:-usoline nu<l filliug station business t
A. 'l'hnt is right.
-=:
Q. You sell soft driuh, cigurettcs, nnd tobucco, 1111d thi11gs
of 111111 killll 011 :-5ulllluvf
A.
bnve
Q.
A.

A. Yes, ~ir.

theA.premises
1
No, I lli<l
not. I i;ol<l ii 1'11r l'onsmuption off thl• pr .. 111
ises.
Q._ You have n right 11111kr your \iccnMe to sell il fur""".
1m111ptio11 oil premises, do11 'I y11111
A. Yes, I <lo, hut our plnl'<' is ·smu\l und 1don't1111\'1• 1·1·1·y
much help, nllll that is why I ,•au hamlle it better tu wait 1111
customer>< that come in 1111tl kl th,•111 tuke their beer h11111<"
Q. Do you :;ell it for ('1111s11111pti1111 on premises l\uri11~ 1lu·
week llays 1
· >I-A. Yes, I do.
page 73 ~
Q. 1l:tvc you ''""r 1u:u\e it n prnclice to '"II ~
for consnmpl ion 1111 pl'l·t11ises on S1111\lt1y !
:::c::
><
A. Not for four """r".
UJ
Q. You cli1l four ~vear>< "~" ~
A. Yes, ~ir.
(~. You. lli.scontinncd tl1al pradi"" four yc11r11 ag-o t
A. Ye~. sir.
Q. Whyt
A. \\/ell, the hcst wu~·-1111• 1111,.itll'S>' wns lnr ..er 111111 I ""uld
wnit ou more custonll'rs liy. ,.,.1li11~ it off pr~111i'sl'S 011 ~n11clnv.
Q. Do you sell sandwi .. 111"' ~
A. Yell, 1:1ir.
. Q. Do yon have nny taliks 11r <·hair~ in your plm·c of l111,-i11css 1
· A. Yes, sir.
Q· '.rhe A. B. C. Board l'l'lJUircs you to huve tuhks n111l

63
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·

tJ. ls thut whnt your custo111crs dl•1111111d 011 that 1luy 1
A. Yl's, sir. 'l'luit is what the public culls for.
(~. Aml ~·ou i;upply the trmleT
A. Yes, sir.
t~. You don't nm n ~cuernl 111erch11mlise storn on Sunlla)',
llO \'OU 1
l\. ~o, tiir.
ll. You llo 011 wcl'k 1.lnys t
A. Y<'ll, ~it·.
(l. llow !uni.: llid the Shl•riff remnin nt yonr place of bnsi11ess 011 this purliculnl' 8m1llnv f
A. l'o~~ihlv 1111 hour.
·
\l. Di1l yo1i 111ake auy sales of hl•er or wi11c while lhe Sl1eriff
was therc1
A. y,.s, I 0111 sure I llid.
ll. 1111~ the SltC"rifT liecn to your pince of hn,i111•ss on an\'
other Sumlnys nny time ncnr ti tis Su111lay 1
pn~e 7G f
A. \Vl'll, he hns been there m1111cro11s tiuies. 11"
hns bcc11 llll'rc very frequently.
CHOSS EXAMINATION.

Hy Mr. Sim11ki11s:
Q." l\fr. l•'rnnci~l'o, you 11tnte that the luw requires that \'011
lmvc tnhll'S 1111<1 chnin1 nml serve :mmlwiches, or the A. B: C.
Bonnl; which liill you snyt
A. 'l'he A. B. C. Bonnl.

·:.iF·~.:--,

:M. G. Francieeo..v.. Cdmmonwe11lth
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M. G. 'Francisco•

.a

A. Well, sandwich meat and cheese.
Q. Snndwi_ch meat a~d cheeseT .
•
A~ S1mdw1ch meat and cheese sandwiches,
Q. And those are two of the ments that you sell in your
grocerv business T
A. "\Veil, I do sell some in my grocery business, too.
Q. You don't operate this sa!1dwich business in any way
sepnrnte from vour grocerv busmess T
A. Oh, yes, i do. "\Ve mi\}ce sandwiches to serve people.
Q. How much do you clmrge for them T
A. "'e charge ten cents for a snmlwich.
Q. You onlv nmke two kinds, Rnndwich mcnt und chcesef
A. Well, we hnve different kind~ of' meut ut different times.
Q. You don't serve cofTcl! f
A. No, we don't.
Q. llon 't i<ervl' iced ten T
,\. No, 011\y soft drinks nnd beer.
l}. Only i;oi't 1lri11ks 111111 beer, nml sn1alwiches, cheese nml
tlitTl!n•11t rn111lwich llll'ats you l111ppe11 to lmve!i\. Yl)S, sir.
Q. -111 your store lmsi1wssT Now, isn't it true ulso tlmt
thL• 1'11111lwil'hcs-'l'hat on Su111l11y~, tl111t. yon clni111 thnt you
hm·•· been sL•lling fur off prl'mises co11su111ptio11, thnt the pco·
pk• l1m'L' l1l'1•11 hu~·ing tho bt•er 1111 11 Inking it rigl1t outside on
~·our 111·,•1nisl's, nml wine nlso, 111111 openin;: it uni! drinkin~
it ont thl'l'l' 11111! romiug on h11ck iu 11ntl getting
]Hlg•• 7tl f some n1ore !
,\, Not to mv k11owl••11!.(',., Thcv tell me thut
tl1•·~· take ii lw111•· or tukc it on thl'ir picnic or' whl'rcvcr they

!ti. G. Fra11cisco.
Q. You don't 1lave any

tnblc~ un<l' clinirs for

serving 1mn<l·

.:x: w

Wiches, though, do you T
A.
Yes, Itold
do. you vou ha<l to hn\'c tnbles and chairs to :;cn·c ><
Q. Who
LU
sandwiches T · · •
A. The A. B. C. Board.
Q. Who with the A. R. C. UoarJf
A. \\'ell, Senator :Miller ii; Chnirmnu.
Q. '!'hut was when ~·ou n'<'l·i\"c1l your li~-en8e originully!
A. Yes, sir.
Q. An<l thnt was how mnny y<'111·s nbro1
A. Possibly four yenrs ngo.
Q. Four year~ 11go r Tiley han·n 't tolu you since thut time,

though, have they f
A. No, thev linve not.
Q. Do yo11°lrnve nctnnl tulih·-< tu serve imllllwiches i11 yu11r

plnce1
page 7G ~

A. Yes, sir, I ,\11.
Q. Iu thL· 1n11i11 p:irl uf tl1c i;torc when.! you

M'l'\"l'

beerf
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How mnnv T
A. 'J'wo tnhl~s ullll six ehair,:.
Q. 'l'wo tnblL•sT How lnr~'.<' 11n• the tnlilesT
A. Oh, I think tlll'y :HL~l .!011 't ha\'C the tlin1cnsio11,:, hut
I think thcv nre nhout us Ian:•· as Ilic table ri~ht there.
Q. Just "sittin~ over n;::1i1.1•t lh" wall i;o1m·when', un•n'I
theyT
A. 'Vell, they sit to \he wall. hut what I u1enu, tlit•rl' an·
three seats to it.
Q. 'J'hrL•e "cnts to it T
A. Aull if we n••••tl to pull th<'lll out, why, we c1111 do it 1111.i
muke n sent for :mother Jll'l":'Oll.
Q. 'l'he chnirs 11re not at tho:'<' talik•><, nre thcyT
A. Yes, they urc.
11-Q. Aren't the chnirs sitli11~ uroullll the store thut ~u~
mcrn g'enernlly sit in T
llO
A. WL·ll, some of them 111iµ:ht Ill'. Customers mny tuke lill!W

~-Q.

You don't contend th11t y1111 an• opcrnting

do yon t
· A. Yes, I do.

Q. Whnt mcal8 do you ~•·n'l' !
A. \Ve serve snndwichcs um! 111.'CI'.
Q. ·what ~nndwiclic~ do yon serve T
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page 77 ~
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~

(). W1•1l, on 8111111a~·s there, priur to 8eptembcr 7th, wercu 't
tl1,•1·,. 11 lot of J>1•opl,• nro1111<1 the plure there, in the run1l, lllhl
in !Ill' pla<'<', that woul,1 !'ive L'Viih•nce of lmvin~ heen 1lrink·
ill!! hl'l 1"!
·A. Not to 111y knowlt>tl~e.
(l. Not. to your knowlctl"cT
A. No. ~ir. I nm i11Hi1lc of tllL' buihlin!(', n111l th!'rc lins bt•cn
11 spL't•ial offit•er nr011111l there sinrt• the mi1l11le of the s111111111•1" 1111il I linvC' not h<•:ll'1] nn~· t•omplnint or :111y urrcst he.
in)!" 111111le. I wuulil ju<l~e thnt the~· were not <lrinl•iug- it nrou11d
th1•re.
Q. Who is the spC't•iul ofiircrf
A. Mr. Nichols.
ll. And us fur m1 yon know, you Nell it in~i,\e, nllll tlicy
1

w

·..
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Mrs. M. G. Francisco.

M. G. Fraucisco.

take it outside of the door, 111111 wl1ether they driuk it uul
there und come back for i;Olllt' 11111rc, you don't know!
A. I know they don't driuk ii :1rou1Hl my premiscti. 1 u111
po!<itive of that, bccauF.C I ,]011 't allow them to.
Q. On Suuduys T
A.
sir. know why tlu~ :-;ht•ri!T wus up there thnl 1lay,
Q. Yes,
Do you
Mr. Frnnciscof
pn)!e 7!l ~
A. Ycs, l thiuk ""·
Q. Whyf
A. I think he came tu!'''' n ,.,.ft 1lri11k fur his wife.
Q. Why did )JC? ~tny nboul nu hour?
A. 'Vl'll, hl' wns just-I "•li'I'""'" 1111.'t some frien1b, 11111!
wu~ tulkiu:;; I don't know.
Q. Who wt're the fric111ls 111· 111l't !
A. 'l'l1t•rc wt're right 111illl\" l'''"l'lc there. I ,]uu 't ku•n·
juHt-1 ,1011 't l:uow.
·
ll. Hi).(ht nuniy people lht·n· al lht• time!
A. Yes, Mir.
RE-DIREC'l' K:\A~llNATION.

c::i

::c

><

~

LU

llv·Q.Mr.
?i!r.Ellis:
Frnncisco, wh11I nwull" 11r rl'fri~cratiuu do you lia\·1·
for vo11 bccr1
·
I h11ve 11 Kclviuntor.Q. El•!Ct rid
A. W11lcr coolt'r.
Q. Jo:lcdrknlly opt·rat<·il !
,\. Ycs, sir, :111tl then l ha\'l' a ilry rcfrii.:t•rntiuu \,ox 1'11'"menls, nnd so forth. ·
CC>
Q. Is thnt elc<•tricnlly 0111•r:1l1·.I abo !
A. Ye~.
"
::c
Q. All of your n•frk1•rnl iuu i" 1•it-d rit•:illy opcrutctl !
><:
A. Ye~, sir, 1•k..t rir:1ll.'"
lliaLLJ
page SO~ Q. !.lo~! of your 1·11,.l11Hlt'I'~ nml Jl<'OJ>lt• in
vi1•inity tlo 110! lm,·1· ri•l"ri~cl'lllion, tlo tht•y !
A. Very few.

A.

Some of tht'm •lo u111l ""'"''

or lhc111

:Mr. Sin1pki111;: .Tu~t n n1i1111\l'.
pm:tiosc of thnt line1

tlo not.

Ohjcction. Whnt

is t 111

The Court: That question is leading, Mr. Ellis.
Mr. Ellis: Of course it was lending. It wasn't on uny
materinl point. I admit it was leacliug.
Q. I will ask yOtP.-What iR the nature of the commuuitv in
wliich you live wifllrilference to being rum) or urbun T •
A. Well, we have electric light through on the muin highway, but the people that live off from the nmiu highwuv don •t
huve it, with the exception of a very fow that liuve ·built n
private line, which is ri~ht expensive, you know; to get n privute line.
Q. What would you sny would he the situntiun with respect
lo th& 11111jority, us to whctlit>r tlmy li:ive or do uot hnvc it 1
A. I ,,·onhl snv that tlicv do not luwe refri~erntion.
(). Is il'e tlelivcretl iu 111;1t comimmity, tlmt ·Joc11lity !
A. No. it is not.
ll- If they t.1011 't lmve refrigerntion for beer, they don't
linve it for nnytl1ing else, ,Jo tlu•y, Mr. f.'ruuciseol
~Ir.

Simpkins: I tlliuk tlint is n conclusion.

Willwss sto0<l 11sitle.
MR~. M. 0. l~HANCISCO,
n witn<'s~ introilnct•tl on behnlf of thl• ,Jefc11<11111t,
l1t•i11g lirst 1l11ly sworn, lt•slilie,J ns follows:

Jllll'c 81 }

A:

~[r. Simpkin~, "'nit n 111iu11k-
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DIHF.CT EXAMINATION.

(..J

By Mr. Elli~:
Q. Yon m·e Mrs. :ill. O. 1',rnnciscof
A. Yes, sir.
l.J. llow far i:< your laomt• place, whcrt! you n•,i.J,•, from ll1e
hniltlin.!!" iu which yonr hushnnd opernlf':< l1is store or rt•sta11rn11t or tillin!!" slntion T
,\. It is not ns far 11~ thnt buildin~ out then'. Ahout hnlf
nl! fnr, perhnps.
Q. About lmlf ns flld
A. Somel11in!!" like !hut. It is 11ln10Ht nt the e111J of Ilic vnrd.
.lust n little liJ;ncc, till! yard i:i nbont lu1lf Ilic tlist:lli<'c; 11nd
thPn llit•re is much more-Q. But iu Ilic snmc ynnlT
A. Yes, >1ir, in t ht• 1<11111e ynnl.
ll. It is 011 the l'Ond thnt lcmlR from Denver Dam lo 'l'ylt•rs,
is it not f
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=

A. Yes, sir.
Q. In the upper eu<l uf 11111111\'er Countyt
><
A. Yes, sir.Q. How mnny p\~•pll' (•omposc your fm!1ily ! . LU
pnitc 82 } A. My family! I have two aunts that hVl' w1I h
me, nud I hnvc l kht l'11ihlrcn. My ohlcsl ""11 is
uol 11onll', but tl1c re.it uf th1•111 I han• there.
Q. \Veil, whc11 you 1111s\H'l' 111y q1ll'stio11t<, you 11<l<lrci<s y1111r
rcmnrks to the jur~·· They 11n· lh1• olll's thut huve got to lll'ar

A. Yes, sir, I recall.
drink.

W

Q. Do you re1·111l whethe•r ~·e111 Wl'l"l' tlwre wlai>n llu•y 111:""°><
tlw 1n11·ch11"e~ or not!
_
u..J
A. \Yell, they 1li1l11 't niake· the• pur1·hn><cs fro111 1111', 1.111 I
think 1 w:i>< in the sl<H'l' or was walki11){ tlll'OU!!h llll' stun• a'
they cm11e in; l h:we a f11i11t n·e·11lh•\ ti1111 of 11ccin){ tl1l'111, J.1;t
tl1l'Y 1li1l11't mnkc :my i111prc·,,i .. 11 011 Ill<' whntsm•\'(•r; l.111 I
h:11l lwe11 wnrkinu: in thl'l'l' fur 11 1·1111ple of l1nnr><.
_Q. Tn what n1a1111cr wns the• stun• licin!! \ 0111h1\'h•1l :11111 th•·
erow1l eonilnrti11.u: it><!-'lf 011 this Hnnelll\' nfternoon !
A. \\'C'll, I \li1ln't 11cc nn,·thi11" 1liso;·dl'rl\' l'rolll 1111,·li111I\'.
It wns nll ril!:l1t.
·
~
·
·
·
Q. Do you recall sct•ing th1• Hh\•rilTt
0

0

RE-l>JHEC'l' EXAMINA'l'ION.
1':1lis:
·Q. llow ilo yon pm·k itf Yon \lo pnck itT
J\. 'l'lil'.V 111·,• in ha!!:s, paper hnu:s, jnHt a hottlc like tlmt, 01·
two hotth•s, \\'(!put tlll'lll in 11 p:qll'r Im_!!;. llnt it' we were sdli111~ a iloz,•n IJOttl1•s, we wouhl pnt th1•111 i11 a paper box.
\\'it m•ss stoo1l :1si1le.

13\'

~

.

I think I sold the Sheriff o soft

Bv Mr. Simpkinc..0Q. Mrs. Frnncis('o, you sold \Jeer to some other people that
Sunday, if you di<ln 't sell it to these two, didn't yon 7
A. I nm 1rnre I must hnvc, in thnt length of time. I can't
rccnll 8l'lling beer, butQ. You sell more beer on Suu<lny thun you do anything
else, don't you 1
A. We sell a good den! of soft <lrinks nnd ice cream.
Q. Just nbout how mnch hccr \lo you sell 011
!JU!!c 84 } Sunday T
A. Well, I wouldn't know, bccun8c I <lon't stay
in there 111! \lay on Sundny, n\Jout whnt we sell un Sunday.
\\\• tlon 't open nny, never lousl'n a top.
(l. A ntl yon \lun 't know how much you sell on 8unduyt
A. I \lo uot.

you.
A. Yes, sir.
l/. Look nt th1•m. How 11i:111y of the cl1ililren live i11 tlll'
hoinc there next to tlll' slun· ~
A. Thev 1111 li\'l• in till' h111111', 11111 ll1l' ohle~t \Joy is i11 l•'l11rid•1
ul the time. But it i~ 1:i).:ht ..l1ililn·11 i11 nil.
O. \\'hat nn• th1• 11!!CS of 1111·111 ~
,\. \\'ell, 111~· ""II i~ :!:!, I hal is ll1e one in Florida. '!'In• oldest i;irl is 18. H!ie is awa_,. at s.-h1111l ri!!ht now, hut i<ln• Ii\'•''
there. A111l thL• lll'Xt i,:irl is Iii. 'l'lll'll I ha\'L' 11 hoy 1-t, a lio~
1:!, o...irirl 10, n t:irl six, :111<1 f1111r.
Q. Au<l thnl f11111ily, i11,.!11di11!! ,n111r two :11rnls, n·sid1· 11 ... .-.·
near the stur1· 111111 111:1k<· I l11•i r l10111l' th,•re !
A. Ye>1, sir.
ll. An• Ill<'~· lhcrc 011 ~11111J:i,·s!
A. YC'8, sir.
ll. Do you nssi~t ~·e1111· l111,l•:111el i11 the 11p1•r:ili1111 111' 11 .. -

~00.

G. Francisco,

CROSS EXAMINATION.

0

storl' T
A. Yes, sir.
ll. \Ven• vou iu his stun• or lilli11!! "lnli1111 or n•sl1111ra11l ""
this partil·nla r ~111111:"· ·1111 whid1 ~Ir. l '1111t hor111·l-Jlllge 83} 1111el i\!r. Willi:1111s 111:1;\,. tlll'>'l' p11rd111s1•s!
;\. I was i11 1111'1'1' :• µ,1111<1 portio11 of Ill<' :ifli'r·c::i

Ci\l

j\(r.

p;u:c 8:i ~

j

l\I. 0. FBANCISCO,
1111' 1h•f1•111lant, heill\; n•calll•1I lo the st11111I, testiliC'1I furtl11•r ns full ow~:
CHOSS EXAMINA'J'JON.
n~· l\l r. Simpkin~:

Q. Mr. Frnncist•o, l1ow rnurh be~r 110 yon nonnully sell i11
a \l'e(•k T
A. l'ossihlv 50 or C.O cnst•s.
Q. J•'iftv o'r sixty cases, 111111 nLont how 11111l'h of tlmt is
sold on :';11111lnvs!
A. I have 11e Vl'r mmlL' n t11l111l11tio11 of it. It would he huril
for me tu KllY ri!!ht ufT-hnnde\l.
Q. 0111•-thi nl of it ''iumlnyt Woult!n 't you my onc-thinlf
J\. l'ossihly so.
(l. l'ossihly n third!
0
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A. A third might be n little too hi~h. You think betwcc11 .>c::
W,J
Q. A third might be a little loo high l
11 fourth and a third T
A.
Possibly
Q. You
sold so.
other bcl!r u11 thi~ Hun<lay; tbi~ wus 11 uonual
Sunday we arc tnlking ubout lwrc !
A. Yes, sir.
By the Court:Q. Well, now, Mr. Pn111"i;.co, you hnve been s1•ll
page SG ~ ing bec1· there ou S11111lay 11mlcr the bclil!f tl111t y111
hnd 11 right to sl'll it 1111 Su1ul11y, huvcn't you!

A. I have.

ists,
you T 111cul~ to tuuri~t~ ! ~ 11, we don 'I. \\'l• d1111 'I
A. do
~clli11g
have 1t1n11v tourist~ uu th11t ru:11l.
Q. Yu11°llo11't lu\\'c n11111y to11ri~1s 11n thnt ron11t
A.
sir.
t1ll of your 1111-illl'"~ is of n locnl untur" !
lJ. No,
l'racticnlly
A. \'cs, tl111 t is right.

HE-DJRElMI' l·:~.\\ll~A'flON.

II-

ByQ.Mr.
Ellis:
Huve
yon l'Vt•r umlcrtuk<'ll 111 t'lllll'l'lll nny of thl'Sl' .a:h>s

from the Shl'riff or 0!111!1' polil'•' ullin•rs of the County~" W
visited your sto1·cf
·
::::C::
1\. No, I Jinvl' not. I hn\'<' sold !11 11llil'l'l'S 011 Sunday.><:
lU.J
Mr. Si111pkins:

No ro111<-11li1111

:111111~

thnl line nl all.

A. I hnvc sold lo 11 .Jnll_~<' 1111 :->1111.l:i~-.
The Court: Not this 11111'.

.J\.. I <licln 't Rn~· wl1h·h om·, 11111 l hn\'C sold ton Circuit I '11nrl
.Tu1l~(} on n Sundny.

l\!r. Hnw: 'VI! woul1l likl' 111 1;11 .. w where you huy yonr".
The Court: .l nst a 111i11ulc. I do not llll'llll 1••

Turuer.

!(.

pnge 87 } reflect on Mr. Frnncisco 11t nil, but I do not think
I hnvc ever been to his place.
llfr. Haw: He Ji<ln 't sny thnt.

Q. You <li<ln 't menuJhnt this J mlg-c- !
A. No, I i;,ertainly did not. It WM' 11 cli/fcrc11t Judge. But
I huvc dold to n Circuit Judge.
Q. You hm·e sold to 11 Circuit Judge, but not this one t
A. Yes.
Q. We won't nRk you to mention his nnmc, who he is.
Mr. Hnw: It is perfoctly legal tu drink it on n Sundny or
nny otlil'r tlny.
Wif11l's~ ~10011

ByQ.Mr.
Silllpkins:
.
•
,
'rhcrt·
is onc 11101'1! lJll<'~111111 l lia\'l': "lou llou t .111 au,·
business. Mr. Frnncisco, of n11y .... 11s<'quc11ce nt 1111 witlt 11111r·
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pai;e SS }

nsi1k

R. 1'. 'l'lJH Nim,
wit11l'ss i11tr0tlm l•1l on li1•hnlf of tl1l' ,Jefc111ln11l,
dnl~· sworn, t1•stifh·d ns follow~:
0

11

l11•i11g-

fir~t

DmEC'r

l~XAmNATJON.

lh· :\Ir. Elli~:
·I). \\'iii , ..,n pl1•a"" slntc to the jury your 1111111" mid oel'11p11ti1111, ~Ir. 'l'11nwr1
,\. H. I\. '1'111'11<'1'. J\. ll. C. lllsfll'dor, for tli,• Virt:i11i11 ,\l<'Ol111li<' 111•\'1'1'111.!;<' Control Bounl, nil'1111101111.
(,>. fu llw dis<'har~l' of yo111' d11(ips, is H11novcr (!on11ty "
part of ~·1111r f1•rritor~·f
,\.It is, Yl'N, t<ir.
ll. ( ':111 yon f!'ll the ~t·ntlrnll'n of the jnr.v l111w 1u:rny l""'J>l1·
1111\'l' Jj!'l'llS!'S tu lliSpCllSC !Jl'l'I' i11 IlnllOV!'I' ( 'Ollllf~· !
,\, 'l'hl'rt' nn• (il li<'l'llSl'll l'st11hlisl111a•11ls iu llm111\'l'r Co1111!\'.
Q. Ts it n pnrt of ~·011r h11si11ess to visit nll !hos" (ii lil'l'll<l'!'S mul Sl'!l wl1Pilll'I' or 1101 llu•v 11rc r111111i1w in n11 or1h•rl1· 111111 prO]Jl•r nt:llllll'rf
•
"
A. 'J'h11t is 011e of 111.1· 1l11fil'H, Yl'"• sir.
Q. 'J'li:it is lllll' of ~·011r d11tit•sf 'J'hnt is your 111:1i11 <1111.1·,
is11 't if !
,\. 0111• of \111• mnin 1luth·~, y1•s, ~ir.
Q. ,\11<1 ~·1111 1111\'<' lit'l'll 11i'l h11n!inc: t1111t 1l11h· a11d 1·isiti11_<~
. thrB!' 11ln1•••s in Tl:111111°l'r Conntv fur how 1011'-'. !
pal,!;<' ~!) ~
A. Ri111•1• .Tn1111nrv, l!l:!!J.
·
(). llnvl• ~·on 111111 oc1·11siou to \'isi( :\Ir. l•'r1111l'isco'11 llnrin~ tl1at timt't
0

M. G. Francl~o
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A.
·
Q. IDohave.
you know
how 11m11)' uf those licensees dispcll'c i:,r

::t:
sell
on Sundav!
A.beer
I have
not ui11de my ol"'l'l"\'Utious throug\1011t tlll' l'll· :>c
tire Count~· of tl1e licensl,.\ l•stahlislnnents on Sumluys, l111f 4J
uf my ow11 kuowledg-e, upproxi111atdy 80 per ceut uf tlil· til
iu the County nre ~el\in){ 011 S11111\11y.
Q. An1l vuu don't know wlll·tlll'I' the other twent\· an· or

LI'>

kuow!

1·:X.\ \tt~A'L'lON.

ByQ.Mr.
Si111pki11M:
!low
du yuu hupjll'll tu 1;111111· lliat tliosc 811 (><.'!' n·11t ar•·
liellini.:. ~Ir. 'l'urnl'r! Y11111l1111'l work 011Sumluy,1\11 _,·1111 !
,\. Oc1:11siu11111l'· I 1lo work 1111 S1111d:n·. I 1\1111 'I 1111 S1111.l:I\
in tuc re111otc•
ulos1·r1·<' 1111· ..
11111 1111 ti;, ..

sc·~tin11s

.-1:1iilislu111•11f~,

like that.

111ui11 thoroiu;lifarcs·
(). Have you 1•isiktl t;O p•·r 11·111 of tlll'lll 011 Su111\11y !
,\. l lt:l\'l', yt•:->, ..:i r.
pugc !JO~
Q. ,\11,\ ~·011 say th:il ~ll per 1•c11t of tln·111 ""
so111e S11111\ays \nJ\·•· '""' loc.:r ! 'l'hat is w\1al" .'""t-nieau T
A. Yes, sir.
Witness stood 11sit!e.

MH8. ~l.\ HY 1:. \\'INN,
11 wituc"~ i11tr11tl111·"il 1111 lll·bnlf of
being first 1luly sworn, lt'."lifi,.,f 11~ f11illlW~:

page 91}

co
:I:

><:

tlil'

1\d..•1ul:111ll.U

nm1W'l' .1·: '\.\\II:'.\ ,vrmN.
Q. Mr!i. \\'inn, wlll.'re llu ~·1111 tin·!
A. I live on the \Vnshi11;..d•111 I li~\1w11~·. just 01•t•r Iii•· li11;·
in Hnnu1·er <.:ouuty.
- Q. \Vlrnt husilll•ss do you op<'ral<- tl1cret
· 1\. I opcralc a place call1·tl tin• 1Ji11er. .Just n-w .. 11. l
µ:ucss it woultl Le cl:1sscd mun• :1s a ui).:ht club 111111 n·~taurn11l
us nuy other type of !Jut;iucss.

Q. How big u place have you there from the standpoint of
the people you cnn seat there in the restaurant 1
A. 'l'he main part of the building is about 32 feet square.
Q. Auel what licenses do yon hnvet
A. I huve n .ru=nntile liceuse, tobacco license, soft drink
licenHc, restuurnut liel!nse, 1rn A. B. C. license for beer au<l
wiuu both on premises nn<l. off for both of those.
Q. How long have you been operating there!
A. About two vea1-s 111111 a half.
Q. About how iunuy customers <l.o you lmve ou nn averngu
Sumlay r
A. Wt·ll, Sumlay is my thir<l largest dny in the week.
wonlcl uot be able tu till,Y just c>xnctly l1ow muny
pni-:c !l2} cu~tomers 1-would huvc. It .vnric~ throu~ho~t tht)
ye11r. The luq~est SC'nson 1.~ from nLout buster
until the licnrli sensou is over. '!'lien tlic second largest sen·
~011 is in the fall 111111 winier.
Q. { \Jllld you g-i1·e me mi iill•11 of tlw 11m111Jcr of pcoplu you
l;l'l'\'C 11 thy tl1eref
,\, On ·Su111l11y or :my otl1<'r <lnyr
t). 011 :-;1111t\11y, on 11 hus.v Suml:1.1', we will sa.1•.
;\, \\\•\\, 011 a husy Hnmln)', prolmhly 11lio11t :?GO, sornethi11~

uot, is thut itt
·
A.
110usnot,
uo, ~ir.
Q. ISo,
l undcrstn111l
it, you kucow thnt 80 1~r ccut or th··
Gl nre se\li11~ 011 Sumluy, mul liuw 111nny more, you t1011°f

cnoss
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1lfrs. Mary R. Win.t1.

Mrs. Jlary ]l. Wim1.

A. I do nut.

:V.

q. ~u11·, wliat pl•r <'1'111 of' tl1c pl!r:<1'11s wl10 <'0111c to your
plal'l• 1111 R111ulay nrc tourists, 11111! wh11t pl'r<'l'lllllge urc local
J•l•upll· wlio l'llllll' tlil•re from ni ..1111101111 or otl1enrisc for

1111111sl•n11•11t mu\ n•fn,~lnncut 1

,\. 'l'l1nt is just 11 li1:le ilillil·ult to sny. 'l'lmt \'lll'ies 1ds11.
q. I just w1111I yon lo g-ivt• 1111 l'slimnte, ns m•;ir us 1·011 run

w

if.
•
A. l will sa1· nhout 011c-thirtl of' th" pt•ople tl111t Wt• serve
1r1111l1l ht• tourists, in most senso11s. ~0111l•fi111l's it is gre:1ter
th:111 tl111t.
tl. Yun Sl'l'\'C llll'nls tooT

g-ct to

:\. Yt•s, ~ii·.

Q. \\'1111! !'l'l'l'Clllllc;c of the persons who come to your place
S11111l11.1· 111111eut111('11!11 then• 01·.It•r hel'l' with their 111eah:
,\. l IJCl'l'I' llw11d1t of it iu tl1l' sl'llSl' of pt,,.l'<'ll!ll!.';"e hl'l'ore.
Quill• 11 1111111hcr of' pcopf<' dri11k lo!'er with their
)la!.';"c !l:l ~ 1J1!'11l.~, or <lr·ink l"-'"r jui;f licforL• I lit• 111Pal. A µ:110'1
1111111y of Ill)' 1·11sfo1111•rs 1lri11k a !!lax~ of ioL'l'I' wl1ile
t\11•y 11n• w:1ili11g for :11111•111 to lie st'l'l'l'tl. l w11tdd11't Joe nlde
!11 ><11~· .inst l'Xm·tl.1• !ltt• pen'l'lll11;.:<', Im! it i~ 11 ~oot! 11umbe1·

011

of )ll'ople.

Q. Do

11 ){ll01l 111m1y COill<'

·

there 11lso who tlo

110!

i;:et uny

M. G. Francisco· v. Co~onwealth

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

74

Mrs. Mary R. Win11.

lifrs. ],far!} Jl. Winn.
I-

1neals but just get a bottle of ln•cr or n :;lass of beerT
A. \Veil, a great mnny pcoplL• 1!0 l.'OllH! there and just )!<'i
a bottle of bl'cr or 11 snntlwi•·h nm\ u bottle of hel'r; ~"""'
times just n bottle of beer.
Q. And docs that same apply 111 wi11l! f Is wi1w <lrnuk wil h
or without meals generally t
A. \\\• st•ll wine un<I l1t.>el' J,.,1h. :\ few people like it wilh
111e11ls 1111tl u few people lik•· it without. \Ve sell n i.:rcnl 1hoal
111ore Leer tlwu wc du wi11l'.
Q. l'lL'n~c stall' wh<'lhcr or 11111 the p.cuentl puLlit', lrnn·I·
in)! pnhlic, usual!~· 1le1111111tls lK'<'r when they co111e to y1111r

CCI

::r::

><:

L

UJ

pince!
A. Ye~, very pusiti\'L•ly sn. Y1·s. Ju fnct, I sell 1lrnft 1...,.,.
out there on the hh:liw11.\', 1111tl that is 11 little unusual, tu 1,..
outsi1le of n cib'.
Q. ,\ml you s;1y tlwt 11ppli1·' tu ""' ~,·neral truwlin).:" p11lili1
who patrouin• your ph1<·c !
A. y,..;, sir, I will sa~· 1h·li11i\L'ly so.

cno.c;;s

t·!:'\ .\ ~11 :-1 A'l'IllN.

By Mr. Hi111pkins:
Q. You said 11l11111t 11111•-thinl of the lll'llph· ll1;it

pn~c

on fiuuday W<'r<' 1<111rists. ~lost of the 111 lll'r
two-thinls ar .. f.-11111 lli1·h1110111l, 11n•11't tlwy!
A. I have quile 11 lilllt• Iowa! lr:i.lt• fro111 ll111111n•r, 11111 l
l111ve nl'Vel' trh·il to fo.:11n· il 11111 iu p1•r<'l•nt11!.!;l'H, Mr. fii111pki11,.
f jnst t!oll'j kllOW hOW to llll~Wt'I" that t(lll'Hliun i11 \'l'l'l'l'lll:t'.!l'Sl-nu\ I llO hnvt• qnitc II littll' 11f 11:1110\'t•r 1'l'1)pll', 111111 p1·11p1':-who fonnerh• live1l in l1:11111\·1·r who 1111w livl' 1low11 l11•tw1•1·1F'3
my plare llll<i nid1111lllhl i11 11 .. 11ri<·o ( '1111111)'. lint n ;.:n·at 1111111\of 111y
nrc fr11111 Hieh11111111l.
'::c:
Q. A ma.iorit~· of llw111 11ll11•r 111:111 tourists, 11 11111.iorily o~
the n•11111i1Hh•r are from Hi1·l11111111tl !
A. A prl'lty g:ollll pnrt. n•s. 1 \\'1111!11 not like to H:IY 11 111a·
jority. A )!;rcnt man~· ot' 1111·111 :11·1•. I would not lik1• 111 H:ly
11 majority. T hm·e nt>\"<'r 1111111:.:ht to li.g:nn• it just t>Xndly.
Q. Yon sl•ll \'l'l'V littl1• lw•·r 1111 S11111l:I\' for oli-pn•miHl'~ 1•u11·
sm11ption, clon't \·on!
·
_A. I sell ouly ,; s111111l 1111:111lil\' ut' !ll·Pr !'or otT-pn•111is1·~ 1·1111~mnption nt any tii111•.
O.. Yon nr1• rcall\· in th•• n·,t:111rn11t or ni«ht l'lnh ur da111·•·
hnll hnsim•RsT
·
,.
,\, 1110 hav<.' n floor 11p1111 whi<·h l'''"Jlle 1·:1n 1l1111re. 1 tl1111 '1
!l-l

~

l'Ollll!

l'll~tm111·rs

75.

(..)

operate an organized dance, if you want to pp.t it that wuy.
People come to my place and spend the even111g fur recrention plll·poses, an<l thcv <lo dance.
page 95 ~
Q. Most of the winc' nnd beer that you sell ut
yonr pince is in conncctio11 with either n customer
that is duneing or witlrmeals. isn't that truef
A. Would y'ou rcpeat that; Mr. Simpkinsf
Q. Most of the cnstomcrs tl1at purdmse beer 01· wine al
your pince purl'll8till it in eonm•ction with u Jllenl which they
hnve CXJK>etcd to purchase or iu co1111cctio11 with 11n evei1i11g
of dancing- or 11 short time of dunciugf
A. Yes; sir.
Q. As n )J11rt of their recr1•ntion 1
;\. Y<.'s, i;ir, I would sny so.
<). Ahout whnt Jl<.'l'ccnt:1~e of the l1t•cr tl111t you st•ll is tiulJ
Oil 811111)11\'f
,\. \\\·!·!, 11! the prc,c11t ti111t> hu~i11ess is quit ... 1lnll, fruw
~lo11day lhrou:~h 'J'l1111·s1lny, 1111<1 l~ri1lny, ~11\nnlay au<] S11111l:1v Ill\• 1111• lar:.:1•st dnvs uf the Wl'l'k. In fuel, vou coul<ln 't
opc·rnte at all 1111lc•ss ~·on l111d those tl1ree d:iy~. Satnrda~·
i, th,• lnr;.:1••! <In~·. l•'riila~· is the m•xt large:.;t, a11d S1111day
is 1l1t• lhirtl lan.:l•sl.
(/. Tl1t•11 woui1l \'OU snv ovt•r l1ali of vonr lmsi111.•ss is du11''
i11 I hos., !11n•t• dav's 1
•
•
,\. I would sa,; lhn•e.fourlhs of it wus tlom• i11 tl1Use tl1r''"
1lnvs.
·
l/. 'l'lll"<'<'·fuudl'" of it is dout• i11 tl10sc tl1n•e days 1
A. At 111" prcsi•ut ti1m·. 'I'l111t !ins 11ot idwnys
png-c !!Ii} heen trill', hut it is 111 tl1e 111·ese11t 1110111e11t.
(/. ,\1111 11ho11l 011e.fonrth of ll1t• ll1r,•e davs ;s
done on 81111.lay, I \'l'l'st1111t•f
·
,\. ! 11111 110! 11 vcr~· ~uotl 11111tli,•111ntit·ia11, lint I will 11gr1•,,
Ilia\ that is nliout ri:.d1t.
\l. ,\1111 ."""•of 1·11111·s<', Ill'<' tlow11 hcrl', ns Mr. l\t•l'to11 trv' ·
in!! to snve vonr fin111lav husim•ss 1
A. No, si1:, I 1lid11 't li1we 1111v idt•n 11111! I \1·1111ld be l':ille1I
ns a wit1wss whr11 1 t'llllW tlowu' h,•r<.'. I t•:11ne 1low11 l1t•1•1111sc I
was i11t1•n•sll•1l in tl1c entire suh.it-l't-maltL'r fro111 tl1e st1111dJ1oi11t of 111<! fnd tlrat I nm opt•ratill!!, t1111t l11rsi11ess, 1111d I
ea111e lll'n• lo the trial in thi:'I Court merely ns 11 ~p1·l'l11tor. l
wus nslw1I if J wonltl hl' 11 witnt•s.s nut! I l'OllSl'llfl•d 0111 tlrcrt•.
<l. But yon urc i11t<.'n•stc<l i11 the 1111kmlll• f
J\, or course I 11111 i11teresll·1l in tlio Ullll'o111c.
Witnl'ss stood nsitle.
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ROBEH'l' :-;'l'ONE,
a witness intrO\llll·(•d oil lwhalf of the dcfomlat~
being first duly sworu, tc~tifh'tl as follows:
_

~

DIRECT EXAmNATION.

w

By Mr. Elli.s:
Q. Wlmt I'! your nnmcT
A. Hohert Stone.
Q. You live iu the toll'll uf Ash laud!
A. Ye~. sir.
Q. Do yon opcrntc o fillin).!; ,1atiu11, lunch room, beer parlor I
. A. Yes, sir.
Q. Whl'ref
A .•J 11st ont~i<le of !ht• 1·r1rp11r:ih· limits of Ashland, al (I,,.
iutL•r:wl'!iun of Route :l:J and \11. I lliµ:liwny.
Q. '!'lint is 011 the 1·11rnt·r ut' \11. 1 11 iµ:liwnr anti I 1:11111,.,.,.
Court llousc Tiontl!
J\. 'l'liat i~ ri!.d1t, yes, sir.
Q. '\'!1111 is tl•l' 11n111<' uf yu111· pl;u•t• of husillc~st
A. College Rhoppt>.
Q. flow 1011µ: ha1'l' you l1t·1•11 111••:r:iti11µ: tlmt 11lncc !
J\. T liav(• ht•ell tht•n• 11 litlt.• 11wr three 1•t>11rs.
Q. \'011 n111 a tilliuµ: st11ti1111 in 1·111111t'l·lio;1 with itt-IJlll!;C

A.

Q.
A.

ll.

CD

:I::

(..)

>c
U,J

i\. \'cs, si I'.

<l·

,\, No, 1111t 011 Rnlldn~-. "~" h111•1• •111itc u few tou1·ists that
nn• sto1>,iin!{ throu~h. pcoplt• tl1nt nrl' frnveliug fhru11g-li.
Q. \\'li:it (l<'r <'1•11t of ~·our 811111111~· ln1si11L•ss wo11J,] yon say

~j J".

Q. I?c•tanr1111t !
J\. YI'~, si 1·.
!l8 ~
ll. J,\lllCfi l'OUlll !
Yes, sir.
Sc•ll soft tlri11ks!
\\•s, ~ir.
\Viue- ant! hcert
Do you sell tho.<t• 11rti"1•··' 1111 S11111la~· !

;\. Y(•s, sir.
Q. Doesn't the RlwritT pas" tlll'1·" "''"r~· time he roull's J'r11111
his htllllC to H11110\'l'r Court l l1111s1., r,~· that COl'ller! . • • • •
A. Jr hi' co111cs from Tln11on·r l'1111rl llousc lie collll'S right
close tu it, yes, ,ir.
Q. J\1al Stnte n111lor Vl'hi1·!" 1111li1·" 11fli,•t•r>i that pntrnl that
roa1l park ri.!{ht tht•re, out th,•n• iu frout of your pine<· 111'
lm~int·~s, 11011't they!
·
J\. Yes, sir.
Q. Snnclny.~ uml other <la)'"!
1\. YL·~. sir.
Q., And there nre n good 1111111lll·r of Stnte police otlj1·l'rs

,,

who patrol that W11shington No. 1 Highway fro1n Richmond
to Ashland, aren't there f
A. Ycs, sir, thero are quite 11 few there,
Q. Sometimes two or three of them are sitting out tl1ere at
once, ar.cn!t. t11eyT
pnge 99 ~
A. Yes, sir, sometimes.
Sometimes we have
more than tl111t.
Q. You serve both locnl and tourist tradef
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What per cent of your business is locnl lra1le, Mr. Sto1wT
A. I would sn:v 11pproximntely ninety per cent of my busi1ic.~s is loc1il trmle.
Q. Prncticully 111! of it f
A. Yes, sir.
0. Whnt is the lnr:rcst dny on which vou do businessT
.1\. Safnnluy i~ 1u~~ Jnr1-{esf day.
·
l~. ;\ JJ.J I ht• lll'X t 1111)' 1
J\. Sl1111lnv.
l!. ~111ula~-. Ant] is your locnl tnul(• nm] traveling tru1Je
Oil ,-;n11da~· i!l>out ill !ht• s:rnll' proportinlls ns nt. otl1er tinH!8 !
About
uim·tr (l('l' l'l'llt of tile 8nllday hnsi11('S~ is locn! trade
11lso
~

Lu

1\. ).' t'S,

·1_77·

'

\\"llS

lnt•td

1111 ....;.jlll"SS

t

:\. T wunld snv it woultl h1• nhout t•i1d1ty pt•1· 1·ellt, tlrag-J.!;1'll
dow11 a litllt• l1it. ill'<'Hllse we h11vp 1111itc 11 few soldiern that
11n• stoppi11!{ i11 tl1t•1·1', that we c1Jnltl11 'l sny wns loc:I) trnde.
I ha1·1· ol ill·1·s llll S111Hln1'.
Q. w.. 11, how mnn~· of ~·our c11sto111ern ill the
nag,• JOO~ 1•on1·s•• of n .~11111ln;v who <'nil for n drink to he
·
s1•1'Vl'tl n1·1· sold heer irnd wi1wf 1\'lint percentng-e
of lhl'111
f
1\. \\'<'II, n.~ to that, I wo11l1l hah• lo say, bt•c1111se I don't
r (':Ill1lri11l;s.
tdl ~·011 this: 'Pl1at I will Sl'lJ as 111:\11\'· ltt•er~ llS
1"'""'"
\\'ill :<oft
0. <Jn S11111l:i1•f
A. Yt•s. sir.
11

<~.

rue11I\\'<'II,
!

11ow, nre those lll'Crs 11suall.1• s<•rvt'<l sillglv or with

1\. \\',. s1•1J 11nite 11 fow with n llll'nl or witli s:111dwicht•s,
l>nl t11., cr!'nlt>st mnioritv of mi11t• Ill'!' ~old with a ha" of
potnto <'hip•, 01· ern,:kers; OJ' so111!'fhin~ like that.
~
Q. Likl' ~·011 lnkc a soft drink lil'Yl'l'll!.!'ef
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CXl'

A. Yeti, sir, the same vmy.
Q. And the trade <lenl!ln<ls tlmt !
A. Yes, sir.

.::r:

><

L.u

CROSS EX.Ull~A'l'!ON.
Hy .Ml'. Simpkins:

"'

Q. Mr. Stone, a grcnt 11u111lier uf .''olll' .. ustonwr:; arc ""l
lcg-e st11t!e11ts, nrcn 't tliey 1
A. Very g-ood colle!(l' stUUl'llt trail<·, yes, ~ir.
(.,!. Yon enter tu tile collcl-:<' ,-t111h•11ts, am! that is wliy .ruu
mil your plnrc the "t.'ollt·g-l' Sl1111•l"'" !

A.

A. No, air.
(/. Di,\ you know 1111ythi111,: ubout it f
A. No, sir.
<!. ]lo yon !mow whether tl111t wns done or not t

1·u11niu ..· n lnisint.·-~s io;o1newl1<.?J't.) l"'1~~f

,\.

\\"l•rn

nut !

i\. -Nu, sir.
\\'itue~s ~tou,J u~hho..

pa~,. 1u:1}

lll. <J. FIL\Ncrnco,
the 1ll'f<•11,Jant, l1ci11'1: rel':tllc1l tu lhl' sl:tutl, lL·~ti
lit·1l fnrther us follows:

.__

-

(:'hips or l'lw1• .... 1•

Were you

N~, ~11·.

ll. \'on

are over :!l.
lJ. Ir n ;..;ronp of llll'll, ('11!11°'-!;•' ~111d1·nts, l'Ollle in, "Wt' will
~n~· fiVl' or si~, om• or two of 1111·111 t11i.~lil he o\•t•r :!I 1111.I t lin"
or fonr under :!Ir
A. ~0111ctir11cs t11l•\' u1j~ltl In•, of 1·11ur:-:e.
Q. 'J'!mt. j..; the its1\nl t\1:-\lu1n, l lial l1uy:-\ l'Ulllc iu iu ~ru111h ~ a:.
That is tilt• usual wa~· ll"'Y """"" .' S1111ll' <'OHIL' to 1H1n·lia»· =x=
fo111\, so111ti kind uf a sa111\wi1·h ~
><
A. Yes, sir.
LU
(~. A1ul tl1osL' that ca1111ol 1rt11-.·!1:i"•' '"'"" 11,rnalh· p11rl'l1a:'l'
soft <lri11ks t _
·
A. Y<'"• sir.
<J. ,\liout what 111·n·l'l1tw:.. 111' ,-,,t11· 1,u,.i11css,· won\,] yu11 '"·'.
is 01T-pn·111ist•s l111silll•ss l
·
,\.'\'hat i~ Surnlay, ,\'111\ :tr" ~till l:tlki11.!! 11liu11t!
lJ. I alll talkit1!! aliout ),..,.,., 1111\\, a11d wine.
i\. A \'Cl')' stt1:tll l'l'l'l'l'tila:~···
Q. ,\ \'er~· :'t11all I'""' 1•11ta!!;<'! !\lust 111' \11111·
JIH)..:C HI:! f l111'in1•ss on Sunday ;, 1111 11n·111is,•s, wit It tl1t• · "•11potuto

n. c.

~\. No, 8ii·.
Q. You were not rnuuing it nt tlwt tirnet

Q. AIHrnl what t"'""'·11t;ig-1• of yuur' l111si11cs>< i~
pa;..;e 101 } with l'{)llcg-c hoys! Ha111l11lph-~luco11 Culll'!(l', lhal
is wlint I a111 speaking- ut',
A. Hi;..;l1t oll-lianll, l ('Ullhl11't ""Y·
lJ. ~lust of tl111sl! hoys al'l' 1111.t,•r :!I, 11rcn't tlicyl
"\. Wl• h:ive quite n few tlial an• ""l'I' :!l.
lJ. A!1d of course yon tluu'I -.·II lu those uutlcr :!I .a".'
1.ieerf ·
A. Not if I kuuw it. l nsk 1!,.•t11.tu pro\'l! tu 111e Iha!' 1!11'.'

in~ of sn1ulwit·l1t•..;. 11r

Q. You run 11 so<l~ fountain too there, do you 1
A. No, sir, I hnve no so<lu fountnin,
Q. You hnve no soda fountain 1
A. I have bottled drinks.
Q. All bottled 1 .And you lmve beeu 1·u1111ing it there how
-_long!
A. A little over three venrs.
l/. 'Vere you running the liuoiu<•ss there ut tlw tinw lite
Stnte A.
Bonni pnt in n I.Jeer bnn Oil Sunday for uinety
davsr

Ye~. ~ir.

crat·l:l•r8 nut! thi11!!;s of lli:tl kiutl .'
A. Yes, sir.
··
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t

'

cJ
I

Dllmc'!' l·:XAi\lINNl'IUN.

Jh tl1l' Conrt:

·l~. ~It·.

l•'rnncisro, I w11ul1l lila• lo 11sk yu11 lllll' •it1t•sti1111_

])., y1111 11p,•1·alc your store 1111,1 h11si11l'ss 011 Satunla_v !
A: \'cs, 1 tlo.

i\l r. 8ii11pki11s: lfo stntcd tl111t he opernf<'<i l'\'ery dav
lltl' \\'l'l'I;, I tliiuk. J triccl to CO\'Cr the qtlllstiu11, .J11dg1·.
Witness stout! nsi1le.

tit
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F. R. H:\ l\:ER,
a witne~s introtlu.,<'d ou behalf of the dcfemlunl, ~
being first duly sworn, tcsti!h·,l as follows:
;;

DIRECT

t~X,UIINATION.

t....l

~

Bv Mr. Haw:
-Q. Whnt nrc your initinls !
A. F. It
Q. I•'. IL, untl where du ~·uu fi\'l', Mr. Bukert
A- In Meehnnicsvilll!.
Q. Do yon lin\'C your ho1111• lh"rl'!
A. Yes, ~ir.
Q. \Vhnt lmsiill'l<S nn• yon 1•11!.:;l!_!l'<l in T
A. Filli11!.: st11tio11 outl 11111..!1 ruo111. 'l'wo scparntl! pla1·'''·
Q. Filliu~ station 11111\ h111,·li 1·1111111! Hnve you n wi1ll' :11111
bcc1· license ut ,•ilher 011c or ln1tli 11f tlll'sc J!lacl'sf
A. T have 11 wi11,• aml IK·1·1·, "" :11111 off, nt the lunch roo111.
Q. Yot1 llll\'l•ll'I hi ~"<1111' lilliu!.: stati11111
A. No, I hnven't at till' lilli11·~ statio11.
Q. \Vhat is your tr:uJ,. 1·11111J""''.J ol'; p11n•ly locnl, or parll>
touristt
A. w,.Jl, we \111\'c-I n•1·k1111 wlial you wonl1I cull "utlwr
conntY" tn11lc. I 1111\'l' 11 Jul of lr:11l1• fro111 till• l'\orllll'rll ~ ....i,
111111 :1° lot of tr:ule frou1 Hi1·l111111•11l, 11111\ tlic11 hm'l' ric:l1l 11111.-11
local tra1\l'.
pn!',C 105}
(~. A g:1H11l 111a11y l"'"l'I<' iu tlw cuum11111il." 1h-al
tllt'l'l' :1t .'·our J1la1·1· !
A. Yes, ~ir.
Q. Do ,·on opernfo 011 ~1111da~· !
I-A. Yes, sir.
_
Q. l>u yon ~ell beer ou ~11111!:1." !
J\. Y cs, si 1·.
c::i
Q. Wlint is tlw 1ll•111u11tl of 1111• lrnn·li11~ Jlnblic and 1111• i"''!::i:: U
pie J:?:l'Hernlly who t·o111e tu Y""." r1•:-:tn11rnnt u11 S11111la~· i11 I•><
g"nr1l lo heer! Do the~· e:q ...l'I 1! ur d1111 't they t•x111·1·I ii!
A. They exped hl't>I', 11111] 1\·111il1l Ii\• \'l'r~· 11111eh i\isapp11i11t.·h'4
if they 1·oullln't g-el it. A lut .,f l"'"Pk• rith, aron1ul "" :->1111tla l's. 'rhev work e\'<'I'\' 1l:"· i 11 I I1<• "'''''!: a nil tl ri 1°1• 11 ru1111.J
on.Sumlay 'awl Htop to ~l'I 11 l1nlll" of l1e1•1· a111l so111Pthi11·~ lo
(•nl, n s:1111lwi1·h. \\\• ~l'l'\'l' a 111! 111' l1111l'hes a111l sa111lwi .. l11·~.
Awl thev u·o uht!Utl. Ou ran· rn·,·asio11s l ever st~l' ntl\'h<Hh
nmler tl;e tnf1nenet• of 111"<1iiol llmt 1lri11ks on S11111la\', ·
·
Q. How close 1lo ~·on opL•rali- tu the Trinl .Jnslic:, I 'uurt
where it !!c11ernllv sit~t

A. Wei~ it is praeticnlly up over me.
Q. He is practically over your head, isn't heT
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are the County officers, police officers, 11nd Sheriff there

frequentlyT
A. Yes, sir, renl often.
Q. Are they !here 011 Sundnyf
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The Comrnonwenltb's .Attorney, I believe, lives very
close to you T
A. He comes to sec me too.
Q. Is he one of your customers T
A. Yes.
Q. Has any objection been mndc dow11 there lo your opern ting on Sundny f
A. 1 lmve ll!'\'cr lienrtl of oue.
page 106 ~

CROSS EXAMINATION.
ll,,. 111 r. !'-li1upkins;
Q. Mr. Bnlwr, yon run n !{ellL•ral lunch roo111, ~~l'nernl restnnnlllt r
A. Yes, sir.
(,I. A11\l 111ostl,• vonr lil•er 111111 wi11e i~ st'l'\'l'1l i11 Iii" rest11ul'l111t will1 t•itlit·r'11 's:1111lwi1•h or h111 .. 1i, or 11 liag of potato el1ips
or 1·l1<•1·s<• t'l'al'la•r, 111· s0111ething like llmt 1
i\. \\·s, q11it .. 11 bit of it.
(). A11t! ~·011 t!o a Jarge t•nrh H•rvice l111si11es~ loo, dun'! you 1
Ou ~1111da~·s a111l other tlay,,;f
A. y, ..,, sir.
(l. :-;,•rviH!.: s11111lwil'lll's 111 the e11rh with drinks, Goc11-Cul11
:rn1l pop uni! ,,o forthr
1'11.!.:L' llli f A. y l'S.
Q. Yun sell Vt•ry littJ,. beer, <1011 't yo11, !\fr.
ll11k1•r, for off-pn·rnis<•s co11su111ptio11, pnrticu!nrlv on Snnda "1
·
;\. J 1lo not in wi111l•r tiuw, lmt in the :-nm1111er ti111c I sell
11 lot of it off premises for lisl1i11g pnrtiL•s, pic11ics, 11111] things
lik1• that. Most of that i~ on S11111l11v.
(,). ~10,1 of thnt is on fl11n1lnvt
·
A. Y1·s.
.

(J. lllost of thnt is ho11ght enrl.v 81111d11y 1110rni11g to l11k,•
1lown lo !ht• rivL•rs 111111 plncei; like thnl'I
1\. 'J'l1:1 t is rig-ht.
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Q. Isn't most of your bui<iill'"~• 1·1•rtai11I>• over hnlf of yo111
business, Riehmond bu~incs~, p1q1plt• 1·01111nv: out frmn l:i1·l1·
mond thnt eonrn to get drink" 11r Coca-Coln and c:it :1 rt .. 1·
1la11ccs1 1111d thinirs of tl111t ki111l !
A. \Veil, I would11 't sny that. I \\'llUld HllY nrou111l -!ll 111·1·
ceut wn~ Rich111mul lmsiuess.
Q. Aud over hnlf of it is Hi1·h111111ul aml touri~t, isu 't it!

::c

>c

I.LI

t
f

A. Yes.

tl.

Very little of it is loc:d, 1·.,1111'arati1·cly!

A. It i>< more Rich111u1ul a1lll l11nri'I tlu111 it i" [01·nl, ~-,.,,
Cl. More Hid11nou1l anti touri"t. \'011 say then• hnn· 1,, ... 1

uo complniuts nhout your l111"i11•""" 011 Rn111lar. Yon 11wa1
there ha1·c ht•C'll 110 cm11plai11t" "'"'"' yum· li11si111•ss ns to '"iu1
hnsin1•ss Oil Sm11l:I\·, .!1111 'f \'Oii r
pngc 108 ~
A. Ye~, thal is 1i'!l1I.
·
Q. You du l;1111w tli:1t tlll'l'l' have !il'l'll a (111 .. r
1ll•k•:.cntio11s nuil p1•tili11ns allll "" 1'11rlh to tlm Bu;tl'll or S1q11'I"
visors hy parti1•11lar ).:'r1111ps 111' 1w11pl1• askiu): that the sat.· .. r
l:ccr h1• stupp1•1l 011 f;11111lay 1 d1111 'I you!
•\ Ye" sir
{;,;;;lo lmow that!
A. 'l'hnt il" µ;cucrall.'' l;uo\\'11,

l):

lligl1wny.
Allot' tl1osc 1·X<'l'pt tlw 1111c nt Ellerson are 111urc or l1·s.s
tourist pr11po~ili1111s 1 an•u't. tlu·~·t
,\, Yt•s, sir.
ll. ls th• om• at l~llc•rson yon1· sturef
.A.

Bv
Hnw:
. Q.Mr.
Arnl
yon 1lo !mow, ~Ir. l::1l;i_•1", ,;illl'l' he has h•1l ~·1111 1111
th11t suhjel'I, tlwt the Hoar1l 111' S1q"'n·isors, at•ti11).: i11 tl,..ir
onidal 1·:1parity 11\lll with authority to h:lll herr on f'1111d:1~· . ._
1
have rC'fu~1·1l to 110 ~o; is t lo:il 1· .. r1H·I !
co
A. Ye~, ~ir, just 11 frw)11011tli" :1'-(11.

~

: (..)

::c

~

FHA:\!\ l\J:.\Dl.l·W.
witJte's i11frlllli11•1•d 1111 l11•half of tJ1e 1Jt.t\•11il:111I,
heing tirl<t tlulx ~worn, lt->'t ifi,.d. :1' 1'11ilo\1's:
I\

nnrF.C'l' W\.\ \I I\: .\'l'lON.

Hv:Mr. Haw:
·Q: 111 r. Hrnill1•y, :in· ~·1111 l·'ra11l: llrmlley !
A. YeHJ ~i.r.

Q. Wh1'1'C' 1lo ynu !ivt•, )Ir. llradh·y !

.A .• .At Ellcrso11.

Q. WJint is your busin<.'ssf
A. It is hard to tl'll you.
Q. Fertilizer business T
A. l•'ertilizer lm~i11ess, gas 1111d oil, 11nd tourist Lusiness,
-service stntion.
Q. How m:rny scrviee st11tions, :\fr. Br!l(lley, do you own
yourselff
A. Own or opern te T
Q. I mcnn how numy <lo you own T
A. I owu nine.
Q. And how mnny do you op<.'rntef
A. "'ell, four.
Q. I~our. Antl lu1vc 1111 of tl1osc servic<! stations !lint you
01\·11 or operate, have thl')' nil h1•c1· li1·p11~cs 1 or ,inst part
of them 1
A. 'l'lie four that I op .. ratu l111vc IJ1•1•r liccnsl's,
pa~1· 110 l
Q. When• a re 1111',\'f
1\. f 1111• is u1.•11r A:<hlantl, with hotl'l t rntl1!; 01w
is Iksto\'1•r, 1111 tli1• \\'a~l1i11".do11 Hig-hwny, 1111tl 011e at J-:ller-

(r

J!E-DIREC'I' l•~:'\.\\11:\ATIO~.

pngc lO!l

Fra11k Bradley.

so11, nutl c111p 011 No.:!

0

\\'it11e~>1 stood :1~itl1•.

83

Yl'~,

sir, the uwiu ontee.

(}. 'Vith r1"l'<•n·n1•1• In y11111· Elll.'1".•011 store, for i11sl:111e,•, t:1h•
tJ111t for thl' pnl'JlllSl~
;\, 11 is opt•l':llt•<I 11 Jittl1• 1liff1'l'l'lltly.
ll. "'li:it l:i11d of l1~•t•r lin•llst•s h:we yon tl1cr1•!
,\, nu :111,1 off.
l/. 011 :11111 oil'. ls yonr tn1tl<' tht•rc any tomi>"t or pr:1<·ti1·:d]y :di !oral!
i\:.· Prncticnlh· :11l loc111.
l/.'Do yon 01;cr:1fe tht'l't• on Snmlny1
A. Yl'", ~ir.
l/. ,\11<! tl11• persons tl1;1t :.:o np there on S1111tl:1~', do tl1('~·
lllll>'lh· Jiu.\' for co11~11111plion off pn•1uisl's or 1111 flrt•111is1•s !
,\, \[11,ll.\•, 11i11;,ty-11i11t' JH'r 1•t•11t, 011 pre111ist•s.
(/. Ou 11n•111ise5 !
TI\' the Court:
·
.
Q. 'I'hnt is :it Ellcrso1i !
png-1• JJ J. f A. Ye~.

I.
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M. G. Francieco !·_Con:µnonwealth

,__

Frau/; Bradley.

C. rlV. Taylor.
u:::i

By Mr. Haw:
.
_
Q. Will you please sti1tc whnl i8 the nttitudc of tho puhli~
townr<ls the necessity of !{l•lli11)! hl•er on Sun<layt
>c::

Mr. Simpkins: Wuit n 111i11nlc.

85'

Not whnt uttitmk•

·fhe Court: That is correct.

w

e: Here followed argument.

th~

public !ms.
·
'rhc Court: Whnt is tlll' 1k•111:111.I for itt
Note: Jurv retires from courtroom.

Q. Puniou me. "'hnt is the nttitn<lc of your cu,;lo1111"r:<
whu collll• tl1crl! to yonr pln1·1• 1111 Hnmlay in re;..runl lo lll'<'I' !
A. 'Vt·ll, they <lcnm111l IK'cl'. If the,\' 11011'1 g-ct it thl'l'l' 1111·."
go so111cwhcrc clsl' u1al t:;l'I ii, ,,,.,.r tlm Henrico line. It' ll'l'
<lon 't keep open they .~u tu I l1·11ril'll :iml l!cl it.
Q. You hm•e beer liec11"''" yon :<ay, for you1· other pla''"·'
toof
A. Thnl is right.
Q. Wiant is Ilic ntlitn,h· 111' ti"' tuna·ist lrmlc tlant patrn11izo·>'
your tourist ho111e,; :11111 lilliaa'! "laliu11s in rl·~:anl to lh1• ,..;iii•
uf hcer 011 Snllll:I\' !
A. 'l'lac :1ttitnd1; i,; \'l'I'\' :<ln111~ t11w:anls it. 'rhe,· rai.-1• a
fuss because \\'1• 11011 'I la:a v1· liqaa;,,.,
·

Note:
--=

Bv thl! Court:

ReC'anse you nl'l~ uut :u1 .\. IL l '. ~toret
'J'lu•,\' :-;;i_\. 1lu·.,· 1n·,·pr :-:.aw sud1 a St:itt•.

t--

CROSS J·:X.\\11:\\'r!ON.

al

A. Yc.s, :.;ir.

By Mr. Simpki11s:
:c.
Q. Mr. Rr:ulli'.'" jn,;t n11c queslio11. ~Ir. ll:I><
pu!!;e 112 ~ nskl'il you :ahuul lla1· altit111h• of people llaal 1·a11£.J
to !lat' pll1!'1• 1'111' (11°1'1', flt' l'Olll'Sl' tlat•y \\':till lw1•l
if thev e11nw llaL•re foa· it!
A. Sure.
Witness stood nsitlc.
l\!r. Ilnw (To l\!r. ('. W. 'l':aylor): Will you pr0<l111·1· 1111•
Supervisors' records!
Mr. Si111pki11s: lf Yu11r ll111111r pl1•:a><L', T w1111t lo 1·1•11<'W
my ohjl'l'liou. I tlaiuk tla:al I ill' :-ill(ll'l'\ isors wcrn 1111t 1h~·id
i11)! ut nil whether ur uol (11 .. .-1· was :a llc(·cssily. 'l'la:al is 1111·
only 11uestion hcfore thi., jury, wlwth1•r it is 11 uecl's.-ity. II'
it is not 11 neecssit:v miller nil lhe 1•vi1lc11ce here, it is tlll'ir
tluty, if it gels lo thnt <111ty, to l'Ollvid.
0

11rt :---mm going to exclude the net ion of the Donni
of Supervisors on these petitions, nnd I wilt strike
puge 113 ~ ont from the reconl 1111y refercncl' to may petitions having been pre~L·ntod to the Board.
Mr. Ellis: 'l'o whieh nctio11 ot' the Court in refusing to
niluait lhL• cviilellL'l' of the nl'liou taken by the Board of Supervisors, 1·ounst•l for the defe11<l1111t excepts, fur the reaso11s
assi~1ll'tl, 11muely, tlaat it is ntlanissihlc us evitlc11< e .!\'oing to
sl1ow !ht• l'Ullllllllllil,\• opinio11 of lhc l'Ollllllllllity i11 which this
nl'! is 11llL•g1•1l to hn\'t• lnkt•n plat'<•.
l woulil like to gt•l Mr. 'l'n~•lor's tcsli111ony i11to the record,
Your llonor.
~Ir. Si1npki11-;: Now, liar~ Co111n101l\\'cnlth th•sires lo object
lo t lais on naaothl'r .~1·01rn1l, thnt Ila• reL"onl of the Bonni of
~ll(rervi~ors, I l111\'i11)~ "''<'IL it 1111\I the 11tlacr si<l<' havin!! sec11
it, do1•s not show 1111v 111·tio11 nt all liv Ila<' lloanl. It lllllrelv
slaows a 111otio11 :rn,J ilae t'nilnrc of n s ec11111l, wlaiela co11l1l sl1ow
110 action or t':iilnre lo nd on anything prop1•rly hl'fore ti,~
lloanl 111' Rn11l'rvi~o1"'·
'!'Ill' l'unrt
All a·iglat, put it in.
0

0

·Q.

---

-

w

0

0

:

Pa!\'l' 11-1

f

C. W. 'l'A YI.on,

a wit111•ss inlrotllll'e1] 1111 lwhnlf of !lac 1lcfo1al1111t,
11t•iu!\' fia·st 1l11h· sworn, lcstifictl fur the n•curd i11 lhl' ah.-wnel'
11!' Ilic .inn· ;as' follow.,·:
DIHECT EXAMINATION.

Bv :\fr. Elli~:

·o. ~Ir. 'l'aylor, you :are now 111111 wL•rc the Ck•a·k 111' tlac Bonr1l

of

~lllll'l'Visors of Il1111ovcr C'11u11t.v 011 .lnly hi, J~ql '!

.A. YPs, sir.

Q. ])j,]

~·ou

\'i~u1·s l11•l1l

011

nttcnd lhl' mr.ctin)!~ of the gourd of S11pcr,July ls!, 1941 !

........

M. G. Francisco v-Com.monwealth

Suprem11 Ccrnrt of Appeals of Virginia

'gis

.......

A.
Yes, sir.state whether or uot the question of the 11<lupQ. Please

·.:C
~

l.LJ'

time.·
A.
ditl. stnte whctlicr or 1101 tlwrc were tlclc~utious ht•Q. It
Plcu~c
fore the Board in bchnlf of 11m\ in opposition tu thnt 11rtli1111ncc f
A. 'rhcrc were.
Q. Please stntc what nctiou, if auy, wns tnken by thll Board
of Supervisors nfter the !tcari11!!' t111 thnt n111tle1· on that

A. A rr.~oluti1111 w:i' ulfon'il by Mr. Tlw111pst11t

<lcr the stutute which w11 J111vc discussed; but for
the purpose of the rerord, if the evidence is ullowe<l iu as to what 11ction the Bonrcl of Supe1·viRors took, in order thnt the mutter to b<.> tnken up muy be
11 true picture of tl~ntirc aetion by the Bonni of Supervisors, we think yo1l0ilg'ht to let ns huve the custuuwry crotis
exnminntion of Mr. 'l'uylor.
'!'he Court: I am going to permit you to <lo it for tlw
rcnson thnt, while the e\'iclence is in my opinion innilmissible,
I do not think that any pnrt of it ought to Le permitte1l tu
~o up unless the whole of it goes up, 11nd for that re11sou I
will let yon cro~s examine him nm\ dev.,lop the whole trnn.-;11ction.
,iage 116

CCI

tion of 11n or<linance prohibitiu~ thl! ~nlc of beer in Hnnov"r
Countv came before the Hoanl f<ir its consideration nt l11:1t

dnv.
·

C. :lV. Taylor.

..._

C. W. Taylor.
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~

Note: Ilere followed nrgnnwnt.

pa~c 115 } 11rohihiti11~ tilt' siilt· 111' lil't'l' um\ wine in Ilnnov<'I'
County 011 Sumln~·, wliil'h received 110 seco11tl a111i

CHOSS EXAMINATION.

wns
Q. lost.
I will ask you if yon will lilt• a <"crti!icd copy of ti"'
miuntes to which yon refer in liil' n"<'11nl.

lh• !llr. 8i11111ki11s:
-Q. ~Ir. 'l':;vlor, u~ Ck'rk of the Board of Supervisors 011

tl1<• on·nsi1111 nliuut whirh yon have .inst hec11 e~n111i111..l, 11t
wl1icli ti111e a motio11 was nuule reg·11nli111: tll!~ ln•t•r lmll, was it
~·our d111_,. lo l'l'l'l'ive petitions fro111 t•itize11s of tl1e Co1111ty
\\'ilh ref\q·e11e!! to thL' lol'<'I' h:iu, 1111d did ~'<lit oliserve the t!is•·11ssio11 lh11t took pllll'L' 111111 lhl' t!ell'~'.atiu11 wl1il'l1 appL'lll'l'tl
h,•fon• tl1< 1J1 for :111,l 11!!'11i11st 111<' ba1111i11g of l>t·••o· t111 :-11111.!11.1·1

A. Y!}s.

Mr. Sil\lpkins: I umlerst1111tl tliat tl1e Court h:is ruktl uul
nil thnt cvi<lencc.
The Co mt: Yes.

0

Note: }fore followed nn~11111t•11l.
The Court: Pro<lnee that n•1·11rtl n11,\ put it
not for the jury.
Note: Ifore follow1·d t't-<·,.,s 1'11r 11111,·!1.

.A. Yes.

in the n•c11nl.

1--,
ll:O
--I

l\!r. Ellis:· If Your JT011or l'l<·:i"" l oli.i<'cl to lli<' t'l'"'s :::C::,
cxmninnlion of the wil11<'~s :11111 i•xt·t•pt to the m·tion of tl11· ><
Conl't i11 pennitti11~ hi111 to ln· •.·r11"s t•x:1111inetl for th<' J't•:J'"li l.&.J
that I suhmit that wl1t•ll !ht• ('1111rl has olll'C rnletl th:1l 1111·
evitlence tlint the wil1a•ss "·11111.t tl'sti1\· l<l in l'l1ief i:< i11:1tlmissihle i11 the 1•asl', thl'n ii \\'11111<1 '"' ;,;qiroper lo pt'r111it tii111
to lie cross exnn1illl'<l :1ho11t a 1n:1t 1<'1· whi<'li the Court ltas
nln•n<lv ruled out of the 1·11~'"
!ITr. ·SiJ11pkin~: It' Your H111111r 11h•n-<<', ('OUllsl'I for th•• ( '<1111monwenlth 1]e;;ireR to sllott• tloal lll' thin);>! thut 1111 of (\It'
C\'i<lem•e of whnt hap]><'ll<'<l loc•ftol't• !lot• Bo11nl of Supervisors
is inelr.vant nn<l iiumnkri:d n11tl is 110\ 1woper evi,\ene<' 1111-

L.)

Q. Do you 1111\'e th1• petitions that •·11111e to I 11,.
p11ge 117} Boan! nskiu~ thnt hecr Oil finmlay he lm1111ell I
A. I hnve.
Q. Ahont how umny of thosL' lll'litions <lo ~·on havet
A. I lml'l' :di tl111t ll'L'l'c Iii<•<!. You w1111t to k11ow tl1e nu111l1cr·-.th11t we1·c file<! I
Q; Approxi11111kly, yl's, ~ir, tlw n11111IJl•r.
Bv the Court:
.Q. JI tlW 111:1 ny

Wl'l'C filL•llf

.\. 1 haVl' th<•m here. I think then• wure 11l1v11t

1.. 11.

Ni1ll'

01' t!'11.

Q. Nine or teu 1 A I'<' !hos" petition" 11!1 in t'nvor of t lio·
!urn, nr'.w<•re some of lhl'lll nskin!!; lh:1t the lin11 "Ii S1111tl.1~
1... ,.,. not be pin red t

A. 'l'iil'l'e werl'
not bn11ne<l.

1w

written pl•titioJJR rc<111csti11g- th:it it

J,.,

M. G. FranciscQ _y. ·aommonweulth
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

C. .JI'. 'J'aylor.
Q. All the petitions, then,

Sumler Priddy.

.......
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""'l"l' iu fu\'Ul' of the Sunday hL'L'r

co
::c
>c:

ban T

A. Yes, sir.

1~.

Note: Jury ~·ns to the courtroom.

llv
"Q.}.[!'.Simpkins:
Do yon kno\\' nhuut how
1)(!<lrlo appenre1l lu•lun·
the Bonrd on the t.lutl' thnl ll1i' :ll'lio11, which you hn\'l' tt·,.;lilit>tl to in rc~ponsc tu :\Ir. Jo:lli,'s 11m•stio11~, to<•k pliw1•!
A. I would
t\icl'c wcri· nl
fifty, mid thL'l'l' 111i;:hl,

~'Y
~peak

The Court: OC'ntlt>lllen of the jnry, when Mr. Tnylor wns
under cross examination Mr. Simpki11~, the Commonwealth's
.Attorney, n<>kecl 11i111 sonwt\Jing nhout certain petitions l111vi11;; heen tiled with the Bonl'<l of Supervisors. Y 011 will disrc~unl thnl evicl1•1ire, 1111<\ you will tlisre~nr<l nil the remnrks
made uhont the Boanl of Snperviso!'s. 'l'lieir uction or fuilnre
to net 1111" nothing- to do with this case, nnd you will not rcg;nn\ nuythinK thnt has heeu sai<l about the Bonn\ of S11pur-

h-11~1

huve hceu as m1111y ns /j )l•'"l'I•· pn·"1.'llt.
Q. Did people
on l111th' ,.;i1h•..: of the issllC', both for 1111·
h:111 111111 a~nin't 1111· !1:111 !

page 118 ~
A.
Q. Yl''·
l'o11l1l you fr11111 ~-.,ur oh~L·rvation for111 :1
conclusion ns lo how !111• 11pi11i1111 111" those prcsl•Ut
\\'a>'
it nhoul c\'l'lllv 1li\'i1kd, ur 11l l11•r\\·i>'<' !
A. Amo11;.: ii""'" pn·sl'lll, I w1111l1l
that it is )""'ii.I··
tl111t thl'n~ w1•re 111orl' opt""i11;.: t 111' ha11 thau w1•n' i11 r,".,,,.
of it, !111!, as yon kno\\', till' writl1·11 p1·titi1111s were fil1•11. Thal
wouhl 11\Tcl'l it, proh:1hly, :111yth"111•-!: of that !'01'1.
Q. Yc·s. ?-lost of t!i1• l"'"l'!t· tl1:il ><pola• in fn\'ur of tlu· !0;111.
I helic\'L', \\'L'l'L' 111i11istl'rs
1·l111n·h ron)!"l'l')!°:tl inll':
A. I think so, y1•s. 'l'lll'y 1·1•rt:1i11I_,. pr<'1lo111i11:1t1·11.
ll. A111\ 111ost of the 1u·opl" tli:d "l'"kt• :1~:1i11sl 1111' ha11 \\., ... ,.

sa~·

\\':I'~

\'i~o1·:-; in

\\'c l'Xe!')ll tu the ('ourl 's rnling- nntl instructio1is to tl1l! jnr.'' i11 tl111t re~anl, for the reasons nlrendy 11ssi!!111•d in unr ohjcdions ns licrctoforc l'l'{'oril<•<l.
'l'h" ('on rt: ll11 ~·011 w:111t to C'X<'l'pt to my strikin~ out your
l'ro!"-.; l'Xa111i11ntiou t
~l r. Si111pki11s:

pnJ.<L' l~IJ

Mr. Ilnw: An• yon 1•~:1111i11i11:~ till' wit11c,.;s, or-?
lie l'llll IL•:11l loi111 "" 1·ro~s l'x:1111i11ntion.
Ml'. Si111pki11s: 111• is 11111 "" olin·1·t 1•x:1111i11:1tio11.
'J'he Court: No, yon 11111 hi111 1111.

Bv·q.the
ConWC'l'l'
rt: the• l"'"l'I'· tli:1I \"Pll h:l\'e st11IP1l! Yon ha\'1•
"'ho
stnlCL\ uhont the p1•oplL• tl1:il spul:1• in fa\'OI' of th1• t.:111. \\'1111
WC'I'<' the Jll'OJlll' ,,·ho a\•l'"ar"d ,,,. •11111:1• n!!;ainsl th<• l11•1•r 1>:111
011S11111lny,11ot hy n:11111', lout. li.1 1·la"ilil·:1ti11n!
A. [ wonltl ~a\' th•• g;n•alo·r 1111111l11•r of tli1•111 Wl'l'l' l"·1•r 1k:d
l'l'S.' ;\. H. ( '. lin•11~1·1·"·
paµl' l lfl}
Q. Do y<•ll !;111111· l1u\\' n1:111~- 11a11ws WL'r~ ~i·-!lll"d
to t lio~l' pl'l it iu11:-: ~

A. No, ~ir.
Q. (';m ;.·on :1pproxh11n\<' 1111· 11n111l11•r !
A. Ahout one 11to11s11111l.

f

No, sir, I don't wnnt to except.
'J'ht• ( '1111rt: All ri~ht. I will let everybud~·
lOXL't•pf j[' fht•y \\'llllt lo.

N'ote: !II r. (', \\". 'l'n~·lor st om\ 11si1le.

t

'l~he l'ourl:

tl1e innftl'r.

~Ir. ll11w:

n·pl"l'""11ti11:~

}iCPllSCCS

:llfr. Haw: Out of tweuty-fivt> thousand.
The Court: All right. Now, I um going to strike it all
out. I nm not goin!! lo pennit any of it to come in, and I
will tell the jury to <li~regnnl your question.

LU

1111111~·
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Sll?llTER. PHIDDY.
\l'iln1•ss i11lro1)lll'l'd Oil lll•lmlf llf fh<• l\l'fen1}:11lt, lil'illg" first
tl11ly sworn, f!'~fifiL•<l as follow~:

-co
I'-

::c:
::><

'UJ

II

w

DIHF.CT F!XAUTNATim~.
Ill· Mr. Ellis:
·Q. Yon :in' !llr. Sn1111l•r Pritl1l_v, nn<l ~·on nrc 11ow 1111d wer<•
in tll!' 111111ith ol' St•plc•1111itH' last 8h1•riff of !1111111\'<'I' Cu1111tv!
A. Yt•:-:., si1·.
.
I!. Diil ,·011 hn\'e Ol'<'nsion lo 11<• i11 Mr. Frn1wio:eo 's stun> or
Jilli11g- station on R11111l11~·. 8cpfl'111lil'I' 7th, l!l41 t
:\. I 1!011 't l'l'lll<'lllhL'I' the t'.~11(·( 1lnll', hnt T wns there 011
qnif P n nmt1hC'r of' 811mln~·s.
</. Do yon l'l'l'all sl'l'ill)!" "Mr. Cnuthorm• or M1·. Williums
1•0111<• in nntl 1111r1·l1:1se 11 hotlle of hl'l'l' on 1111\' Sn11dny that
Yllll \\'l'l'l' !11C'rc T
.
.
. A. Yes, sir.

-

M. G. Francisco
Supreme Court of Appenls of Virginia

"9o·

Q. How long were yon then.• on thc Sunday that they mnil<·
theA.purchase
of beer1
I hnd been
there twice tlwt :ifh'rnoon. In fnct, I di<ln'I
stop, I slowed up and went h~·. 1n•11t llll the rond uml ca111<'
back nnd I stnvetl tl11•n• ahont nn hour.
pagu 121 } Q. In whnt in:u1111•r wns thc 11lnce of lm~im•ss
being condnckd with r"~l'L'd to orderliness 01·

cc

ul

.::x=

><;
UJ

Mr. Simpkins: Thnt is aJI, if Your Honor plense:
Note:

!JU6'1!

Sumlay~;

Bv
Mr. Simpkins:
· Q. How di1l yon hnppell tu lot• ,-i~iti11~ l\[r. F1·n11riS<'o 1111
two ocC'nsious on thnt Sumln~·?
A. l went hy, WL'llt in l.01tisa t '11u11t~", ju~! m·l'I" flit• !iJI<', I••
sec n party, nnd when I ea111<' 11:11·1; I stopped liy ?tlr. F'n111
lip~

A. I didn't st on on the wa~· up.
Q. Yon ~nid yoi1 visite1l hi111 1111 two 11t•c-11sio11s !
I-A. I snicl I ~1owe1l up wlll'11 I ""·Ill hn T 1li1l11 't slop.
_
Q. Yon didn't "'"P· hnt ~-nu ,1111'!"''1 wh<•n yon cnm<' 11:1..I; ! a:i
A. T stoppNl wh<•ll I 1•:i111<' l1:u·I;.
_
Q. Yon just stopped in t lu•n• as you woultl ;;lop i11 :111~· ::c
other placl'1
.
><
A. Y<'~. Sil'.
u.J
pn!!;e 122} Q. Di1l11't stop f111· a11y purpose olhl•r tli:111 111
huv th<• (~orn-C'ol:t !
A. "'ell, T ,;•ns rhlill!.! aro1111d; 1lri\"it1~ thro11v;h th1• C1111uty.
I stop nrn· ti111e nt 1111~· pl:H'L' tu ,.,.,. iJ' 1•\'l'l",vlhing is qui<'I, a11tl
no clrn111:s ri11in!!' 11rou1ul.
Q. •r11en you 1li<l slop m11h•r ~·1111r duth•s n~ Sheriff tu~····· if
A. \Vell, I do 111o~t ('\·1·r~·wl11·n· I !!" nlong, in litw or 1luly.
O. H1ul ~·ou hail :u1y n•pwsl 1,,. anyone to stop there!
A. No, sir.

At this point the Conrt took up considernHon of

~~

CROSS EXA)IJNA'l'JON.

cvt)1·ytltin.~ wn~ orderly!

</(
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Witness stood aside.

A. Yes, sir.

. Q. 'You ~tuppe<l on the w11_,.

· - · \,l ' .

liness on Sundnys T
A. No, sir.
Q. Had none at nil from anyoneT
A. No, sir•

box of i•·"

crenm.
Q. On other ocrnsions when you w<•re there on
hn<l yon sern him ninkc nnv ~al<'" 11f wine or hccrf

CISCO R.

:

Q. Or to observe that pince for 01·dediness or disorder

I--

behnviorf
A. It wnR quiet. I dicln 't S<''' a11ytl1ini: wronv;.
Q. Did he mnke 1111v s:1ll's of h<'t'I" or wine to olh!!rK whih·
11

', \

Sumter Phady.

Sumter Pritltl!/·

von
there!two Cocn-('olns
·
· A.were
I bon.l'.ht
frn111 him nml

,,,,..

·v,~orriinonwealth

l

~t

i

.

•

•

j

j
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Note: Here followed extended argument
~trnctions.
·

011

i11-

Mr. Ellis:~el for !ht•Cleft•11t!1111t exc<•pts to the lll'tiu11 of the Court in refnsiui.:- to g-ivl' lu~truclions Nus. :!, :~.
4, ;,, (i, 7 anti 8 olfored h~· hi111, for the reuson th11t 1111• questio11 or Wlll'till'r 01' not Ilic snll! of b,•t•r Oil Sundav 1J11<le1· till!
pa rt icnla r l'i rc·n111-<tn ll<'l'S me11 t ioned in this t'nsd is 11 qne.;t ion of fact fur tlw jnry, nllll thnt the giving of the i11strneti1111~ is antliori;wd 11111ler tltl' tleci~ious o( tlte ('ourt, th" 811pn•111e Court of A pp1•nls, in tl1c c•.nsc>s of Pirkt'.•I 1·. Co1111111wll't'<1illt mul /.11/;1-.,id,, /1111 v. r.0111111011wrnltl1, hoth rl'porll'cl in
J:!4 Virl!:inin.
N'ow,'Jwn• nrl' 11 111ul 11 (n) we nre :.roin1~ to n~k !'or.
\'1111 i·efn,c lh<·111, do you, ,JtHl~eT
'1'11,• C'onrt: Y<"s. xir.
~!1·. ll11w: ('0111isc>I for th1• def<•1ul1111t <'X<'<•pts lo tlu• .,, ..
tiu11 of tl11• Court i11 l'l'fusin•r Tnstrn<'lious 11 :111<] 11 (:t) :t'
off,•t'<'<l ou lrl'half of tl1e d1•f<'llll:111t for the n•n.,1111 tl111t it ;,,
Jll'llJll'I' that tl1t• jurv lie JH'nnitl<•d to p:tss 11pu11 tl1e qll<'S·
tiu11 ns lo ll'hl'lher or 1111! the s11l1• of hc>1•r 011 Su11t!11v !iv tl11•
1k•J'p11d1111t, 1111<1l'r the• 1·i1'1•1J111st11m•es 11111! c·o11ditio11s 1;s sl1ow"
I"· t 1,,. "'•i1h•11<'l', i11 the; C'ountv of Jl:111ovrr w11s lawful dtt<·
lo tl1t• f11<"1 that the J\C't of Asspmhlv of fo:1~ 1111t!1•r ,:·hil'I•
the 1\IC'oholic· l\rv1•J':J!(<' Contrnl Bonni w:is et'l•:ttl'd pc•rniitt .. d
tl1l' isstJJlllt•l' to rl'lnill'rs of the ~t:ilt• or Virc:-iui:t
pnge 124 ~of lirensl's for !hr sail• of lll'f!I' lllll] \\'i1w witl1011tf
nn~· n•.stri<·!iou wl~tlso1•vpr Its to tit<' s:ill' of 11, ..
wr~J)\iJll!P OU Sn.JJ.!.!ny.
Note :•1•11c jiiry 1't'tur1H'i1 to the Courtrno111.
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Tile Court: Gentlemen of the jury, tile accu9ed in thi~
case is presumed to be innoce11t nutil hi9 ~uilt is establishc1l
by one reasonable lloulJt, 111111 tl1l' Lnnlen of proof rests upon
the Commonwenlth to prov<• that thi~ gentlemnn sol<l l1l•cr
on Sumluy; Now, if you hl•lil•\'l' from the evidence IJC~·11111l
rensonn\Jle doubt thnt he did s<•ll IK'cr 011 Sunday, then I ~in·
you this instruction:
Note: At this point till' ( 11111rt rend to the jury Iu~tnH··

,__

-

co

::c::

L)

x

LLJ

tion No. 1.
Note: Following n diS<'nssiuu with couni;cl, the ('onrt a.tJresscd the jury us follows:

I The Comt: Thnt is whnt 111<• inslrnction tells you )!'l'ltth•inen, that the on!~· question i11n1h·,•.J is, do you bclie\'t• fr11111
/the evidence bevornl n l'""""11:1h!,. 1lo11\1t that ~Ir. l~r:11wi,.;,·11
!sold lll'cr on Sui1tla,·T Now, ir , ... 11 l"•\i,•\'C from th<' ""id .. 11<·1•
1cvo11d u n•usoH:tlil~' 1l1111l1t tli;1t.!11• sold l1<?l'I' 011 S1111<l:iv, 1lw11
, ,;u musl ti1<1l !1i111 •J;uilt\', :111<! Ii\'<' 1l11ilar' will hc :i suni"i .. 111
j;, • to he li:>ml.
.
.
~ • lJaW: ()f ('Ollr'l' it is lllllh•rstlllll] thnt the wJ"ifl<'ll ill·
No. 1. as W<•ll ns I ill' n·rlml instruction giw11 lo
e jury Ii~· tlu• ('1111rt ·an• oh.i<'< kil to hv 1·111111."j,
for
~t\•111l1111t :111-I 1·xu•ptr1l to. 'l'h1• :11·IV<'t•
of tl1e ('ciiii'M~~1·,,,.
the rea1<011>< ·h!'rcloforl' 'tal1·1l.
The Conl'I: Ye~.
Mr. llnw: ""t• nlso l'X<'<•11t, Y<onr Ilnnor, to tlll' n•111ark~
of the Co111mo11\\ \':Jlth'' ,\ff,.1·1w,· wlii<'h W<'n• not
.1111111•• a•
1
lll"!('lllllellt, hnt i11 i11strm·ti11~ tl11• I '1111d wha~ the ( nnrt sh .. 1dil
1!0 uml which Wl.'rl' prl'.i111li1·ial t11 lhl• 1lcfe1111:111t 's l'll"•'. i11 co
1
that it 11111011111l•1l to 1111 l'xlrn ill"lr111·li1111 !!i1•1•11 hv thl' ('111111111111·
:I::
w!'nlth's Attornev.
·
'l'\11, Con rt: \\'ell, wlll'll till' i11st rndi111i i" )!'i\'l'll loy t 111· ><
0ourt, it !'oi1l1l uot pn•.i11ili1·1· tl11• 1li•fl'111ln11t'~ Cllf-'l', ltl't•;i t1:-o" LlJ
the Court has instrndl•<l 1111• j11r.'".
0

0

NotC':
verdict.

At this poi11t t111· j111v n·lin• to co11~idcr of llll'ir

{

Note: ·'I"11c i-e11111rk>< of lh1• ('111111111111wc11lth's Attor11<',. 1·1'ferrC'cl to nhovC' hy l\lr. Hnw \\'l"l'l' ns follows:
Mr. Si111pki11s: Cun von h·ll ll1l'lll that the 111nxinm111 iilll'
for mistlC'mcanor is $'100.00 !

,__

I
I

~

·93··

The Court: Yes, thii'Inaxi~um fine for misdemeanoi: is
$500.00, but $5.00 will lie a sufficient fine to fix in tllis case':
l\Ir. Simpkins: Do you want to say anything
page 126 } to the jury r
·
Mr. Haw: '\Ve don't cure to argue it, gentlemen.
l\Ir. Simpkins: I would like to make a statement to the
jury.
-1\Ir. Haw: I don't think it is necessary to have any argument in the case.
Mr. Simpkin~: There is onl' thinb'"Mr. Huw: If you want to m11kc a statement, we will urgue
it.
.Mr. Simpkins: Well, I will use five minutcs'l'hc Court: I cannot prcv!'11t you gcntle111cn from arguing
the ense if you wnnt to,_\Jut I do nut ~C'c the nccessity of urgu111l'nt. I hnve iustrnctc1l the jury thnt, if they believe from
!Ill' l'Vidc11ce 1Je\'Oll1l a re11sorn1blc tlo11ht thut .\Ir. l•'rnncisco
sul1l IJcer on ~11;1tlay 1 that tl1l·y must li111l hi111 g-uilty.
~Ir. :Si111pki11s: 111 other words-Wait n mi1111te, nuwMr. llaw: You t•nu't tell me whc11 to sit dow11 aml stall!!
lip.
~Ir. Ri111pkins: All 1 wnnt, if Your Honor plcnse~I r. llnw: Arc ~·ou going" to mldrrss your l'l'J11arks to the
Court or the .iuryT
.\Ir. :Si111pki11s: I will ml1lrcss lhl'rn lo the Court, nntl if
!ht• Cv11rt dol•s as I nsk, I want lo 11u1kc a state111ent lo the
jury. If Your I!onor plt•nse, I 111erely w1111t to
pngl' l:!i } tli"·nss the i11str11l'tio11 1 so if you will stnte to
the jur~· thnt it lt·nVl's out of th'" cnse the qucstiou which !ht·~· hnvr hl•nnl us t11lld11g- nhuut lien• all day,
wlirthl'r it was a nceessity or not, nm! t!1al tlie Court has
rnlt•1l it is 1111! a n~t'l'ssily, 11ml if lhC'y hdie\'t' he sold it, tl1L'll
ht· is guilty.
Note:

Aftc1· stnying- out five 111i11utcs the jury knocb.

'l'he Clerk: llnVl' you ugreetl upon 11 venlict, )!'Clltlcmen T
'l'l1e l•'urc1111111: Yes, sir.
'J'l1c l 'lcrk: "'\Ve, the jury, find tht• at•t•use1l g·uilty us
t•h11rge1l in Ilic within imlict111l'llt nml fix his p1111isl1111cnt at 11
li11c of $:i.00. Ri)!'ncd, .Ja111l's .Jo11l's, Jr., l•'ort•111:111." ls tl111t
~·011~ Yl'rdic·t, g-l•11tll'men !
'I'll(~ Porcnu\11:

Yes, si1·.

'l'hc Court: Now, 11;cntlc11w11 1 yon urc discharged until
Wl•dnC's<la~·, Octoli!'r '.!9th.

--
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INSTRUCTJQN NO. 4.
Note: Jury leaves the <.'011rtroo111.

Mr. Ellis: If Your Honor pl<'ns<', on IJelmlf of the 1lcfendant we move to set nsill<' tlll' n•nlicl of the jury 11~ hei11;...
contrary to the law and the ,.,.;,J,·11C'1', und for 111is1lirl'l'liu11
of the jury hy Iht' ('umt.
pagt! 128 ~
The Court: All rit!l•I, ~ir, 11nd we wi11 t·trn!i11m·
tlmt 111otion 111111 I will l1<•:1r vou on it.
Mr. Ellis: Yon wnnt to ht•nr 11r~11111t•1;t on it1
'l'he Court: Yes, sir.

,__
co
::?::

c....;

><

Lu

Note\ 'l'hc followhi!.:' instrm·ti1111~ were otforl'1l: Nn. l 1111
hcl111lf of the Connno1111•c:1lth, :111.1 :\rn<. :!, ;;, 4, :-,, G, 7, I{, 11
nm\ 11-A on lll'hnlf of thL• :ll'l'llS<·•l. 111structio11 No. I wa•
~.rnntetl, nil the others rcfu~c·cl.

TJie Court iush-ucts the jury that if they find from the
evidence tb11t the keeping open by the <lefcndnnt of his pince
of business on Sum.Inv nud the ~nle t!tcreiu of the beer u~
nllcg-ed in the indictuient teml<'d to promote t!Je rensonablc
rccrention, nml necessnry convenience of tlw travclli11g public, nnd that thC?·-premises where ~aid bnsiucss wns transncted were kept in nu or<lerly nnd quiet mnnpnge 130 ~ ner nnd that the work therein done wns mornlly
fit nnd proper lo bc done 011 Su11tlny, then lhL•y
mny find thnt the work of eon1lucting such fillin.!{ stntiou for
the 11urposes ontlinecl, is ueccssnry within the 11ll'n1ti11~ or
the ~tntnte nml they shonltl !ind the 1lefcn1lnnt not guilty.
( Refusc1l.)

J~S'I'Hll("l'll 1;\ :\0. J.

INS'rRUCTION NO. 5.

'l'hl' ('ourt inslrncts the jnry tli:it if the~· Idil'l'C !'1·0111 111•·
evi<lt•llct' hc\·01111 a rt'nso11alilc• clc11il1t ll1:1t tl1e a1·cllst•1l ~I. 1:.
Frnnci~co .ii1l kl'l'fl ope11 :11111 111:1i11tai11 on Sn1uhy 111" Ith
of Scp!C'111lit•1· i11 JlnnoVL'I" I '11u11I ,. a l111oi1wss for \11<• sal" .. r
hc1•r 1111tl 1li11 011 Rai,] Snlllla~· s1·l·I l11·l'r, they slionld fin.I l1i111
~nilly :111tl !ix his pu11ish1111•11I al a lint' of uot h·~~ tli:111 Ji\'1·

'l'hc l'onl'l i11strucl1> the jurv that a work of Jll'l'<'Ssil\· as
llll':tllt ""the ~t:itnll' or Vir:.:iuia, is not n pl1ysil':tl l11H1 nl"""
Int" 11t•1"essit~-, liul n moral lit111•ss or proprietv of tl1<• \l'urk
or lnl101· or net donLl nmler !lit• circu111st:u1ees of enl'i1 pa1'tie11lnr l'HS<'.
( llt'1'11~ed.)

dollnrH.
IN~'J'JlUC'J'ION

(Given.)

NO. Ii.

IN8'1'Hlll''l'lll;\' ;\ll. :!.
The Court instnwts tl1t• j11r." tlwl tl1e 1n11·post• of th1• 1:111· tin prol1il1ili11i: \\'orJ; l'ro111 lll'itw ,111110 on Sn11da,·
page l::!fl ~ is to givt• lo tl1t• p11l1li .. :1 ""'t fro111 its !'Usto111al'\ CC
lnhnt• fo1· tlie l11•1wlil uf 11111 lt the lllornl 11111! pli."si- en! nnture of 111:111ki111l, 1111tl 11111 fur 1111• pnrpose of t•11ful'l'i11;.!' ::C:
the h<•lit•t's or lt•11ds of :111•: ro·li·"·iu11~ l'l'<'t'<I ol' 1lc110111'111ali1111. ><
(Refused.)
u..i

1N'S1'RFl"l'lt 1~: ;\O.

;1,

Th<' ("uurt iusfnwls till' j11r.<· tlmt tl1t• hnnlcn of prrn•I' i ·
on th<' C01111111111wcr.lth tu l'sl:il1li.•h l11•\'0t1tl 11 rcnso1111hh· tln11l1I
thnt the 1lt'fe111l:111t i11 llll' 0111·r:t1iu11 ·,.r his 1111si1wss sol1l ""
81111!111'' llt'er r.>< :illt•g"i\ tu Ii:\\'" J.,.1•11 sol1l in the i11tlil'11111·11t.
nml tlint thC' lahor n.rnl lrnsi11t':'~ in "' 1lni11g ll"l'l'l' not a worl:
of ll<'l'l'Rsitv or «hnrit~·. :11111 11111,.,~ th<> C111mnom1·<'111tlt ha'
llll'f t Iii,, ]111 nll'll, t Jip~· <11011 Id lim 1 1ltl' tlefcntln 11t 11nt ~n i It y.
(Refused.)

w

'!'I"'. Court instrnl'ls th1• .inr~· that tl1t• q11,•slio11 uf wl1ell1t•r
the net of kt·1•pi111~ lh<• <lefc111l:111t 's plllt'<' of 1111.,im'.'·' 01w11
m11l sl'llin!.:' hc1•r 011 8111111nv wns a work of lll'l't•ssity wi11ti11
tl1e lll_L'llllillg of till' Stntnlt', is II qtll'stion of fal'I. for I lie
jnr~-, :11ul in 1lL•l'itli11g 11111! <Jlll'slion lht• ,illl'y 111ay t•t111sith·1·
_ll11• 111a1111er i11 whi .. li the Jll'l'lllist•s lll1tl 1ht• l111si11Pss l'lllllll'l'lt•tl
ll1t•1· .. with wen• nlll, tl1t• 1•ff1•<·I wliielt 111!' opl'11i11g of ll1t• pla1·"
:1111! !l1t• s:tll' of liPCr tlicrcfn>111 l111s 011 Jl11• :..:""d ord1•r :111.t
moral Wt'lfnn• of flit' e01111111111ily, and wl1t·ll1er or
pagti i:n ~ 110!. it ll'rnls to the onh•rly a11tl 11111rnl n•t'1'l·:1\io11
of the p11hli1·.
( Rt•f\1sml.)

lNSTHUCTION NO. 7.
Tlw <'omt iu~trm•ts lltt• jnry thnt if tht•1• ti111l frn111 till'
1•1·i1!1•nrl' that the ope11i11~ of the 1ll'ft•1ul1111t 's pl:u·1! of li11sillt'ss awl the s:ilt• lht•ref1·0111 ol' hccr 011 S1111t!11_1', is 11 prrlilie
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necessity within the meanin~ of thl' Stntute, then the de·
fondnut shoul<l be found not ~uilly.
( I il' fusi:d.)

INSTRUCTIO=' :'\11. 8.

,__
cc

=z::

'l'hc Cout"t instl"ucts the jur~· that lhl rc is 110 fixed 01· uuvnryiug definition uf thl! word "lll"l"l'""ily", but on tl1e ulill'r
hunt!, it i~ 1111 l•lnstic nllll relnth·l' wunl llllll uue thnt must
l:e construl'tl in the lit.:ht of the 1·11111lili11n" umfor which \\'l'
live ut thc prl'scut, nu~! nut in ll1L' li.t.:hl of the pnst, fur 11111n~·
thi1ws that were l'Oll>'idcrctl lnxuri,•s lhl•u, ur eveu hntl 1111
exi,.tcnce at 1111, ure uow con>'hll'l"l"li ll<"l"l'ssilics.
(HefnSl'<l.)
0

,J

>c:
LU

0

0

0

0

Countv to pass nu <1rtlin:tnl'l' prulail1iti11.~ tlie :-::nk! of Ju.•t•J' :11ul
wi11C' in Ilnnovel' Cou11tv ou S1111d:"·· ln1t l'l1~:u·llle:-;s ol' il:--

fiower to <lo so till' Ho;1nl or S1qoc:r1·isors r~·fns<•<l lo !'"""
sneh onli11:11irt• 11111\ 111111 lh<•r1• ;, i11 1•\ish-11t'<' in !l:11111\·1·r
l.'011nt~· 110 1Jl'lli11a11c·t• <•t' >'llicl 1:11:1r;1 \\·hi1·h prohibit,- 111<· ,al"
-_of llC'Pr uul1 wi11e on RtuHlav~.
(Hcfusc11.)
.
pnµ-e 1:m

~

INSTIHJCTIO:-\

~11.

0

0

0

0

11-A.

'\'he Court iustrncts tl1c jun· that n111h•r the lnwR or Vi1-,l!inin ~iu,\!" the yea1· l!l38 tho floar,\ ul' Supervisors of Ilnn:

I, Leon M. Bazile, Judge of the Circuit Court of
Hnnover County, Virg-inin, do certify that the
forl'going, which is l'mbrnced within the covers of this volume,
l'11titled, "Virgi11i11 1 in the Circuit Court of Hnnovcr County,
(\111n11011Wl'Hlth ul' Virginia v. M. G. Prn11cisco, October 17,
]~).})" i11cl11di11~ p11!!es !'ri)m 1 to JOS (huth inclnsi\•e) n!l(l
wl1il"l1 j, !'mthl•r i<l.•11titie,l by tlw siµ-11nture u!' th" ,J11dµ:o 111'
ll1is court 011 the !'r1111t t·uvcr lhcrl'11l" 1 is n t1·ne 1111<1 eorred
''•'llo.!!Tnphie eupy 1111<1 n•port of 1111 th1! lcsti111011~· 1111d e1·id,•n•·•· 1111 \,.•hair of the ('0111111011wL'11lth, 11ntl ubo 011 lll"l1alf .,f
111" tlt·fo111l:111t as tl1t•n•i11 1le11ot1~tl, lh11t wns inlruduccd, nnd
111,. otl1l'I' i111'ilh•11ts of till' trinl, i11l'111tlin!{ all or the i11strnctio11s requ1.• .... h•tl, :.:-ivt•u, Hlhl l"l fnsL'd and uhjcctio11s anll ex·
•·••plio11s lhl•n•lo, as lht•r•·iu i11tlirntl'll, ns well a' all questions
1·ai~l'1I, nili11t.:s tl11•n•u11 111111 l'Xl'l'plions thl'retu in the trial of
ti,.. 11l1111'l -stl'h\ <'ll~t', 1111<1 that the Atlornev for lhe Com111011\\'t•alth l;as 111111 rea.<1111nhl1• llolil"e or tl1e li111l' and plncl'
wl11•n ll1i~ l'<'pod 111111 l·el'lifieatc wo11l1l '"' tenth·1·e1l :i11d preM·1il••<l to 111,• l"o1· 111~· "i.-::11at111·••, 1111 ot' whie\1 is t•1•l'lilie1l wil11r11
si.\l.1° 1hys 11!"1<-r li11al jn<l~lll<'nt.
l:i1·,·11 1111'11·1· 111.'· l11111cl 011 tl1is !ith <lu~· of 11!11~-, 191:!.
1

0

0

over County has bud the authority to adopt an ordinanc11
(effective outside of the Town of Ashlnn<l) spl!eifically mnkin" it unlawful to sell beer nn<l wine in the Cou11ty, ulthoug·h
th~ stntute conforring that power upon the Board of Supervisors forther prnvi<lcs thut nothing therein contained, nor
n11y or<linnnce ndopted by the Bourd of Supervisors in pUl·sunnce thereof, shall be constrtH!l\ ns in nny wny changing
or reper.ling the lnw-gt>nernlly known as the "Sunday" law,
under which this ZJl'OSectiut1 is hnd.
(Refused.)
page 134 ~

INSTR!JC'l'lll:\ :\II. I 1.
Thc ('omt iustnwl- II"' jun· that b1• au ;wl
·pn~~;c 1:~2 } of the Ut·11t.·1·al A~st·111l1I.'· ul' V.ir;.:-iuia 1;as:·wd nl
the )!1:1-i Sl•s,.ion lh<·1·.. \\·ns <"l"l'llll'<I lllL' Alt·oholi:·
Bevern~l' Control lloanl with l'""·"r lu issllL' to rdaill'rs in
the Stnte uf Virt.:i11i:1 li<"l'll"l'" fu1· 11•1• sal•• of hl l'I" niul wi111·
11ml pnrsi1mt tl1cr•·l11 sai,\ !:oar.I l.:1"' p1·11< <'1°1h•<I In iss111• 111
the ret11ile1·s in Virginia, i11<·li11li11!:- 1111• <ll l\•11<l:111t, >'lll'h lil'l'llJ<l'S without llll\" n·sl1·idi1111 tl11·n·i11 "" lu sal<•s 011 S1111tl:I\·;
fnrlher th:it ti~· n fmtl1< 1· ad ~·t' 11 ... <.'1·11:·r:d ,\.s-<t 111hly pass;·.!
· i11 l!J::8 thc B1111nl of Sup<•1·1·1~.,,., .. r 1111· , .. 1·1°ral ( '01111li1·" in
Vi1·i.:i11i11 \\"('!'(' l'llllJll\\'l'rl'.l lo l"I"' ur.li11all< <s lo prohiliil lhl'
1<nk· of wi11e nntl h<•t•r 011 Su111la~. wl1i1·li 11l"t pro1•i•h•1\ th:il
nothi11t.: then•_in sh1111hl J.e t·ousl nw.J :1" alh•rinµ;, 111nl'mli11µ; 111·
rl'1Jl'llii11!.!: ~e1·tio11 4:i7ll of 111<' ( 'udl" (•·1111111101111" k1111w11 ns 1111·
8u11cln:v hlne law).
·
Fnrthl'r the l'onrt h•lls lh<.• jnr.v that it llJlJll'lll"s fr11111 lh.l'Vitll'11cc that sin<"l' !ht• passa;.t1• of lliP ;\\'t of rn:lS 11pplil':I·
lion l111s hee11 111111ll' lu thl' H11:1rtl ut' S11111·1'1"isor~ of llan11l'l r
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0
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plication to the Supreme Court of "\ Jlpl'nls of Virginia for a ,__
writ of error.

co

Yours very trnly,
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TUE

~'ACTS

This case presents to the Supreme Court of Appeals
for decision whether or not che business of selling beer
in the: Commonwealth is a "trade or calling" whose

(2]

(3)

,__

prosecution on Sunday is prohibited by section 4570 a:>
of the Code of 1936. lt cumes before this court on an appeal from a judgment of the: Circuit Court of Han- ~
over County. M. G. Francisco was convicted by a LU
jury on October 17, 1941, ;ind judgment was rendered
un March 16, 1942. A line uf $5 was assessed.
The: facts are correctly stated, and the law clearly
and forcefully expressc:d in the: opinion of the learned
trial judge included in the record, which is adopted in
toto as a part of this brief by rderence, and is not
reprinted here.

them, prohibiting the sale of soft drinks on Sunday, is
being violated. They introduced evidence in the instant case that ~t l::ast 80 per cent of the holders of
licenses for the sale of wine and beer in Hanover County
were selling either wine or beer or both on Sunday.
This kind of argument and procedure might be very
well fur jury consumption, if permitted, but, of course,
will have nu influence here.
In Callan V. Stalt, 156 Md. 459, 144 A. 350, 353
( 1929) the defendant was being prosecuted for opening
:rn opera house on Sunday. The particular portion of
the opinion with which we: are concerned is as follows:

o

TllR QUF.STIUN TO Jill DECIDED

.The final decision in this l·ase will dctermilll' 1hc
policy with respect 111 the sak uf beer on Sunday
throughout the Comm11nwcalth until a different poliq'
may be declared by the l;cnrral Assembly. The: courts
construe and interpret the: law. Capital Th<atc'i· Co.\'.
Co111111011w<alth, 178 Ky. 7~0. 78'). Section 4570 11f thi:
Code prohibits the lah.. rin~ :1r any trade or i.:allin~
on Sumby, cxi.:c:p! works ,,r ncressity or charity, :111d
certain spe..:ilic exq:pri1111s whid1 du nut include: th.: sak
of beer. Chapter 12'J 11! :\i.:ts of Assembly of l'H2 by
spe..:ial proviso in the 1ht 1loes nut alter the provisi11n
of section +570.
A Ill; 1; Mt:N'l'

Counsel for ddendanl (I'. •J) take the: pus1t11111 1ha1
the decision in E//i1 \'. <:u1•i11!Jl<111, 122 Va. 821, and
H11119er v. Comrno1m·.-,,/1/i, Ill? Va. 872, an: not h1 hc
considered as law be..:ausc thc principle cstablistml in

.o:J

::c

:;><
UJ

c:i

"Thc:re arc: sc:vc:ntec:n exceptions to the rulings
uf the: cuurr upon the evidence:, and as to these
:ippc:llants contend:
"First, that the court erred in nut allowing
them to show that the construction placed upon
the law by those charged with its enforcement
was such as to permit without mulc:statiun in
Baltimore: city 011 Sunday morning pi<.:turc: shows
in chur..:hes, operas in the Lyri..: Theater, and
basket ball games in public pla..:c:s, for which
either ;1dmission was directly charged or at which
a collection was t:iken up. \Ve find nu error in
these: rulings. The guilt ur innocence: of the
cravc:rsers here: i.:ould not be made: ro depend upon
the qursrion of whether urher parties had been
guilty of similar acts without prnse<.:utiun or i:unviction, any more than the fact that persons rn·
g'1gc:d in similar occup:uions had been rnnvicted
would be: proper evidrn<.:e for the jury to consider

[5)

L4 J
in order to convict the traversers here. Ncitl11:r
can a criminal St'1tute be repealed by the failure
of authorities Ill prosecute and convict for its 1-violation. N ini:ry-nine grand juries might n:::l
fuse to indict fur the: violation of a statute and the
hundredth might t;1kc: the opposite: view and in- ::i::.
dict. It would dcarly be nut admissible: in thr ><
u.J
trial of the c:1sc 111 allow evidence: of the failure
of the ninety-nine juric:s t•> indict."

hc:ld that this is such a case. Considering the character
of the product sold, the fact that the purchase could
have been rrr:Ide un any day during the week, that beer
is definitely a luxury and not a necessity under any circumstances, that the demand for sale of beer on Sunday
comes from holders of licenses for the sale uf beer and
wine, and that tourists, rather than residents in the community, demand and are being given the: service, and
that beer is simply desirable, he has wisely held that
there is no necessity as a mural fitness or propriety of
the work and labor dune undt:r the: circumstances of thr
casc:.

Cl

Cf. Taylor v. Co1111111,,",.,.,i/1h. 90 Va. IO<J.
The: court's pruvinrl· is 111 intc:rprc:t the law, and 111
sec to it that it is cnf11rn:d. \Vholesalc violation 11i a
statute duc:s nut rc:ndcr it \'oid or nc:gativc its force . .-\n,1
C:vidcnce of othc:r violatie1ns by the ;a:cused is impr11p,·.and should not be admi11ed against him, nor should cvi·
dencc of violations by 11ther persons be admi11cd in hi~
behalf.
··The mere i:1ct th;ll a license has been gr;1111<:.t
tu do certain ac1s ur carry un a certain husines~
docs nut c:xempt 1111l· holding such license lr11111
the necessity 11! <"•1111plyin~ with Sunday laws.
where the :1c1s or business in quc:stiun arc of sud1
nature as tu fall within thc: prohibitions of sud>
laws; and thi.-; is true ev.:n where the lict'.11Sl" is
unc: grantc:d by tlu: United States." 60 C. J. 10711.
section :\9-j :111d c1S<"> citc:d.
This court has <lc:darcd that thc:re are 1.:ases in whid>
what is a "necessity" is a question fur the court tu det·i1k
as a matter of law (Pirh·y Hrothers v. Co111111u11wc•11/1/1,
134 Va. 713, 722). The k1rncd trial judge has rightly

_ , I , I

t

"~ "' • The word (necessity) is elastic and
relative, and must be construed with reference
tu the conditions under which we live, a11J yd

Ilic elasticity 111usl 110/ be extn1d(J so ft1r as lo
co~>U that «Jhich is 110/ 11ud/11l but simply J;Jir11blc, aud t/ier(by dt/tt1/ lhe 1111111ifest purpose uf
the statute" /CJ ut t1p11r1 S1111J11y '" a day of rest
from ordinary l:ibur." (Italics suppli.:d.) l'iri«'y
llruthers, supra.
"\Vhether work dune on the Sabbath is a work
uf nc:cessity ur charity may bc: a question of law
to be dc:cided by the trial wurt, in c1sc:s 'll'ha,·
the facts ar< estt1blished or 11yr;eJ 11po11. Capital
"J'lieater C:o. Y. Co11111101nue1tf1h, llJ<J S. \V. 1076,
178 Ky. 780." (Italics supplied) (,QC . .J. Ill%,
note.

tc:C
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\Ve have not had our attention called 10 a casc: in
which the sale of beer on Sunday has been held tu be: a
work u{ nc:cessity.

(7]

(b]
In

Stal~

v. Jll erlz, I H S. E. 242, 91 W. Va. 622, 2<J

A. L. R. 391, it is said:

"lt cannot be said, as matter of law, tha(:°
selling soft drinks and conducting a soft drinkco
stand is either a w11rk uf necessity or charity." :::c

c:::>

The annotation (29 A. L. R. p. +o7) deals with~
ordinances .dealing with Sunday dosing of places sdl·
ing intoxicating liquors. The: dc:cisiuns cited have: uni·
formly uphdd the urdi11;111<:t: in every case whert: the
ordinance was made: in u1nf1Jrmity with the law autlwriz.ing its adoption.
The only persons whu ap1ll::1r in behalf of the dc:kn· • • • I A I I I
dant, and, of course, in f:ivllr of Sunday sale of bc:er, an:
th;;;e who hold lice1rn:s 111 sdl bc:er. His wimesscs.
Keeton, 1'Vlrs. \Vinn, Stllnt", Baker and Bradley ;1rt" all
licensc:c:s, and !lradky has fuur placc:s where winc :rnJ
beer arc: suld, :ind all thc:s• sdl bc:er on Sunday. :\r,:
these: proper pc:rsuns tu rcllcct :1 community "opinion
of mural litness and propriety" of the: work or lahor
dune:? They bdung tn thc ani<:ulate class. The rc.d
community upiniun is made hy those substantial citizen,
who rely upon and rc:spc:ct the· courts and support them.
c:O
The costumers of these witnc:ssc:s would like: fur them
c:>
tu sell whiskey :i!so. And the witnc:ssc:s doubtless would
::r::
he glad tu have the: privilege of doing so.
><
LU
This court has dedarc:d that thc:rc are cases when· the
quc:stiun is unc: uf l:iw fo.r the court (Pirk~y flro//i,•n
wu, p. 725). Thc: lc:anwf trial judge has rightly held
that this is such a case. t'unsidc:ring the character uf
· the product sold, th:11 the purchase could have: been
made: during the week, that beer is definitely a luxury

,_

and oat a necessity under any circumstances, that the
demand is being made by beer licensees, and that "tourists" demand anJ ::re bc:in~ given the service, he has
wisely held that there is no necessity as a moral fitness
or propriety of the work and labor done under the
circumstances of this case. Some courts hold that where
the nature of the act or work is patent and obvious as
constituting a work of necessity, or the contrary, the
question becomes one of law for the court. An example
is found in the case where one was convicted of working in a barber shop grnerally on Sunday. S111/( v.
Selia/I, 128 Mo. App. 622, 107 S. W. 10.
\Vhere it was shown th:ll serious loss would be en·
uilcd from closing a plant in which "carbon black"
was manufactured from n:11ural gas, th( co111"t decidd
that then: was a nc:cc:ssity and that operation on Sunday
would not be a violation uf thc: Sunday law. It was
shown clearly by the: evidence that it tuuk two or three
days aftc:r the Sunday shutdown for the machinery to
run normally ;1ml tu produce a product that was of good
e11<1ugh quality to b-: uscd gcncrally "111 the pruccsscs
for which it was intended. N111ur11/ Gil! l'1·0,J11ct5 Co.
,._ "J'lt11r1111111, '.?OS Ky. 100, 265 S. \V. 475.
In the recent case of Co11111w11wc1ilth \-'. f',furi11r1y.
(Mass.) 40N. E. (2d) 307,308 (1942),ddendantwas
convicted fur kcc:ping a "shop" open un Cnlumbus Day
and selling intoxicating liquor.
Gcnc:ral L:iws (Ter. Ed.) Chapter 1:16, Section 5,
which is referred to as the Lord's day statute:, provides
that "\Vhuever on this Lord's day keeps open his shop.
warc:huuse or workhouse, or doc.-s any manner of labor,

[ 8 .I
business or work, except works of necessity and charity,
shall be punished by a fine • • • ." This statute was
amended to apply tu Columbus day. Defendant w:is
convicted and the judgnmll was affirmed.
In the case of People v. Waldman, 261 App. Div.
1001, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 707, defendant was convi1:tc:J
of selling beer on Sund:iy. The court said:
"• • • so far as the conceded act of the: ddcn·
dant in selling beer on Sunday is concerned, the:
same constiturc:d a viul::ition of the Penal Law,
secrion 2147, which statute was not amended or
repe:iled by 1hc: prllvisiuns of the Alcoholic lkvcragc Control Law so far as it (sec. 2147) rnn·
templates and, in ctlcc1, pruhibits the ddrndant's
act. ,. • •"

,_
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C<INCl.USION

The record is dc:vuid ul ic:vc:rsiblc: error and the: judgment should be aflirmt:d.
Respectfully submitted,
AllR.\M.
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17th.
------· -·-----·-·-··------- ---December
·--·--

-----

l'1/1l.

Garland Grubbs, an infbnt, etc.
Upon an apreal ~rem the judcment of the Trial Ju~tice Court.

Vs •. '·'
Leroy King.

·' '

This duy cotoe tin! IJbl"ties in, per"on, urul Ly their Attorneys, 11nd the JeJ'en..iant

having plead not r111lty, puts hlm5elf on the Country nnd the plaintiff doth tloe like,
tiifreupon came a ·1ury, to-wit: VI~ ::;. l!urris, Juke Hale, A. ll. Tute, IHlLur Lee 1:>tanl11y,
and Hartwell AdolDS, who heint: '"orn the truth upon the premi<es to spealc, bov1ng fully
,heart! the eviilencP., belnc instructed by the Court and h•vln& heurd orr.ucr.ent of counsel
retired to their room <>nd orter rnC>etiwe returned into court anti ret;.irned the follo11ing
~icneJ,

verdict, to-111 t: "Ile the jury find for the defe11rl"nt."

;;. :,. Horris, Foreinan.

· /,nd the jury l1elne. Jl5clwrced it is the judcmeut of the Court thut tile ploin't!ff toke noth1nr Hild that the t.!efenrl&n·t recover oi the plaintiff its costs by him in

~~ 'fV\. A~ '~litv ~

:this c1111se tn his beh6lf ex,.emled.

ExHI B IT

, \JV\ " l{'-

. ·E

.VJl•G!!IIA: In th~ Clrcul t Court for the Ccunty of iionover, iield &t the Court House thereof
on the JOth day of !1ece:ul:.er, In the year of our Lord lltnetcen llundred and Forty-one.
Pri••nt: Hon. Leon U. fazile, Judfe.

Jn re the vacancy ~n the
Qff1ce of Supervltor from
P.PoVer Dam District.
It appearinr, to the c.)urt th•t T. tJ. T;.ouov5on, the ':'frul;er Of the f.ourd of
SuperviH•rs of llnnover Cnw1ty frr.m Pezver Dom DHtrlct, h•• departet.! this life, thereby
creoting

8

v 0 c 0 nc:1 tn 5ald office, JT IS O!iDEr.ED, that J. Z. Johnson, a qu&lifled voter

resident or reaver

D&in

Pi strict, iia11over County, l:.e and loe is hereby appr11ted Supervisor

frflm •aid District to fill thP une~pired ter01 of such oJ'f~ce.
I

.......•

EXHIBIT

E

In re the appolnt,,,ent of

Jl.art~.a Conv;ay as a Cono:clssloner in Ch•ncery

for this Ccurt.
The Ccurt ce<t!Jl!lg it nec<•"c.ry J'or the

cm'oVEni~11t

dtsp;;tch of tlte tusiness

of t111s Ccurt, IT !S CP.l'r=:.ED tna t !l~rtha Con\·,;:iy, a r:.e~ber of the tJor of tl11s Court, be

ind ~he 1s !'-1ere-t.y 21:pc1nted a Ccrc::l1~!"1oner 111 Ch3ncery of tii1s Court.

~~.~~,~~
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Exhibit "F"-1
Type~itten Facsimile of Handwritten File Copy of Leon M. Bazile Letter

From the Virginia Historical Society prepared by Wm. R. VandcrKJoot, June 15, 2005
Elmont, Va
NovL?] 20, 1941
Dear Mr. Attorney General

I write to urge you to start proceedings for the indictment and trial of John L. Lewis
on a charge of treason.
The United States are at war with Germany. Bas v Tingy, [4 US] 4 Dall. 3 7, 40, I L.
ed. 731, 733-4 ((1800)].
"Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them or
in ad-herin2: 1o their enemies. !!iving them aid and comfort." Constitution III, 3, I.

Mt. Lewis is adhering to the cause of the Nazis, giving them aid and comfort. What
he is doing

h~ but

one dominant purpose in view, namely the injury

of our war efforts and

the promotion of the cause of our enemy. This is treason. Young v The United States, 97

US. 39, 61-66, 24 Led. 992, 998-99 [(1877)).
I was a member of the A.E.F in 1918-1919. I was in France in the autumn of 1938,
and I saw French labor then doing to the Franch [sic] what Mr. Lewis is now trying to do to
·.'•

the United States.. We know how disastrous was what labor did to France. Surely the
responsible authorities of the United States arc not going to wait until we are brought to the
brink of ruin before attempting to do something about it.

I urge you to act.
With the assurance of my esteem[,] I am
Respectfully,

[In the left margin in a "North-South" direction is written:] "Tills Jetter was went to the
Attorney General of the United States by U.S. Mail, but he did not have the courtesy to
ackno\vledge it. Leon M. Bazile."

Exhibit "F-1"

Cover Sheet for

Exhibit "G"
Letter from House of Delegates Member Albert 0. Boschen on December 28, 1941
To the Honorable Leon M. Bazile
[Last sentence in third paragraph from end ofletter concerning "Geo Haw
and Andrew EIIis" is significant for this thesis.]
(Courtesy of the Virginia Historical Society, Richmond)
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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

'~.

''

... -·. ~

COMMITTU '4a•t0HMPl'T9

HOUSE Of".OELEGATES
.... n.u"'• -o .,,.,....,..

"'°•ou.•o 11"""'9

RICH MONO

.ALBC:RT O. BOfiCH£N
~ICH,,,.Df'K1dTT

AICHMOND 0 YA..

Bon. L'!on M. Ea zi le,
Ell',cnt, Vi rginia 1

....

Uy Dear Leon:

. . _
I em new adc!reEEing ycu u 11. friend,ir.nd not all Judge.Pleaea panlOJl
the ff.lr.ilir.rity,for I have bicwn ycu that length t'bat I £holl hh t'he Hb~rtr
to eddreEB you ae i ·have in tbie letter.

. '. ;: . . ,.,.=.~. .

!· ;; .... ..,,

~-

•..-.

4•

I th~k ycu for frcm.tl;ie bdtcn,i of c:y her.rt fc,r your kind lltter,.in which
yo~ ~fpe,d rie a MV..ry F.i;;w::C'!lrl.'!ha'e e.nd J:ew Year".
..

,: _ ·\ ;~;~ ~-' ~!.' ••· . ._ ':~ ~ ~· -."( ~ . . r i .i:: •:, - ·~·~I;.~
~ ·.:" i •",
I e;<l.end to ytu ni.h all rrf. beari tne very whr.eii for a P.'appy New .Tear,r.no:!
the. l:rrl o!bee.lth;(;h~lf l' ray,Wulth ).Vi-d a lcn'g 'and titc11~tful car11~r a.a
Judge.:
t~1.[~~:"CO:i·::f~; '/:' t::~·rt.·~·..( ..."1 .. t. . .
..
, ..
l talked with the Governor t'he dhr cay. relaHv·e ·to. reducing 11pe11d ·on
the eutci:.cl::ile• r..r.d. told him of tbe e!rcrt en 'r:y 'ri_rt'.i.ci'i:.ct a jcint ruoluticm
th~cugb to ·l:eu ~p~ Ccngree; a of tne United :0-tatcS ill) pnu •..n act
~ rt
-!.be itluiu!acture of a~tcr;cl::ilee trat cculd run r.cn thnn:45 mile'e llZl hcu'r0

to·

op

I ;,ii.ii lr.ut,hed e.t,r.nd the rtEoluticn tltepe tilently in the tcmb •"iere
miUiy a geed iter.Eure EleEpe ell, he e.ute ot' telfi tb-.ece on the i::ii-t o·r thie or tbat
intererle
Ncw,we Eee a~

to ~tcp c1.re free runnir,g J?Jore thnn 35 !din cm hour.

Th11 c11uee or the reeECn ie a prcper er.el ihculd tr..ink th ..t the livee of our
good i;ecple 'JU a prefer_ ne.ECn to ctcp can !rem racing to eternity,but J. have
at lllet reached ihe point tr.at the puMic dces r.ct -.·ant a"Don Qf:i,.cte",nor do
tbey need either"AtleE;to carry the ~crld en hie thoulder or "P.'ercul11•"•
'.

l'i'hile ilelldng

.

io fbe Gcverncr,your r.e.ir.e cl!::;e up end I told 'b.i111_ that he did

cne Hg ect irhen be encinted ycu ae Judc<lle tcld me th.et be tlad eplendid
reports of ycur i;ood 'Jork.l did r.ot Jcr.cw that Geo .?.io.w end Andn'1Ellia
cppct11d you but I underttend it now.
I e..t!l glr.d you are gcing to t1.ke t!rc.e cut EJld n.tch i::e,for l

know the.t I

.

n:uet ha-Jll dcne ECMthing in the f&Et to e>eke frcl!l you that kind c':&J)rettiOne.
l.'ay God EleH you ll!ld keep ycu,co 'trat tne .Fecple of thi• Staie can ha.ve
the 't:er.e!it o! ycur 11lility.Witb 'teet fllrEcnel r11i;r.rcie,l r.m,
. ...,
~incerely Your Frleo~... / ' .·· ·

'SJ

EXHIBIT
6
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.
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Cover Sheet for

Exhibit "H"
Letter from Thesis Writer William R. VandcrKloot on April 16, 2002
To Mr. Sumpter Priddy
Concerning his father, 1941 Hanover County Sheriff Sumpter Priddy
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\VILLIAl\1

R. VANDE!iKLOOT

11801 GOODWICK SQUARE RJCHMOND,

VmGrNlA 23233-3424

( 804-754-2i75); e-mail: 1m1d<'lkl117/'anl.mm

April 16, 2002

EXHIBIT
H
Montpelier, Virginia
I

Re:

Jnfonnation about Francisco v. Commo1111·co/1h, 180 Va. 371{December7, 1942)

Dear Mr. Priddy:
You were kind enough to advise me of some particulars about this case, 1ried in Hanover County,
Virginia beginning October I 7, 1941, when you were a young man and your father, also named
Sumpter Priddy, was the county sheriff.
You advised that your father had told you, in so many words, that this case was brought ih no small
mea~ure bec:iu~e::. County Commissioner, .Joseph Johnson, from the Beaverdam area oft he County,
had a daughter who operated a store similar to the one alltgcdly operated illegally by Mr. Francisco
on a Sunday. The inference was, as your fother undcrs10od it and suggested to you, in so many
words, was that Johnson hoped thereby that his cfoughtcr could gain a commercial advantage over
Francisco, due to the latter's having been prosecuted in this case for operating his business on Sunday
in violation of the Sunday Closing Law in force in Virginia at that time.
You, of course, had no direct involvement in 1he case, and no access to records or major personalities involved in that long-ago criminal c2se, where the defendant was fined five dollars upon conviction, a conviction later oven urned by 1he Vi1ginia Supreme Court. You have become, many years
thereafter, a legislative representative for the Virginia Retail Merchants Association, and were associcated with its counsel, Lewis F. Powell, Esq., later an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, in promotion and drafting ofl~1er v~r~ions of the Virginia Sunday Closing Laws.
It would be useful for my disscr1ation which l am writing for a Master's Degree thesis in history at
the University of Richmond, if you could confirm the above, with the qualifications above given
showing your lack. of direct involvement.

Confirmed:

Sincerely,

~,~:l.:./J:·,-,;-.,,

WILLIAM R VA."-.'DERKLOOT

(copy of letter retained)

EXHIBIT
H

Cover Sheet for

Exhibit "I"
May 1942 Hanover County Criminal Docket

Showing Commonwealth v. Francisco "pending on motion."
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EXHIBIT
I

JI:\NOVER COUNTY CRI1.!IMJU,
DOCKET

May, 1942

CASES

PENDING FROM LAST TERM:

Commomvoalth v. Glenn - f'ivo lndlctmonta - not

- continuod r,oncrnlly

Commonwealth v. Lim10od Taylor
Cor.u;iomveal th

1

/fv~ f~ ·
ln~uatody ~ f ..-o-.

Comraonwonlth v. Wnltor McKinnon - not in cu:itody

v. Willirur. Johna on - not in cuotody

- not

Conmonv1oal th v. Norr.um Gracy
Co1nmonwenl th v. Vr.rnon Hall

-

in custody

fino to

~)0

paid l.Jny lfith

// ;.o~f~ j......._

Commonweal th v. llonry Cronohaw - not ln custody
Commonwealth v. M.

s.

Eortz - oxocution lo31wll vs. !")ui;1mlmrt, bor\\l::irann

Commonwealth v. Frnnci:ico -

po1~cllne

on notlon

Commomvoalth v. Francisco
Co:nmonweal th v. Nolaon Goodman, Simon Luck nntl IIG rir.<Jn Co0tlr.mn
,/

Comr.1onweal th v. Haymond Taylor ancl
Commonwealth v. Arthur Pago

~lllliam

Thornton

~

~~

~f~

CommonwE:nl th v. Arthur Page V
Com1101meal th v. V/illiam Thorr. ton

v'

J

Commonwealth v. Arthur Puc:c an<l Rn:nnonu Taylor
Comrr.or.wcal th v. 'iiilllar::i Thornton and Jolm f.!ason
CASES APPEALED FROM THE TRIAL .f.JSTICE cc;UET:
Cor.imomrnal th v. J. H. Canady -

17°1~ ~ - Af ~ d 7 -

Co::m:onwcnl th v. George H. Tdrry
Comr::on':1eo.l th v. \"1illia::1 Johnoon \
Commonwealth v, Hobert E. Martin\
Commom1 eal th v. Chnrlie Jackson
Com-:ion-;:eal th

v. lI a rr:r

JI o·;rn rd

/Vl~ ~j

J~~-J~3

EXHIBIT
I

I

Cover Sheet for

Exhibit "J"
Commonwealth Attorney's Motion Nolle Prosequi !dismissal)
of Commonwealth v. Francisco
in Hanover County [Virginia), Circuit Court
on September 20, 1943
Hanover County Common Law Order Book No. 19, Page 379
Hanover County, Virginia (1943)
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379
September 20th. 1~1~•

It appearing ·to-the·

Cburt

t-h~t it iould hllve further u•e for the' Grnnd Jurr th•T

1;djourned over,_ until a ln~er date,•.

irh~

I

Tri-Councy BE.nit, Inc.

!vs

· ORDER

P. O. Gravatt and
Gnynelle Gravatt

I. .
I

Thh day cm T_he Morris Plnn

~~.2.,of\~S~.!iff~~~-~~~1

Collcote4

.li_t;ione.l Dank, of R1c.h-

mond, &.nd SouthErn Danlt end Trust Compll.ll)' of Ricluno~u ..... a for BDr-er t~ the g•rni1hee.

!~sued

Wltt•~red

~~~~ 111

flan Denk

::!,~f

"t;ains.t them «vertlly
aa follo""' That. there i• on depoai
T
Central
in The llorris Plan lllillk o! R!cbmond to .the credit of the defw<li..nta the sum of 167.t.7, 1n r.et1
67.6'
!louthern
the Central National Blink to the credit of P. O. GrLVlltt t::48.l7 Lnd 1n the Couthem Dank Bk & Tr
675.92
'
. and Trust C_ompBD)' to tbe cndit of the de!cndr.nta f~n;.'92, •h1ch Hid rnma 6re zubJeot
,wa~~
Cont
4.~
respectively to the lien of the &foresll1d &&rnishee ~ummon1 i..nd the lion of the Judtment Retn1~to
llz nnw ·.',·'·
'
1187;0
isUllllllona herein

I

·

·

Wherefore it is considered by the Court that the plaintiff do rjcover of the
.
several defendnnta the moneys
h•ld !Ub,lect to Hid. G_r.rn1•hee, nnmel7, or th• 6outhcrn

'

so

.llfillk o.nd Trust

Plan Bank ir

CompD~:f f575.92, ot. theCent;al 1111tiono.1 bi.i,,k 1::48~17 md of The llorrb

~;~i,;o~d·.t:6'7. ;7j.~f.ich. fn~~ ~e~:e·~a~ ~~~;;;;G ~h~

ordered to pay to ·c.

It

w.

.

Taylor~ Clerk, of thia Court to
,.;,o,•·.

is further ordered thnt so

fOOQ

shall pay theref~om. •11 costs accrued uid
Attorney tor
I

the

aa said
p&)'

!UIDB ~re

:e1d ieveral detondanh r.re

credited on eatd Judgment •
paid to

c. w.

To7lor, Clerk,

over the }~L.nce thereof to George E. Haw,

pls1nt1!!.

ENDORSEllEN1'1

EXHIBIT

I ask fbil! •
. _...-'·-·r--- ....,
Geo.

be

J

E. Bnw, Atty. for Plaintiff.

Indictment for B M1tdcmeanor.

110. l.

Upon ootion of the Attorn•)' for the Cc=or.-.elllth • Nolle Protcqui is entered 1n

this case.

•:!>

•C0""1'001'€Bl th

lv~. o.

.

l

.

his

Jndictmcnt for B Uifdcme•r.or.
Francisco.
Upon motion of the .i.ttcr:oey for
c£~e.

tte Cc=or..,.<•lth n Nolle Pro«qu1 is entered 1n

